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Today's Daf Yomi

July 5, 2023 | 讟状讝 讘转诪讜讝 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

Gittin 50

拽讘诇谉 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪砖转注讘讚 注专讘 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜拽讘诇谉 讚讻转讜讘讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 谞讻住讬 诇诇讜讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讗讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚


Everyone also agrees that an unconditional guarantor for the repayment of a creditor becomes responsible for payment of the borrower鈥檚 debt. The Sages disagree with regard to the following cases: A guarantor for the repayment of a creditor and an unconditional guarantor for payment of a marriage contract. There is one Sage who says: Although the borrower does not have property of his own at the time of the loan, the guarantor becomes responsible for payment of the obligation. And there is one Sage who says: If the obligated party has property of his own, then the guarantor becomes responsible; if he does not have property of his own, he does not become responsible.


讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讘讻讜诇讛讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讘专 诪注专讘 讚讻转讜讘讛 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚


And the halakha is: In all of these cases, although the obligated party does not have property of his own at the time he assumes the obligation, the guarantor becomes responsible for payment of that obligation. This is so except in the case of a guarantor for payment of a marriage contract, as in that case, even if the husband has property of his own when he gives a marriage contract, the guarantor does not become responsible for payment of the obligation.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 讚注讘讚 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讞住专讛


What is the reason for this? The intention of the guarantor is performing a mitzva of facilitating a marriage by encouraging the woman to consent to the marriage as a result of his involvement, but he does not truly intend to obligate himself. And furthermore, the woman does not lose anything in exchange for which the guarantor would accept responsibility, as the husband does not borrow money from the woman. Therefore, the Sages instituted that the guarantor does not become responsible for payment of the marriage contract from his own property.


讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 诪注讬拽专讗 讚转拽谞转讬谉 讬讜转专 诪诪讛 砖讛讗讬砖 专讜爪讛 诇讬砖讗 讗砖讛 专讜爪讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪讬转诪讬 讛讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讬转诪讬 讛讜讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚诪专 讝讜讟专讗 转讬讜讘转讗


Ravina said: Come and hear a proof concerning the question of whether the mishna鈥檚 ruling that payment of a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land applies only when the woman collects from orphans or if it applies even when she collects from her husband. The proof is from the beginning of our ordinance: Why did the Sages say that a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land? It is because more than a man wants to marry a woman, a woman wants to become married to a man. And if it enters your mind that this halakha applies only when the woman collects from orphans, then the reason given for this halakha should be that it is because they are orphans, not because a woman wants to become married. This indicates that the mishna鈥檚 ruling applies even when she collects her marriage contract during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, contrary to the opinion of Mar Zutra. The Gemara affirms: The refutation of the opinion of Mar Zutra is a conclusive refutation.


讗诪专 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讛讬讜爪讗 注诇 讛讬转讜诪讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘 讘讜 砖讘讞 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转


搂 Apropos a statement attributed to Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, the Gemara cites another halakha in his name on a similar topic: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, said in the name of Rav Na岣an: If a promissory note is presented to orphans for repayment of a loan taken by their father, then although an enhancement of the creditor鈥檚 ability to collect, enabling the collection of even superior-value land, is written in it, the creditor can collect only from inferior-quality land.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转讚注 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讬谞讬讛 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜诪讬转诪讬 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转


Abaye said: Know that this is the case, as the halakha governing a creditor is that he collects from intermediate-quality land, but from orphans he collects only from inferior-quality land. If one cannot collect even from intermediate-quality land of orphans, all the more so one cannot collect from their superior-quality land.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讬谞讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转 讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转 砖谞讗诪专 讘讞讜抓 转注诪讚 讜讛讗讬砖 讜讙讜壮 诪讛 讚专讻讜 砖诇 讗讬砖 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻讞讜转 砖讘讻诇讬诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讬谉 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


Rava said to him: How can these two cases be compared? By Torah law, the halakha governing a creditor is that he collects from inferior-quality land, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: By Torah law, a creditor collects from inferior-quality land, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall stand outside, and the man to whom you have lent shall bring forth the pledge out to you鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:11). What would a man ordinarily take out as a pledge? The least valuable of his vessels. This demonstrates that the creditor is entitled only to the least valuable of the debtor鈥檚 vessels. Similarly, when he collects from land, he collects only from inferior-quality land. And for what reason did the Sages say that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land? So as not to lock the door before potential borrowers, i.e., so that people do not refrain from extending loans. And with regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is stated in the Torah.


讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讚讬谞讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘注讬讚讬转 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬转诪讬 谞诪讬 讘注讬讚讬转


But here, a stipulation enhancing the creditor鈥檚 ability to collect was included in the promissory note. Therefore, since by Torah law the halakha governing this creditor is that he collects from superior-quality land as stipulated in the loan agreement, then he should also collect from superior-quality land even when collecting the debt from orphans.


