This week’s learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm for the refuah shleima for מעין ליאורה בת שלומית פייגא. “Our precious Maya”
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Tina Lamm for the refuah shleima for מעין ליאורה בת שלומית פייגא. “Our precious Maya”
Gittin 73
וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּהָלַךְ עַל מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ – הוּא דְּבָעֵינַן אוּמְדָּנָא, אִידַּךְ – אוּמְדָּנָא נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵינַן.
And this teaches us that we require assessment only in a case where he walked with his staff. But in another case, where he did not arise from his illness and walk but immediately became ill again, we do not even require assessment, as it is clear that his death from the second illness was a result of the first illness.
שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁנִּיתַּק מֵחוֹלִי לְחוֹלִי – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה? אִין, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁנִּיתַּק מֵחוֹלִי לְחוֹלִי – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה.
The Gemara asks: Can you conclude from it that in the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift, as he ultimately died as a result of the first illness? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rav: In the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift.
רַבָּה וְרָבָא לָא סְבִירָא לְהוּ הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ יֵשׁ גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
The Gemara notes: Rabba and Rava do not hold in accordance with this halakha stated by Rav Huna, that if the husband was healed of his illness then the bill of divorce is nullified even if he did not specify such a condition. They hold that there is a rabbinic decree in place lest people say that there can be a valid bill of divorce given after death. Since people will see that in this case the bill of divorce took effect only once the husband died, in the future they may mistakenly consider a bill of divorce to be valid even though the husband explicitly made a condition that it would take effect only after his death.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי, דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא, וּמִשּׁוּם גְּזֵירָה שָׁרֵינַן אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא?!
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law is not a valid bill of divorce, but due to a rabbinic decree we permit a married woman to marry anyone, even though by Torah law she remains married to her husband? Both Rabba and Rava agree that by Torah law the bill of divorce is nullified once the husband is healed from his illness, yet they treat the bill of divorce as valid. How can this be?
אִין, כֹּל דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּרַבָּנַן מְקַדֵּשׁ, וְאַפְקְעִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן לְקִדּוּשִׁין מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Yes, the Sages have the ability to nullify even a marriage that took effect by Torah law, because anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively. Consequently, it is permitted for the woman to remarry.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תִּינַח דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּכַסְפָּא, קַדֵּישׁ בְּבִיאָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁוְּיוּהּ רַבָּנַן לִבְעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ מֵהַיּוֹם, אִם מַתִּי מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל הַבַּיִת עָלָיו אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט. ״אִם לֹא אֶעֱמוֹד מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:2): If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if he said: This is your bill of divorce if I will not arise healthy from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then this is a valid bill of divorce.
מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא?
The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause such that the bill of divorce is not valid and what is different in the latter clause that the bill of divorce is valid? In neither case did he die from the illness. The Gemara gives no answer to this question.
שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: אֲכָלוֹ אֲרִי – אֵין לָנוּ.
They sent a ruling to Babylonia from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and a lion ate him, then we do not need to be concerned about this bill of divorce, for it is certainly not valid.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין אַרְעָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, קַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. לְסוֹף אַפִּיקוּ בַּהּ נַהֲרָא.
It is related: There was a certain man who sold land to another, and he accepted upon himself the responsibility for any unavoidable accident that may happen to the land. In such a case he would reimburse the buyer for the damage. In the end they diverted a river into it, meaning the government decided to make a new canal through the land that he sold.
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבִינָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל שְׁפִי לֵיהּ, דְּהָא קַבֵּילְתְּ עֲלָךְ כׇּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא לְרָבִינָא: אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא!
The buyer came before Ravina to lodge a claim. Ravina said to the seller: Go pacify him, i.e., reimburse him, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might happen. Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa disagreed and said to Ravina: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the condition of the sale should not apply in such a case.
אִיגַּלְגַּל מִילְּתָא, וּמְטָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: ״אִם לֹא אֶעֱמוֹד מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט!
The matter was circulated, as this ruling was never finalized, and it came before Rava. He said to them: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the seller should not have to pay. Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Isn’t it taught that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him then it is a valid bill of divorce? These cases are both uncommon, unavoidable accidents, yet the bill of divorce is valid.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְאֵימָא מֵרֵישָׁא – אֵינוֹ גֵּט!
Rava said to him: But you can say an opposite inference from the first clause: If a husband says: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, an uncommon, unavoidable accident is not included within his condition. If so, the inference from first clause of the baraita contradicts the inference from latter clause and it cannot be used to prove either opinion.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וּמִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא אַסֵּיפָא – לָא מוֹתְבִינַן תְּיוּבְתָּא מִינַּהּ?
Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, can we no longer raise an objection from it? Seemingly, the challenge raised by Ravina from the latter clause of the baraita is still valid.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, כֵּיוָן דְּקַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא אַסֵּיפָא – לָא אִיתְּמַר בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא, וּמְשַׁבַּשְׁתָּא הִיא; זִיל בָּתַר סְבָרָא.
Ravina said to him: Yes, Rava was correct. Since there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, this baraita was never stated in the study hall and it is corrupted. As it is not possible to rely on this baraita one must follow reason, and the most reasonable interpretation is that his condition would not include an uncommon and unavoidable accident.
רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ זְבֻן שׁוּמְשְׁמֵי אַגִּידָּא דִּנְהַר מַלְכָּא. אֲגוּר מַלָּחֵי לְעַבּוֹרִינְהוּ, קַבִּילוּ עֲלַיְיהוּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. לְסוֹף אִיסְתְּכַר נְהַר מַלְכָּא,
It is related that Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, purchased sesame on the bank of the Malka River. They hired sailors to cross them to the other side of the river, and the sailors accepted upon themselves responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might occur. In the end the Malka River was dammed so that the merchandise could not be transported by river.
אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: אֱגוּרוּ חַמָּרֵי אַפְקְעִינְהוּ נִיהֲלַן, דְּהָא קַבֵּילְתּוּ עֲלַיְיכוּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִיתְיְלִיד!
The two Sages said to them: Hire donkeys and release them to us in order to transport the sesame, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might arise.
אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: קָאקֵי חִיוָּרֵי מְשַׁלְּחִי גְּלִימֵי דְאִינָשֵׁי, אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא.
The two Sages came to court before Rava and he said to them: You white geese [kakei ḥivarei], referring to their long, white beards, who strip men of their cloaks. You are acting unfairly with the sailors. It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident for the Malka River to be dammed, and the sailors did not accept responsibility for this case.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא תִּתְיַיחֵד עִמּוֹ אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים,
MISHNA: If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse.
אֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי עֶבֶד אֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה; חוּץ מִשִּׁפְחָתָהּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבָּהּ גַּס בָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָתָהּ.
This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him even in the presence of a slave or even in the presence of a maidservant, except for the wife’s personal maidservant. And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter because she is accustomed to her maidservant, and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present.
מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר:
What is the halakhic status of the wife during these days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is
כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּתְיַיחֲדָה עִמּוֹ בַּאֲפֵילָה, אוֹ שֶׁיָּשְׁנָה עִמּוֹ תַּחַת מַרְגְּלוֹת הַמִּטָּה – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נִתְעַסְּקוּ בְּדָבָר אַחֵר; וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִדּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:4): If, after the giving of this bill of divorce witnesses saw that she secluded herself with her husband in the dark, or that she slept with him under the foot of the bed, one is not concerned that perhaps they were engaged in another matter, i.e., sexual intercourse. And one is concerned due to their action of licentiousness but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, הָכִי קָאָמַר: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. נָתַן לָהּ כְּסָפִים – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת, דְּאָמְרִינַן: בְּאֶתְנַנָּהּ נָתַן לָהּ; וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף בְּזוֹ חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, then there one is concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal and perhaps through this act he intended to remarry her. If he gave her money immediately following the sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, wherein we say: He gave this money as hire for a prostitute, but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even in this case one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal, i.e., one is concerned that he gave her the money as betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי? כְּמַאן –
Based on this explanation of the baraita, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (81a) is relevant only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, but if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him, everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him? In the case of a divorced woman who was secluded with her husband after the divorce, Beit Shammai are of the opinion that she does not require a second bill of divorce, while Beit Hillel are of the opinion that she does. In accordance with whose opinion mentioned in the baraita is this?
כְּדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara explains: It is in accordance with everyone. It is in accordance with the opinion of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who hold that when they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that they are betrothed, and she does not need a second bill of divorce.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִידֵּי כְּסָפִים קָתָנֵי?!
Abaye objects to this understanding of the baraita, according to which the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagree about a case where he gave her money after they engaged in sexual intercourse: Is anything with regard to money taught in the baraita?
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, but one is not concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי? כְּמַאן –
If so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, that if they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned that she may be betrothed to him and she requires a second bill of divorce. By contrast, according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that she may be betrothed.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, מַאי ״אַף״?
