Gittin 74

Gittin 74

וּמִטַּמֵּא לָהּ. כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר – אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

and he becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest. The principle of the matter is as follows: At that time she is like his wife in every sense, but she does not require a second bill of divorce from him when he dies. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: בְּעִילָתָהּ תְּלוּיָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בְּעִילָתָהּ סָפֵק. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיָּמוּת.

Rabbi Meir says: If she engages in sexual intercourse with another man, the legal status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from this illness. If he dies, she is considered to have been divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and her sexual intercourse is not deemed adulterous. Rabbi Yosei says: Her sexual intercourse has an uncertain status. And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and this is an uncertainty provided that he dies from this illness. If he does not, they are certainly not divorced.

מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי?

The Gemara clarifies: What difference is there between the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from his illness, and the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse is uncertain?

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ; לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר – לָא מַיְיתֵי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וּלְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מַיְיתֵי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the bringing of a provisional guilt-offering, which is brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the paramour does not bring a provisional guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), because, although there was uncertainty at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, the matter will eventually be clarified once the husband either dies or recovers from his illness. If the husband survives her paramour must bring a sin-offering, and if the husband dies the other man is exempt from bringing any offering. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei her status is uncertain, and even if the husband dies from this illness Rabbi Yosei is uncertain when the bill of divorce took effect. Therefore, her paramour must bring a provisional guilt-offering.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. חֲכָמִים הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי! אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים ״מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״ – בַּעְלָהּ חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ.

The baraita taught: And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. The Gemara comments: Apparently, the opinion of the Rabbis is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Why are they recorded as having a dispute? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakhic ruling transmitted by Rabbi Zeira. As Rabbi Zeira says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: Wherever the Sages said: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her with sustenance. This formulation is stated only by the Rabbis, and Rabbi Zeira’s halakha would apply only according to them, not according to Rabbi Yosei.

מַתְנִי׳ ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, וְתִתֵּן.

MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then she is divorced and must give two hundred dinars in order to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce.

״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מִיכָּן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ – אִם נָתְנָה לוֹ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת; וְאִם לָאו, אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced. And if not she is not divorced.

אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּצַיְדָּן, בְּאֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי אִיצְטְלִיתִי״, וְאָבְדָה אִיצְטְלִיתוֹ, וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: תִּתֵּן לוֹ אֶת דָּמֶיהָ.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat [itztaliti], and she lost his coat, so that she could not give it to him. And the Rabbis said that she must give him the value of the coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״וְתִתֵּן״? רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: וְהִיא תִּתֵּן. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: לִכְשֶׁתִּתֵּן.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: She is divorced and must give the money. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And must give? Rav Huna says: She is divorced immediately, once the bill of divorce has been given over to her, and she must give him the money subsequently in order to fulfill the condition. The bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, from the time when it was given, after she gives the money. Rav Yehuda says: She is divorced only when she gives him this sum.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שֶׁנִּתְקָרַע הַגֵּט אוֹ שֶׁאָבַד; רַב הוּנָא אָמַר ״וְהִיא תִּתֵּן״ – אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי; רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר ״לִכְשֶׁתִּתֵּן״ – צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Huna and the opinion of Rav Yehuda? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them if the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna, who says: And she must give but the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, if it was torn or lost then she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. By contrast, Rav Yehuda says that the divorce takes effect only when she gives him the sum. Therefore, if the document is torn or lost she requires a second bill of divorce from him, as in his opinion it is not yet a valid bill of divorce until she has given him the money.

וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא – דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי, עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֶתֵּן לִיךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז״ – הֲרֵי הִיא מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וְיִתֵּן. וְאִיתְּמַר: מַאי ״וְיִתֵּן״? רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: וְהוּא יִתֵּן. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן.

The Gemara comments: And it was also taught in the mishna with regard to betrothal that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagreed about a case like this, as we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 60a): If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, then she is betrothed, and he must give the sum. And it was stated that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed with regard to what is the meaning of: And he must give. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that she is betrothed immediately, provided that the husband gives what he promised. Rav Yehuda says: She is betrothed only when he gives.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ – שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְקִיבְּלָה קִידּוּשִׁין מֵאַחֵר. רַב הוּנָא אָמַר ״וְהוּא יִתֵּן״ – תְּנָאָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, מְקַיֵּים תְּנָאֵיהּ וְאָזֵיל. רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן״ – לְכִי יָהֵיב לַהּ הוּא דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין, הַשְׁתָּא לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where she extended her hand and received betrothal from another man before the first man gave her the money that he promised. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that it is merely a condition that he accepted upon himself. He fulfills his condition and moves on, and the woman is betrothed to him immediately. Therefore, her betrothal to the second man has no validity. Rav Yehuda says: When he gives, which means that when he gives her the money it will be a valid betrothal. But now it is not a valid betrothal and therefore the betrothal from the second man takes effect.

