Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the marriage of their daf friend Devorah Heller’s daughter Sarita to Moshe Caplan. “May the new home they build be based on a foundation of Torah, avoda and gemilut chasadim.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
Gittin 51
אוֹ דִּלְמָא קְצוּבִין, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן כְּתוּבִים?
Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאִיתְּמַר: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ שְׁתֵּי בָּנוֹת וּבֵן, וְקָדְמָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְנָטְלָה עִישּׂוּר נְכָסִים, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיקָה שְׁנִיָּה לִגְבּוֹת עַד שֶׁמֵּת הַבֵּן.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was stated, that the amora’im disagree about the following issue: There is a case of one who died and left two daughters and a son, and the first daughter went ahead and took one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as sons are obligated to sustain their deceased father’s daughters until they reach majority or become betrothed and to give them part of his estate as a dowry, as daughters do not inherit when there are sons; but the second daughter did not manage to collect her tenth of the estate for her dowry before the son died. Therefore, the entire estate fell to the two daughters, who then divide it between themselves, and there is a dispute as to how they divide the estate.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה. וְאָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, גְּדוֹלָה מִזּוֹ אָמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין לְפַרְנָסָה וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹנוֹת; וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה?!
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate, and therefore she cannot demand that she should first receive one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as did her sister, and that only afterward they divide what remains of the estate equally between themselves. And Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Did they not say even more than this, that if the brother sold off property belonging to his father’s estate, payment for the daughter’s dowry can be appropriated from the buyer, but payment for her sustenance cannot be appropriated from him? If the father’s estate is liened to his daughter’s dowry, so that she can collect her dowry even from a third party who bought the property from the son, she should be able to collect it from her father’s estate before it is divided up between the daughters. And you say that the second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate?
וְהָא פַּרְנָסָה – דְּמִיקָץ קַיְיצָא, מִיכְתָּב לָא כְּתִיבָא; וְקָא מוֹצִיאָה!
The Gemara tries to draw a conclusion with regard to the question that was raised previously: But isn’t the dowry mentioned by Rabbi Ḥanina, i.e., the dowry to which an orphan daughter is entitled from her father’s estate, of a fixed amount, i.e., one-tenth of the estate, and it is not written? And nevertheless, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, it can be appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another party.
שָׁאנֵי פַּרְנָסָה, כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לַהּ קָלָא, כְּמַאן דִּכְתִיבָא דָּמֵי.
The Gemara rejects this argument: A dowry is different, since it generates publicity. If one dies and is survived by daughters, everyone knows that a portion of his estate is pledged for their dowries. Therefore, the obligation is considered to be as if it were written. In other situations, it might be necessary according to Rabbi Ḥanina that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and written.
מֵתִיב רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ: מֵתוּ – בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין,
Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ raised an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 101b) that addresses the case of a woman who was married to a man with whom she had stipulated that he would sustain her daughter from a previous marriage. After receiving a divorce from him, she married a different man with whom she made the same stipulation, so that the stepdaughter receives sustenance from the two husbands. That mishna states: If the husbands died, then their own daughters, even from that same woman, are sustained only from the unsold property in their estate. This accords with the halakha taught in the mishna above (48b).
וְהִיא נִזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב!
The mishna in Ketubot continues: But the stepdaughter is sustained even from liened property that had been sold to a third party. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, and therefore she has the right to collect her debt from property formerly owned by her stepfather, her debtor. This is difficult according to both opinions, as the stepdaughter’s sustenance is appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another person, despite it being neither a fixed amount nor written.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the mother acquired the right to the daughter’s sustenance from his possession, i.e., where they performed an act of acquisition confirming the stipulation. Consequently, it is considered as though the stipulation had been written and publicized, and so the property of the two husbands is liened for the stepdaughter’s sustenance.
אִי הָכִי, בָּנוֹת נָמֵי! בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ לָזוֹ, וְלֹא קָנוּ לָזוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the mishna is referring to a case where they performed an act acquisition, then the deceased’s own daughters as well should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property that has been sold to a third party. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the mother acquired the right to sustenance on behalf of this one, the stepdaughter, but did not acquire the right to sustenance on behalf of the other daughters.
