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Today's Daf Yomi

February 22, 2016 | 讬状讙 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Gittin 71

According to Rav, a deaf person who can write – can write a note instructing others to give a get to his wife. 聽The gemara points out that his law is a subject of debate among tanaim. 聽 The gemara here is grappling with issues of people with disabilities and is aware of the fact that although people may be categorized into a particular group, there are shades within each group and those with higher intellectual capabilities.


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讗诇讗 讘驻讬专讬

Rather, it means that the court asks him questions with regard to produce that is not found during that season.

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞专砖 砖讬讻讜诇 诇讚讘专 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 谞砖转转拽 讜讗诪专讜 诇讜 谞讻转讜讘 讙讟 诇讗砖转讱 讜讛专讻讬谉 讘专讗砖讜 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖诇砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗诪专 注诇 诇讗讜 诇讗讜 讜注诇 讛谉 讛谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讬讻转讘讜 讜讬转谞讜

Rav Kahana says that Rav says: With regard to a deaf-mute who can express himself through writing, the judges of the court may write and give a bill of divorce to his wife based on his written instructions. Rav Yosef said: What is he teaching us? We already learned in the mishna: In a case where the husband became mute, and the members of the court said to him: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife, and he nodded his head indicating his agreement, they examine him with various questions three times. If he responded to questions that have a negative answer: No, and responded to questions that have a positive answer: Yes, indicating his competence, they shall write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife based on the nod of his head.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诇诐 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 讗诇诐 讚转谞讬讗 诪讚讘专 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜诪注 讝讛讜 讞专砖 砖讜诪注 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讝讛讜 讗诇诐 讜讝讛 讜讝讛 讛专讬 讛谉 讻驻拽讞讬谉 诇讻诇 讚讘专讬讛诐

Rabbi Zeira said to him: A mute, you say? Is your challenge based on the mishna which discusses one who is mute? A mute is different because it is clear that his mind is intact. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:2): With regard to one who speaks but cannot hear, this individual is categorized as a deaf person. With regard to one who hears but cannot speak, this individual is categorized as a mute person, and both this one and that one are considered to be like halakhically competent people with regard to all their matters. Rav Kahana stated his ruling with regard to one who can neither hear nor speak. This goes beyond the halakha of the mishna, as Rav Kahana says that the written statement of a deaf-mute is an indication of his mental competence.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪讚讘专 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜诪注 讝讛讜 讞专砖 砖讜诪注 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讝讛讜 讗诇诐 讚讻转讬讘 讜讗谞讬 讻讞专砖 诇讗 讗砖诪注 讜讻讗诇诐 诇讗 讬驻转讞 驻讬讜 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讬砖转拽讬诇 诪讬诇讜诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And from where do we learn that one who speaks but cannot hear, this individual is categorized as a deaf person, and that with regard to one who hears but cannot speak, this individual is categorized as a mute person? As it is written: 鈥淎nd I am like a deaf man, I do not hear, and like the mute man who will not open his mouth鈥 (Psalms 38:14). And if you wish, say as people say: The word for a mute [ilem] is a contraction of the expression his speech has been taken [ishtakil millulei].

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 讛讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 诇讗 讬讙讬讚 驻专讟 诇讗诇诐 砖讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讙讬讚 讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讙讬讚 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘

Rabbi Zeira said: If Rav Kahana鈥檚 statement is difficult for me, this is difficult for me, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the punishment of one who was called to testify and failed to do so: 鈥淚f he does not utter his testimony then he shall bear his iniquity鈥 (Leviticus 5:1). The Sages derive from this that the verse serves to exclude a mute who is unable to utter his testimony, and he is exempt from bringing the offering of one who refuses to testify. And it is possible to raise the following question: Why is he exempt from bringing the offering; but he is able to utter his testimony through writing? Apparently, written testimony is not valid testimony.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 注讚讜转 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 注讚讜转 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪驻讬讛诐 讜诇讗 诪驻讬 讻转讘诐

Abaye said to him: You say testimony? Testimony is different, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淔rom their mouths鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:6), which emphasizes that testimony must come from the witnesses鈥 mouths and not from their writing.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻砖诐 砖讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇讙讬讟讬谉 讻讱 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪砖讗讜转 讜诇诪转谞讜转 讜诇注讚讬讜转 讜诇讬专讜砖讜转 拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 注讚讬讜转

The Gemara raises an objection to this based on that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:1): Just as the judges of the court investigate him, one who lost his ability to speak, with regard to bills of divorce, so too, the judges investigate him with regard to business transactions, testimonies, and inheritances. In any event it teaches: Testimonies, which proves that even one unable to speak can give testimony.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讘注讚讜转 讗砖讛 讚讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Sheshet said: This is not referring to testimony in general. Rather, it is referring to testimony with regard to a woman whose husband died, as the Sages were lenient with her and allowed testimony that would normally not be accepted, in order to permit her to remarry.