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא ״וְהוּא יִתֵּן״ – מִשּׁוּם דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי; אֲבָל גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין – דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב יְהוּדָה;

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention this dispute in both the case of divorce and the case of betrothal. As if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And he should give, because he comes to draw her close in marriage. Consequently, he does this willingly, and therefore there is an assumption that his intention was for the betrothal to take effect immediately. But with regard to divorce, where he comes to distance her, there is an assumption that he does so unwillingly, so that he makes the divorce dependent on a condition in order to delay the matter. Therefore, say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce does not take effect until the condition has been fulfilled.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין; בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב הוּנָא ״וְהִיא תִּתֵּן״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא כְּסִיף לְמִיתְבְּעַהּ; אֲבָל גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין, דִּכְסִיפָא לְמִיתְבְּעֵיהּ, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב יְהוּדָה.

And if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And she must give, because he is not embarrassed to demand the money from her afterward to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce, and his intent was to divorce her immediately. But with regard to betrothal, where she is embarrassed to demand the money that he promised would come from him, she may not agree to be betrothed to him until she actually receives the money. Therefore, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the betrothal is valid only once he gives her the money.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין; בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה ״לִכְשֶׁיִּתֵּן״ – מִשּׁוּם דִּכְסִיפָא לְמִיתְבְּעֵיהּ; אֲבָל גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין – דְּלָא כְּסִיף לְמִיתְבְּעַהּ, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא;

And furthermore, if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the betrothal is valid only when he gives her the money, because she is embarrassed to demand it from him if he does not give it to her. Therefore, her intention is that she will be betrothed only once the condition is fulfilled. But with regard to divorce, where the husband is not embarrassed to demand the money from her, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גַּבֵּי גֵירוּשִׁין; בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה ״לִכְשֶׁתִּתֵּן״ – מִשּׁוּם דִּלְרַחוֹקַהּ קָאָתֵי; אֲבָל גַּבֵּי קִידּוּשִׁין – דִּלְקָרוֹבַהּ קָאָתֵי, אֵימָא מוֹדֵה לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא; צְרִיכָא.

And furthermore, if it would have taught us only with regard to the case of divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the divorce is valid only when she gives him the money, because the husband comes to distance her. But with regard to betrothal, where he comes to draw her close, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it is necessary to state this dispute in both cases.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּקְרַע הַגֵּט אוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱבַד – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת; וּלְאַחֵר לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא עַד שֶׁתִּתֵּן.

The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): If one says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then even though the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. And she may not marry another man until she gives her first husband the money.

וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, וָמֵת, נָתְנָה – אֵינָהּ זְקוּקָה לְיָבָם; לֹא נָתְנָה – זְקוּקָה לְיָבָם. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֶנֶת לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאָחִיו אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַקְּרוֹבִים.

And it is taught further in that same baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give two hundred dinars to me, and the husband died childless, if she had already given him the money, then she is not bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because she was already divorced from her husband through the bill of divorce that he gave her. But if she had not given him the money, then she is bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because the bill of divorce did not take effect and she is a widow. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give the money to her late husband’s father, or to his brother, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is released from the levirate bond.

עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי – אֶלָּא דְּמָר סָבַר: ״לִי״ – וְלָא לְיוֹרְשַׁי, וּמָר סָבַר: ״לִי״ – וַאֲפִילּוּ לְיוֹרְשַׁי; וְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהָא תְּנָאָה הָוֵי – תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב יְהוּדָה!

The Gemara notes: The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only with regard to the meaning of the condition. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that when the husband said: On the condition that she will give to me, he meant: To me specifically and not to my heirs. Consequently, she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that when the husband said that she will give the money to me, he meant and even to my heirs. But in any event, everyone agrees that this is a valid condition, yet its fulfillment does not change the date that the bill of divorce takes effect. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the bill of divorce takes effect only when she gives.

אָמַר לָךְ רַב יְהוּדָה: הָא מַנִּי, רַבִּי הִיא – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי. וּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ, וַאֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי כְּרַבָּנַן.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. And the Rabbis disagree with him. And I say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בְּבָבֶל אָמְרִינַן, הָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי – פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ. כִּי סְלִיקִי, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַבִּי אַסִּי דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ – כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״.

And Rabbi Zeira says: When we were in Babylonia we would say with regard to this following statement that Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on; we would say that the Rabbis disagree with him. When I ascended to Eretz Yisrael I found Rabbi Asi, who was sitting and saying in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Everyone concedes that with regard to anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, he is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now; and the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only in a case where the bill of divorce included the condition: From today and after my death.

וְהָתַנְיָא: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט, דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים; רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט.