讜诇专讘讗 讜讛转谞讬 讗讘专诐 讞讜讝讗讛 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 谞讬讝拽讬谉 讜讛讗 谞讬讝拽讬谉 讚讬谞谉 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘注讬讚讬转


The Gemara asks: And according to this explanation of Rava, there is a difficulty: Didn鈥檛 the Sage Avram 岣za鈥檃 teach a baraita that states: A father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land? The Gemara infers: And this ruling applies even if the property is collected for payment to injured parties. But isn鈥檛 it true that by Torah law the halakha governing injured parties is that they collect from superior-quality land? This indicates that even when by Torah law collection should be from superior-quality land, the Sages instituted that one may collect from orphans only inferior-quality land.


讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讻讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽


The Gemara answers: With what case are we dealing here in the baraita taught by Avram 岣za鈥檃? We are dealing with a case where superior-quality land of the injured party is equal in quality to inferior-quality land of the one who caused the damage, i.e., the orphans, and the one who caused the damage also has land of superior quality.


讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘讚谞讬讝拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讚诪讝讬拽 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


And the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: By Torah law we appraise the property of the injured party, and therefore the one who caused the damage can pay with his inferior-quality fields that are equal in quality to the superior-quality land owned by the injured party. And for the betterment of the world, the Sages instituted that we appraise the property of the one who caused the damage, and he pays with his superior-quality land. But with regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is stated in the Torah; they pay from their inferior-quality land that is equal in quality to superior-quality land belonging to the injured party. By contrast, a creditor who holds a promissory note stipulating that the debt can be collected from superior-quality land can collect superior-quality land even from orphans, as stipulated in the loan agreement.


讗讬谞讬 讜讛转谞讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞讬讜转讗讛 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 注讬讚讬转 诪讗讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 注讬讚讬转 诇讗讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讻转讬讘 注讬讚讬转 讘砖讟专讗


The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer Nayota鈥檃 teach a baraita that states: A father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land, even if it is superior-quality land? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if it is superior-quality land? Is it not the following: Although superior-quality land is written in the promissory note, the debt can be collected from the orphans only from inferior-quality land.


诇讗 诪讗讬 注讬讚讬转 砖驻讗讬 注讬讚讬转 讻讚专讘讗


The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, what is the meaning of superior-quality land? Orphans can repay the debt even from strips of superior-quality land that due to their location cannot be cultivated or guarded and that consequently have a lower market value than inferior-quality land, as in the statement of Rava.


讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讝讬拽 讝讬讘讜专讬转 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 砖驻讗讬 注讬讚讬转 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


As Rava says: If one damaged inferior-quality land, the injured party collects from superior-quality land. The one who caused damage is penalized and made to pay from land of much higher quality than that which he damaged. If he damaged strips of superior-quality land that cannot be cultivated, the injured party collects from intermediate-quality land, as the land that was damaged is inferior in value even to inferior-quality land, and therefore it suffices if compensation is paid from intermediate-quality land. And why did Rabbi Eliezer Nayota鈥檃 teach that orphans may pay their father鈥檚 debt from land of the lowest quality? With regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is written in the Torah, that a creditor collects from inferior-quality land.


讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讘注讬 专讘 讗讞讚讘讜讬 讘专 讗诪讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 拽讟谞讬诐 讗讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 转拽谞转讗 讛讬讗 讚注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 诇拽讟谞讬诐 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐 诇讗 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉


搂 The mishna teaches: If one who owed money died and his children inherited his property, the father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land. Rav A岣devoi bar Ami raised a dilemma with regard to the meaning of this statement: Do the orphans of which they spoke refer specifically to minors or even to adults? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Is this an ordinance that the Sages instituted for the benefit of the orphans, in which case it may be argued that the Sages instituted it for minors but they did not institute it for adults?


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 讗讚注转讗 讚诪诇讜讛 讚诪讬转 诇讜讛 讜谞驻诇讬 谞讻住讬 拽诪讬 讬转诪讬 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 谞讜注诇 讚诇转 讛诇讻讱 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 谞诪讬


Or, perhaps the reason is different. The reason that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land is so that the door not be locked before potential borrowers. Here, this is not a concern, since it does not enter the mind of the creditor that he should not lend money as perhaps the borrower will die and his property will fall to the orphans. As only if he were to consider this possibility, would it be that this would lock the door before potential borrowers. Consequently, the ordinance that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land was instituted only in the standard case, where the creditor collects from the debtor himself, but not where he collects from the heirs. Therefore, the ordinance that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only from inferior-quality land should apply also to adult orphans.


转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 讗讘讬讬 拽砖讬砖讗 讬转讜诪讬谉 砖讗诪专讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讜诪专 拽讟谞讬诐


The Gemara answers: Come and hear what Abaye the Elder taught: With regard to the orphans of which the Sages spoke, the phrase is referring to adults, and needless to say it is referring also to minors.


