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Today's Daf Yomi

February 23, 2016 | 讬状讚 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Gittin 72

The discussion from the last daf continues as to who the mishna is according to – Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yossi regarding whether or not messengers can set up pther messengers to write and give the get. 聽If a man divorces his wife conditioning it upon his death – does that work? 聽Tanna Kama holds that it depend on the wording – if聽he said this is your get from now if I die, it works – upon his death, the get applies retroactively from the date he gave it. 聽If not, it doesn’t work. Rabbi Yossi holds that it works in any case because the get is dated from today and therefore the date proves that he meant the get to be effective upon his death retroactive to the date in the get. 聽Rav Huna’s statement about this mishna is questioned and the gemara struglles to explain according to who he was relating and which case.


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专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and there is no concern that the scribe signed the document without the husband instructing him to do so.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 谞驻讬拽 诪讬谞讛 讞讜专讘讗 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讗诪专讜 诇住讜驻专 讜讬讻转讜讘 讜诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讜讬讞转诪讜 讜诪砖讜诐 讻讬住讜驻讗 讚住讜驻专 讞讬讬砖讬 讜诪讞转诪讬 诇讬讛 讜讘注诇 诇讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬

And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it, a pitfall will result from it. As sometimes, it happens that one said to two people: Tell a scribe and he will write the document and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they will sign it. And due to the shame of the scribe, who asks: Don鈥檛 you consider me a sufficiently upright person to sign the document as a witness, the agents are concerned to avoid that disgrace and they will have one of those witnesses and the scribe sign together with him, and the husband did not say to do so. This bill of divorce is invalid because it was signed contrary to the husband鈥檚 instructions, and the agents will mistakenly think it is valid.

讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The reason that this is not a concern must be because Rabbi Yosei holds that even if the husband says to the agents: Tell the scribe to write, the bill of divorce is not valid. Rather, it is clear that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 诇讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗诪专讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 讗诪专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗

Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation of the attribution of the mishna: The mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and it is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to state that the bill of divorce is not valid in a case where he did not say to the agents: Give the document to my wife; rather, even if he said to the agents: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, the document is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say his instructions to three people; rather, even if he said his instructions to three people, no, the bill of divorce is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say to the agents: Say my instructions to a scribe, but even if he said: Say my instructions to a scribe, the bill of divorce is also not valid.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 讻转讘 住讜驻专 诇砖诪讛 讜讞转诪讜 注讚讬诐 诇砖诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讘讜讛讜 讜讞转诪讜讛讜 讜谞转谞讜讛讜 诇讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讛专讬 讛讙讟 讘讟诇 注讚 砖讬砖诪注讜 拽讜诇讜 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:7鈥8) in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi that Rabbi Yosei validated the bill of divorce even if the husband said: Tell my instructions to a scribe, as it is taught: If the scribe wrote the bill of divorce for her sake and the witnesses signed it for her sake then even though they wrote it, and they signed it, and they gave it to the husband and he gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void until they hear the husband鈥檚 voice when he says to the scribe: Write the document for the sake of my wife, and to the witnesses: Sign the document for the sake of my wife.

讬砖诪注讜 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 拽讜诇讜 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘

The inference from the baraita is that it uses the term: Until they hear, serves to exclude the opinion of the one who said: Rabbi Yosei concedes in a case where the husband says: Say my instructions to the scribe; because the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband themselves. Furthermore, the baraita uses the term: His voice, to exclude that which Rav Kahana says that Rav says, that a husband may issue written instructions to the scribe and witnesses. According to the baraita the instructions must be verbal.

诪转谞讬壮 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟

MISHNA: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then it is as if he said nothing, since a bill of divorce is valid only if it takes effect before the husband鈥檚 death. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce, because once he dies, the bill of divorce retroactively applies from when he made this statement.

诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

If the husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then it is uncertain whether his primary intention was for the bill of divorce to take effect that day, in which case it is a valid bill of divorce, or if his primary intention was that it should take effect after his death and is therefore not valid. The halakha is that there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or not a valid bill of divorce. And if he dies without children his wife must perform 岣litza, since perhaps the bill of divorce is not valid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing 岣litza. But she may not enter into levirate marriage, since perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is prohibited for a divorc茅e to marry her brother-in-law.

讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讜讞诇讛 讜诪转 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗诐 诪讞诪转 讞讜诇讬 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟

If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, as his conditional statement was fulfilled, but if not, i.e., if he was cured from the first illness and died from another illness, then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

讙诪壮 讗诇诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬 讜讛讚专 转谞讬 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 讗诇诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 诇讗讜 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. The Gemara deduces: Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. And afterward the mishna teaches: If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is not considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. As explained previously in the mishna, a bill of divorce which takes effect only after the husband鈥檚 death is not a valid bill of divorce. There is an apparent contradiction as to the meaning of the term: If I die.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 诪转讬 砖转讬 诇砖讜谞讜转 诪砖诪注 诪砖诪注 讻诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诪砖诪注 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

Abaye said: The expression: If I die, indicates two different meanings. It indicates the same meaning as one who says: From now, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect after death retroactively from now. And it indicates the same meaning as one who says: After my death, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect only after his death.

讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

If the husband said to his wife: From today if I die, it is considered to be like one who says to her: From now, conditional upon my death. But if he did not say to her: From today, it is considered to be like one who says to her: After my death, and the bill of divorce is void because it takes effect only after his death.

讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诪转讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讞讜诇爪转

搂 The mishna teaches that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But if her husband died without children this woman must perform 岣litza and not enter into a levirate marriage because perhaps it is a valid bill of divorce.

讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 拽转谞讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讚讗住讬专讗 诇注诇诪讗 讜诇讬讘诐 谞诪讬 讗住讬专讗

The Gemara raises a challenge: But isn鈥檛 the expression: It is as if he said nothing, taught in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it is as if he said nothing with regard to the fact that she is still forbidden to everyone after the death of her husband, and is bound by a levirate bond. And she is also forbidden to the yavam because perhaps the bill of divorce was valid, in which case she has no levirate bond.

讜讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 讞讜诇爪转 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讬讘讜诪讬 谞诪讬 诪讬讘诪讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara raises a challenge: But since the latter clause of the mishna teaches that in those cases of uncertainty she must perform 岣litza, by inference it appears that in the cases of the first clause she may also enter into levirate marriage, indicating that in those cases the bill of divorce is definitely not valid. The Gemara answers: This is not a challenge to Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion, as the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that this kind of conditional bill of divorce is invalid and she may enter into levirate marriage.

讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

But Rav Huna was not explaining the words of the mishna; the statement that he said is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says as a principle: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. Therefore, since the bill of divorce bears that day鈥檚 date, it takes effect immediately, even though it is not stated explicitly.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: If Rav Huna鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei then the woman should also not require 岣litza, as in his opinion the bill of divorce is entirely valid and there is no levirate bond at all. And if you would say that Rav Huna is uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or if the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and on account of this he was stringent in accordance with both opinions, i.e., the one which requires 岣litza and the one which forbids levirate marriage, this also presents a difficulty. But is Rav Huna in fact uncertain?

讜讛讗 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讞诇砖 注讜诇 诇讙讘讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讗讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛诇讻讛 讜讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱

But when Rabba bar Avuh was ill Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: Ask of him, Rabba bar Avuh: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Rav Na岣an said to Rav Huna: I do not know the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei, and you ask me to ask Rabba bar Avuh the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: You ask him the halakha, and I will tell you the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei afterward.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讘转专 讚谞驻拽 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽住讘专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an asked of Rabba bar Avuh what the halakha is. Rabba bar Avuh said to him: So said Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After he left Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as he holds: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. From this incident it is clear that Rav Huna holds that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, as Rav Huna certainly accepted the opinion that Rabba bar Avuh said in the name of Rav. Rather, it is necessary to say that Rav Huna is uncertain

讗讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘注诇 驻讛 讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专

if Rabbi Yosei says that the date on which a document is written proves when it takes effect even when the husband stated a verbal condition as he handed it over, or if Rabbi Yosei does not say his principle in such a case.

讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜诪转 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜转谞讬 注诇讛 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讛转讬专讜讛 诇讛讬谞砖讗

The Gemara asks: But is Rav Huna uncertain with regard to this matter? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (76b): If one says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce if I have not come back here from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within twelve months, then it is not a valid bill of divorce because the bill of divorce does not take effect until the end of twelve months, which is after the husband鈥檚 death? As a result, she is bound by a levirate bond if her husband has no children. And it is taught with regard to that mishna: Our Rabbis disagree, and they rendered it permitted for her to marry, because they are of the opinion that there is no levirate bond in this case.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗谉 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚砖专讜 诪讬砖讞讗 讜住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

And we say: Who represents the opinion cited as our Rabbis? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is the court that permitted the consumption of oil manufactured by gentiles, and they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. Evidently, according to Rabbi Yosei this principle applies even when the husband made a verbal condition with regard to the bill of divorce.

讗诇讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘注诇 驻讛 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛

Rather, it is necessary to say as follows: Rav Huna is uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei when the husband adds a verbal condition when giving the document, or if the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 opinion in such a case.

讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讜砖讗谞讬 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讻砖讗诪讜转 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讬谉 讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara asks: But is Rav Huna uncertain with regard to this matter? But didn鈥檛 Rava say: If one says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce if I die, or: 鈥淭his is your bill of divorce when I am dead, then this is a valid bill of divorce? If he said to her: When I die, or: After my death, then this is not a valid bill of divorce.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘谞谉 爪专讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讜讛转谞谉 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that he said to her: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, and Rava鈥檚 statement is in accordance with opinion of the Rabbis, which is the unattributed opinion of the mishna, is it necessary that this halakha be said by Rava, an amora? But didn鈥檛 we learn explicitly in the mishna that if he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, then it is a valid bill of divorce? But rather, is it not speaking about a case where he did not say the term: From today, when he gave the bill of divorce, and Rava鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? Conclude from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

诇专讘讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: It is obvious to Rava that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even when the husband added a verbal condition. But according to Rav Huna, it is uncertain whether or not this is the halakha.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘谞谉 讜讛谞讬 诇讬砖谞讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讬 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 诪转 讻讗诐 诪转讬 讚诪讬 讻砖讗诪讜转 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, Rava鈥檚 statement is referring to a case where he said to her: This is your bill of divorce from today, and it is in accordance with opinion of the Rabbis. And it was necessary for Rava to state his ruling to teach the halakha of these expressions not stated in the mishna: First, the husband saying: When I am dead, is considered to be like the expression: If I die. Second, the husband saying: When I die, is considered to be like the expression: After my death.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚诪转谞讬 诇讛 讗住讬驻讗 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞讜诇爪转

And there are those who teach this statement of Rav Huna with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, which states that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then the bill of divorce is invalid and it is as though he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei she must nevertheless perform 岣litza, as it is uncertain if the bill of divorce takes effect from the day the bill of divorce was given when the date is supplied verbally.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 诇专讘谞谉 讞讜诇爪转 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞讜诇爪转

The Gemara questions this version of Rav Huna鈥檚 statement: This is obvious. Since it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna, in a case where he explicitly stated: From today, that according to the opinion of the Rabbis she must perform 岣litza due to the uncertainty as to when the bill of divorce takes effect, in the first clause as well, when he did not add: From today, it is obvious that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei she must perform 岣litza due to the uncertainty. The dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis concerns only whether the husband needs to add the term: From today.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讛讗 讻专讘讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 讙讬讟讗 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讜讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 专讘讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬

The Gemara answers: His statement necessary, lest you say that with regard to this, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: It is a proper bill of divorce, and she is not even required to perform 岣litza. Therefore, Rav Huna teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Each has a unique, albeit similar, opinion.

