Sanhedrin 31
גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית?
The Gemara answers: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Rav Ḥisda holds that a contradiction with regard to secondary details does not disqualify the testimony even in capital law, and Rav Yehuda holds that it does disqualify the testimony. Neither Sage is bound by the statement of the other.
נְהַרְדָּעֵי אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״מָנֶה שָׁחוֹר״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״מָנֶה לָבָן״ – מִצְטָרְפִים.
The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if one says that it was a black coin and the other one says that it was a white coin their testimonies are combined.
כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה? אֵימַר דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה הֵיכָא דְּלָא מַכְחֲשִׁי אַהֲדָדֵי, הֵיכָא דְּמַכְחֲשִׁי אַהֲדָדֵי מִי אָמַר?
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that as long as both witnesses testify that the defendant owes the plaintiff the same sum, the testimonies are combined? Say that you heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa saying that two testimonies are combined in a case where they do not contradict each other; but in a case where they contradict each other, did he say that they are combined?
אֶלָּא הוּא דְּאָמַר כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל עַל שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים, שֶׁאַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת מָאתַיִם וְאַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת מָנֶה, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בִּכְלַל מָאתַיִם מָנֶה.
Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to a case of two sets of witnesses, where one set says that the plaintiff lent the defendant two hundred dinars, and the other one says that he lent him one hundred dinars. Both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that this is not considered a contradiction, and the testimony is accepted concerning the amount of one hundred dinars, as one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred, i.e., testimony concerning a large amount includes testimony concerning a smaller amount.
עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ? עַל כַּת אַחַת, שֶׁבֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: נֶחְלְקָה עֵדוּתָן, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ בִּכְלַל מָאתַיִם מָנֶה.
With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree over the case of one set of two witnesses, where one witness testifies that the defendant owes the plaintiff two hundred dinars, and the other witness says that he owes him one hundred. As Beit Shammai say that their testimony is divided. Since they are not testifying about the same amount, the entire testimony is disqualified. And Beit Hillel say: One hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred. Apparently, according to Beit Hillel’s opinion, as transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although the testimonies are not identical, since both attest to the defendant’s liability to pay a certain amount of money, they are combined and accepted to that effect. This is the source for the opinion of the Sages of Neharde’a.
אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״חָבִית שֶׁל שֶׁמֶן״. הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא, וְאָתֵי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי. חַיְּיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי לֵיהּ חָבִיתָא דְחַמְרָא מִיגּוֹ חָבִיתָא דְמִשְׁחָא.
With regard to a case where one witness says that the plaintiff gave the defendant a barrel of wine, and the other one says that he gave him a barrel of oil, there was actually such an incident, and it came before Rabbi Ami. Since wine was cheaper than oil, Rabbi Ami deemed the defendant liable to pay the plaintiff only the value of a barrel of wine out of the value of a barrel of oil, an amount both witnesses agreed that he owed.
כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר? אֵימַר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הֵיכָא דְּיֵשׁ בִּכְלַל מָאתַיִם מָנֶה, כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי אָמַר?
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that two contradicting testimonies can be combined in a case where one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred; perhaps one of the witnesses saw only half the loan, and the other one saw it all. But in a case like this, where the testimonies are about completely different items, did he say that they can be combined?
לָא צְרִיכָא, לִדְמֵי.
The Gemara answers: No, this is not a case of a direct contradiction. This ruling is necessary only with regard to monetary value, i.e., where one witness says that the defendant owes the value of a barrel of wine, and the second one says that he owes the value of a barrel of oil. Therefore, it is comparable to a case of one hundred dinars and two hundred dinars.
אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״בִּדְיוֹטָא הָעֶלְיוֹנָה״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״בִּדְיוֹטָא הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה״. אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי, וְצֵירַף עֵדוּתָן.
With regard to a case where one witness says that the incident took place on the upper floor [badeyota] and the other one says that it occurred on the lower floor, Rabbi Ḥanina says that an incident like this came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he combined their testimonies. This was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that since they agree with regard to the matter itself, the secondary details are insignificant.
וּמִנַּיִין לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, מִנַּיִין לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא לֹא יֹאמַר: הֲרֵינִי מְזַכֶּה וַחֲבֵירַי מְחַיְּיבִין, אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁחֲבֵירַי רַבּוּ עָלַי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ״, וְאוֹמֵר ״הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל מְגַלֶּה סוֹד״.
