Bava Kamma 99
וְהִקְדִּיחוֹ יוֹרָה – נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ. דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ – אִין, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ – לָא; לָאו שֶׁהִקְדִּיחוֹ לְאַחַר נְפִילָה, דְּאִיכָּא שְׁבָחָא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי?
and it was burned in the cauldron in which it was dyed, the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. The Gemara infers: The value of his wool, yes, the dyer must pay that amount, but the value of the wool and its enhanced value, no, he need not pay. The Gemara suggests: Is this not referring to a case where the wool was burned after falling into the cauldron and the dye had taken hold, so that there is enhanced value, and one can learn from the mishna that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and therefore the dyer need not pay the enhanced value?
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקְדִּיחוֹ בִּשְׁעַת נְפִילָה, דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁבָחָא. אֲבָל הִקְדִּיחוֹ לְאַחַר נְפִילָה מַאי? נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ?! לֵימָא שְׁמוּאֵל לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב אַסִּי?
Shmuel said: This is not a proof. With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the wool was burned at the moment of falling into the cauldron, before the dye had taken hold, so that there is no enhancement. The Gemara asks: But according to this opinion, what would the halakha be if it was burned after falling into the cauldron, when the dye had taken hold? Would the dyer give the owner the value of his wool and its enhancement? Shall we say that Shmuel does not accept the statement of Rav Asi, and holds that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel?
אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּצֶמֶר וְסַמָּנִין דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת, וְצַבָּע אֲגַר יְדֵיהּ הוּא דְּשָׁקֵיל.
The Gemara rejects this statement. Shmuel could have said to you: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with a case where the wool and herbs used in the dye both belong to the homeowner, and the dyer is taking only the payment of his hand, i.e., the wages for his labor, and nothing else. In this case, the craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but in a case where the craftsman provides the materials, he does acquire such rights.
אִי הָכִי, ״נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְסַמָּנִין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא שְׁמוּאֵל דַּחוֹיֵי קָא מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the homeowner’s herbs were also ruined by the dyer, the mishna should have said that the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool and herbs, not just the value of his wool. Rather, Shmuel is merely dismissing the Gemara’s proof with regard to the statement of Rav Asi that a craftsman acquires a vessel through its enhancement, by saying that the mishna could be understood otherwise. He does not, however, state his own opinion on this matter.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַנּוֹתֵן טַלִּיתוֹ לְאוּמָּן; גְּמָרוֹ וְהוֹדִיעוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תָלִין״. נְתָנָהּ לוֹ בַּחֲצִי הַיּוֹם – כֵּיוָן שֶׁשָּׁקְעָה עָלָיו הַחַמָּה, עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״.
The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who gave his garment to a craftsman, and the craftsman concluded the work and notified the owner that the work was complete, even if the owner delays paying the craftsman from now until ten days henceforth, he does not violate, for this delay, the prohibition of: “You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him; the wages of a hired worker shall not abide with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13). If the craftsman gave the garment to him at midday, then once the sun has set and the owner has not paid him, the owner does violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי, אַמַּאי עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״?
The Gemara concludes: And if it enters your mind to say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, why does the owner violate the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages? It is as if the craftsman acquired the garment, and the payment is considered to be a purchase of the garment by the owner, rather than a wage.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא: בְּגִרְדָּא דְסַרְבָּלָא, דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁבָחָא.
The Gemara responds: Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: The baraita is stating the halakha with regard to the laundering of a thick garment, where there is no enhancement of the garment. Therefore, the craftsman does not acquire it.
סוֹף סוֹף, לְמַאי יַהֲבַהּ נִהֲלֵיהּ – לְרַכּוֹכֵי; כֵּיוָן דְּרַכְּכֵיהּ, הַיְינוּ שְׁבָחָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאַגְרֵיהּ לְבִיטְשֵׁי – בִּיטְשָׁא בִּיטְשָׁא בְּמָעֲתָא, דְּהַיְינוּ שְׂכִירוּת.
The Gemara asks: Ultimately, to what end did the owner of the garment give it to the craftsman? He gave it to him in order to soften it. Once he has softened it, that is its enhancement, and the craftsman has therefore acquired it. The Gemara responds: No; it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the owner hired the craftsman for treading, i.e., to forcefully tread on the garment in water until it softens, with the owner paying the craftsman a ma’a coin for each tread. The difference is that this is considered hired labor, where the craftsman is paid based on the amount of times he performed an action, and not contractual labor, where he is paid based on the outcome, in this case, a softened garment.
וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּלָא אַגְרֵיהּ לְבִיטְשֵׁי, מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת – דִּבְעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: קַבְּלָנוּת, עוֹבֵר עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״, אוֹ אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר? וַאֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: עוֹבֵר.
The Gemara comments: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that the owner did not hire the worker for treading but rather he hired him like a craftsman based on the assumption that the garment would be returned laundered, this supports the opinion of Rav Sheshet. As they asked Rav Sheshet: If one hires a contractor, who is not paid an hourly wage but is paid upon the completion of his task, and the one who hired him does not pay him on the day that he completes the work, does he violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages, or does he not violate the prohibition? And Rav Sheshet said to them: He does violate the prohibition.
לֵימָא דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת פְּלִיגָא אַדְּרַב אַסִּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַחָא: בִּשְׁלִיחָא דְאִיגַּרְתָּא.
The Gemara asks: Shall we say based on this statement that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the statement of Rav Asi, who holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and his payment is not considered to be a wage? Shmuel bar Aḥa said: Rav Sheshet is discussing a specific type of contractor, and he stated his ruling with regard to an agent tasked with the delivery of a letter, in which case, since the contractor’s only task is to deliver the letter, there is no enhancement through which he might acquire ownership rights. Consequently the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages applies.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי? ״עֲשֵׂה לִי שֵׁירִים, נְזָמִין וְטַבָּעוֹת, וְאֶקַּדֵּשׁ לָךְ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ מָמוֹן לְיָדָהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rav Asi, that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: Fashion bracelets, earrings, or rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you as payment for your work, then once he has fashioned them she is betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.
מַאי ״מָמוֹן״? אִילֵּימָא אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן לָא?! אֶלָּא בְּמַאי [כּוּ] מִקַּדְּשָׁא? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, מַאי ״מָמוֹן״ – מָמוֹן אַחֵר;
The Gemara asks: What is this money mentioned by the Rabbis? If we say it means that very money, i.e., the rings she ordered, then by inference Rabbi Meir holds that even that very money is not required in order for the betrothal to take effect. But with what does he betroth her? He has given her nothing but the jewelry. Rather, it is obvious. To what money are the Rabbis referring? They must be referring to when he betroths her via other money, i.e., the payment she owes him for his service. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, in order for the betrothal to take effect he must give her additional money, while according to Rabbi Meir the betrothal takes effect when he gives her the jewelry.
וְסַבְרוּהָ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף; וּדְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
The Gemara prefaces its explanation of the connection to the issue at hand by delineating two assumptions: And those who say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis are engaging in a dispute with regard to the issue of a craftsman acquiring ownership rights through the enhancement of a vessel assumed that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, i.e., the obligation to pay for a service begins when the hired party commences work, and the sum owed increases as he proceeds. The fact that he is not paid from the time he commences work establishes the wages as a debt. Consequently, the wages now have the status of a loan. And they also assumed that everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan that she is not betrothed. She therefore cannot be betrothed to him by not having to pay the wages for his work.
מַאי, לָאו בְּאוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי?
Based on these assumptions, the Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to whether a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel? As Rabbi Meir holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since he owns the enhanced value of the vessel, when he gives the jewelry to her he is giving her something valuable of his own, and she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since a craftsman, in this case, the goldsmith, does not own the jewelry, he cannot betroth a woman with it.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי; אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּיֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף קָא מִיפַּלְגִי –
The Gemara rejects this explanation of the dispute: No, it is possible that everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but here they disagree with regard to the issue of whether the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: אֵין לִשְׂכִירוּת אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: יֵשׁ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף.
Rabbi Meir holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired, i.e., the owner is obligated to pay only when the work is complete, and therefore the goldsmith’s wages do not have the status of a loan, but of a sum of money that she becomes obligated to give him at that time. If he gives her the jewelry without asking for that money, it is as though he gave the money from his wages to her, and she may be betrothed with it. And the Rabbis hold that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and therefore his wages have the status of a loan, and she cannot be betrothed with them and must be given additional money.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וְהָכָא בִּמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and here they disagree with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan. As Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.
רָבָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וּדְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּמִלְוָה אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּדְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין אוּמָּן קוֹנֶה בִּשְׁבַח כְּלִי;
Rava said another interpretation: Everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period a craftsman is hired to its end; and everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed; and everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוֹסִיף לָהּ נוֹפֶךְ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ. רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: מִלְוָה וּפְרוּטָה – דַּעְתַּהּ אַפְּרוּטָה, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מִלְוָה וּפְרוּטָה – דַּעְתַּהּ אַמִּלְוָה.
But with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he added a jewel [nofekh] of his own for her. Rabbi Meir holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta, her mind is focused on the peruta. Therefore, in this case the jewel serves as the betrothal money. And the Rabbis hold that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, so the loan serves as the betrothal money, and if one betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמָּךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ״ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמָּךְ״.
And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the dispute between these tanna’im. As it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:4): If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you, she is not betrothed, as the payment is a loan, since she already owes him this money. But if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is betrothed, as from the moment he is entitled to the money, he gives it to her for her betrothal. Rabbi Natan says: If he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed, as Rabbi Natan holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, which means that upon the completion of the labor it is a loan, and all the more so if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא אוֹמֵר, בֶּאֱמֶת אָמְרוּ: בֵּין ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמָּךְ״, וּבֵין ״בִּשְׂכַר שֶׁאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמָּךְ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. וְאִם הוֹסִיף לָהּ נוֹפֶךְ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
The baraita cites a third opinion: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Actually they said that the halakha is that regardless of whether he said: With the payment for which I have worked for you, or whether he said: With the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed. But if he added a jewel of his own for her, she is betrothed.
מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין תַּנָּא קַמָּא לְרַבִּי נָתָן? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שְׂכִירוּת. בֵּין רַבִּי נָתָן לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מִלְוָה וּפְרוּטָה.
The Gemara clarifies the dispute: What difference is there between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan? The difference between them is with regard to a wage: Is the obligation incurred continuously or only upon the completion of the work? The difference between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the issue of a loan and one peruta. Rabbi Natan holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, and in this case his jewel is disregarded; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that her mind is focused on the peruta, in this case the jewel, and she is betrothed with the jewel.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טַבָּח אוּמָּן שֶׁקִּלְקֵל – חַיָּיב לְשַׁלֵּם. מַזִּיק הוּא, פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא, נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״שְׁחוֹט לִי מִכָּאן״, וְשָׁחַט לוֹ מִכָּאן.
§ The Gemara now returns to the topic of a craftsman who damages the item with which he is working. Shmuel says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal for the damage. Why? He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, i.e., the area of the throat where ritual slaughter is performed, and he slaughtered it from there, i.e., a different area of the throat, in violation of the owner’s wishes.
לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר ״מַזִּיק הוּא, פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא״? אִי אָמַר ״מַזִּיק הוּא״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָא עָבֵיד בְּשָׂכָר, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּקָא עָבֵיד בְּחִנָּם – לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן ״פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא״.
The Gemara asks: Why must he say both that the butcher is one who causes damage and that he is negligent? The Gemara explains: If Shmuel had said only that he is one who causes damage, I would say that this statement applies only in a case where the butcher slaughtered the animal for pay, in which case, due to the extra responsibility that he bears, he is considered to be one who caused damage and is liable to pay even in a case where the damage was unintentional; but in a case where he does the work for free, I would say no, he is exempt from liability in a case where the damage was unintentional. Shmuel therefore teaches us that the butcher is negligent, and one who works without pay is analogous to an unpaid bailee, who is liable to pay for damage caused by negligence.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל: הַנּוֹתֵן בְּהֵמָה לַטַּבָּח וְנִיבְּלָהּ, אוּמָּן – פָּטוּר, הֶדְיוֹט – חַיָּיב. וְאִם נוֹתֵן שָׂכָר, בֵּין הֶדְיוֹט בֵּין אוּמָּן – חַיָּיב! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִעֲכַר מוֹחָךְ!