And it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then this is both a valid bill of divorce and not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty. This teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree only in this case, but everyone agrees that when he employed the language: On the condition, it is as though he stipulated: From now.

וּלְרַב יְהוּדָה – דְּאָמַר: בְּ״עַל מְנָת״ פְּלִיגִי, אַדְּמִיפַּלְגִי בְּ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״, (לִיפַּלְגִי) [לִיפַּלְגוּ] בְּ״עַל מְנָת״! לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree about one who employs the language: On the condition, rather than disagreeing with regard to the case where the husband said: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to the case where the husband said: On the condition. The Gemara answers that the baraita uses this case to inform you about the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is certain that the bill of divorce is valid.

וְלִיפַּלְגוּ בְּ״עַל מְנָת״ – וּלְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן! כֹּחַ דְּהֶיתֵּירָא עֲדִיף לֵיהּ.

The Gemara challenges: And let them disagree about: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not hold that the phrase: On the condition, is considered to be like the phrase: From now, as this ruling is a more general matter. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency, and therefore it is preferable to teach the degree to which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is lenient.

״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ וְכוּ׳. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא קְפִידֵיהּ לָאו קְפִידָא – וּלְזָרֹזַהּ קָאָתֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

§ The mishna teaches: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced, and if not she is not divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, since everything depends on whether or not the condition was fulfilled? The Gemara answers: No, the halakha that the divorce does not take effect unless she gives the money by that time needs to be said, lest you say that the concern of the husband that his wife will give him the money within a specific time frame is not a real concern, and he comes only to galvanize her. Although he wishes to receive this money as soon as possible, in truth he does not care if he receives it later. Therefore, it teaches us that his statement is a valid condition, and if she does not fulfill it then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּצַיְדָּן כּוּ׳. מַאי תַּנָּא דְּקָתָנֵי מַעֲשֶׂה?

§ The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him the value of that coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced. The Gemara asks: What did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teach before, such that he now teaches and cites an incident which is similar to it? This incident does not seem to be referring to what was stated immediately before in the mishna.

חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם אָמַר לָהּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי אִיצְטְלִיתִי״, וְאָבְדָה אִיצְטְלִיתוֹ – אִיצְטְלִיתִי דַּוְקָא קָאָמַר לַהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: תִּתֵּן לוֹ אֶת דָּמֶיהָ. וְאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּצַיְדָּן, בְּאֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי אִצְטְלִיתִי״, וְאָבְדָה אִצְטְלִיתוֹ, וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: תִּתֵּן לוֹ אֶת דָּמֶיהָ.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat, then since he specifically stated to her: Give me my coat, she cannot give him its value instead. And since she has lost the coat, the bill of divorce is not valid; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In such a case she can give him its value. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in support of his statement: There was an incident also in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him its value.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַסִּי מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר לָהּ ״מְחוּלִים לָךְ״, מַהוּ?

Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and afterward he returned and said to her: It is waived for you, then what is the halakha?

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן; תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

He explained his question in detail: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא אַחֲלַהּ גַּבָּהּ; אֲבָל הָכָא, הָא קָאָמַר לַהּ: ״מְחוּלִים לָךְ״; אוֹ דִלְמָא, אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לָא קָאָמַר, אֶלָּא דְּקָא מְפַיְּיסָה לֵיהּ בִּדְמֵי; אֲבָל לִגְמָרֵי – לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis: One can say that only there do the Rabbis state their opinion that she is not divorced if the condition is not fulfilled and she gives him his coat, because he did not waive his claim to it; but here he says to her: It is waived for you, so they are divorced. Or perhaps one can say that even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that she can be divorced even if he does not receive the coat only there, as she appeases him by giving him money, i.e., the condition is considered to be fulfilled due to the fact that he received the value of the coat; but in a case where he waives the condition entirely, no, because he does not receive anything from her. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in response: She is not divorced, because the condition has not been fulfilled.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאַתָּה נֶהֱנֶה לִי, אִם אִי אַתָּה נוֹתֵן לִבְנִי כּוֹר אֶחָד שֶׁל חִטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי חָבִיּוֹת שֶׁל יַיִן״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן; וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף זֶה – יָכוֹל לְהַתִּיר אֶת נִדְרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא עַל פִּי חָכָם, וְאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵינִי כְּאִילּוּ הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי״!

He raised an objection to his opinion from a mishna (Nedarim 63b): In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, meaning it is prohibited for you to derive benefit from me, if you do not give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a wedding gift, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for this other person to benefit from the person who took the vow until he gives his son the gift. And the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority, and he does this by saying: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift from you. Based on this mishna, it would seem that if the husband forgives his wife the money that she owes him, it should be considered as if he received it, and the bill of divorce should be valid.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם לְצַעוֹרַהּ קָא מְכַוֵּין – וְלָא צַיעֲרַהּ. הָכָא מִשּׁוּם הַרְוָוחָה הוּא, וְהָא לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ.