讜讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘讜注讛 讚讙讚讜诇 讘诪讬诇讬 讚讗讘讜讛 讻拽讟谉 讚诪讬 讗讘诇 诇注谞讬谉 讝讬讘讜专讬转 诇讗


The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps this statement applies only to the matter of an oath. One who collects a debt from property left by the debtor to his heirs always takes an oath, even if he produces a promissory note. This halakha applies even if the heirs are adults. This is because even an adult son is considered like a minor with regard to his father鈥檚 financial matters, since he does not know the details of his father鈥檚 business dealings and it is possible that his father had actually repaid the debt before dying. But with regard to collecting the debt from inferior-quality land, no, this halakha applies only to minors.


讜讛诇讻转讗


The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is:


讬转讜诪讬谉 砖讗诪专讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讜诪专 拽讟谞讬诐 讘讬谉 诇砖讘讜注讛 讘讬谉 诇讝讬讘讜专讬转


With regard to the orphans of which the Sages spoke, the phrase is referring to adults, and needless to say it is referring also to minors, whether with regard to the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only with an oath, or whether with regard to the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only from inferior-quality land.


讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讘注讬 专讘 讗讞讚讘讜讬 讘专 讗诪讬 讘诪转谞讛 讛讬讗讱


搂 The mishna teaches: Payment of a debt or other obligation is not collected from liened property that has been sold to a third party when the debtor still has unsold property, even when this unsold property is inferior-quality land. Rav A岣devoi bar Ami raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to liened property that the debtor gave to another person as a gift? Is it the halakha that the debt is not collected from liened property that has been given as a gift to a third party when the debtor still has property?


转拽谞转讗 讛讜讗 讚注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 诪砖讜诐 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 讗讘诇 诪转谞讛 讚诇讬讻讗 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 诪转谞讛 讜讛诇讻讱 讻讬 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 讚诪讬


The Gemara presents the two sides to this dilemma: Is the halakha that payment is not collected from liened property that has been sold an ordinance that the Sages instituted due to the loss of the buyers, who would lose the money that they had paid for the property? But in the case of a gift, where there is no issue of loss to the buyers, i.e., the recipients, as the recipients paid nothing for the property, the halakha does not apply. Or perhaps the halakha applies to a gift as well, as, were it not for some benefit that the donor derives from the recipient, he would not have given him the gift. And therefore this loss to the recipient is considered to be like the loss to buyers and payment of the debt is not collected from the recipient of the gift when the debtor still has property in his possession.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 拽砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗专讘注 诪讗讜转 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 讝讻讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讙讜讘讛 诪讻讜诇谉


Mar Kashisha, son of Rav 岣sda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Batra 9:6): If a person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and three hundred to so-and-so, and four hundred to so-and-so, in this case one does not say that whoever appears first in the deed acquires his money first. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against the one who gave the gifts, and it becomes clear that the money given was pledged to a creditor, then the creditor collects from all of them.


讗讘诇 讗诐 讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 讝讻讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讙讜讘讛 诪砖诇驻谞讬讜 讗讬谉 诇讜 讙讜讘讛 诪砖诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜


But if the person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so, then one says: Anyone who appears first in the deed acquires his money first. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against him, the creditor first collects from the last one of the recipients. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the previous person. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the person listed before the previous person.


讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽诪讗 讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜讘转专讗 讝讬讘讜专讬转 诪讝讬讘讜专讬转 讙讘讬 诪讘讬谞讜谞讬转 诇讗 讙讘讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讘诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗


The Gemara infers: And this is the halakha even if the property given to the first recipient is intermediate-quality land and the property given to the last recipient is inferior-quality land. Although a creditor is entitled to collect his debt from intermediate-quality land, the creditor in this case collects from inferior-quality land, as he collects from the last person to receive his gift, and he does not collect from the intermediate-quality land given to the first recipient. Conclude from the baraita that the Sages also instituted this ordinance in the case of a gift, and that payment of a debt is not collected from liened property that has been given as a gift to a third party when the debtor still has property that has not been sold or given away as a gift. The reason is that the second gift is considered to be unsold property in relation to the first gift because, when the first gift was given, the second gift was still in the donor鈥檚 possession.


讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜讛讗 转谞讜 拽讗诪专 转谞讜 讘讞讜讘讬


The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are not dealing here with a person on his deathbed who is distributing monetary gifts, but rather with a debtor who is dividing his money between his various creditors. The Gemara raises an objection: But didn鈥檛 the person on his deathbed say: Give the money to so-and-so, a formulation that indicates that he is granting a gift? The Gemara answers that what this means is: Give this money as payment for my debt.


