Today's Daf Yomi
June 1, 2017 | ז׳ בסיון תשע״ז
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
Bava Batra 130
The mishna brings two opinions relating to one who wants to bequeath to one’s children in a way different than the Torah law – is it allowed and if so, in what cases is it allowed? It seems there are two opinions, however the gemara raises a problem with stating there are two opinions based on the simple reading of the mishna. Two solutions are suggested. The halacha is concluded like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka who allows one to favor one son over the others or one daughter over the others (in a case where there are no sons). There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi’s psak – whether he said “The halacha is like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka” or whether he ruled in a case like Rabbi Yochanan. This leads to a discussion regarding what the best way to learn a halacha is – by what someone says or by case law? What are the pros and cons of each approach? There are those who say neither is good enough – one must say “This is the halacha and you can act upon it.”
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וקדושין:
and betrothal, as if a man betroths a woman and retracts the betrothal within the time required for speaking, his retraction is not effective.
מתני׳ האומר איש פלוני יירשני במקום שיש בת בתי תירשני במקום שיש בן לא אמר כלום שהתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין ועל מי שאין ראוי לו ליורשו אין דבריו קיימין:
MISHNA: In a case of one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah concerning the order of inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands, but if it was about one for whom it was not fit to inherit from him, his statement does not stand.
גמ׳ טעמא דאחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן הא בן בין הבנים ובת בין הבנות דבריו קיימין אימא סיפא רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין היינו תנא קמא
GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna that the reason the first tanna rules that his bequeathal is invalid is that he bequeathed his estate to another in a case where he had a daughter, or to his daughter where he had a son, but if he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, his statement stands. The Gemara questions this inference: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that if he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands. This is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. What information does this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka add? With regard to what case do they disagree?
וכי תימא רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אפילו אחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן קאמר והתניא רבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר לא נחלקו אבא וחכמים על אחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן שלא אמר כלום
The Gemara continues: And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka is saying that one’s statement stands even in a case where he bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, as although he bequeathed it to one who is not currently his heir, the beneficiary would be fit to inherit from him if the current heirs die, and this would be contrary to the opinion of the first tanna, this is difficult. And isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:18) that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: My father and the Rabbis did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son; in a case such as this, my father concedes that he has said nothing.
על מה נחלקו על בן בין הבנים ובת בין הבנות שאבא אומר יירש וחכמים אומרים לא יירש
Rabbi Yishmael continues: With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, as my father says that the son or daughter inherits the entire estate, and the Rabbis say that he does not inherit it.
איבעית אימא מדקאמר לא נחלקו מכלל דתנא קמא סבר נחלקו
The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that from the fact that Rabbi Yishmael is saying that they did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, by inference, the first tanna of that baraita, to whom he was responding, holds that they did disagree in this case.
איבעית אימא כוליה דרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה היא וחסורי מחסרא והכי קתני האומר איש פלוני יירשני במקום שיש בת בתי תירשני במקום שיש בן לא אמר כלום הא בת בין הבנות ובן בין הבנים אם אמר יירש כל נכסיו דבריו קיימין שרבי יוחנן אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין
And if you wish, say instead that the entire mishna is stating the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and the mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, but if he bequeathed his property to one son among his other sons, or one daughter among his other daughters, then if he said that the son or daughter will inherit all his property, his statement stands, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit him, that he should inherit all of his property, his statement stands.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה וכן אמר רבא הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה
§ As for the halakhic ruling, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And Rava says as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.
אמר רבא מאי טעמיה דרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אמר קרא והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה
Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? The verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit” (Deuteronomy 21:16), which is interpreted to mean that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whomever he wishes among his sons.
אמר ליה אביי הא מלא יוכל לבכר נפקא
Abaye said to him: Isn’t this halakha derived from the continuation of the verse: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn, before the son of the hated, who is the firstborn”? From the prohibition against depriving the firstborn of his double portion it can be inferred that one can change the apportionment of the inheritance of his other sons.
ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אבא חנן אמר משום רבי אליעזר
The Gemara answers: That clause in the verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:
מה תלמוד לומר לא יוכל לבכר
Why must the verse state: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” (Deuteronomy 21:16)?