讜讛讗 拽转谞讬 讬专讜砖讜转 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讬专讜砖转 讘谞讜 讛讘讻讜专

The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it also taught: Inheritances. This seems to be referring to monetary matters, where proper testimony is required. Rabbi Abbahu said: The baraita is referring to the inheritance of his own firstborn son, meaning that he is not testifying about other people鈥檚 property but testifying which one of his sons is the firstborn. Since this testimony is merely considered to be a division of the property that belongs to him, the testimony of one who is unable to speak is valid.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 诇诪砖讗讜转 讜诇诪转谞讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇注诇诪讗 诇讗 诇讚讬讚讬讛

The Gemara continues to challenge: In any event it teaches in the baraita: With regard to business transactions, what, does it not mean that a mute may testify with regard to business transactions for everyone else? The Gemara answers: No, he may testify for himself only. The baraita is saying that when a mute conducts business the court must first check if he is mentally capable.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讞专砖 诇讗 讛诇讻讜 讘讜 讗讞专 专诪讬讝讜转讬讜 讜讗讞专 拽驻讬爪讜转讬讜 讜讗讞专 讻转讘 讬讚讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讙讬讟讬谉

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to a deaf-mute, the judges of the court follow his signals, and follow the movement of his lips, and follow his handwriting only for matters of buying and selling movable property but not for bills of divorce. This appears to contradict Rav Kahana鈥檚 statement that it is permitted for a deaf-mute husband to give written instructions to divorce his wife.

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讞专砖 诪注讬拽专讜 讗讘诇 驻讬拽讞 讜谞转讞专砖 讛讜讗 讻讜转讘 讜讛谉 讞讜转诪讬谉

The Gemara answers: It is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:1) that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement that the court may not rely on the written testimony of a deaf-mute with regard to a bill of divorce said? Only in the case of a deaf-mute who was deaf from the outset, i.e., from birth. But if he had been halakhically competent, i.e., he could previously hear, but became a deaf-mute later, then he may write instructions to give his wife a bill of divorce and they, the witnesses, should sign, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana.

讜讞专砖 诪注讬拽专讜 诇讗 讻砖诐 砖讻讜谞住讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讻讱 诪讜爪讬讗讛 讘专诪讬讝讛

The Gemara asks: And one who is a deaf-mute from the outset cannot give written instructions with regard to a bill of divorce? Isn鈥檛 it true that just as he marries her with intimation, i.e., without speaking, so too, he divorces her with intimation.

讗讬 讘讗砖转讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讬讘诪转讜

The Gemara answers: If the baraita is referring to his wife, indeed this would be the case and he could divorce her through intimations, because such a marriage is not a fully valid marriage by Torah law. But with what are we dealing here? With his yevama, his sister-in-law whose husband, his brother, died childless to whom he performed levirate marriage, and whom he subsequently wishes to divorce. This marriage is a fully valid marriage.

讬讘诪转讜 诪诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讻砖诐 砖讻谞讬住转讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讻讱 讬爪讬讗转讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讗诇讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 驻讬拽讞

The Gemara asks: His yevama from whom? If we say that she fell to him from his brother who was also a deaf-mute, then just as her marriage to the brother was through intimation, so too, her divorce from the yavam can be through intimation. Rather, it must be that she fell to him from his halakhically competent brother. Consequently, the bond of the levirate marriage is by Torah law, whereas the deaf-mute man鈥檚 intimations that he desires to divorce her are valid only by rabbinic law.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讜讙讝讬专讛 讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讗讟讜 讗讞讬讜 驻讬拽讞

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, explain that she fell to him from his deaf-mute brother, and the Sages instituted a rabbinic decree with regard to a woman bound in a levirate marriage from his deaf-mute brother due to the death of his halakhically competent brother.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗砖转讜 谞诪讬 讬讘诪转讜 讘讬讘诪转讜 诪讬讞诇驻讗 讗砖转讜 讘讬讘诪转讜 诇讗 诪讬讞诇驻讗

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the Sages made such a decree with regard to a case where a deaf-mute brother died due to the case where a brother who is halakhically competent died, then with regard to his own wife as well, they should have made a decree that a deaf-mute husband cannot divorce her with a bill of divorce if he married her as a deaf-mute. The Gemara answers: His yevama who was married to his halakhically competent brother might be confused with his yevama who was married to his deaf-mute brother. But people would not confuse his own wife with his yevama. Therefore, there was no need to institute such a decree.