§ The mishna teaches: And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom, he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13). The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that when the judge leaves he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? The verse states: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).
הָהוּא תַּלְמִידָא דִּנְפַק עֲלֵיהּ קָלָא דְּגַלִּי מִילְּתָא דְּאִיתְּמַר בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא בָּתַר עֶשְׂרִין וְתַרְתֵּין שְׁנִין, אַפְּקֵיהּ רַב אַמֵּי מִבֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא. אֲמַר: ״דֵּין גָּלֵי רָזַיָּא.״
The Gemara relates: There was a certain student, about whom a rumor emerged that he revealed a statement that was stated in the study hall and should have been kept secret, and the rumor emerged twenty-two years after the time the statement was revealed. Rav Ami removed him from the study hall as a punishment. Rav Ami said: This is a revealer of secrets and he cannot be trusted.
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא רְאָיָה – סוֹתֵר אֶת הַדִּין. אָמַר לוֹ: ״כׇּל רְאָיוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לְךָ הָבֵא מִיכָּן עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״. מָצָא בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – סוֹתֵר, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – אֵינוֹ סוֹתֵר.
MISHNA: Any time one of the litigants brings additional proof, he can overturn the verdict that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant said to the other: Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days from now, if he found additional proof within thirty days, he can overturn the verdict. If he found it after thirty days, he cannot overturn the verdict anymore.
אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מָה יַעֲשֶׂה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָצָא בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים, וּמָצָא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים?
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He can still overturn the verdict, as what should this litigant, who sought and did not find additional proof within thirty days but found it after thirty days, have done?
אָמַר לוֹ: ״הָבֵא עֵדִים״, וְאָמַר: ״אֵין לִי עֵדִים״. אָמַר: ״הָבֵא רְאָיָה״, וְאָמַר: ״אֵין לִי רְאָיָה״. וּלְאַחַר זְמַן הֵבִיא רְאָיָה וּמָצָא עֵדִים – הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ כְּלוּם.
In a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and the latter said: I have no witnesses, and the former said to him: Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses, in this case, this proof or these witnesses are worth nothing. It is apparently a false proof or false testimony.
אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מָה יַעֲשֶׂה זֶה שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עֵדִים, וּמָצָא עֵדִים? לֹא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ רְאָיָה, וּמָצָא רְאָיָה?
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this litigant, who did not know that he has witnesses and ultimately found witnesses, or who did not know that he has a proof and ultimately found proof, have done? Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict.
רָאָה שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בַּדִּין, וְאָמַר: ״קָרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וִיעִידוּנִי״, אוֹ שֶׁהוֹצִיא רְאָיָה מִתַּחַת פּוּנְדָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ כְּלוּם.
If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then he saw that he was about to be deemed liable to pay in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [pundato], even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is worth nothing. If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
GEMARA: With regard to the first halakha in the mishna, Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.
פְּשִׁיטָא! כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִמֵּילָא יָדַעְנָא דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כַּחֲכָמִים.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְכַתְּחִילָּה, אֲבָל דִּיעֲבַד שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאִי עָבֵיד – מַהְדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this statement, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, applies ab initio, but after the fact, even if the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the ruling is valid, as their opinion was not entirely rejected, Rabba bar Rav Huna therefore teaches us that if the court acts in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, we send the case back to court.
אָמַר לוֹ: הָבֵא עֵדִים כּוּ׳, אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
§ The mishna teaches that in a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and he admitted that he had none, and he subsequently found witnesses, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that their testimony is valid. Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
פְּשִׁיטָא! כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, מִמֵּילָא יָדַעְנָא דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דִּבְהָהִיא אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל; הָא בְּכוּלְּהוּ – הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches us that specifically with regard to that halakha, the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but with regard to all other statements of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the corpus of the Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
לְאַפּוֹקֵי מֵהָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ, הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב וְצַיְדָן וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה.