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he intends to vex her, and until she pays him he did not vex her. If he forgives this condition, his initial intention has not been fulfilled. Here, in the case of the vow, the reason the father took the vow is for the sake of profit; he wants his son to receive a valuable gift, but subsequently the one who took the vow decides that it was not necessary. Therefore, he can waive his claim.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לַאֲרִיסֵיהּ: כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דְּלוּ תְּלָת דָּלָווֹתָא, וְאָכְלִי רִיבְעָא; אַתְּ דְּלִי אַרְבְּעָה, וֶאֱכוֹל תִּילְתָּא. לְסוֹף אֲתָא מִיטְרָא.

The Gemara relates an incident of a certain man who said to his sharecropper: Everyone waters the field three times during the season, and they consume, i.e., receive as payment, one quarter of the crops from the field. Will you water four times and consume as your payment one-third of the produce? Ultimately, rain came when the sharecropper would have needed to water a fourth time, and so he did not need to water the field a fourth time. The question was presented to the Sages: Is the sharecropper still entitled to receive one-third of the produce since he was prepared to water the field four times, although ultimately it was not necessary to do so?

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הָא לָא דְּלָה. רַבָּה אָמַר: הָא לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא.

Rav Yosef said: But he did not water the field a fourth time, so the condition was not fulfilled. Consequently, he deserves the same as the other sharecroppers, and receives only one quarter of the produce. Rabba said: But it was not necessary to water the field the fourth time because the rain fell to the benefit of the sharecropper, and therefore he should receive one-third of the produce.

לֵימָא רַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּנַן, וְרַבָּה דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל?

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Yosef said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who require that the condition of the bill of divorce be fulfilled, and that Rabba said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not the fulfillment of the specifics of the condition that matter but the fulfillment of the intent of the condition?

וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן הִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה; וּבְהָא – אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל!

The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it in this way? But don’t we maintain that in all of their disputes the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba when he disagrees with Rav Yosef? And with regard to this halakha we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, this presents a contradiction between one halakha and another.

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כְּרַבָּנַן. רַב יוֹסֵף – כְּרַבָּנַן; וְרַבָּה אָמַר לָךְ: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם – אֶלָּא דִּלְצַעוֹרַהּ קָא מִיכַּוֵּין; אֲבָל הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם הַרְוָוחָה הוּא, וְהָא לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ.

Rather, according to both opinions, this dispute is actually in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Yosef clearly rules in accordance with the Rabbis. And Rabba could have said to you: I was saying my statement even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis are saying there that she is not divorced if she does not return the coat itself only when the husband intends to vex her, and if she does not need to give the coat itself she will not be vexed, as it is not difficult for her to give him its value. But here, in the case of watering the field, the reason the owner is making the condition is only for the sake of increasing his profit, and it was not necessary to actually water the field.

תְּנַן הָתָם: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיָה נִטְמָן יוֹם שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא חָלוּט לוֹ. הִתְקִין הִלֵּל הַזָּקֵן שֶׁיְּהֵא חוֹלֵשׁ אֶת מְעוֹתָיו לַלִּשְׁכָּה, וִיהֵא שׁוֹבֵר אֶת הַדֶּלֶת וְנִכְנָס. וְאֵימָתַי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה הַלָּה, יָבוֹא וְיִטּוֹל אֶת מְעוֹתָיו.

§ With regard to the redemption of houses in walled cities, we learned elsewhere in a mishna (Arakhin 31b) that if a house was sold and not redeemed by its owners within twelve months it remains permanently in the possession of the purchaser. The Gemara describes this: At first the purchaser would hide for all of the final day of the twelfth month so that the house would be confirmed as his (see Leviticus 25:29–30). Because the purchaser was in hiding, the seller would be unable to redeem the house from him. Hillel the Elder instituted an ordinance whereby the seller may deposit [ḥolesh] his redemption money in the Temple treasury chamber, and then he may break the door of his house and enter and take possession. And when that purchaser wishes, he should come and take his money from the Temple treasury.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: מִתַּקָּנָתוֹ שֶׁל הִלֵּל נִשְׁמַע – ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, וְנָתְנָה לוֹ מִדַּעְתּוֹ, מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת; עַל כּוֹרְחוֹ, אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת –

And Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel we learn that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave him the money with his consent, then she is divorced. If she gave it to him against his will then she is not divorced.

מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ לְהִלֵּל לְתַקּוֹנֵי נְתִינָה בְּעַל כּוּרְחֵיהּ – דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ נְתִינָה,

How does Rava prove this? From the fact that it was necessary for Hillel to institute a unique ordinance in the case of houses in walled cities whereby giving against the will of the receiver is considered giving.