מַאי פַּסְקָא? בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ, דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן; בִּתּוֹ, דְּלָא הֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – לָא מַהֲנֵי לָהּ קִנְיַן.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the decision of the tanna to record the halakha in a case where the mother acquired the right for this one but not for that one? The Gemara explains: With regard to his wife’s daughter from her previous marriage, who was alive at the time of the act of acquisition, i.e., when he gave the mother her marriage contract, the act of acquisition is effective for her. With regard to his own daughter from this mother, who was not alive at the time of the act of acquisition, the act of acquisition is not effective for her.
מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּהֲווֹ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי, דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ?!
The Gemara raises an objection: Are we not dealing here even with a case where both of them were alive at the time of the act of acquisition? And what are the circumstances? It is a case where after she was married to him and had a daughter from him, he divorced her and later remarried her, at which time an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation with regard to sustenance. As his own daughter was alive at the time, why is the act of acquisition not effective for his own daughter’s sustenance as it is for that of his stepdaughter?
אֶלָּא בִּתּוֹ – דְּבִתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, לָא מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיַן; בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ – דְּלָאו בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן.
Rather, the difference between them is as follows: With regard to his own daughter, who eats, i.e., is sustained, from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, as the daughter’s right to sustenance from her father’s estate is an inseparable part of her mother’s marriage contract, the act of acquisition that was performed is not effective for her, because her entitlement is derived from a different source, the stipulation of the court. With regard to his wife’s daughter, who eats from his estate not based on a stipulation of the court, as her entitlement is based on the explicit stipulation made between the husband and the wife, the act of acquisition is effective for her and enables her to collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to a third party.
וְכִי מִיגְרָע גָּרְעָה?! אֶלָּא בִּתּוֹ – כֵּיוָן דְּבִתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, אֵימַר צְרָרֵי אַתְפְּסַהּ.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But is a right that is rooted in two sources, both a stipulation of the court and an act of acquisition, inferior to a right that is rooted in an act of acquisition alone? The act of acquisition is in addition to the stipulation of the court, and should be effective for her as well. Rather, this is the difference between them: With regard to his own daughter, since his daughter eats from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, say that perhaps he already gave her money during his lifetime for her sustenance. Since there is uncertainty, she cannot recover her sustenance from liened property, even if an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation. With regard to the stepdaughter, there is no concern that perhaps he already gave her the money while he was alive. Therefore, if an act of acquisition was performed, she can collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to another.
תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן: אֵימָתַי – בִּזְמַן שֶׁקָּדַם מִקָּחוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי לְשִׁבְחוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן;
The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party: Come and hear what Rabbi Natan said: When do we say that if one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land and enhanced it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had been appropriated reclaimed the property, the buyer can recover the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements only from unsold property in the robber’s possession but not from liened property that has been sold to another party? This is said when the purchase of the second buyer, i.e., the party who purchased the property that rightfully belonged to the robber, preceded the enhancements made by the first buyer to the appropriated property he purchased from the robber.
אֲבָל קָדַם שִׁבְחוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן לְמִקָּחוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי – גּוֹבֶה מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים. אַלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא קָדֵים הוּא!
But if the enhancements made by the first buyer preceded the acquisition of the second buyer, then he can collect the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements even from liened property that has been sold to the second buyer. Apparently, he cannot collect the increase in value from liened property because the enhancements did not precede the sale of the other field, not because the increase in value is not of a fixed amount or written in a deed.
תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לַאֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת, וְלִשְׁבַח קַרְקָעוֹת, וְלִמְזוֹן אִשָּׁה וְהַבָּנוֹת – מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם; לְפִי שֶׁאֵין כְּתוּבִין.
The Gemara answers: Proof cannot be brought one way or the other from this baraita, since the issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in another baraita: The court does not appropriate payment from liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land or for the sustenance of a man’s wife and daughters. The reason why one cannot collect these debts from liened property is for the betterment of the world, because all these obligations are not written in any deed. If purchasers are at risk of losing the land they purchased to pay debts of the seller that had not been written, they will have no way to protect themselves, and no one will purchase land.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: וְכִי מָה תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם יֵשׁ בָּזוֹ? וַהֲלֹא אֵין קְצוּבִין!
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this, in stating that the reason the land is not appropriated is only because the debt was not written? But isn’t the real reason that these obligations cannot be collected from liened property is that they are not of a fixed amount? No one would be willing to purchase land if the land were liened to an unlimited debt. It is clear in this baraita that the criteria for collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party are subject to a tannaitic dispute.