This is to the exclusion of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥanna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement. Whereas in the former dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the latter dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabba bar Rav Huna, by contrast, maintains that in the case of a guarantor and in the case in Tzaidan, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
הָהוּא יָנוֹקָא דְּתַבְעוּהּ לְדִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אִית לְךָ סָהֲדֵי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא. אִית לָךְ רְאָיָה? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא. חַיְּיבֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain child who was taken to court before Rav Naḥman. They said to him: Do you have witnesses on your behalf? The child said to them: No. They continued to ask: Do you have evidence? The child said to them: No. Rav Naḥman deemed him liable, in accordance with the claim of the other litigant.
הֲוָה קָא בָכֵי וְאָזֵיל. שַׁמְעוּהּ הָנָךְ אִינָשֵׁי, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אֲנַן יָדְעִינַן בְּמִילֵּי דַּאֲבוּךְ. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן מוֹדוּ, דְּיָנוֹקָא בְּמִילֵּי דַּאֲבוּהּ לָא יָדַע.
The child was walking and crying. These people heard him, and said to him: We know about the monetary matters of your father and can testify on your behalf. When he brought them before Rav Naḥman, Rav Naḥman said: In a case like this, even the Rabbis concede that the testimony is accepted, as a child does not know about the monetary matters of his father. Clearly, when he said that he has no witnesses or proof, he said so out of ignorance and was mistaken; there is no concern about artifice.
הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דִּנְפַק שְׁטָרָא מִתּוּתֵי יְדַהּ, אֲמַרָה (לֵיהּ): יָדַעְנָא בְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא דִּפְרִיעַ הֲוָה. הֵימְנַהּ רַב נַחְמָן.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman from whose possession a promissory note emerged, i.e., she was appointed to hold it. She said to the judge: I know that this promissory note was repaid. The creditor should not use it to collect. Rav Naḥman deemed her testimony credible and did not allow the creditor to collect the debt.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר אוֹתִיּוֹת נִקְנוֹת בִּמְסִירָה.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose opinion is your ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that letters, i.e., the content of a promissory note, are acquired by merely transferring the document? In other words, there is no need to write a deed for the transfer of a monetary document from one individual’s ownership to another. By giving it to the recipient, he becomes the owner of the document. Therefore, since the promissory note is in this woman’s possession, she is considered its legal owner, and her claim that it was repaid is consequently accepted.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא – קְלָתֵיהּ.
Rav Naḥman said to him: That is not the reason for my ruling; rather, here it is different. Here the woman’s claim is accepted in any event, as, since the promissory note was in her possession, if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. Therefore, she is presumably telling the truth.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לָא הֵימְנַהּ רַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: וְהָא אִי בָּעֲיָא —
Some say that there is another version of the story, according to which Rav Naḥman did not deem her testimony credible. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But if she had wanted to,
קְלָתֵיהּ!
she could have burned it. Why did you not accept her testimony?
כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַּחְזַק בְּבֵי דִינָא, ״אִיבַּעְיָא קְלָתֵיהּ״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
Rav Naḥman answered him: Since the promissory note was ratified in court, we do not say that she is deemed credible to nullify its validity because if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. The validity of a ratified document is not nullified without evidence.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: סִימְפּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – יִתְקַיֵּים בְּחוֹתְמָיו. אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים, וְיָצָא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ, אוֹ שֶׁיָּצָא אַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת – כָּשֵׁר. אַלְמָא שָׁלִישׁ מְהֵימַן!
Rava raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: A receipt [simfon] of repayment of a debt upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. The witnesses testify that these are their signatures, and it is thereby ratified. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the receipt emerged from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerged after the signing of the documents, i.e., the receipt was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid. Rava states his objection: Apparently, the testimony of a third party serving as a trustee is deemed credible, as he can testify that the receipt is valid even if it was not signed by witnesses.
תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Naḥman is indeed a conclusive refutation.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר, עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו וְיֹאמַר: קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהַעִידוּנִי.
§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One can always bring a proof for his claim and overturn the previous verdict, until his claims are stopped up, i.e., until he has no more claims, and he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, in which case those witnesses are not allowed to testify.
הָא גוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ ״יִסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו״ – אֲתָאן לְרַבָּנַן, וַהֲדַר אָמְרַתְּ ״קִרְבוּ אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהַעִידוּנִי״ – אֲתָאן לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.