Rav Ḥama bar Gurya raised an objection to Shmuel from the Tosefta (10:10): With regard to one who gives an animal to a butcher, and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an animal carcass, if the butcher is an expert, then he is exempt from liability; if he is an ordinary person, without particular expertise in the act of ritual slaughter, he is liable. And if the owner of the animal paid the butcher, then regardless of whether he is an ordinary person or whether he is an expert, the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. This indicates that an expert butcher who slaughtered the animal improperly is exempt if he slaughtered it without pay. Shmuel said to him: May your mind be muddled for raising a ridiculous objection.
אֲתָא הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן קָא מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא שָׁקְלַתְּ מַאי דִּשְׁקַל חַבְרָךְ! קָאָמֵינָא לְכוּ אֲנָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְקָאָמְרִיתוּ לִי רַבָּנַן?! אַמַּאי לָא דָּיְיקַתְּ מִילֵּי – שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: מַזִּיק הוּא, פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא, נַעֲשֶׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לוֹ ״שְׁחוֹט לִי מִכָּאן״ – וְשָׁחַט לוֹ מִכָּאן; מַאן אִית לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמִירְמֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ!
One of the Sages came and raised the same objection to Shmuel. Shmuel said to him: Now you shall receive what your friend received from me, since I say to you my statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and you say to me, i.e., you raise an objection, based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Why were you not precise in your consideration of my choice of words? As I say: He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, and he slaughtered it from there. Who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, who says: He should have taken upon himself the responsibility to perform his task properly, and if he did not, he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. The other baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt him from liability.
הֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר? אִילֵּימָא [הָא] רַבִּי מֵאִיר (קל״ן סִימָן) –
The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Meir is Shmuel referring to? If we say it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, that is difficult. Parenthetically, the Gemara states that the letters kuf, lamed, nun serve as a mnemonic device for the three statements of Rabbi Meir that will be cited. It stands for: He tied it [kesharo], to dye [litzboa], and broke [nishbera].
דִּתְנַן: קְשָׁרוֹ בְּעָלָיו בְּמוֹסֵירָה וְנָעַל בְּפָנָיו כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצָא וְהִזִּיק, בֵּין תָּם בֵּין מוּעָד – חַיָּיב, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara returns to the matter at hand: As we learned in a mishna (45b): If the ox’s owner tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in an appropriate manner, but nevertheless the ox emerged and caused damage, whether the ox is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable, since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. As the Gemara explains on 45b, Rabbi Meir holds that a forewarned ox requires a heightened level of safeguarding, and since the owner did not safeguard it, he is liable. The same would apply here, that one who agrees to perform a task must exercise care in executing it. Otherwise, he will be held liable to pay for damage.
הָתָם בִּקְרָאֵי פְּלִיגִי!
The Gemara explains why this cannot be the statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel was referring to: There, in that mishna, the Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of biblical verses, not logical reasoning, as the Gemara explains there, and conclusions cannot be drawn from that halakha to this one.
אֶלָּא הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – דִּתְנַן: לִצְבּוֹעַ לוֹ אָדוֹם וּצְבָעוֹ שָׁחוֹר, שָׁחוֹר וּצְבָעוֹ אָדוֹם – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ. הָתָם בְּיָדַיִם קְלָאו מִינֵּיהּ!
Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and he dyed it black, or to dye it black, and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner the value of his wool, indicating that he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara rejects this opinion: This statement also does not prove that according to Rabbi Meir a worker is liable to pay for a job performed improperly, since there, the dyer burned the wool, thereby removing it from the owner by direct action.
אֶלָּא הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – דִּתְנַן: נִשְׁבְּרָה כַּדּוֹ וְלֹא סִילְּקָהּ, נָפְלָה גְּמַלּוֹ וְלֹא הֶעֱמִידָה – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב בְּנִזְקָן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם, וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. וְקַיְימָא לַן דִּבְנִתְקַל פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא פְּלִיגִי.
Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a baraita: If one’s jug broke on the road and he did not remove it, or if his camel fell on the road and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir says: He is liable for the damage that they cause, and the Rabbis say: He is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara notes: And we maintain that they disagree with regard to the question of whether one who stumbles is considered negligent. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, one who stumbles is considered negligent, since he should have paid attention while walking. He is therefore liable for whatever damage he causes. In the case of an expert butcher as well, Rabbi Meir holds that he is considered negligent when damaging the animal he slaughtered, and the Rabbis hold that he is not negligent and therefore exempt from liability.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טַבָּח אוּמָּן שֶׁקִּלְקֵל – חַיָּיב, וַאֲפִילּוּ הוּא אוּמָּן כְּטַבָּחֵי צִיפּוֹרִי. וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי?! וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה: עוֹבָדָא הֲוָה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בִּכְנִישְׁתָּא דְמָעוֹן, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה דְּמַמְחֵית לְתַרְנְגוֹלִים, וְאֶפְטְרָךְ!
The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion concerning the case of an expert butcher. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal, and even if he is as expert as the butchers of Tzippori, it is not considered an accident, and he is considered to be at fault. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that there was an incident in which a butcher who damaged an animal was brought to court before Rabbi Yoḥanan in the synagogue of the town Maon, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the butcher: Go bring proof that you are an expert at slaughtering chickens, and I will exempt you from payment.
לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּחִנָּם, כָּאן בְּשָׂכָר. כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הָרוֹצֶה שֶׁיִּתְחַיֵּיב לוֹ טַבָּח – יַקְדִּים לוֹ דִּינָר.
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, in the aforementioned incident, the butcher slaughtered the animal for free, and he is therefore exempt, while there, in Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s previous statement, he slaughtered the animal for pay, and is therefore liable to pay for the damage. This is in accordance with that which Rabbi Zeira says: One who wants a butcher to be liable to pay him in the event that he damages the animal during slaughter should advance him a dinar, so that he is paid for his services, and he is consequently liable to pay damages.
מֵיתִיבִי: הַמּוֹלִיךְ חִטִּים לַטָּחוֹן – וְלֹא לְתָתָן, וַעֲשָׂאָן סוּבִּין אוֹ מוּרְסָן; קֶמַח לַנַּחְתּוֹם – וַעֲשָׂאוֹ פַּת נִיפּוּלִין; בְּהֵמָה לַטַּבָּח – וְנִיבְּלָהּ; חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר! אֵימָא: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר.
The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (10:9): One who brought wheat to another to grind for him, and the miller did not wet the grains sufficiently for the grinding to be performed effectively, and as a result he converted the grain into bran or coarse bran; or if one gave flour to the baker and he made bread that is underbaked and tends to crumble; or if one gave an animal to a butcher and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an unslaughtered animal carcass, the worker is liable, because he is like a paid bailee. This indicates that even if the work was done for free, the worker has the legal status of one who is paid, and he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara answers by emending the baraita: Say instead: Because he is a paid bailee and actually receives payment.
הָהוּא מַגְרוּמְתָּא דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, טַרְפֵהּ, וּפַטְרֵיהּ לְטַבָּח מִלְּשַׁלּוֹמֵי דְּמֵי. פְּגַעוּ בֵּיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי בְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: עֲבֵיד בָּךְ רַב תַּרְתֵּי.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain animal that was slaughtered with an incision not in the neck that was brought before Rav. He declared it non-kosher, and exempted the butcher from paying its value. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi encountered that man, i.e., the owner of the animal, and they said to him: Rav did two for you.
מַאי תַּרְתֵּי? אִילֵימָא תַּרְתֵּי לִגְרִיעוּתָא – דְּאִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְאַכְשׁוֹרֵי כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְטַרְפַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן; וְאִי נָמֵי כְּרַבָּנַן – דְּאִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ חִיּוּבָא לְטַבָּחָא; וּמִי שְׁרֵי לְמֵימַר כִּי הַאי גַּוְנָא?!
The Gemara asks: What are the two? If we say there were two unfavorable rulings, what are they? One is that he should have declared the animal kosher, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an animal that has been slaughtered in this manner is kosher, and instead he declared it non-kosher, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not kosher. And the second is that even if he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, he should have ruled that the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But if these are the two that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi are referring to, is it permitted for them to say this type of statement to the owner of the animal?
וְהָתַנְיָא: לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא, לֹא יֹאמַר: ״אֲנִי מְזַכֶּה וַחֲבֵירַי מְחַיְּיבִין, אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁחֲבֵירַי רַבּוּ עָלַי״, וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר: ״הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל מְגַלֶּה סּוֹד״!