וְהַמּוֹצֵא מְצִיאָה לֹא יִשָּׁבַע. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: ״שְׁנֵי כִּיסִין קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ לִי״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא מָצָאתִי אֶלָּא אֶחָד״ – נִשְׁבָּע. ״שְׁנֵי שְׁוָורִים קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ לִי״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא הָיָה אֶלָּא אֶחָד״ – אֵינוֹ נִשְׁבָּע.
§ The mishna teaches: And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: If the owner of the lost item brings a claim against the finder, saying: You found two money pouches tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: I found only one pouch, then the finder takes an oath, similar to anyone who admits to part of a claim. If the owner claims: You found two oxen tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: There was only one ox, the finder is not required to take an oath.
מַאי טַעְמָא? שְׁווֹרִין מִנַּתְחִי מֵהֲדָדֵי, כִּיסִין לָא מִנַּתְחִי מֵהֲדָדֵי.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases? It is that oxen become detached from each other. Consequently, it is possible that when the oxen were lost, there had been two that were tied together, but afterward they became separated and the finder found only one. By contrast, pouches do not become detached from each other. Since the finder admits that he found one of them, it stands to reason that he actually found both of them.
״שְׁנֵי שְׁווֹרִין קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״מָצָאתִי וְהֶחְזַרְתִּי לָךְ אֶחָד מֵהֶן״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע.
Rabbi Yitzḥak also says: If the owner of the lost item says to the finder: You found two tied oxen, and the other person says: I found two oxen, but I already returned one of them to you, then the finder takes an oath.
וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק – לֵית לֵיהּ ״הַמּוֹצֵא מְצִיאָה לָא יִשָּׁבַע – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם״?!
A question may be raised against these rulings of Rabbi Yitzḥak: But does Rabbi Yitzḥak not accept the halakha stated in the mishna that one who finds a lost item is not required to take an oath, this being an enactment instituted for the betterment of the world?
הוּא דְּאָמַר, כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע. וְזֶה הוּא שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitzḥak stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevuot 5:10) that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when a person takes an oath about his own claim. How so? One says to another: One hundred dinars of your deceased father’s was in my possession, as I had borrowed that sum from him. And I already paid him part [peras] of it, but I still owe you fifty dinars. In this case, he is not believed unless he takes an oath that he repaid the half, like anyone who admits to part of a claim. And this is an example of a case where one takes an oath about his own claim. Although nobody has claimed anything from him, he still takes an oath on the basis of his own statement.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
But the Rabbis say: In such a case, the borrower is regarded only as someone who is returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from an oath. Rabbi Yitzḥak’s position is similar to that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Since the finder says that he found only half of what the owner claims was lost, he is treated like someone who admits to part of a claim and therefore takes an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – לֵית לֵיהּ: ״מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה – פָּטוּר״?! אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן.
The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not maintain that someone who returns a lost item is exempt from an oath? Rav says: The case in dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis is not one where nobody has claimed anything from the borrower, as in such a case all agree that the borrower is exempt from taking an oath. Rather, it is a case where the creditor has died, leaving a child as his heir, and this minor confronts the borrower and claims a hundred dinars from him, which he alleges was lent by his late father. The other admits to having borrowed the money but claims that he already repaid half the sum. Since he admits to part of the claim, he takes an oath that he did repay the other part.
קָטָן, מִידֵּי מְשָׁשָׁא אִית בֵּיהּ?! וְהָתְנַן: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower’s admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.
מַאי ״קָטָן״ – גָּדוֹל; וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״קָטָן״? דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא.
The Gemara answers: To which kind of minor was Rav referring? It was to an adult son of the creditor. And why does Rav call him a minor, if he is in fact an adult? It is as with regard to his father’s affairs he is like a minor. He does not know with certainty how much money the borrower repaid but merely says that he thinks he owes his father more.
אִי הָכִי, טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ?! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הוּא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that we are dealing with a case where the deceased creditor’s adult son made a claim against the debtor, how can Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say about this claim that it is his own claim? Is this an oath taken about his own claim? It is an oath taken about the claim of others, i.e., the son. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov calls it an oath taken about one’s own claim, although it is really the claim of others, because it is his own admission that obligates him to take the oath.