讜诪讬 讙讝专讬谞谉 讞专砖 讗讟讜 驻讬拽讞

The Gemara asks: And do we, the Sages, decree with regard to his deaf-mute brother due to confusion between him and his halakhically competent brother?

讜讛转谞谉 砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讞专砖讬谉 谞砖讜讗讬谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 驻讬拽讞讜转 讗讜 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讞专砖讜转 讗讜 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讗讞转 驻讬拽讞转 讜讗讞转 讞专砖转 讜讻谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讞专砖讜转 谞砖讜讗讜转 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 驻讬拽讞讬谉 讗讜 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讞专砖讬谉 讗讜 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讗讞讚 驻讬拽讞 讜讗讞讚 讞专砖 讛专讬 讗诇讜 驻讟讜专讜转 诪谉 讛讞诇讬爪讛 讜诪谉 讛讬讘讜诐

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yevamot 112b): In a case where there were two deaf-mute brothers, whose marriage is valid by rabbinic law, married to two halakhically competent sisters, or to two deaf-mute sisters, or to two sisters, one of whom was halakhically competent and one of whom was a deaf-mute; and similarly, if there were two deaf-mute sisters, whose marriage is valid by rabbinic law, married to two halakhically competent brothers, or to two deaf-mute brothers, or to two brothers, one of whom was halakhically competent and one of whom was a deaf-mute; and in each case one brother dies without children, then all these women are exempt from 岣litza and from levirate marriage. Each sister is exempt, as she is the sister of the wife of the yavam.

讜讗诐 讛讬讜 谞讻专讬讜转 讬讻谞住讜 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗谉 讬讜爪讬讗讜

And if they were unrelated women the men may marry them in levirate marriage, and if they wanted to divorce them later via a bill of divorce they may divorce them. Since this is stated as a general halakha it indicates that the deaf-mute brother can also give a bill of divorce to his yevama who was previously married to his deaf-mute brother, and the Sages did not institute a decree in order not to create confusion with the similar case of a deceased halakhically competent brother.

讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚砖谞讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗

Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, that it is referring to a yevama, previously married to a halakhically competent brother, who fell before a yavam who was a deaf-mute from birth. The alternative answer given on the previous amud is rejected.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讞诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讞讘讬专讬讜 注诇 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The colleagues of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree with him, and hold that written instructions from a deaf-mute have no halakhic validity.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 谞讬砖讟转 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 谞转讞专砖 讛讜讗 讗讜 谞砖转讟讛 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 注讜诇诪讬转 诪讗讬 注讜诇诪讬转 诇讗讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讬讻讜诇 诇讚讘专 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘

Abaye said that we, too, learn in the mishna (Yevamot 112b) that non-verbal instructions are insufficient to initiate a divorce even for one who was born with the ability to hear and subsequently became a deaf-mute: If a woman became an imbecile after her wedding the Sages instituted that the husband must not divorce her. If the husband became a deaf-mute or an imbecile he can never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to grant a bill of divorce. Abaye explains: What is the reason that the mishna emphasizes that he can never divorce her? Isn鈥檛 this teaching that even though he can communicate through writing, he is unable to divorce her?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇驻专讜砖讬 讟注诪讗 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜诪讗讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讞讝讬谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讞专讬祝

Rav Pappa said: If not for the fact that Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that there is a dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis, then I would say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes only to explain the reason of the first tanna, not to disagree with him. If that were so, all agree that one who was born with the ability to hear and subsequently became a deaf-mute can issue written instructions to write and give a bill of divorce for his wife. And according to this explanation, what is the meaning of the word never? It is not referring to issuing written instructions. It means that even though I see that he is sharp by means of examining his gestures, these indications are not sufficient to warrant the giving of a bill of divorce. Despite this, if he were to issue written instructions to divorce his wife, they would be followed.

讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗驻讬拽讞转 讘注诇 讻专讞讛

Alternatively, the mishna emphasized that the only situation where the husband can never divorce his wife is where her husband became a deaf-mute or an imbecile, but not if the husband remained healthy and the wife became a deaf-mute or imbecile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitz岣k, as Rabbi Yitz岣k says: By Torah law a woman who is an imbecile may be divorced even though she is unable to give her consent, just as it is permitted to divorce a halakhically competent woman against her will.

讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

And what is the reason that the Rabbis said she may not be divorced? So that she will not be treated as ownerless property. If she has no husband to protect her, and she is unable to protect herself, she may be treated as ownerless property by anyone who wishes to engage in sexual intercourse with her. By contrast, if the husband is a deaf-mute or an imbecile then he cannot divorce her by Torah law. This is why the mishna stresses only that the husband may never divorce his wife in the case where he becomes halakhically incompetent, but not when it is the wife who becomes a deaf-mute or an imbecile, in order to demonstrate the difference between the two cases in terms of Torah law.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专讜 诇讜 谞讻转讜讘 讙讟 诇讗砖转讱 讜讗诪专 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讜 讗诪专讜 诇住讜驻专 讜讻转讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讜讞转诪讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讘讜讛讜 讜讞转诪讜讛讜 讜谞转谞讜讛讜 诇讜 讜讞讝专 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讛专讬 讛讙讟 讘讟诇 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜

MISHNA: If people said to the husband: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he said to them: Write the document, and those people told the scribe to write it, and he wrote it and instructed the witnesses to sign it, and they signed it; even if they wrote it, and signed it, and gave it to him, and he then gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void unless he himself says to the scribe: Write the document, and he himself says to the witnesses: Sign the document.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讛讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna: The reason that the bill of divorce is void is because he told the people only to write the document, but he did not say: Give a bill of divorce to my wife. But if he said to them: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, and they told the scribe to write the document and the witnesses to sign it, those people give the document to his wife and it is valid. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Verbal directives can be delegated to an agent. Everyone agrees that an agent can be appointed to perform an action on behalf of another, but Rabbi Meir holds that an agent can be appointed to give instructions to others on behalf of another.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜 讗转讗谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

The Gemara comments: Say the latter clause of the mishna: The bill of divorce is void unless he himself says to the scribe: Write the document, and he himself says to the witnesses: Sign the document. In the latter clause of the mishna, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent.

专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬谉 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? The Gemara answers: Yes, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Although unusual, it is possible for a single mishna to represent two contrary opinions.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Abaye said: Actually, the mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. And with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not say: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, but said only to write it. In that case he must instruct the scribe and the witnesses directly. If he issued instructions to give the bill of divorce, it would also have been effective. The Gemara asks: If so, the mishna should have said: The bill of divorce is void unless he says: Give the bill of divorce to my wife.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇砖诇砖讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not say his instructions to three people, who constitute a court with the authority to appoint others to write a bill of divorce. Rather, he instructed two people, who do not constitute a court, and therefore do not have the authority to appoint others to write a bill of divorce, even if the husband told them to give the bill of divorce to his wife. Witnesses may only write and give the document themselves. The Gemara challenges: If so, the mishna should have said: Unless he says his instructions to three people.

讗诇讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗诪专讜

Rather, the mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not explicitly say to his agents: Say my instructions to the scribe to write the document.

讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 讗诪专讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: If so, the expression: Until he says to the scribe, is imprecise. Rather, the mishna should have said: Until the husband instructs the agents to tell.

讜注讜讚 诪讬 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 讜讛转谞谉 讻转讘 住讜驻专 讜注讚 讻砖专 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讞转诐 住讜驻专 砖谞讬谞讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬

And does Rabbi Yosei concede in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (87b): If a bill of divorce has the writing of a scribe, and the scribe identifies his handwriting, and one witness verifies his signature, it is valid as though two witnesses testified to ratify their signatures. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: We learned in the mishna that this is the halakha with regard to the scribe鈥檚 signature and not the scribe鈥檚 writing. And Rav 岣sda said: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Gittin 71

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 71

讗诇讗 讘驻讬专讬

Rather, it means that the court asks him questions with regard to produce that is not found during that season.

讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞专砖 砖讬讻讜诇 诇讚讘专 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 讙讟 诇讗砖转讜 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转谞讬谞讗 谞砖转转拽 讜讗诪专讜 诇讜 谞讻转讜讘 讙讟 诇讗砖转讱 讜讛专讻讬谉 讘专讗砖讜 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖诇砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗诪专 注诇 诇讗讜 诇讗讜 讜注诇 讛谉 讛谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讬讻转讘讜 讜讬转谞讜

Rav Kahana says that Rav says: With regard to a deaf-mute who can express himself through writing, the judges of the court may write and give a bill of divorce to his wife based on his written instructions. Rav Yosef said: What is he teaching us? We already learned in the mishna: In a case where the husband became mute, and the members of the court said to him: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife, and he nodded his head indicating his agreement, they examine him with various questions three times. If he responded to questions that have a negative answer: No, and responded to questions that have a positive answer: Yes, indicating his competence, they shall write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife based on the nod of his head.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诇诐 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 讗诇诐 讚转谞讬讗 诪讚讘专 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜诪注 讝讛讜 讞专砖 砖讜诪注 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讝讛讜 讗诇诐 讜讝讛 讜讝讛 讛专讬 讛谉 讻驻拽讞讬谉 诇讻诇 讚讘专讬讛诐

Rabbi Zeira said to him: A mute, you say? Is your challenge based on the mishna which discusses one who is mute? A mute is different because it is clear that his mind is intact. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:2): With regard to one who speaks but cannot hear, this individual is categorized as a deaf person. With regard to one who hears but cannot speak, this individual is categorized as a mute person, and both this one and that one are considered to be like halakhically competent people with regard to all their matters. Rav Kahana stated his ruling with regard to one who can neither hear nor speak. This goes beyond the halakha of the mishna, as Rav Kahana says that the written statement of a deaf-mute is an indication of his mental competence.

讜诪诪讗讬 讚诪讚讘专 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜诪注 讝讛讜 讞专砖 砖讜诪注 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讚讘专 讝讛讜 讗诇诐 讚讻转讬讘 讜讗谞讬 讻讞专砖 诇讗 讗砖诪注 讜讻讗诇诐 诇讗 讬驻转讞 驻讬讜 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讚讗诪专讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讬砖转拽讬诇 诪讬诇讜诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And from where do we learn that one who speaks but cannot hear, this individual is categorized as a deaf person, and that with regard to one who hears but cannot speak, this individual is categorized as a mute person? As it is written: 鈥淎nd I am like a deaf man, I do not hear, and like the mute man who will not open his mouth鈥 (Psalms 38:14). And if you wish, say as people say: The word for a mute [ilem] is a contraction of the expression his speech has been taken [ishtakil millulei].

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗讬 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 讛讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 诇讗 讬讙讬讚 驻专讟 诇讗诇诐 砖讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讙讬讚 讗诪讗讬 讛讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讙讬讚 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘

Rabbi Zeira said: If Rav Kahana鈥檚 statement is difficult for me, this is difficult for me, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the punishment of one who was called to testify and failed to do so: 鈥淚f he does not utter his testimony then he shall bear his iniquity鈥 (Leviticus 5:1). The Sages derive from this that the verse serves to exclude a mute who is unable to utter his testimony, and he is exempt from bringing the offering of one who refuses to testify. And it is possible to raise the following question: Why is he exempt from bringing the offering; but he is able to utter his testimony through writing? Apparently, written testimony is not valid testimony.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 注讚讜转 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 注讚讜转 讚专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 诪驻讬讛诐 讜诇讗 诪驻讬 讻转讘诐

Abaye said to him: You say testimony? Testimony is different, as the Merciful One states: 鈥淔rom their mouths鈥 (Deuteronomy 17:6), which emphasizes that testimony must come from the witnesses鈥 mouths and not from their writing.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻砖诐 砖讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇讙讬讟讬谉 讻讱 讘讜讚拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪砖讗讜转 讜诇诪转谞讜转 讜诇注讚讬讜转 讜诇讬专讜砖讜转 拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 注讚讬讜转

The Gemara raises an objection to this based on that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:1): Just as the judges of the court investigate him, one who lost his ability to speak, with regard to bills of divorce, so too, the judges investigate him with regard to business transactions, testimonies, and inheritances. In any event it teaches: Testimonies, which proves that even one unable to speak can give testimony.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讘注讚讜转 讗砖讛 讚讗拽讬诇讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Sheshet said: This is not referring to testimony in general. Rather, it is referring to testimony with regard to a woman whose husband died, as the Sages were lenient with her and allowed testimony that would normally not be accepted, in order to permit her to remarry.