专讘讬 诇讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讝讛 讙讟 诇诪注讜讟讬 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讝讛 讙讟 诇诪注讜讟讬 讚专讘讬

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as it teaches in a baraita: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce and there is no need for the wife to perform 岣litza. By emphasizing the term: Like this, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi intends to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who is uncertain with regard to the matter. And similarly, Rabbi Yosei did not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it teaches in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce, to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

专讘讬 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara cites the baraita and mishna that demonstrate the difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei. What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then there is uncertainty whether it is a bill of divorce or whether it is not a bill of divorce, and the wife must perform 岣litza. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty, and there is no need for the wife to perform 岣litza.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讙讟 诇讗砖转讬 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讬讻谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻转讘讜讛讜 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜谞转谞讜 诇讗讞专 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

What is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As we learned in a mishna (76b): If one says: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I have not come from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and the court wrote the bill of divorce within twelve months and gave it to the wife after twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce.

讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market and became ill again and died, then it must be assessed whether he died from the first illness and it is therefore a valid bill of divorce. But if he did not die from this illness then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讙讬讟讜 讻诪转谞转讜 诪讛 诪转谞转讜 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 讗祝 讙讬讟讜 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专

Rav Huna said: With regard to a person on his deathbed, the halakhot of his bill of divorce are the same as the halakhot of his gift. The Sages instituted that when a person on his deathbed gives a gift, no formal act of acquisition is required. Just as with regard to his gift, if he arose and was cured from his illness the gift he granted while on his deathbed is retracted, as he gave it only based on the assumption that he was about to die, so too, with regard to his bill of divorce, if he arose and was cured from his illness, the bill of divorce is retracted and nullified, as he gave his wife her bill of divorce only because he thought he was about to die and he wanted to exempt her from a levirate bond.

讜诪讛 讙讬讟讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 驻专讬砖 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 讻转讜讘讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗祝 诪转谞转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 转谞讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛

Rav Huna continues: And just as in the case of his bill of divorce, where, even though he did not explicitly say his full intention, once he said: Write the bill of divorce, his statement is interpreted to mean that the court should give the bill of divorce to his wife even though he did not say: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, which a healthy man would need to state, so too, this is the halakha with regard to his gift. Once he said: Give the gift, then even though the recipients did not acquire it from him, which finalizes a gift from a healthy person, because he is dying the halakha takes into account his intention without all the necessary legal requirements.

转谞谉 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讜讞诇讛 讜诪转 讗讜诪讚讬诐 讗讜转讜 讗诐 诪讞诪转 讞讜诇讬 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讛专讬 注诪讚

The Gemara challenges: We learned in the mishna: If a man said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, but if not then it is not a valid bill of divorce. And if you say that if he arose and was cured of his illness the bill of divorce is retracted, then why do I need assessment at all? He arose from his sickbed, so the bill of divorce should automatically be nullified.

讗诪专 诪专 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 砖谞讬转拽 诪讞讜诇讬 诇讞讜诇讬

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava: This is referring to a case where, instead of recovering completely, he proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, and the assessment is to ascertain whether he died from the first illness or from the second one.

讜讛讗 注诪讚 拽转谞讬 注诪讚 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜谞驻诇 诇讞讜诇讬 讗讞专 讜讛讗 讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 拽转谞讬 讛诇讱 注诇 诪砖注谞转讜

The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the mishna: He arose from his illness, which indicates that he was completely cured? The Gemara answers: No, it means that he arose from this illness but fell into another illness. The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it also taught in the mishna: He walked in the market? The Gemara answers: This means that he walked with his staff for support, meaning that he was not fully recovered from his illness but was able to walk only with assistance.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Gittin 72