כּוּלְּהוּ טַעֲנָתָא נָמֵי, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ! אֶלָּא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּאָמַר רַבָּה, מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה – יִשָּׁבַע? חֲזָקָה – אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ;
The Gemara objects: All claims that lead to the oath of one who admits to part of the claim are also a combination of the claim of others and the defendant’s own admission. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the following explanation given by Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim brought against him takes an oath with regard to the rest of the claim, which he denies, whereas one who denies the entire claim is not required to take an oath? Rabba answers: The oath of partial admission is based on a presumption with regard to the defendant’s behavior. There is a presumption that a person would not be so brazen as to stand before his creditor and deny his debt when his creditor knows that he is lying.
וְהַאי, בְּכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי לְמִכְפְּרֵיהּ לֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כַּפְרֵיהּ – מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ; וּבְכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ – אִישְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ – סָבַר: עַד דְּהָווּ לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ; וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עִילָּוֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
Rabba continues: And this one who admits to part of the claim would want to deny all of it, and the only reason he does not deny all of it is because a person would not be so brazen before his creditor. And in fact, he would want to admit to all of the claim to him. And the reason that he did not admit the whole claim to him and say that in fact he owes him the entire sum is that he was evading his obligation temporarily. The debtor is short of money and he thinks: I will pay my creditor as much as I can afford now, and I will evade paying the rest until I have enough money, and then I will repay him the rest, to which I have not yet admitted. Therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on the debtor in order to induce him to admit all of the debt to the creditor.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ – אֵינוֹ מֵעֵיז, וְהִילְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הוּא; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעֵיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ מֵעֵיז, וּמִדְּלֹא מֵעֵיז – מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הוּא.
Following Rabba’s reasoning, the difference of opinion between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis can be explained as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that there is no difference between the creditor himself and the creditor’s son, as in all cases the debtor would not be so brazen as to deny his debt. Therefore, the debtor is not considered like someone who is returning a lost item. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that Rabba’s reasoning applies in this case as well, so he is required to take an oath. And the Rabbis hold that he would not be so brazen as to deny a debt before the creditor himself, but toward his creditor’s son he would be brazen and deny the claim completely. And since he was not so brazen as to deny the entire claim, but admitted to part of it, he is considered like someone returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath.
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I decided to give daf yomi a try when I heard about the siyum hashas in 2020. Once the pandemic hit, the daily commitment gave my days some much-needed structure. There have been times when I’ve felt like quitting- especially when encountering very technical details in the text. But then I tell myself, “Look how much you’ve done. You can’t stop now!” So I keep going & my Koren bookshelf grows…
Miriam Eckstein-Koas
Huntington, United States
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Hannah Lee
Pennsylvania, United States
Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.
Susan Handelman
Jerusalem, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Michelle Lewis
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When we heard that R. Michelle was starting daf yomi, my 11-year-old suggested that I go. Little did she know that she would lose me every morning from then on. I remember standing at the Farbers’ door, almost too shy to enter. After that first class, I said that I would come the next day but couldn’t commit to more. A decade later, I still look forward to learning from R. Michelle every morning.
Ruth Leah Kahan
Ra’anana, Israel
I start learning Daf Yomi in January 2020. The daily learning with Rabbanit Michelle has kept me grounded in this very uncertain time. Despite everything going on – the Pandemic, my personal life, climate change, war, etc… I know I can count on Hadran’s podcast to bring a smile to my face.
Deb Engel
Los Angeles, United States
Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!
Judith Weil
Raanana, Israel
Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.
Lisa S. Malik
Wynnewood, United States
I have joined the community of daf yomi learners at the start of this cycle. I have studied in different ways – by reading the page, translating the page, attending a local shiur and listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcasts, depending on circumstances and where I was at the time. The reactions have been positive throughout – with no exception!
Silke Goldberg
Guildford, United Kingdom
After reading the book, “ If All The Seas Were Ink “ by Ileana Kurshan I started studying Talmud. I searched and studied with several teachers until I found Michelle Farber. I have been studying with her for two years. I look forward every day to learn from her.
Janine Rubens
Virginia, United States
In early January of 2020, I learned about Siyyum HaShas and Daf Yomi via Tablet Magazine’s brief daily podcast about the Daf. I found it compelling and fascinating. Soon I discovered Hadran; since then I have learned the Daf daily with Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber. The Daf has permeated my every hour, and has transformed and magnified my place within the Jewish Universe.