讜讛讗 拽转谞讬 讬专讜砖讜转 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讬专讜砖转 讘谞讜 讛讘讻讜专

The Gemara challenges: But isn鈥檛 it also taught: Inheritances. This seems to be referring to monetary matters, where proper testimony is required. Rabbi Abbahu said: The baraita is referring to the inheritance of his own firstborn son, meaning that he is not testifying about other people鈥檚 property but testifying which one of his sons is the firstborn. Since this testimony is merely considered to be a division of the property that belongs to him, the testimony of one who is unable to speak is valid.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 诇诪砖讗讜转 讜诇诪转谞讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诇注诇诪讗 诇讗 诇讚讬讚讬讛

The Gemara continues to challenge: In any event it teaches in the baraita: With regard to business transactions, what, does it not mean that a mute may testify with regard to business transactions for everyone else? The Gemara answers: No, he may testify for himself only. The baraita is saying that when a mute conducts business the court must first check if he is mentally capable.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讞专砖 诇讗 讛诇讻讜 讘讜 讗讞专 专诪讬讝讜转讬讜 讜讗讞专 拽驻讬爪讜转讬讜 讜讗讞专 讻转讘 讬讚讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讙讬讟讬谉

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to a deaf-mute, the judges of the court follow his signals, and follow the movement of his lips, and follow his handwriting only for matters of buying and selling movable property but not for bills of divorce. This appears to contradict Rav Kahana鈥檚 statement that it is permitted for a deaf-mute husband to give written instructions to divorce his wife.

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讞专砖 诪注讬拽专讜 讗讘诇 驻讬拽讞 讜谞转讞专砖 讛讜讗 讻讜转讘 讜讛谉 讞讜转诪讬谉

The Gemara answers: It is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:1) that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement that the court may not rely on the written testimony of a deaf-mute with regard to a bill of divorce said? Only in the case of a deaf-mute who was deaf from the outset, i.e., from birth. But if he had been halakhically competent, i.e., he could previously hear, but became a deaf-mute later, then he may write instructions to give his wife a bill of divorce and they, the witnesses, should sign, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana.

讜讞专砖 诪注讬拽专讜 诇讗 讻砖诐 砖讻讜谞住讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讻讱 诪讜爪讬讗讛 讘专诪讬讝讛

The Gemara asks: And one who is a deaf-mute from the outset cannot give written instructions with regard to a bill of divorce? Isn鈥檛 it true that just as he marries her with intimation, i.e., without speaking, so too, he divorces her with intimation.

讗讬 讘讗砖转讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讬讘诪转讜

The Gemara answers: If the baraita is referring to his wife, indeed this would be the case and he could divorce her through intimations, because such a marriage is not a fully valid marriage by Torah law. But with what are we dealing here? With his yevama, his sister-in-law whose husband, his brother, died childless to whom he performed levirate marriage, and whom he subsequently wishes to divorce. This marriage is a fully valid marriage.

讬讘诪转讜 诪诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讻砖诐 砖讻谞讬住转讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讻讱 讬爪讬讗转讛 讘专诪讬讝讛 讗诇讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 驻讬拽讞

The Gemara asks: His yevama from whom? If we say that she fell to him from his brother who was also a deaf-mute, then just as her marriage to the brother was through intimation, so too, her divorce from the yavam can be through intimation. Rather, it must be that she fell to him from his halakhically competent brother. Consequently, the bond of the levirate marriage is by Torah law, whereas the deaf-mute man鈥檚 intimations that he desires to divorce her are valid only by rabbinic law.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 诪讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讜讙讝讬专讛 讗讞讬讜 讞专砖 讗讟讜 讗讞讬讜 驻讬拽讞

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, explain that she fell to him from his deaf-mute brother, and the Sages instituted a rabbinic decree with regard to a woman bound in a levirate marriage from his deaf-mute brother due to the death of his halakhically competent brother.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗砖转讜 谞诪讬 讬讘诪转讜 讘讬讘诪转讜 诪讬讞诇驻讗 讗砖转讜 讘讬讘诪转讜 诇讗 诪讬讞诇驻讗

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the Sages made such a decree with regard to a case where a deaf-mute brother died due to the case where a brother who is halakhically competent died, then with regard to his own wife as well, they should have made a decree that a deaf-mute husband cannot divorce her with a bill of divorce if he married her as a deaf-mute. The Gemara answers: His yevama who was married to his halakhically competent brother might be confused with his yevama who was married to his deaf-mute brother. But people would not confuse his own wife with his yevama. Therefore, there was no need to institute such a decree.