讜诇讬讞讝讬 砖讟专讗 讚诪讗谉 拽讚讬诐 讚诇讬讻讗 砖讟专讗 讜讛讗 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 拽讗诪专 讘砖讟专 驻拽讚转讗


The Gemara asks: If so, why should the recovery of the debts depend upon the wording of the debtor鈥檚 instructions? But let us see whose promissory note was written first, as it is he who collects first. The Gemara answers: We are dealing with a case where there is no promissory note, e.g., where the creditors lost their deeds. The Gemara raises an objection: But didn鈥檛 it say in the baraita: Whoever appears first in the deed? This indicates that there is in fact a deed. The Gemara answers: The reference here is not to the promissory notes but to the testamentary deed drawn up by the person on his deathbed.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诪讗讬 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 谞驻住讚 讗诇讗 讗讞专讜谉


And if you wish, say: The baraita is referring also to a case of a gift, and even if the mishna鈥檚 ordinance does not apply to liened property that had been given away as a gift, the halakha that the creditor collects from the last recipient is not difficult, as what is the meaning of the words: He collects from the last recipient? This means that it is only the last recipient who really loses, as the creditor can collect from intermediate-quality land wherever it is, even if it is in the possession of the first recipient. But after the creditor collects what is due him, the recipients of the gifts distribute the remaining property, in accordance with the order set down in the donor鈥檚 testament. Therefore, it will always be the last recipient who loses and no one else.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚砖讜讜 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讛讚讚讬


And if you wish, say: The baraita is referring to a case where all of the properties are of equal quality. There is no reason to collect specifically from the first recipient because he has intermediate-quality land as opposed to the last recipient who does not. In such a case, the debt is collected first from the last recipient. Therefore, there is no proof from here that the mishna鈥檚 ordinance applies even to liened property that had been given away as a gift.


讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉


搂 The mishna teaches: The court does not appropriate liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce. If one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land, improved it, and grew produce on it, and then the owner came and took back his field together with the produce, the buyer cannot collect the value of the produce from property that the robber sold to another person. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Ulla says that Reish Lakish says: This is because the produce is not written in the deed of sale. The obligation of a seller to reimburse the buyer if the field he sells him is repossessed by a prior owner or creditor is dependent upon the obligation recorded in the deed of sale. His obligation of reimbursement with regard to the produce is therefore treated like a loan by oral agreement, which is not a matter of public knowledge, and those who subsequently purchased land from the robber are not obligated to pay for debt incurred in a loan by oral agreement, as they had no way to know about it at the time of their purchase.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 诪讝讜谉 讛讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 讚讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讬 讚诪讜 讜拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉


Rabbi Abba said to Ulla: But isn鈥檛 the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters considered as if it were written, as even if it is not explicitly recorded in the marriage contract it is one of the fixed stipulations of a marriage contract that are imposed by the court? It is known that a man is obligated to provide for the sustenance of his wife and daughters, and yet the mishna teaches: Payment for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters cannot be collected from the husband鈥檚 liened property.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 诪注讬拽专讗 讛讻讬 讗转拽讜谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 诪砖讜注讘讚讬谉


Ulla said to him: There, with regard to sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters, the Sages instituted it like this from the outset: It is considered as if it were written with regard to unsold property that is still in the man鈥檚 possession, so that sustenance can be collected from such property, but it is not considered as if it were written with regard to liened property that has been sold to another party.


讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诇专讘 讗住讬 讜讛讗 诪讝讜谉 讛讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 讚讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讬 讚诪讜 讜拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讛讻讬 讗转拽讜谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 诪砖讜注讘讚讬谉


And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says with regard to the mishna: Why can鈥檛 the payment for the consumption of produce be collected from property that the robber sold to another person? It is because the produce is not written in the purchaser鈥檚 deed of sale. Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But isn鈥檛 the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters considered as if it were written in the marriage contract, and yet the mishna teaches: Payment for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters cannot be collected from the husband鈥檚 liened property? Rav Asi said to him: The Sages instituted it like this from the outset: Sustenance is considered as if it were written with regard to unsold property that is still in the man鈥檚 possession, so that sustenance can be collected from such property, but it is not considered as if it were written with regard to liened property that has been sold to another party. This concludes the discussion of one reason for the halakha in the mishna.


专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉


Rabbi 岣nina says that it is for a different reason that payment for the consumption of produce cannot be recovered from property that the robber sold to another person: It is because the produce is not of a fixed amount, i.e., it could not be known at the outset how much produce would grow on the field or what its value would be. The Sages instituted that any obligation that is not of a fixed amount cannot be collected from property sold to another person, because the purchaser of the liened property cannot assess the risk he is assuming of having another person come to collect compensation from that property for a loss he has suffered.


讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜讻转讜讘讬谉 讘注讬


A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina, in order to collect from liened property, is it necessary that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and also written? If so, this would indicate that Rabbi 岣nina adds another requirement in addition to that of Rabbi Yo岣nan.


  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Gittin is sponsored by Elaine and聽Saul聽Schreiber in honor of their daughter-in-law Daniela Schreiber on receiving her Master of Science in Marriage and Family Therapy.

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The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 50

拽讘诇谉 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪砖转注讘讚 注专讘 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜拽讘诇谉 讚讻转讜讘讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 谞讻住讬 诇诇讜讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讗讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚


Everyone also agrees that an unconditional guarantor for the repayment of a creditor becomes responsible for payment of the borrower鈥檚 debt. The Sages disagree with regard to the following cases: A guarantor for the repayment of a creditor and an unconditional guarantor for payment of a marriage contract. There is one Sage who says: Although the borrower does not have property of his own at the time of the loan, the guarantor becomes responsible for payment of the obligation. And there is one Sage who says: If the obligated party has property of his own, then the guarantor becomes responsible; if he does not have property of his own, he does not become responsible.


讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讘讻讜诇讛讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚 讘专 诪注专讘 讚讻转讜讘讛 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚


And the halakha is: In all of these cases, although the obligated party does not have property of his own at the time he assumes the obligation, the guarantor becomes responsible for payment of that obligation. This is so except in the case of a guarantor for payment of a marriage contract, as in that case, even if the husband has property of his own when he gives a marriage contract, the guarantor does not become responsible for payment of the obligation.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 讚注讘讚 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讞住专讛


What is the reason for this? The intention of the guarantor is performing a mitzva of facilitating a marriage by encouraging the woman to consent to the marriage as a result of his involvement, but he does not truly intend to obligate himself. And furthermore, the woman does not lose anything in exchange for which the guarantor would accept responsibility, as the husband does not borrow money from the woman. Therefore, the Sages instituted that the guarantor does not become responsible for payment of the marriage contract from his own property.


讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 转讗 砖诪注 诪注讬拽专讗 讚转拽谞转讬谉 讬讜转专 诪诪讛 砖讛讗讬砖 专讜爪讛 诇讬砖讗 讗砖讛 专讜爪讛 诇讬谞砖讗 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪讬转诪讬 讛讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讬转诪讬 讛讜讗 转讬讜讘转讗 讚诪专 讝讜讟专讗 转讬讜讘转讗


Ravina said: Come and hear a proof concerning the question of whether the mishna鈥檚 ruling that payment of a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land applies only when the woman collects from orphans or if it applies even when she collects from her husband. The proof is from the beginning of our ordinance: Why did the Sages say that a woman鈥檚 marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land? It is because more than a man wants to marry a woman, a woman wants to become married to a man. And if it enters your mind that this halakha applies only when the woman collects from orphans, then the reason given for this halakha should be that it is because they are orphans, not because a woman wants to become married. This indicates that the mishna鈥檚 ruling applies even when she collects her marriage contract during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, contrary to the opinion of Mar Zutra. The Gemara affirms: The refutation of the opinion of Mar Zutra is a conclusive refutation.


讗诪专 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讛讬讜爪讗 注诇 讛讬转讜诪讬谉 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘 讘讜 砖讘讞 讗讬谞讜 讙讜讘讛 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转


搂 Apropos a statement attributed to Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, the Gemara cites another halakha in his name on a similar topic: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, said in the name of Rav Na岣an: If a promissory note is presented to orphans for repayment of a loan taken by their father, then although an enhancement of the creditor鈥檚 ability to collect, enabling the collection of even superior-value land, is written in it, the creditor can collect only from inferior-quality land.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转讚注 讚讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讬谞讬讛 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜诪讬转诪讬 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转


Abaye said: Know that this is the case, as the halakha governing a creditor is that he collects from intermediate-quality land, but from orphans he collects only from inferior-quality land. If one cannot collect even from intermediate-quality land of orphans, all the more so one cannot collect from their superior-quality land.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讚讬谞讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转 讻讚注讜诇讗 讚讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘讝讬讘讜专讬转 砖谞讗诪专 讘讞讜抓 转注诪讚 讜讛讗讬砖 讜讙讜壮 诪讛 讚专讻讜 砖诇 讗讬砖 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻讞讜转 砖讘讻诇讬诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讬谉 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


Rava said to him: How can these two cases be compared? By Torah law, the halakha governing a creditor is that he collects from inferior-quality land, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: By Torah law, a creditor collects from inferior-quality land, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall stand outside, and the man to whom you have lent shall bring forth the pledge out to you鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:11). What would a man ordinarily take out as a pledge? The least valuable of his vessels. This demonstrates that the creditor is entitled only to the least valuable of the debtor鈥檚 vessels. Similarly, when he collects from land, he collects only from inferior-quality land. And for what reason did the Sages say that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land? So as not to lock the door before potential borrowers, i.e., so that people do not refrain from extending loans. And with regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is stated in the Torah.


讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讚讬谞讬讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘注讬讚讬转 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讬转诪讬 谞诪讬 讘注讬讚讬转


But here, a stipulation enhancing the creditor鈥檚 ability to collect was included in the promissory note. Therefore, since by Torah law the halakha governing this creditor is that he collects from superior-quality land as stipulated in the loan agreement, then he should also collect from superior-quality land even when collecting the debt from orphans.


讜诇专讘讗 讜讛转谞讬 讗讘专诐 讞讜讝讗讛 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 谞讬讝拽讬谉 讜讛讗 谞讬讝拽讬谉 讚讬谞谉 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘注讬讚讬转


The Gemara asks: And according to this explanation of Rava, there is a difficulty: Didn鈥檛 the Sage Avram 岣za鈥檃 teach a baraita that states: A father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land? The Gemara infers: And this ruling applies even if the property is collected for payment to injured parties. But isn鈥檛 it true that by Torah law the halakha governing injured parties is that they collect from superior-quality land? This indicates that even when by Torah law collection should be from superior-quality land, the Sages instituted that one may collect from orphans only inferior-quality land.


讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬转讛 注讬讚讬转 讚谞讬讝拽 讻讝讬讘讜专讬转 讚诪讝讬拽


The Gemara answers: With what case are we dealing here in the baraita taught by Avram 岣za鈥檃? We are dealing with a case where superior-quality land of the injured party is equal in quality to inferior-quality land of the one who caused the damage, i.e., the orphans, and the one who caused the damage also has land of superior quality.


讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讘讚谞讬讝拽 砖讬讬诪讬谞谉 讜诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讚诪讝讬拽 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


And the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: By Torah law we appraise the property of the injured party, and therefore the one who caused the damage can pay with his inferior-quality fields that are equal in quality to the superior-quality land owned by the injured party. And for the betterment of the world, the Sages instituted that we appraise the property of the one who caused the damage, and he pays with his superior-quality land. But with regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is stated in the Torah; they pay from their inferior-quality land that is equal in quality to superior-quality land belonging to the injured party. By contrast, a creditor who holds a promissory note stipulating that the debt can be collected from superior-quality land can collect superior-quality land even from orphans, as stipulated in the loan agreement.


讗讬谞讬 讜讛转谞讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 谞讬讜转讗讛 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 注讬讚讬转 诪讗讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛谉 注讬讚讬转 诇讗讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讻转讬讘 注讬讚讬转 讘砖讟专讗


The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Eliezer Nayota鈥檃 teach a baraita that states: A father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land, even if it is superior-quality land? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if it is superior-quality land? Is it not the following: Although superior-quality land is written in the promissory note, the debt can be collected from the orphans only from inferior-quality land.


诇讗 诪讗讬 注讬讚讬转 砖驻讗讬 注讬讚讬转 讻讚专讘讗


The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, what is the meaning of superior-quality land? Orphans can repay the debt even from strips of superior-quality land that due to their location cannot be cultivated or guarded and that consequently have a lower market value than inferior-quality land, as in the statement of Rava.


讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讝讬拽 讝讬讘讜专讬转 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛注讬讚讬转 砖驻讗讬 注讬讚讬转 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 讗讜拽诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 讗讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


As Rava says: If one damaged inferior-quality land, the injured party collects from superior-quality land. The one who caused damage is penalized and made to pay from land of much higher quality than that which he damaged. If he damaged strips of superior-quality land that cannot be cultivated, the injured party collects from intermediate-quality land, as the land that was damaged is inferior in value even to inferior-quality land, and therefore it suffices if compensation is paid from intermediate-quality land. And why did Rabbi Eliezer Nayota鈥檃 teach that orphans may pay their father鈥檚 debt from land of the lowest quality? With regard to orphans, the Sages left the halakha as it is written in the Torah, that a creditor collects from inferior-quality land.


讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬 讬转讜诪讬谉 讗诇讗 诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讘注讬 专讘 讗讞讚讘讜讬 讘专 讗诪讬 讬转讜诪讬诐 砖讗诪专讜 拽讟谞讬诐 讗讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 转拽谞转讗 讛讬讗 讚注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 讙讘讬 讬转诪讬 诇拽讟谞讬诐 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐 诇讗 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉


搂 The mishna teaches: If one who owed money died and his children inherited his property, the father鈥檚 debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land. Rav A岣devoi bar Ami raised a dilemma with regard to the meaning of this statement: Do the orphans of which they spoke refer specifically to minors or even to adults? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Is this an ordinance that the Sages instituted for the benefit of the orphans, in which case it may be argued that the Sages instituted it for minors but they did not institute it for adults?


讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 讗讚注转讗 讚诪诇讜讛 讚诪讬转 诇讜讛 讜谞驻诇讬 谞讻住讬 拽诪讬 讬转诪讬 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 谞讜注诇 讚诇转 讛诇讻讱 讗驻讬诇讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 谞诪讬


Or, perhaps the reason is different. The reason that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land is so that the door not be locked before potential borrowers. Here, this is not a concern, since it does not enter the mind of the creditor that he should not lend money as perhaps the borrower will die and his property will fall to the orphans. As only if he were to consider this possibility, would it be that this would lock the door before potential borrowers. Consequently, the ordinance that a creditor collects from intermediate-quality land was instituted only in the standard case, where the creditor collects from the debtor himself, but not where he collects from the heirs. Therefore, the ordinance that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only from inferior-quality land should apply also to adult orphans.


转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 讗讘讬讬 拽砖讬砖讗 讬转讜诪讬谉 砖讗诪专讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讜诪专 拽讟谞讬诐


The Gemara answers: Come and hear what Abaye the Elder taught: With regard to the orphans of which the Sages spoke, the phrase is referring to adults, and needless to say it is referring also to minors.