לפי שנאמר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה פשוט שיפה כחו שנוטל בראוי כבמוחזק התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה בכור שהורע כחו שאינו נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק לא כל שכן תלמוד לומר לא יוכל לבכר
Abba Ḥanan explains: It is necessary because it is stated previously in the verse: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” as one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to an ordinary son, one who is not a firstborn, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed at the time he died, nevertheless, the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes, depriving his other sons of their portions, then with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed at the time of his death, is it not clear all the more so that his father can deprive him of the double portion he receives as a firstborn? Therefore, the verse states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.”
ויאמר לא יוכל לבכר מה תלמוד לומר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו
Abba Ḥanan continues: And let the verse state only the prohibition of: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.” Why must the verse state: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?
שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה בכור שהורע כחו שאינו נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק אמרה תורה לא יוכל לבכר פשוט שיפה כחו שנוטל בראוי כבמוחזק לא כל שכן
It is necessary because one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed, nevertheless the Torah states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn,” i.e., the firstborn may not be deprived of his double portion, then with regard to an ordinary son, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed, is it not clear all the more so that his father cannot deprive him of his portion of the inheritance?
תלמוד לומר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה
Therefore, the verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” indicating that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes. Consequently, the prohibition “he may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” is not available to prove that one may bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes.
אמר רבי זריקא אמר רבי אמי אמר רבי חנינא אמר רבי הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אמר ליה רבי אבא הורה איתמר
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the halakhic ruling: Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Zerika: It was stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in an actual case in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.
במאי קמיפלגי מר סבר הלכה עדיפא ומר סבר מעשה רב
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Since both Rabbi Zerika and Rabbi Abba agree that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, why did Rabbi Abba state that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled as much in an actual case? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Zerika, holds that a ruling in principle is a preferable source for a halakha, rather than a ruling from an incident; and one Sage, Rabbi Abba, holds that a specific incident ruled upon by a Sage is a preferable source.
תנו רבנן אין למדין הלכה לא מפי תלמוד ולא מפי מעשה עד שיאמרו לו הלכה למעשה שאל ואמרו לו הלכה למעשה ילך ויעשה מעשה ובלבד שלא ידמה
The Gemara examines which source is preferable. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may derive the halakha neither from a statement nor from an incident where one saw a ruling issued in a certain manner, unless the Sages explicitly tell him that it is the practical halakha. If he asked the Sages and they told him the practical halakha, he may go and act upon the ruling in those circumstances, provided that he does not compare between cases and apply the ruling to other circumstances.
מאי ובלבד שלא ידמה והא כל התורה כולה דמויי מדמינן לה
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: Provided that he does not compare? But don’t we compare cases throughout the entire Torah? The main method of halakhic derivation is through comparing cases where the halakha was already established to cases where the halakha is unclear.
אמר רב אשי הכי קאמר ובלבד שלא ידמה בטרפות
Rav Ashi said that this is what the baraita is saying: Provided that he does not compare between various cases of animals with wounds that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], which are forbidden for consumption. In general, one may compare cases, but with regard to the definition of a tereifa, one may not compare.
דתניא אין אומרים בטרפות זו דומה לזו ואל תתמה שהרי חותכה מכאן ומתה חותכה מכאן וחיתה
This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to tereifot, one does not say: This wound is similar to that wound. Every type of wound has its own halakhot. And do not wonder about this principle, as there are organs with regard to which one cuts it from here, i.e., one side, and the animal dies within twelve months, but one cuts it from there, i.e., another side, and it lives.
אמר ליה רבי אסי לרבי יוחנן כי אמר לן מר הלכה הכי נעביד מעשה אמר לא תעבידו עד דאמינא הלכה למעשה
Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: When the Master, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, says to us: This is the halakha, should we act upon the ruling? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Do not act upon the ruling unless I say that it is a practical halakha.
אמר להו רבא לרב פפא ולרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע כי אתי פסקא דדינא דידי לקמייכו וחזיתו ביה פירכא לא תקרעוהו עד דאתיתו לקמאי אי אית לי טעמא אמינא לכו ואי לא הדרנא בי לאחר מיתה לא מיקרע תקרעוהו ומגמר נמי לא תגמרו מיניה לא מיקרע תקרעיניה דאי הואי התם דלמא הוה אמינא לכו טעמא
Rava said to Rav Pappa and to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When a legal ruling of mine comes before you and you perceive a refutation of it, do not tear it up until you come before me to discuss it. If I have a valid explanation, I will tell you, and if not, I will retract my ruling. If a ruling of mine comes before you after my death, when you can no longer discuss it with me, do not tear it up, but do not learn from it either, i.e., do not rule in accordance with it. Do not tear it up, as had I been there, perhaps I would have told you a valid explanation that you would have accepted;
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Bava Batra 130
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
וקדושין:
and betrothal, as if a man betroths a woman and retracts the betrothal within the time required for speaking, his retraction is not effective.