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 72

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and there is no concern that the scribe signed the document without the husband instructing him to do so.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 谞驻讬拽 诪讬谞讛 讞讜专讘讗 讚讝讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 诇砖谞讬诐 讗诪专讜 诇住讜驻专 讜讬讻转讜讘 讜诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜驻诇讜谞讬 讜讬讞转诪讜 讜诪砖讜诐 讻讬住讜驻讗 讚住讜驻专 讞讬讬砖讬 讜诪讞转诪讬 诇讬讛 讜讘注诇 诇讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬

And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it, a pitfall will result from it. As sometimes, it happens that one said to two people: Tell a scribe and he will write the document and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they will sign it. And due to the shame of the scribe, who asks: Don鈥檛 you consider me a sufficiently upright person to sign the document as a witness, the agents are concerned to avoid that disgrace and they will have one of those witnesses and the scribe sign together with him, and the husband did not say to do so. This bill of divorce is invalid because it was signed contrary to the husband鈥檚 instructions, and the agents will mistakenly think it is valid.

讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The reason that this is not a concern must be because Rabbi Yosei holds that even if the husband says to the agents: Tell the scribe to write, the bill of divorce is not valid. Rather, it is clear that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 诇讗 讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗诪专讜 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讗诪专 讗诪专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗

Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation of the attribution of the mishna: The mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and it is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to state that the bill of divorce is not valid in a case where he did not say to the agents: Give the document to my wife; rather, even if he said to the agents: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, the document is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say his instructions to three people; rather, even if he said his instructions to three people, no, the bill of divorce is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say to the agents: Say my instructions to a scribe, but even if he said: Say my instructions to a scribe, the bill of divorce is also not valid.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讗砖讬 讻转讘 住讜驻专 诇砖诪讛 讜讞转诪讜 注讚讬诐 诇砖诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讘讜讛讜 讜讞转诪讜讛讜 讜谞转谞讜讛讜 诇讜 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讛专讬 讛讙讟 讘讟诇 注讚 砖讬砖诪注讜 拽讜诇讜 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:7鈥8) in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi that Rabbi Yosei validated the bill of divorce even if the husband said: Tell my instructions to a scribe, as it is taught: If the scribe wrote the bill of divorce for her sake and the witnesses signed it for her sake then even though they wrote it, and they signed it, and they gave it to the husband and he gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void until they hear the husband鈥檚 voice when he says to the scribe: Write the document for the sake of my wife, and to the witnesses: Sign the document for the sake of my wife.

讬砖诪注讜 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 拽讜诇讜 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘

The inference from the baraita is that it uses the term: Until they hear, serves to exclude the opinion of the one who said: Rabbi Yosei concedes in a case where the husband says: Say my instructions to the scribe; because the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband themselves. Furthermore, the baraita uses the term: His voice, to exclude that which Rav Kahana says that Rav says, that a husband may issue written instructions to the scribe and witnesses. According to the baraita the instructions must be verbal.

诪转谞讬壮 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟

MISHNA: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then it is as if he said nothing, since a bill of divorce is valid only if it takes effect before the husband鈥檚 death. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce, because once he dies, the bill of divorce retroactively applies from when he made this statement.

诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗诐 诪转 讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讬讘诪转

If the husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then it is uncertain whether his primary intention was for the bill of divorce to take effect that day, in which case it is a valid bill of divorce, or if his primary intention was that it should take effect after his death and is therefore not valid. The halakha is that there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or not a valid bill of divorce. And if he dies without children his wife must perform 岣litza, since perhaps the bill of divorce is not valid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing 岣litza. But she may not enter into levirate marriage, since perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is prohibited for a divorc茅e to marry her brother-in-law.

讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讜讞诇讛 讜诪转 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗诐 诪讞诪转 讞讜诇讬 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟

If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, as his conditional statement was fulfilled, but if not, i.e., if he was cured from the first illness and died from another illness, then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

讙诪壮 讗诇诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬 讜讛讚专 转谞讬 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诪转讬 讗诇诪讗 讗诐 诪转讬 诇讗讜 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. The Gemara deduces: Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. And afterward the mishna teaches: If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is not considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. As explained previously in the mishna, a bill of divorce which takes effect only after the husband鈥檚 death is not a valid bill of divorce. There is an apparent contradiction as to the meaning of the term: If I die.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 诪转讬 砖转讬 诇砖讜谞讜转 诪砖诪注 诪砖诪注 讻诪注讻砖讬讜 讜诪砖诪注 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

Abaye said: The expression: If I die, indicates two different meanings. It indicates the same meaning as one who says: From now, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect after death retroactively from now. And it indicates the same meaning as one who says: After my death, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect only after his death.

讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪注讻砖讬讜 讚诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讻诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

If the husband said to his wife: From today if I die, it is considered to be like one who says to her: From now, conditional upon my death. But if he did not say to her: From today, it is considered to be like one who says to her: After my death, and the bill of divorce is void because it takes effect only after his death.

讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诪转讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讞讜诇爪转

搂 The mishna teaches that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But if her husband died without children this woman must perform 岣litza and not enter into a levirate marriage because perhaps it is a valid bill of divorce.

讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 拽转谞讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讚讗住讬专讗 诇注诇诪讗 讜诇讬讘诐 谞诪讬 讗住讬专讗

The Gemara raises a challenge: But isn鈥檛 the expression: It is as if he said nothing, taught in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it is as if he said nothing with regard to the fact that she is still forbidden to everyone after the death of her husband, and is bound by a levirate bond. And she is also forbidden to the yavam because perhaps the bill of divorce was valid, in which case she has no levirate bond.

讜讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 讞讜诇爪转 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讬讘讜诪讬 谞诪讬 诪讬讘诪讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻专讘谞谉

The Gemara raises a challenge: But since the latter clause of the mishna teaches that in those cases of uncertainty she must perform 岣litza, by inference it appears that in the cases of the first clause she may also enter into levirate marriage, indicating that in those cases the bill of divorce is definitely not valid. The Gemara answers: This is not a challenge to Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion, as the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that this kind of conditional bill of divorce is invalid and she may enter into levirate marriage.

讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

But Rav Huna was not explaining the words of the mishna; the statement that he said is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says as a principle: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. Therefore, since the bill of divorce bears that day鈥檚 date, it takes effect immediately, even though it is not stated explicitly.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: If Rav Huna鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei then the woman should also not require 岣litza, as in his opinion the bill of divorce is entirely valid and there is no levirate bond at all. And if you would say that Rav Huna is uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or if the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and on account of this he was stringent in accordance with both opinions, i.e., the one which requires 岣litza and the one which forbids levirate marriage, this also presents a difficulty. But is Rav Huna in fact uncertain?

讜讛讗 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讞诇砖 注讜诇 诇讙讘讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讛讜谞讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讗讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛诇讻讛 讜讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讱

But when Rabba bar Avuh was ill Rav Huna and Rav Na岣an entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: Ask of him, Rabba bar Avuh: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Rav Na岣an said to Rav Huna: I do not know the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei, and you ask me to ask Rabba bar Avuh the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: You ask him the halakha, and I will tell you the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei afterward.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讘转专 讚谞驻拽 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽住讘专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜 讗诇讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

Rav Na岣an asked of Rabba bar Avuh what the halakha is. Rabba bar Avuh said to him: So said Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After he left Rav Huna said to Rav Na岣an: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as he holds: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. From this incident it is clear that Rav Huna holds that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, as Rav Huna certainly accepted the opinion that Rabba bar Avuh said in the name of Rav. Rather, it is necessary to say that Rav Huna is uncertain

讗讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘注诇 驻讛 讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专

if Rabbi Yosei says that the date on which a document is written proves when it takes effect even when the husband stated a verbal condition as he handed it over, or if Rabbi Yosei does not say his principle in such a case.

讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜诪转 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜转谞讬 注诇讛 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讛转讬专讜讛 诇讛讬谞砖讗

The Gemara asks: But is Rav Huna uncertain with regard to this matter? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (76b): If one says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce if I have not come back here from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within twelve months, then it is not a valid bill of divorce because the bill of divorce does not take effect until the end of twelve months, which is after the husband鈥檚 death? As a result, she is bound by a levirate bond if her husband has no children. And it is taught with regard to that mishna: Our Rabbis disagree, and they rendered it permitted for her to marry, because they are of the opinion that there is no levirate bond in this case.

讜讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讗谉 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讚砖专讜 诪讬砖讞讗 讜住讘专讬 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讝诪谞讜 砖诇 砖讟专 诪讜讻讬讞 注诇讬讜

And we say: Who represents the opinion cited as our Rabbis? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is the court that permitted the consumption of oil manufactured by gentiles, and they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. Evidently, according to Rabbi Yosei this principle applies even when the husband made a verbal condition with regard to the bill of divorce.

讗诇讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讗讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘注诇 驻讛 讗讜 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛

Rather, it is necessary to say as follows: Rav Huna is uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei when the husband adds a verbal condition when giving the document, or if the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 opinion in such a case.

讜诪讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讜砖讗谞讬 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讻砖讗诪讜转 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗讬谉 讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara asks: But is Rav Huna uncertain with regard to this matter? But didn鈥檛 Rava say: If one says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce if I die, or: 鈥淭his is your bill of divorce when I am dead, then this is a valid bill of divorce? If he said to her: When I die, or: After my death, then this is not a valid bill of divorce.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘谞谉 爪专讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讜讛转谞谉 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讜讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that he said to her: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, and Rava鈥檚 statement is in accordance with opinion of the Rabbis, which is the unattributed opinion of the mishna, is it necessary that this halakha be said by Rava, an amora? But didn鈥檛 we learn explicitly in the mishna that if he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, then it is a valid bill of divorce? But rather, is it not speaking about a case where he did not say the term: From today, when he gave the bill of divorce, and Rava鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? Conclude from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

诇专讘讗 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: It is obvious to Rava that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even when the husband added a verbal condition. But according to Rav Huna, it is uncertain whether or not this is the halakha.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诪讛讬讜诐 讜专讘谞谉 讜讛谞讬 诇讬砖谞讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讻讬 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 诪转 讻讗诐 诪转讬 讚诪讬 讻砖讗诪讜转 讻诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讚诪讬

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, Rava鈥檚 statement is referring to a case where he said to her: This is your bill of divorce from today, and it is in accordance with opinion of the Rabbis. And it was necessary for Rava to state his ruling to teach the halakha of these expressions not stated in the mishna: First, the husband saying: When I am dead, is considered to be like the expression: If I die. Second, the husband saying: When I die, is considered to be like the expression: After my death.

讜讗讬讻讗 讚诪转谞讬 诇讛 讗住讬驻讗 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞讜诇爪转

And there are those who teach this statement of Rav Huna with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, which states that if the husband said: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then the bill of divorce is invalid and it is as though he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei she must nevertheless perform 岣litza, as it is uncertain if the bill of divorce takes effect from the day the bill of divorce was given when the date is supplied verbally.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 诇专讘谞谉 讞讜诇爪转 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讞讜诇爪转

The Gemara questions this version of Rav Huna鈥檚 statement: This is obvious. Since it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna, in a case where he explicitly stated: From today, that according to the opinion of the Rabbis she must perform 岣litza due to the uncertainty as to when the bill of divorce takes effect, in the first clause as well, when he did not add: From today, it is obvious that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei she must perform 岣litza due to the uncertainty. The dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis concerns only whether the husband needs to add the term: From today.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讛讗 讻专讘讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 讙讬讟讗 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讬 讜讞诇讬爪讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 专讘讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬

The Gemara answers: His statement necessary, lest you say that with regard to this, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: It is a proper bill of divorce, and she is not even required to perform 岣litza. Therefore, Rav Huna teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Each has a unique, albeit similar, opinion.