Lisa Berkelhammer
San Francisco, CA , United States
While vacationing in San Diego, Rabbi Leah Herz asked if I’d be interested in being in hevruta with her to learn Daf Yomi through Hadran. Why not? I had loved learning Gemara in college in 1971 but hadn’t returned. With the onset of covid, Daf Yomi and Rabbanit Michelle centered me each day. Thank-you for helping me grow and enter this amazing world of learning.
Meryll Page
Minneapolis, MN, United States
In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.
Rhondda May
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Michelle Lewis
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Denise Neapolitan
Cambridge, United Kingdom
I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.
Anne Rubin
Elkins Park, United States
Ive been learning Gmara since 5th grade and always loved it. Have always wanted to do Daf Yomi and now with Michelle Farber’s online classes it made it much easier to do! Really enjoying the experience thank you!!
Lisa Lawrence
Neve Daniel, Israel
I started learning Jan 2020 when I heard the new cycle was starting. I had tried during the last cycle and didn’t make it past a few weeks. Learning online from old men didn’t speak to my soul and I knew Talmud had to be a soul journey for me. Enter Hadran! Talmud from Rabbanit Michelle Farber from a woman’s perspective, a mother’s perspective and a modern perspective. Motivated to continue!
Keren Carter
Brentwood, California, United States
I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!
Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Minnesota, United States
I started learning with rabbis. I needed to know more than the stories. My first teacher to show me “the way of the Talmud” as well as the stories was Samara Schwartz.
Michelle Farber started the new cycle 2 yrs ago and I jumped on for the ride.
I do not look back.
Jenifer Nech
Houston, United States
Gittin 51
אוֹ דִּלְמָא קְצוּבִין, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן כְּתוּבִים?
Or perhaps, in order to collect from liened property, it suffices that the obligation be of a fixed amount, even if it is not written?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאִיתְּמַר: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ שְׁתֵּי בָּנוֹת וּבֵן, וְקָדְמָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְנָטְלָה עִישּׂוּר נְכָסִים, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיקָה שְׁנִיָּה לִגְבּוֹת עַד שֶׁמֵּת הַבֵּן.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was stated, that the amora’im disagree about the following issue: There is a case of one who died and left two daughters and a son, and the first daughter went ahead and took one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as sons are obligated to sustain their deceased father’s daughters until they reach majority or become betrothed and to give them part of his estate as a dowry, as daughters do not inherit when there are sons; but the second daughter did not manage to collect her tenth of the estate for her dowry before the son died. Therefore, the entire estate fell to the two daughters, who then divide it between themselves, and there is a dispute as to how they divide the estate.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה. וְאָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, גְּדוֹלָה מִזּוֹ אָמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין לְפַרְנָסָה וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לִמְזוֹנוֹת; וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ שְׁנִיָּה וִיתְּרָה?!
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate, and therefore she cannot demand that she should first receive one-tenth of the estate as her dowry, as did her sister, and that only afterward they divide what remains of the estate equally between themselves. And Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Did they not say even more than this, that if the brother sold off property belonging to his father’s estate, payment for the daughter’s dowry can be appropriated from the buyer, but payment for her sustenance cannot be appropriated from him? If the father’s estate is liened to his daughter’s dowry, so that she can collect her dowry even from a third party who bought the property from the son, she should be able to collect it from her father’s estate before it is divided up between the daughters. And you say that the second daughter forfeited her one-tenth of the estate?
וְהָא פַּרְנָסָה – דְּמִיקָץ קַיְיצָא, מִיכְתָּב לָא כְּתִיבָא; וְקָא מוֹצִיאָה!
The Gemara tries to draw a conclusion with regard to the question that was raised previously: But isn’t the dowry mentioned by Rabbi Ḥanina, i.e., the dowry to which an orphan daughter is entitled from her father’s estate, of a fixed amount, i.e., one-tenth of the estate, and it is not written? And nevertheless, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, it can be appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another party.
שָׁאנֵי פַּרְנָסָה, כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לַהּ קָלָא, כְּמַאן דִּכְתִיבָא דָּמֵי.
The Gemara rejects this argument: A dowry is different, since it generates publicity. If one dies and is survived by daughters, everyone knows that a portion of his estate is pledged for their dowries. Therefore, the obligation is considered to be as if it were written. In other situations, it might be necessary according to Rabbi Ḥanina that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and written.