מתני׳ האומר איש פלוני יירשני במקום שיש בת בתי תירשני במקום שיש בן לא אמר כלום שהתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין ועל מי שאין ראוי לו ליורשו אין דבריו קיימין:
MISHNA: In a case of one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah concerning the order of inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands, but if it was about one for whom it was not fit to inherit from him, his statement does not stand.
גמ׳ טעמא דאחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן הא בן בין הבנים ובת בין הבנות דבריו קיימין אימא סיפא רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין היינו תנא קמא
GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna that the reason the first tanna rules that his bequeathal is invalid is that he bequeathed his estate to another in a case where he had a daughter, or to his daughter where he had a son, but if he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, his statement stands. The Gemara questions this inference: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that if he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands. This is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. What information does this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka add? With regard to what case do they disagree?
וכי תימא רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אפילו אחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן קאמר והתניא רבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר לא נחלקו אבא וחכמים על אחר במקום בת ובת במקום בן שלא אמר כלום
The Gemara continues: And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka is saying that one’s statement stands even in a case where he bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, as although he bequeathed it to one who is not currently his heir, the beneficiary would be fit to inherit from him if the current heirs die, and this would be contrary to the opinion of the first tanna, this is difficult. And isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:18) that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: My father and the Rabbis did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son; in a case such as this, my father concedes that he has said nothing.
על מה נחלקו על בן בין הבנים ובת בין הבנות שאבא אומר יירש וחכמים אומרים לא יירש
Rabbi Yishmael continues: With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, as my father says that the son or daughter inherits the entire estate, and the Rabbis say that he does not inherit it.
איבעית אימא מדקאמר לא נחלקו מכלל דתנא קמא סבר נחלקו
The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that from the fact that Rabbi Yishmael is saying that they did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, by inference, the first tanna of that baraita, to whom he was responding, holds that they did disagree in this case.
איבעית אימא כוליה דרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה היא וחסורי מחסרא והכי קתני האומר איש פלוני יירשני במקום שיש בת בתי תירשני במקום שיש בן לא אמר כלום הא בת בין הבנות ובן בין הבנים אם אמר יירש כל נכסיו דבריו קיימין שרבי יוחנן אומר אם אמר על מי שראוי ליורשו דבריו קיימין
And if you wish, say instead that the entire mishna is stating the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and the mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, but if he bequeathed his property to one son among his other sons, or one daughter among his other daughters, then if he said that the son or daughter will inherit all his property, his statement stands, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit him, that he should inherit all of his property, his statement stands.
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה וכן אמר רבא הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה
§ As for the halakhic ruling, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And Rava says as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.
אמר רבא מאי טעמיה דרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אמר קרא והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה
Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? The verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit” (Deuteronomy 21:16), which is interpreted to mean that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whomever he wishes among his sons.
אמר ליה אביי הא מלא יוכל לבכר נפקא
Abaye said to him: Isn’t this halakha derived from the continuation of the verse: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn, before the son of the hated, who is the firstborn”? From the prohibition against depriving the firstborn of his double portion it can be inferred that one can change the apportionment of the inheritance of his other sons.
ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אבא חנן אמר משום רבי אליעזר
The Gemara answers: That clause in the verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:
מה תלמוד לומר לא יוכל לבכר
Why must the verse state: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” (Deuteronomy 21:16)?
לפי שנאמר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה פשוט שיפה כחו שנוטל בראוי כבמוחזק התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה בכור שהורע כחו שאינו נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק לא כל שכן תלמוד לומר לא יוכל לבכר
Abba Ḥanan explains: It is necessary because it is stated previously in the verse: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” as one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to an ordinary son, one who is not a firstborn, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed at the time he died, nevertheless, the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes, depriving his other sons of their portions, then with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed at the time of his death, is it not clear all the more so that his father can deprive him of the double portion he receives as a firstborn? Therefore, the verse states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.”