专讘讬 诇讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讝讛 讙讟 诇诪注讜讟讬 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讝讛 讙讟 诇诪注讜讟讬 讚专讘讬

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as it teaches in a baraita: If the husband said: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce and there is no need for the wife to perform 岣litza. By emphasizing the term: Like this, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi intends to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who is uncertain with regard to the matter. And similarly, Rabbi Yosei did not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it teaches in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce, to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

专讘讬 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪讛讬讜诐 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讙讟 讜讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

The Gemara cites the baraita and mishna that demonstrate the difference of opinion between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei. What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then there is uncertainty whether it is a bill of divorce or whether it is not a bill of divorce, and the wife must perform 岣litza. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty, and there is no need for the wife to perform 岣litza.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讻转讘讜 讜转谞讜 讙讟 诇讗砖转讬 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讬讻谉 讜注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讻转讘讜讛讜 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜谞转谞讜 诇讗讞专 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻讝讛 讙讟

What is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As we learned in a mishna (76b): If one says: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I have not come from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and the court wrote the bill of divorce within twelve months and gave it to the wife after twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce.

讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market and became ill again and died, then it must be assessed whether he died from the first illness and it is therefore a valid bill of divorce. But if he did not die from this illness then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讙讬讟讜 讻诪转谞转讜 诪讛 诪转谞转讜 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 讗祝 讙讬讟讜 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专

Rav Huna said: With regard to a person on his deathbed, the halakhot of his bill of divorce are the same as the halakhot of his gift. The Sages instituted that when a person on his deathbed gives a gift, no formal act of acquisition is required. Just as with regard to his gift, if he arose and was cured from his illness the gift he granted while on his deathbed is retracted, as he gave it only based on the assumption that he was about to die, so too, with regard to his bill of divorce, if he arose and was cured from his illness, the bill of divorce is retracted and nullified, as he gave his wife her bill of divorce only because he thought he was about to die and he wanted to exempt her from a levirate bond.

讜诪讛 讙讬讟讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 驻专讬砖 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 讻转讜讘讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗祝 诪转谞转讜 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 转谞讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛

Rav Huna continues: And just as in the case of his bill of divorce, where, even though he did not explicitly say his full intention, once he said: Write the bill of divorce, his statement is interpreted to mean that the court should give the bill of divorce to his wife even though he did not say: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, which a healthy man would need to state, so too, this is the halakha with regard to his gift. Once he said: Give the gift, then even though the recipients did not acquire it from him, which finalizes a gift from a healthy person, because he is dying the halakha takes into account his intention without all the necessary legal requirements.

转谞谉 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诪讛讬讜诐 讗诐 诪转讬 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜注诪讚 讜讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 讜讞诇讛 讜诪转 讗讜诪讚讬诐 讗讜转讜 讗诐 诪讞诪转 讞讜诇讬 讛专讗砖讜谉 诪转 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讗诐 诇讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讙讟 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗诐 注诪讚 讞讜讝专 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讛专讬 注诪讚

The Gemara challenges: We learned in the mishna: If a man said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, but if not then it is not a valid bill of divorce. And if you say that if he arose and was cured of his illness the bill of divorce is retracted, then why do I need assessment at all? He arose from his sickbed, so the bill of divorce should automatically be nullified.

讗诪专 诪专 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 砖谞讬转拽 诪讞讜诇讬 诇讞讜诇讬

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava: This is referring to a case where, instead of recovering completely, he proceeded from one illness immediately to another illness, and the assessment is to ascertain whether he died from the first illness or from the second one.

讜讛讗 注诪讚 拽转谞讬 注诪讚 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讜谞驻诇 诇讞讜诇讬 讗讞专 讜讛讗 讛诇讱 讘砖讜拽 拽转谞讬 讛诇讱 注诇 诪砖注谞转讜

The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it taught in the mishna: He arose from his illness, which indicates that he was completely cured? The Gemara answers: No, it means that he arose from this illness but fell into another illness. The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it also taught in the mishna: He walked in the market? The Gemara answers: This means that he walked with his staff for support, meaning that he was not fully recovered from his illness but was able to walk only with assistance.

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