But isn’t it taught in a baraita that when a judge leaves the courthouse, he should not say to the litigant: I found you innocent and my colleagues found you liable, but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumber me? And it is concerning a circumstance such as this that it is stated: “He that goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets; but he that is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).
אֶלָּא תַּרְתֵּי לִמְעַלְּיוּתָא – דְּלָא אוֹכְלָךְ סְפֵק אִיסּוּרָא, וּמַנְעָךְ מִסְּפֵק גְּזֵילָה.
Rather, the intention is that they told him that there were two favorable rulings: First, that by declaring the animal to be non-kosher, he did not allow you to eat an item about which there is uncertainty as to whether it is forbidden, and second, by exempting the butcher from paying you, he prevented you from being in a situation where there is uncertainty as to whether receiving payment from the butcher constitutes robbery, since you would have been given the butcher’s money when he may be exempt, as the animal may in fact be kosher.
אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּרְאֶה דִּינָר לַשּׁוּלְחָנִי וְנִמְצָא רַע, תָּנֵי חֲדָא: אוּמָּן – פָּטוּר, הֶדְיוֹט – חַיָּיב; וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: בֵּין אוּמָּן בֵּין הֶדְיוֹט – חַיָּיב!
§ The Gemara continues the discussion of an expert who erred, thereby causing a loss. It was stated: With regard to one who presents a dinar to a money changer to assess its value or authenticity and the money changer declares it valid, and it is found to be bad, i.e., invalid, causing its owner a monetary loss, it is taught in one baraita that if the money changer is an expert, he is exempt, while if he is an ordinary person he is liable. And it is taught in another baraita that irrespective of whether he is an expert or whether he is an ordinary person, he is liable to pay for the owner’s loss.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כִּי תַּנְיָא אוּמָּן פָּטוּר – כְּגוֹן דַּנְכּוּ וְאִיסּוּר, דְּלָא צְרִיכִי לְמִיגְמַר כְּלָל. אֶלָּא בְּמַאי טְעוֹ? טְעוֹ בְּסִיכְּתָא חַדְתָּא, דְּהָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא דִּנְפַק מִתּוּתֵי סִיכְּתָא.
To reconcile the baraitot, Rav Pappa said: When the baraita teaches that an expert is exempt from liability, it is referring to renowned experts such as the money changers Dankhu and Issur, whose expertise is so great that they do not need to learn about assessing currency at all. The Gemara asks: But if they are so proficient, in what did they err? The Gemara answers: They erred with regard to a coin from a new press, which at that time was leaving the press, and they did not know its value.
הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דְּאַחְזְיָא דִּינָרָא לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא, אֲמַר לַהּ: מְעַלְּיָא הוּא. לְמָחָר אֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ, וַאֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: אַחֲזִיתֵיהּ, וַאֲמַרוּ לִי בִּישָׁא הוּא, וְלָא קָא נָפֵיק לִי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְרַב: זִיל חַלְּפֵיהּ נִיהֲלַהּ, וּכְתוֹב אַפִּנְקָסִי: ״דֵּין עֵסֶק בִּישׁ״.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who presented a dinar to Rabbi Ḥiyya to assess its authenticity. He said to her: It is a proper coin. The next day she came before him and said to him: I presented it to others, and they told me that it is a bad dinar, and I am not able to spend it. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go exchange it for her, and write on my tablet [apinkasi]: This was a bad transaction, as I should not have assessed the coin.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא דַּנְכּוּ וְאִיסּוּר דִּפְטִירִי – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא צְרִיכִי לְמִיגְמַר? רַבִּי חִיָּיא נָמֵי לָאו לְמִיגְמַר קָא בָּעֵי! רַבִּי חִיָּיא, לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין הוּא דַּעֲבַד. כִּדְתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״וְהוֹדַעְתָּ לָהֶם״ – זֶה
The Gemara asks: But what is different about Dankhu and Issur, who are exempt due to the fact that they do not need to learn about assessing currency? Rabbi Ḥiyya too did not need to learn, as he was also an expert. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Ḥiyya was not actually required to return a dinar to this woman, but when he did so he acted beyond the letter of the law. This is as that which Rav Yosef taught concerning the verse: “And you shall show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do” (Exodus 18:20): “And you shall show them”; this is referring to