讜讚诇诪讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇注谞讬谉 砖讘讜注讛 讚讙讚讜诇 讘诪讬诇讬 讚讗讘讜讛 讻拽讟谉 讚诪讬 讗讘诇 诇注谞讬谉 讝讬讘讜专讬转 诇讗


The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps this statement applies only to the matter of an oath. One who collects a debt from property left by the debtor to his heirs always takes an oath, even if he produces a promissory note. This halakha applies even if the heirs are adults. This is because even an adult son is considered like a minor with regard to his father鈥檚 financial matters, since he does not know the details of his father鈥檚 business dealings and it is possible that his father had actually repaid the debt before dying. But with regard to collecting the debt from inferior-quality land, no, this halakha applies only to minors.


讜讛诇讻转讗


The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is:


讬转讜诪讬谉 砖讗诪专讜 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讜诪专 拽讟谞讬诐 讘讬谉 诇砖讘讜注讛 讘讬谉 诇讝讬讘讜专讬转


With regard to the orphans of which the Sages spoke, the phrase is referring to adults, and needless to say it is referring also to minors, whether with regard to the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only with an oath, or whether with regard to the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of orphans only from inferior-quality land.


讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪谞讻住讬诐 诪砖讜注讘讚讬诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讬砖 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讘注讬 专讘 讗讞讚讘讜讬 讘专 讗诪讬 讘诪转谞讛 讛讬讗讱


搂 The mishna teaches: Payment of a debt or other obligation is not collected from liened property that has been sold to a third party when the debtor still has unsold property, even when this unsold property is inferior-quality land. Rav A岣devoi bar Ami raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to liened property that the debtor gave to another person as a gift? Is it the halakha that the debt is not collected from liened property that has been given as a gift to a third party when the debtor still has property?


转拽谞转讗 讛讜讗 讚注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 诪砖讜诐 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 讗讘诇 诪转谞讛 讚诇讬讻讗 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 诪转谞讛 讜讛诇讻讱 讻讬 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转 讚诪讬


The Gemara presents the two sides to this dilemma: Is the halakha that payment is not collected from liened property that has been sold an ordinance that the Sages instituted due to the loss of the buyers, who would lose the money that they had paid for the property? But in the case of a gift, where there is no issue of loss to the buyers, i.e., the recipients, as the recipients paid nothing for the property, the halakha does not apply. Or perhaps the halakha applies to a gift as well, as, were it not for some benefit that the donor derives from the recipient, he would not have given him the gift. And therefore this loss to the recipient is considered to be like the loss to buyers and payment of the debt is not collected from the recipient of the gift when the debtor still has property in his possession.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 拽砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 转讗 砖诪注 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜砖诇砖 诪讗讜转 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗专讘注 诪讗讜转 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 讝讻讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讙讜讘讛 诪讻讜诇谉


Mar Kashisha, son of Rav 岣sda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Batra 9:6): If a person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and three hundred to so-and-so, and four hundred to so-and-so, in this case one does not say that whoever appears first in the deed acquires his money first. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against the one who gave the gifts, and it becomes clear that the money given was pledged to a creditor, then the creditor collects from all of them.


讗讘诇 讗诐 讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讗转讬诐 讝讜讝 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讗讞专讬讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 讝讻讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讬爪讗 注诇讬讜 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讙讜讘讛 诪砖诇驻谞讬讜 讗讬谉 诇讜 讙讜讘讛 诪砖诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜


But if the person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so, then one says: Anyone who appears first in the deed acquires his money first. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against him, the creditor first collects from the last one of the recipients. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the previous person. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the person listed before the previous person.


讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽诪讗 讘讬谞讜谞讬转 讜讘转专讗 讝讬讘讜专讬转 诪讝讬讘讜专讬转 讙讘讬 诪讘讬谞讜谞讬转 诇讗 讙讘讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讘诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗


The Gemara infers: And this is the halakha even if the property given to the first recipient is intermediate-quality land and the property given to the last recipient is inferior-quality land. Although a creditor is entitled to collect his debt from intermediate-quality land, the creditor in this case collects from inferior-quality land, as he collects from the last person to receive his gift, and he does not collect from the intermediate-quality land given to the first recipient. Conclude from the baraita that the Sages also instituted this ordinance in the case of a gift, and that payment of a debt is not collected from liened property that has been given as a gift to a third party when the debtor still has property that has not been sold or given away as a gift. The reason is that the second gift is considered to be unsold property in relation to the first gift because, when the first gift was given, the second gift was still in the donor鈥檚 possession.


讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讘注诇 讞讜讘 讜讛讗 转谞讜 拽讗诪专 转谞讜 讘讞讜讘讬


The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are not dealing here with a person on his deathbed who is distributing monetary gifts, but rather with a debtor who is dividing his money between his various creditors. The Gemara raises an objection: But didn鈥檛 the person on his deathbed say: Give the money to so-and-so, a formulation that indicates that he is granting a gift? The Gemara answers that what this means is: Give this money as payment for my debt.