ויאמר לא יוכל לבכר מה תלמוד לומר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו
Abba Ḥanan continues: And let the verse state only the prohibition of: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.” Why must the verse state: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?
שיכול והלא דין הוא ומה בכור שהורע כחו שאינו נוטל בראוי כבמוחזק אמרה תורה לא יוכל לבכר פשוט שיפה כחו שנוטל בראוי כבמוחזק לא כל שכן
It is necessary because one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed, nevertheless the Torah states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn,” i.e., the firstborn may not be deprived of his double portion, then with regard to an ordinary son, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed, is it not clear all the more so that his father cannot deprive him of his portion of the inheritance?
תלמוד לומר והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו התורה נתנה רשות לאב להנחיל לכל מי שירצה
Therefore, the verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” indicating that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes. Consequently, the prohibition “he may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” is not available to prove that one may bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes.
אמר רבי זריקא אמר רבי אמי אמר רבי חנינא אמר רבי הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אמר ליה רבי אבא הורה איתמר
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the halakhic ruling: Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Zerika: It was stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in an actual case in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.
במאי קמיפלגי מר סבר הלכה עדיפא ומר סבר מעשה רב
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Since both Rabbi Zerika and Rabbi Abba agree that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, why did Rabbi Abba state that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled as much in an actual case? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Zerika, holds that a ruling in principle is a preferable source for a halakha, rather than a ruling from an incident; and one Sage, Rabbi Abba, holds that a specific incident ruled upon by a Sage is a preferable source.
תנו רבנן אין למדין הלכה לא מפי תלמוד ולא מפי מעשה עד שיאמרו לו הלכה למעשה שאל ואמרו לו הלכה למעשה ילך ויעשה מעשה ובלבד שלא ידמה
The Gemara examines which source is preferable. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may derive the halakha neither from a statement nor from an incident where one saw a ruling issued in a certain manner, unless the Sages explicitly tell him that it is the practical halakha. If he asked the Sages and they told him the practical halakha, he may go and act upon the ruling in those circumstances, provided that he does not compare between cases and apply the ruling to other circumstances.
מאי ובלבד שלא ידמה והא כל התורה כולה דמויי מדמינן לה
The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: Provided that he does not compare? But don’t we compare cases throughout the entire Torah? The main method of halakhic derivation is through comparing cases where the halakha was already established to cases where the halakha is unclear.
אמר רב אשי הכי קאמר ובלבד שלא ידמה בטרפות
Rav Ashi said that this is what the baraita is saying: Provided that he does not compare between various cases of animals with wounds that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], which are forbidden for consumption. In general, one may compare cases, but with regard to the definition of a tereifa, one may not compare.
דתניא אין אומרים בטרפות זו דומה לזו ואל תתמה שהרי חותכה מכאן ומתה חותכה מכאן וחיתה
This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to tereifot, one does not say: This wound is similar to that wound. Every type of wound has its own halakhot. And do not wonder about this principle, as there are organs with regard to which one cuts it from here, i.e., one side, and the animal dies within twelve months, but one cuts it from there, i.e., another side, and it lives.
אמר ליה רבי אסי לרבי יוחנן כי אמר לן מר הלכה הכי נעביד מעשה אמר לא תעבידו עד דאמינא הלכה למעשה
Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: When the Master, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, says to us: This is the halakha, should we act upon the ruling? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Do not act upon the ruling unless I say that it is a practical halakha.
אמר להו רבא לרב פפא ולרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע כי אתי פסקא דדינא דידי לקמייכו וחזיתו ביה פירכא לא תקרעוהו עד דאתיתו לקמאי אי אית לי טעמא אמינא לכו ואי לא הדרנא בי לאחר מיתה לא מיקרע תקרעוהו ומגמר נמי לא תגמרו מיניה לא מיקרע תקרעיניה דאי הואי התם דלמא הוה אמינא לכו טעמא
Rava said to Rav Pappa and to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When a legal ruling of mine comes before you and you perceive a refutation of it, do not tear it up until you come before me to discuss it. If I have a valid explanation, I will tell you, and if not, I will retract my ruling. If a ruling of mine comes before you after my death, when you can no longer discuss it with me, do not tear it up, but do not learn from it either, i.e., do not rule in accordance with it. Do not tear it up, as had I been there, perhaps I would have told you a valid explanation that you would have accepted;