讜诪讬 讙讝专讬谞谉 讞专砖 讗讟讜 驻讬拽讞

The Gemara asks: And do we, the Sages, decree with regard to his deaf-mute brother due to confusion between him and his halakhically competent brother?

讜讛转谞谉 砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讞专砖讬谉 谞砖讜讗讬谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 驻讬拽讞讜转 讗讜 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讞专砖讜转 讗讜 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讗讞转 驻讬拽讞转 讜讗讞转 讞专砖转 讜讻谉 砖转讬 讗讞讬讜转 讞专砖讜转 谞砖讜讗讜转 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 驻讬拽讞讬谉 讗讜 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讞专砖讬谉 讗讜 诇砖谞讬 讗讞讬谉 讗讞讚 驻讬拽讞 讜讗讞讚 讞专砖 讛专讬 讗诇讜 驻讟讜专讜转 诪谉 讛讞诇讬爪讛 讜诪谉 讛讬讘讜诐

But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Yevamot 112b): In a case where there were two deaf-mute brothers, whose marriage is valid by rabbinic law, married to two halakhically competent sisters, or to two deaf-mute sisters, or to two sisters, one of whom was halakhically competent and one of whom was a deaf-mute; and similarly, if there were two deaf-mute sisters, whose marriage is valid by rabbinic law, married to two halakhically competent brothers, or to two deaf-mute brothers, or to two brothers, one of whom was halakhically competent and one of whom was a deaf-mute; and in each case one brother dies without children, then all these women are exempt from 岣litza and from levirate marriage. Each sister is exempt, as she is the sister of the wife of the yavam.

讜讗诐 讛讬讜 谞讻专讬讜转 讬讻谞住讜 讜讗诐 专爪讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗谉 讬讜爪讬讗讜

And if they were unrelated women the men may marry them in levirate marriage, and if they wanted to divorce them later via a bill of divorce they may divorce them. Since this is stated as a general halakha it indicates that the deaf-mute brother can also give a bill of divorce to his yevama who was previously married to his deaf-mute brother, and the Sages did not institute a decree in order not to create confusion with the similar case of a deceased halakhically competent brother.

讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚砖谞讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗

Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, that it is referring to a yevama, previously married to a halakhically competent brother, who fell before a yavam who was a deaf-mute from birth. The alternative answer given on the previous amud is rejected.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讞诇讜拽讬谉 注诇讬讜 讞讘讬专讬讜 注诇 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The colleagues of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree with him, and hold that written instructions from a deaf-mute have no halakhic validity.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 讗谞谉 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 谞讬砖讟转 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 谞转讞专砖 讛讜讗 讗讜 谞砖转讟讛 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗 注讜诇诪讬转 诪讗讬 注讜诇诪讬转 诇讗讜 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讬讻讜诇 诇讚讘专 诪转讜讱 讛讻转讘

Abaye said that we, too, learn in the mishna (Yevamot 112b) that non-verbal instructions are insufficient to initiate a divorce even for one who was born with the ability to hear and subsequently became a deaf-mute: If a woman became an imbecile after her wedding the Sages instituted that the husband must not divorce her. If the husband became a deaf-mute or an imbecile he can never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to grant a bill of divorce. Abaye explains: What is the reason that the mishna emphasizes that he can never divorce her? Isn鈥檛 this teaching that even though he can communicate through writing, he is unable to divorce her?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇驻专讜砖讬 讟注诪讗 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讜诪讗讬 注讜诇诪讬转 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讞讝讬谞讗 诇讬讛 讚讞专讬祝

Rav Pappa said: If not for the fact that Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that there is a dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis, then I would say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes only to explain the reason of the first tanna, not to disagree with him. If that were so, all agree that one who was born with the ability to hear and subsequently became a deaf-mute can issue written instructions to write and give a bill of divorce for his wife. And according to this explanation, what is the meaning of the word never? It is not referring to issuing written instructions. It means that even though I see that he is sharp by means of examining his gestures, these indications are not sufficient to warrant the giving of a bill of divorce. Despite this, if he were to issue written instructions to divorce his wife, they would be followed.

讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讘专 转讜专讛 砖讜讟讛 诪转讙专砖转 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗驻讬拽讞转 讘注诇 讻专讞讛

Alternatively, the mishna emphasized that the only situation where the husband can never divorce his wife is where her husband became a deaf-mute or an imbecile, but not if the husband remained healthy and the wife became a deaf-mute or imbecile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitz岣k, as Rabbi Yitz岣k says: By Torah law a woman who is an imbecile may be divorced even though she is unable to give her consent, just as it is permitted to divorce a halakhically competent woman against her will.

讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪转讙专砖转 砖诇讗 讬谞讛讙讜 讘讛 诪谞讛讙 讛驻拽专

And what is the reason that the Rabbis said she may not be divorced? So that she will not be treated as ownerless property. If she has no husband to protect her, and she is unable to protect herself, she may be treated as ownerless property by anyone who wishes to engage in sexual intercourse with her. By contrast, if the husband is a deaf-mute or an imbecile then he cannot divorce her by Torah law. This is why the mishna stresses only that the husband may never divorce his wife in the case where he becomes halakhically incompetent, but not when it is the wife who becomes a deaf-mute or an imbecile, in order to demonstrate the difference between the two cases in terms of Torah law.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专讜 诇讜 谞讻转讜讘 讙讟 诇讗砖转讱 讜讗诪专 诇讛谉 讻转讜讘讜 讗诪专讜 诇住讜驻专 讜讻转讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讜讞转诪讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讘讜讛讜 讜讞转诪讜讛讜 讜谞转谞讜讛讜 诇讜 讜讞讝专 讜谞转谞讜 诇讛 讛专讬 讛讙讟 讘讟诇 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜

MISHNA: If people said to the husband: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he said to them: Write the document, and those people told the scribe to write it, and he wrote it and instructed the witnesses to sign it, and they signed it; even if they wrote it, and signed it, and gave it to him, and he then gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void unless he himself says to the scribe: Write the document, and he himself says to the witnesses: Sign the document.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讛讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 谞讜转谞讬谉 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna: The reason that the bill of divorce is void is because he told the people only to write the document, but he did not say: Give a bill of divorce to my wife. But if he said to them: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, and they told the scribe to write the document and the witnesses to sign it, those people give the document to his wife and it is valid. In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Verbal directives can be delegated to an agent. Everyone agrees that an agent can be appointed to perform an action on behalf of another, but Rabbi Meir holds that an agent can be appointed to give instructions to others on behalf of another.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇住讜驻专 讻转讜讘 讜诇注讚讬诐 讞转讜诪讜 讗转讗谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪讬诪住专谉 诇砖诇讬讞

The Gemara comments: Say the latter clause of the mishna: The bill of divorce is void unless he himself says to the scribe: Write the document, and he himself says to the witnesses: Sign the document. In the latter clause of the mishna, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent.

专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讬谉 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? The Gemara answers: Yes, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Although unusual, it is possible for a single mishna to represent two contrary opinions.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转谞讜 讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 转谞讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Abaye said: Actually, the mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. And with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not say: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, but said only to write it. In that case he must instruct the scribe and the witnesses directly. If he issued instructions to give the bill of divorce, it would also have been effective. The Gemara asks: If so, the mishna should have said: The bill of divorce is void unless he says: Give the bill of divorce to my wife.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讘讬 转诇转讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇砖诇砖讛 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not say his instructions to three people, who constitute a court with the authority to appoint others to write a bill of divorce. Rather, he instructed two people, who do not constitute a court, and therefore do not have the authority to appoint others to write a bill of divorce, even if the husband told them to give the bill of divorce to his wife. Witnesses may only write and give the document themselves. The Gemara challenges: If so, the mishna should have said: Unless he says his instructions to three people.

讗诇讗 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗诪专讜

Rather, the mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and with what are we dealing here? With a situation whereby the husband did not explicitly say to his agents: Say my instructions to the scribe to write the document.

讗讬 讛讻讬 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 讗诪专讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara challenges: If so, the expression: Until he says to the scribe, is imprecise. Rather, the mishna should have said: Until the husband instructs the agents to tell.

讜注讜讚 诪讬 诪讜讚讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘讗讜诪专 讗诪专讜 讜讛转谞谉 讻转讘 住讜驻专 讜注讚 讻砖专 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讞转诐 住讜驻专 砖谞讬谞讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬

And does Rabbi Yosei concede in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (87b): If a bill of divorce has the writing of a scribe, and the scribe identifies his handwriting, and one witness verifies his signature, it is valid as though two witnesses testified to ratify their signatures. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: We learned in the mishna that this is the halakha with regard to the scribe鈥檚 signature and not the scribe鈥檚 writing. And Rav 岣sda said: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna?

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