מֵתִיב רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ: מֵתוּ – בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִזּוֹנוֹת מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין,
Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ raised an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 101b) that addresses the case of a woman who was married to a man with whom she had stipulated that he would sustain her daughter from a previous marriage. After receiving a divorce from him, she married a different man with whom she made the same stipulation, so that the stepdaughter receives sustenance from the two husbands. That mishna states: If the husbands died, then their own daughters, even from that same woman, are sustained only from the unsold property in their estate. This accords with the halakha taught in the mishna above (48b).
וְהִיא נִזּוֹנֶת מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּבַעֲלַת חוֹב!
The mishna in Ketubot continues: But the stepdaughter is sustained even from liened property that had been sold to a third party. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, and therefore she has the right to collect her debt from property formerly owned by her stepfather, her debtor. This is difficult according to both opinions, as the stepdaughter’s sustenance is appropriated from liened property that has been sold to another person, despite it being neither a fixed amount nor written.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the mother acquired the right to the daughter’s sustenance from his possession, i.e., where they performed an act of acquisition confirming the stipulation. Consequently, it is considered as though the stipulation had been written and publicized, and so the property of the two husbands is liened for the stepdaughter’s sustenance.
אִי הָכִי, בָּנוֹת נָמֵי! בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ לָזוֹ, וְלֹא קָנוּ לָזוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the mishna is referring to a case where they performed an act acquisition, then the deceased’s own daughters as well should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property that has been sold to a third party. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the mother acquired the right to sustenance on behalf of this one, the stepdaughter, but did not acquire the right to sustenance on behalf of the other daughters.
מַאי פַּסְקָא? בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ, דַּהֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן; בִּתּוֹ, דְּלָא הֲוַאי בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – לָא מַהֲנֵי לָהּ קִנְיַן.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the decision of the tanna to record the halakha in a case where the mother acquired the right for this one but not for that one? The Gemara explains: With regard to his wife’s daughter from her previous marriage, who was alive at the time of the act of acquisition, i.e., when he gave the mother her marriage contract, the act of acquisition is effective for her. With regard to his own daughter from this mother, who was not alive at the time of the act of acquisition, the act of acquisition is not effective for her.
מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּהֲווֹ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בִּשְׁעַת קִנְיָן – וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי, דְּגָרְשַׁהּ וְאַהְדְּרַהּ?!
The Gemara raises an objection: Are we not dealing here even with a case where both of them were alive at the time of the act of acquisition? And what are the circumstances? It is a case where after she was married to him and had a daughter from him, he divorced her and later remarried her, at which time an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation with regard to sustenance. As his own daughter was alive at the time, why is the act of acquisition not effective for his own daughter’s sustenance as it is for that of his stepdaughter?
אֶלָּא בִּתּוֹ – דְּבִתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, לָא מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיַן; בַּת אִשְׁתּוֹ – דְּלָאו בִּתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, מַהֲנֵי לַהּ קִנְיָן.
Rather, the difference between them is as follows: With regard to his own daughter, who eats, i.e., is sustained, from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, as the daughter’s right to sustenance from her father’s estate is an inseparable part of her mother’s marriage contract, the act of acquisition that was performed is not effective for her, because her entitlement is derived from a different source, the stipulation of the court. With regard to his wife’s daughter, who eats from his estate not based on a stipulation of the court, as her entitlement is based on the explicit stipulation made between the husband and the wife, the act of acquisition is effective for her and enables her to collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to a third party.
וְכִי מִיגְרָע גָּרְעָה?! אֶלָּא בִּתּוֹ – כֵּיוָן דְּבִתְנַאי בֵּית דִּין קָאָכְלָה, אֵימַר צְרָרֵי אַתְפְּסַהּ.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But is a right that is rooted in two sources, both a stipulation of the court and an act of acquisition, inferior to a right that is rooted in an act of acquisition alone? The act of acquisition is in addition to the stipulation of the court, and should be effective for her as well. Rather, this is the difference between them: With regard to his own daughter, since his daughter eats from his estate based on a stipulation of the court, say that perhaps he already gave her money during his lifetime for her sustenance. Since there is uncertainty, she cannot recover her sustenance from liened property, even if an act of acquisition was performed to confirm the stipulation. With regard to the stepdaughter, there is no concern that perhaps he already gave her the money while he was alive. Therefore, if an act of acquisition was performed, she can collect her sustenance even from liened property that has been sold to another.
תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן: אֵימָתַי – בִּזְמַן שֶׁקָּדַם מִקָּחוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי לְשִׁבְחוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן;
The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party: Come and hear what Rabbi Natan said: When do we say that if one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land and enhanced it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had been appropriated reclaimed the property, the buyer can recover the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements only from unsold property in the robber’s possession but not from liened property that has been sold to another party? This is said when the purchase of the second buyer, i.e., the party who purchased the property that rightfully belonged to the robber, preceded the enhancements made by the first buyer to the appropriated property he purchased from the robber.
אֲבָל קָדַם שִׁבְחוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן לְמִקָּחוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי – גּוֹבֶה מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים. אַלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא קָדֵים הוּא!
But if the enhancements made by the first buyer preceded the acquisition of the second buyer, then he can collect the increase in value of the field resulting from his enhancements even from liened property that has been sold to the second buyer. Apparently, he cannot collect the increase in value from liened property because the enhancements did not precede the sale of the other field, not because the increase in value is not of a fixed amount or written in a deed.
תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין מוֹצִיאִין לַאֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת, וְלִשְׁבַח קַרְקָעוֹת, וְלִמְזוֹן אִשָּׁה וְהַבָּנוֹת – מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם; לְפִי שֶׁאֵין כְּתוּבִין.
The Gemara answers: Proof cannot be brought one way or the other from this baraita, since the issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in another baraita: The court does not appropriate payment from liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land or for the sustenance of a man’s wife and daughters. The reason why one cannot collect these debts from liened property is for the betterment of the world, because all these obligations are not written in any deed. If purchasers are at risk of losing the land they purchased to pay debts of the seller that had not been written, they will have no way to protect themselves, and no one will purchase land.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: וְכִי מָה תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם יֵשׁ בָּזוֹ? וַהֲלֹא אֵין קְצוּבִין!
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this, in stating that the reason the land is not appropriated is only because the debt was not written? But isn’t the real reason that these obligations cannot be collected from liened property is that they are not of a fixed amount? No one would be willing to purchase land if the land were liened to an unlimited debt. It is clear in this baraita that the criteria for collection from liened property that has been sold to a third party are subject to a tannaitic dispute.
וְהַמּוֹצֵא מְצִיאָה לֹא יִשָּׁבַע. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: ״שְׁנֵי כִּיסִין קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ לִי״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא מָצָאתִי אֶלָּא אֶחָד״ – נִשְׁבָּע. ״שְׁנֵי שְׁוָורִים קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ לִי״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא הָיָה אֶלָּא אֶחָד״ – אֵינוֹ נִשְׁבָּע.
§ The mishna teaches: And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: If the owner of the lost item brings a claim against the finder, saying: You found two money pouches tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: I found only one pouch, then the finder takes an oath, similar to anyone who admits to part of a claim. If the owner claims: You found two oxen tied together that belong to me, and the other person says: There was only one ox, the finder is not required to take an oath.
מַאי טַעְמָא? שְׁווֹרִין מִנַּתְחִי מֵהֲדָדֵי, כִּיסִין לָא מִנַּתְחִי מֵהֲדָדֵי.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases? It is that oxen become detached from each other. Consequently, it is possible that when the oxen were lost, there had been two that were tied together, but afterward they became separated and the finder found only one. By contrast, pouches do not become detached from each other. Since the finder admits that he found one of them, it stands to reason that he actually found both of them.
״שְׁנֵי שְׁווֹרִין קְשׁוּרִין מָצָאתָ״; וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״מָצָאתִי וְהֶחְזַרְתִּי לָךְ אֶחָד מֵהֶן״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע.
Rabbi Yitzḥak also says: If the owner of the lost item says to the finder: You found two tied oxen, and the other person says: I found two oxen, but I already returned one of them to you, then the finder takes an oath.
וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק – לֵית לֵיהּ ״הַמּוֹצֵא מְצִיאָה לָא יִשָּׁבַע – מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם״?!
A question may be raised against these rulings of Rabbi Yitzḥak: But does Rabbi Yitzḥak not accept the halakha stated in the mishna that one who finds a lost item is not required to take an oath, this being an enactment instituted for the betterment of the world?