Rava objects to this: If so, what is the meaning of the expression used by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: There is also concern that due to their actions they performed a betrothal? If there is concern about betrothal there should be no concern with regard to licentiousness.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָאָמַר, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט? כְּמַאן –
And if so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only where they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in intercourse with him, then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
דְּלָא כְּחַד.
This is not in accordance with any one of the tanna’im, for according to Rava the first tanna is not concerned about betrothal even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is concerned even when they did not witness that she engaged in sexual intercourse.
מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת:
§ The mishna teaches: What is her status during these days? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
תָּנָא: וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיָּמוּת. וּלְכִי מָיֵית הָוֵי גִּיטָּא?! וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה! אָמַר רַבָּה: בְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעֵת שֶׁאֲנִי בָּעוֹלָם״.
The Sages taught in reference to the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita: Their dispute with regard to her status in the interim is stated provided that he dies. The Gemara clarifies: And when he dies, is this a valid bill of divorce? Do they hold that the bill of divorce takes effect after the husband’s death? But don’t we maintain that there is no bill of divorce after death? Rabba says that this is referring to a case where the husband says: This should be a valid bill of divorce from the last moment that I am in the world, meaning that it should take effect a moment before he dies.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינָתַיִם – בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ; וְיוֹרְשָׁהּ,
The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:4): In a case where the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die from this illness, during the days between, before he dies, her husband is entitled to anything that she finds, i.e., any lost item that cannot be returned to its owner, in accordance with the rabbinic principle that any lost item found by a wife belongs to her husband. And he is entitled to the profits from her earnings, and he is entitled to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:7–9), and he inherits from her if she predeceases him,
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Gittin 73
וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּהָלַךְ עַל מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ – הוּא דְּבָעֵינַן אוּמְדָּנָא, אִידַּךְ – אוּמְדָּנָא נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵינַן.
And this teaches us that we require assessment only in a case where he walked with his staff. But in another case, where he did not arise from his illness and walk but immediately became ill again, we do not even require assessment, as it is clear that his death from the second illness was a result of the first illness.
שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁנִּיתַּק מֵחוֹלִי לְחוֹלִי – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה? אִין, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁנִּיתַּק מֵחוֹלִי לְחוֹלִי – מַתְּנָתוֹ מַתָּנָה.
The Gemara asks: Can you conclude from it that in the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift, as he ultimately died as a result of the first illness? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rav: In the case of a person on his deathbed who proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, his gift is a valid gift.
רַבָּה וְרָבָא לָא סְבִירָא לְהוּ הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ יֵשׁ גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
The Gemara notes: Rabba and Rava do not hold in accordance with this halakha stated by Rav Huna, that if the husband was healed of his illness then the bill of divorce is nullified even if he did not specify such a condition. They hold that there is a rabbinic decree in place lest people say that there can be a valid bill of divorce given after death. Since people will see that in this case the bill of divorce took effect only once the husband died, in the future they may mistakenly consider a bill of divorce to be valid even though the husband explicitly made a condition that it would take effect only after his death.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי, דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא, וּמִשּׁוּם גְּזֵירָה שָׁרֵינַן אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא?!
The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law is not a valid bill of divorce, but due to a rabbinic decree we permit a married woman to marry anyone, even though by Torah law she remains married to her husband? Both Rabba and Rava agree that by Torah law the bill of divorce is nullified once the husband is healed from his illness, yet they treat the bill of divorce as valid. How can this be?
אִין, כֹּל דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּרַבָּנַן מְקַדֵּשׁ, וְאַפְקְעִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן לְקִדּוּשִׁין מִינֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Yes, the Sages have the ability to nullify even a marriage that took effect by Torah law, because anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively. Consequently, it is permitted for the woman to remarry.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תִּינַח דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּכַסְפָּא, קַדֵּישׁ בְּבִיאָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁוְּיוּהּ רַבָּנַן לִבְעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ מֵהַיּוֹם, אִם מַתִּי מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל הַבַּיִת עָלָיו אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט. ״אִם לֹא אֶעֱמוֹד מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:2): If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if he said: This is your bill of divorce if I will not arise healthy from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then this is a valid bill of divorce.
מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא?
The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause such that the bill of divorce is not valid and what is different in the latter clause that the bill of divorce is valid? In neither case did he die from the illness. The Gemara gives no answer to this question.
שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: אֲכָלוֹ אֲרִי – אֵין לָנוּ.
They sent a ruling to Babylonia from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and a lion ate him, then we do not need to be concerned about this bill of divorce, for it is certainly not valid.
הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין אַרְעָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, קַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. לְסוֹף אַפִּיקוּ בַּהּ נַהֲרָא.
It is related: There was a certain man who sold land to another, and he accepted upon himself the responsibility for any unavoidable accident that may happen to the land. In such a case he would reimburse the buyer for the damage. In the end they diverted a river into it, meaning the government decided to make a new canal through the land that he sold.
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבִינָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל שְׁפִי לֵיהּ, דְּהָא קַבֵּילְתְּ עֲלָךְ כׇּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא לְרָבִינָא: אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא!
The buyer came before Ravina to lodge a claim. Ravina said to the seller: Go pacify him, i.e., reimburse him, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might happen. Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa disagreed and said to Ravina: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the condition of the sale should not apply in such a case.
אִיגַּלְגַּל מִילְּתָא, וּמְטָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: ״אִם לֹא אֶעֱמוֹד מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְנָפַל עָלָיו בַּיִת אוֹ הִכִּישׁוֹ נָחָשׁ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט!
The matter was circulated, as this ruling was never finalized, and it came before Rava. He said to them: It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident, and the seller should not have to pay. Ravina raised an objection to Rava: Isn’t it taught that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce if I am not healed from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him then it is a valid bill of divorce? These cases are both uncommon, unavoidable accidents, yet the bill of divorce is valid.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְאֵימָא מֵרֵישָׁא – אֵינוֹ גֵּט!
Rava said to him: But you can say an opposite inference from the first clause: If a husband says: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and the house collapsed on him or a snake bit him, then it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, an uncommon, unavoidable accident is not included within his condition. If so, the inference from first clause of the baraita contradicts the inference from latter clause and it cannot be used to prove either opinion.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: וּמִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא אַסֵּיפָא – לָא מוֹתְבִינַן תְּיוּבְתָּא מִינַּהּ?
Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And because there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, can we no longer raise an objection from it? Seemingly, the challenge raised by Ravina from the latter clause of the baraita is still valid.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, כֵּיוָן דְּקַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא אַסֵּיפָא – לָא אִיתְּמַר בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא, וּמְשַׁבַּשְׁתָּא הִיא; זִיל בָּתַר סְבָרָא.
Ravina said to him: Yes, Rava was correct. Since there is a difficulty presented by the contradiction between the first clause of the baraita and the latter clause, this baraita was never stated in the study hall and it is corrupted. As it is not possible to rely on this baraita one must follow reason, and the most reasonable interpretation is that his condition would not include an uncommon and unavoidable accident.
רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ זְבֻן שׁוּמְשְׁמֵי אַגִּידָּא דִּנְהַר מַלְכָּא. אֲגוּר מַלָּחֵי לְעַבּוֹרִינְהוּ, קַבִּילוּ עֲלַיְיהוּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִתְיְלִיד. לְסוֹף אִיסְתְּכַר נְהַר מַלְכָּא,
It is related that Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, purchased sesame on the bank of the Malka River. They hired sailors to cross them to the other side of the river, and the sailors accepted upon themselves responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might occur. In the end the Malka River was dammed so that the merchandise could not be transported by river.
אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: אֱגוּרוּ חַמָּרֵי אַפְקְעִינְהוּ נִיהֲלַן, דְּהָא קַבֵּילְתּוּ עֲלַיְיכוּ כֹּל אוּנְסָא דְּמִיתְיְלִיד!
The two Sages said to them: Hire donkeys and release them to us in order to transport the sesame, as you accepted upon yourself responsibility for any unavoidable accident that might arise.
אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: קָאקֵי חִיוָּרֵי מְשַׁלְּחִי גְּלִימֵי דְאִינָשֵׁי, אוּנְסָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ הוּא.
The two Sages came to court before Rava and he said to them: You white geese [kakei ḥivarei], referring to their long, white beards, who strip men of their cloaks. You are acting unfairly with the sailors. It is an uncommon, unavoidable accident for the Malka River to be dammed, and the sailors did not accept responsibility for this case.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא תִּתְיַיחֵד עִמּוֹ אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים,
MISHNA: If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse.
אֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי עֶבֶד אֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה; חוּץ מִשִּׁפְחָתָהּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבָּהּ גַּס בָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָתָהּ.
This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him even in the presence of a slave or even in the presence of a maidservant, except for the wife’s personal maidservant. And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter because she is accustomed to her maidservant, and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present.
מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר:
What is the halakhic status of the wife during these days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is
כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּתְיַיחֲדָה עִמּוֹ בַּאֲפֵילָה, אוֹ שֶׁיָּשְׁנָה עִמּוֹ תַּחַת מַרְגְּלוֹת הַמִּטָּה – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נִתְעַסְּקוּ בְּדָבָר אַחֵר; וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִדּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:4): If, after the giving of this bill of divorce witnesses saw that she secluded herself with her husband in the dark, or that she slept with him under the foot of the bed, one is not concerned that perhaps they were engaged in another matter, i.e., sexual intercourse. And one is concerned due to their action of licentiousness but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, הָכִי קָאָמַר: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. נָתַן לָהּ כְּסָפִים – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת, דְּאָמְרִינַן: בְּאֶתְנַנָּהּ נָתַן לָהּ; וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף בְּזוֹ חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, then there one is concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal and perhaps through this act he intended to remarry her. If he gave her money immediately following the sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, wherein we say: He gave this money as hire for a prostitute, but one is not concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even in this case one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal, i.e., one is concerned that he gave her the money as betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי? כְּמַאן –
Based on this explanation of the baraita, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (81a) is relevant only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband, but if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him, everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him? In the case of a divorced woman who was secluded with her husband after the divorce, Beit Shammai are of the opinion that she does not require a second bill of divorce, while Beit Hillel are of the opinion that she does. In accordance with whose opinion mentioned in the baraita is this?
כְּדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara explains: It is in accordance with everyone. It is in accordance with the opinion of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who hold that when they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that they are betrothed, and she does not need a second bill of divorce.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִידֵּי כְּסָפִים קָתָנֵי?!
Abaye objects to this understanding of the baraita, according to which the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagree about a case where he gave her money after they engaged in sexual intercourse: Is anything with regard to money taught in the baraita?
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם זְנוּת, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: If they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned due to licentiousness, but one is not concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is also concerned that due to their actions there was a betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט שֵׁנִי? כְּמַאן –
If so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, that if they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is concerned that she may be betrothed to him and she requires a second bill of divorce. By contrast, according to the first tanna, even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse one is not concerned that she may be betrothed.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: אִם כֵּן, מַאי ״אַף״?
Rava objects to this: If so, what is the meaning of the expression used by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: There is also concern that due to their actions they performed a betrothal? If there is concern about betrothal there should be no concern with regard to licentiousness.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָאָמַר, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – חוֹשְׁשִׁין מִשּׁוּם קִידּוּשִׁין.
Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even if they did not see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, one is concerned that due to their actions they performed a betrothal.
כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – כְּשֶׁרָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה, אֲבָל לֹא רָאוּהָ שֶׁנִּבְעֲלָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט? כְּמַאן –
And if so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only where they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse with him. But if they did not see that she engaged in intercourse with him, then everyone agrees that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement?
דְּלָא כְּחַד.
This is not in accordance with any one of the tanna’im, for according to Rava the first tanna is not concerned about betrothal even when they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is concerned even when they did not witness that she engaged in sexual intercourse.
מָה הִיא בְּאוֹתָן הַיָּמִים? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְכׇל דְּבָרֶיהָ, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת:
§ The mishna teaches: What is her status during these days? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.
תָּנָא: וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיָּמוּת. וּלְכִי מָיֵית הָוֵי גִּיטָּא?! וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּאֵין גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה! אָמַר רַבָּה: בְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעֵת שֶׁאֲנִי בָּעוֹלָם״.
The Sages taught in reference to the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita: Their dispute with regard to her status in the interim is stated provided that he dies. The Gemara clarifies: And when he dies, is this a valid bill of divorce? Do they hold that the bill of divorce takes effect after the husband’s death? But don’t we maintain that there is no bill of divorce after death? Rabba says that this is referring to a case where the husband says: This should be a valid bill of divorce from the last moment that I am in the world, meaning that it should take effect a moment before he dies.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינָתַיִם – בַּעְלָהּ זַכַּאי בִּמְצִיאָתָהּ, וּבְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּבַהֲפָרַת נְדָרֶיהָ; וְיוֹרְשָׁהּ,
The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:4): In a case where the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die from this illness, during the days between, before he dies, her husband is entitled to anything that she finds, i.e., any lost item that cannot be returned to its owner, in accordance with the rabbinic principle that any lost item found by a wife belongs to her husband. And he is entitled to the profits from her earnings, and he is entitled to annul her vows (see Numbers 30:7–9), and he inherits from her if she predeceases him,