讜诇讬讞讝讬 砖讟专讗 讚诪讗谉 拽讚讬诐 讚诇讬讻讗 砖讟专讗 讜讛讗 讻诇 讛拽讜讚诐 讘砖讟专 拽讗诪专 讘砖讟专 驻拽讚转讗


The Gemara asks: If so, why should the recovery of the debts depend upon the wording of the debtor鈥檚 instructions? But let us see whose promissory note was written first, as it is he who collects first. The Gemara answers: We are dealing with a case where there is no promissory note, e.g., where the creditors lost their deeds. The Gemara raises an objection: But didn鈥檛 it say in the baraita: Whoever appears first in the deed? This indicates that there is in fact a deed. The Gemara answers: The reference here is not to the promissory notes but to the testamentary deed drawn up by the person on his deathbed.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诪讗讬 讙讜讘讛 诪谉 讛讗讞专讜谉 讗讬谉 谞驻住讚 讗诇讗 讗讞专讜谉


And if you wish, say: The baraita is referring also to a case of a gift, and even if the mishna鈥檚 ordinance does not apply to liened property that had been given away as a gift, the halakha that the creditor collects from the last recipient is not difficult, as what is the meaning of the words: He collects from the last recipient? This means that it is only the last recipient who really loses, as the creditor can collect from intermediate-quality land wherever it is, even if it is in the possession of the first recipient. But after the creditor collects what is due him, the recipients of the gifts distribute the remaining property, in accordance with the order set down in the donor鈥檚 testament. Therefore, it will always be the last recipient who loses and no one else.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚砖讜讜 讻讜诇讛讜 诇讛讚讚讬


And if you wish, say: The baraita is referring to a case where all of the properties are of equal quality. There is no reason to collect specifically from the first recipient because he has intermediate-quality land as opposed to the last recipient who does not. In such a case, the debt is collected first from the last recipient. Therefore, there is no proof from here that the mishna鈥檚 ordinance applies even to liened property that had been given away as a gift.


讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉


搂 The mishna teaches: The court does not appropriate liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce. If one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land, improved it, and grew produce on it, and then the owner came and took back his field together with the produce, the buyer cannot collect the value of the produce from property that the robber sold to another person. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Ulla says that Reish Lakish says: This is because the produce is not written in the deed of sale. The obligation of a seller to reimburse the buyer if the field he sells him is repossessed by a prior owner or creditor is dependent upon the obligation recorded in the deed of sale. His obligation of reimbursement with regard to the produce is therefore treated like a loan by oral agreement, which is not a matter of public knowledge, and those who subsequently purchased land from the robber are not obligated to pay for debt incurred in a loan by oral agreement, as they had no way to know about it at the time of their purchase.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 诪讝讜谉 讛讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 讚讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讬 讚诪讜 讜拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉


Rabbi Abba said to Ulla: But isn鈥檛 the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters considered as if it were written, as even if it is not explicitly recorded in the marriage contract it is one of the fixed stipulations of a marriage contract that are imposed by the court? It is known that a man is obligated to provide for the sustenance of his wife and daughters, and yet the mishna teaches: Payment for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters cannot be collected from the husband鈥檚 liened property.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 诪注讬拽专讗 讛讻讬 讗转拽讜谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 诪砖讜注讘讚讬谉


Ulla said to him: There, with regard to sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters, the Sages instituted it like this from the outset: It is considered as if it were written with regard to unsold property that is still in the man鈥檚 possession, so that sustenance can be collected from such property, but it is not considered as if it were written with regard to liened property that has been sold to another party.


讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诇专讘 讗住讬 讜讛讗 诪讝讜谉 讛讗砖讛 讜讛讘谞讜转 讚讻诪讗谉 讚讻转讬讘讬 讚诪讜 讜拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讛讻讬 讗转拽讜谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 讘谞讬 讞讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛谉 讗爪诇 诪砖讜注讘讚讬谉


And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says with regard to the mishna: Why can鈥檛 the payment for the consumption of produce be collected from property that the robber sold to another person? It is because the produce is not written in the purchaser鈥檚 deed of sale. Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But isn鈥檛 the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters considered as if it were written in the marriage contract, and yet the mishna teaches: Payment for the sustenance of a man鈥檚 wife and daughters cannot be collected from the husband鈥檚 liened property? Rav Asi said to him: The Sages instituted it like this from the outset: Sustenance is considered as if it were written with regard to unsold property that is still in the man鈥檚 possession, so that sustenance can be collected from such property, but it is not considered as if it were written with regard to liened property that has been sold to another party. This concludes the discussion of one reason for the halakha in the mishna.


专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉


Rabbi 岣nina says that it is for a different reason that payment for the consumption of produce cannot be recovered from property that the robber sold to another person: It is because the produce is not of a fixed amount, i.e., it could not be known at the outset how much produce would grow on the field or what its value would be. The Sages instituted that any obligation that is not of a fixed amount cannot be collected from property sold to another person, because the purchaser of the liened property cannot assess the risk he is assuming of having another person come to collect compensation from that property for a loss he has suffered.


讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜讻转讜讘讬谉 讘注讬


A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina, in order to collect from liened property, is it necessary that the obligation be both of a fixed amount and also written? If so, this would indicate that Rabbi 岣nina adds another requirement in addition to that of Rabbi Yo岣nan.


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