הוּא דְּאָמַר, כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע. וְזֶה הוּא שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitzḥak stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevuot 5:10) that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when a person takes an oath about his own claim. How so? One says to another: One hundred dinars of your deceased father’s was in my possession, as I had borrowed that sum from him. And I already paid him part [peras] of it, but I still owe you fifty dinars. In this case, he is not believed unless he takes an oath that he repaid the half, like anyone who admits to part of a claim. And this is an example of a case where one takes an oath about his own claim. Although nobody has claimed anything from him, he still takes an oath on the basis of his own statement.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
But the Rabbis say: In such a case, the borrower is regarded only as someone who is returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from an oath. Rabbi Yitzḥak’s position is similar to that of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Since the finder says that he found only half of what the owner claims was lost, he is treated like someone who admits to part of a claim and therefore takes an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – לֵית לֵיהּ: ״מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה – פָּטוּר״?! אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן.
The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not maintain that someone who returns a lost item is exempt from an oath? Rav says: The case in dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis is not one where nobody has claimed anything from the borrower, as in such a case all agree that the borrower is exempt from taking an oath. Rather, it is a case where the creditor has died, leaving a child as his heir, and this minor confronts the borrower and claims a hundred dinars from him, which he alleges was lent by his late father. The other admits to having borrowed the money but claims that he already repaid half the sum. Since he admits to part of the claim, he takes an oath that he did repay the other part.
קָטָן, מִידֵּי מְשָׁשָׁא אִית בֵּיהּ?! וְהָתְנַן: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower’s admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.
מַאי ״קָטָן״ – גָּדוֹל; וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״קָטָן״? דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא.
The Gemara answers: To which kind of minor was Rav referring? It was to an adult son of the creditor. And why does Rav call him a minor, if he is in fact an adult? It is as with regard to his father’s affairs he is like a minor. He does not know with certainty how much money the borrower repaid but merely says that he thinks he owes his father more.
אִי הָכִי, טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ?! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הוּא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that we are dealing with a case where the deceased creditor’s adult son made a claim against the debtor, how can Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say about this claim that it is his own claim? Is this an oath taken about his own claim? It is an oath taken about the claim of others, i.e., the son. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov calls it an oath taken about one’s own claim, although it is really the claim of others, because it is his own admission that obligates him to take the oath.
כּוּלְּהוּ טַעֲנָתָא נָמֵי, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ! אֶלָּא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּאָמַר רַבָּה, מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה – יִשָּׁבַע? חֲזָקָה – אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ;
The Gemara objects: All claims that lead to the oath of one who admits to part of the claim are also a combination of the claim of others and the defendant’s own admission. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the following explanation given by Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim brought against him takes an oath with regard to the rest of the claim, which he denies, whereas one who denies the entire claim is not required to take an oath? Rabba answers: The oath of partial admission is based on a presumption with regard to the defendant’s behavior. There is a presumption that a person would not be so brazen as to stand before his creditor and deny his debt when his creditor knows that he is lying.
וְהַאי, בְּכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי לְמִכְפְּרֵיהּ לֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כַּפְרֵיהּ – מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ; וּבְכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ – אִישְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ – סָבַר: עַד דְּהָווּ לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ; וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עִילָּוֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
Rabba continues: And this one who admits to part of the claim would want to deny all of it, and the only reason he does not deny all of it is because a person would not be so brazen before his creditor. And in fact, he would want to admit to all of the claim to him. And the reason that he did not admit the whole claim to him and say that in fact he owes him the entire sum is that he was evading his obligation temporarily. The debtor is short of money and he thinks: I will pay my creditor as much as I can afford now, and I will evade paying the rest until I have enough money, and then I will repay him the rest, to which I have not yet admitted. Therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on the debtor in order to induce him to admit all of the debt to the creditor.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ – אֵינוֹ מֵעֵיז, וְהִילְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הוּא; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעֵיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ מֵעֵיז, וּמִדְּלֹא מֵעֵיז – מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הוּא.
Following Rabba’s reasoning, the difference of opinion between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis can be explained as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that there is no difference between the creditor himself and the creditor’s son, as in all cases the debtor would not be so brazen as to deny his debt. Therefore, the debtor is not considered like someone who is returning a lost item. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that Rabba’s reasoning applies in this case as well, so he is required to take an oath. And the Rabbis hold that he would not be so brazen as to deny a debt before the creditor himself, but toward his creditor’s son he would be brazen and deny the claim completely. And since he was not so brazen as to deny the entire claim, but admitted to part of it, he is considered like someone returning a lost item, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath.
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