The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. When you say: Until his claims are stopped up, we arrive at, i.e., this represents, the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold in the mishna that once a litigant stops presenting his claims, he cannot present additional claims later. And when you then say: Until he says come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, we arrive at the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that it is only in that case that the testimony is not accepted.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: כּוּלַּהּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וּפָרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ? מַאי ״עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו״? עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: קִרְבוּ פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְהַעִידוּנִי. וְהָא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב וְצַיְדָן וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה?
And if you would say that the entire statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is explaining his own statement, saying: What is the meaning of the phrase: Until his claims are stopped up? Until he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, this is difficult. But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement? Evidently, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case.
אֶלָּא, כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְעוֹלָם מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר, עַד שֶׁיִּסְתַּתֵּם טַעֲנוֹתָיו וְיֹאמְרוּ לוֹ: ״הָבֵא עֵדִים״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לִי עֵדִים״. ״הָבֵא רְאָיָה״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לִי רְאָיָה״. אֲבָל בָּאוּ עֵדִים מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה דִּיסַקַּיָּא שֶׁל אָבִיו מוּפְקֶדֶת בְּיַד אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זֶה מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְסוֹתֵר.
Rather, the Gemara presents another version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One can always bring a proof and overturn the previous verdict until his claims are stopped up, and the judges say to him: Bring witnesses, and he says: I have no witnesses, and they say to him: Bring evidence, and he says: I have no evidence. This is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. But if witnesses came from overseas, or if there was a saddlebag [disakkaya] of his father’s documents deposited by another individual, which are cases where he did not know of the evidence, he can bring this evidence and overturn the previous verdict, as there is no concern of artifice.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַתּוֹקֵף אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בַּדִּין, אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״נִדּוֹן כָּאן״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״נֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְיֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד.
§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who attacks another in judgment, i.e., tenaciously raises legal claims against another, and one of the litigants says: Let us go to court here in our locale, and the other one says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, i.e., the Sanhedrin, or another High Court, the former litigant is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly.
אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: רַבִּי, מִי שֶׁנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, יוֹצִיא מָנֶה עַל מָנֶה? אֶלָּא, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ.
Rabbi Elazar said before him: My teacher, if so, must one who claims a debt of one hundred dinars from another spend one hundred dinars of travel and lodging expenses for the one hundred dinars he wants to collect? Rather, one is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city.
אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנֵים שֶׁנִּתְעַצְּמוּ בַּדִּין, אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נִדּוֹן כָּאן״, וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר: ״נֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ. וְאִם הוּצְרַךְ דָּבָר לִשְׁאוֹל – כּוֹתְבִין וְשׁוֹלְחִין.
It was also stated that Rav Safra says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to two who were struggling in judgment, one of whom says: Let us go to court here, and one of whom says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, the latter litigant is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city. And if the local court needs to ask a higher court about a certain matter, the judges write to the Assembly, and the higher court sends its response.
וְאִם אָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לִי מֵאֵיזֶה טַעַם דַּנְתּוּנִי״ – כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ.
And if one of the litigants says to a court: Write for what reason you judged me in this manner and give it to me, as I do not trust your decision without explanation, the judges write it and give it to him.
וְהַיְּבָמָה, הוֹלֶכֶת אַחַר הַיָּבָם לְהַתִּירָהּ.
Another halakha was stated with regard to the location of the judgment: And with regard to a woman whose husband had a brother, and he died childless [vehayevama], she follows her brother-in-law [hayavam] for him to free her of the levirate bond through ḥalitza. The yavam does not have to go to her.
עַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: אֲפִילּוּ מִטְּבֶרְיָא לְצִפּוֹרִי.
The Gemara asks: How far does she have to go? Rabbi Ami says: Even from Tiberias to Tzippori. This is the halakha even though the court in Tiberias is more prestigious than the one in Tzippori.
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי קְרָא? ״וְקָרְאוּ לוֹ זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ״, וְלֹא זִקְנֵי עִירָהּ.
Rav Kahana says: What is the verse that alludes to this halakha? It is the verse that states: “Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him, and if he stands and says: I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). The fact that the elders of his city, and not the elders of her city, are mentioned indicates that ḥalitza is performed in his city and not in hers.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִילְכְתָא, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְיֵלֵךְ לִמְקוֹם הַוַּועַד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ! הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ לֹוֶה לְמַלְוֶה, אֲבָל מַלְוֶה – ״עֶבֶד לֹוֶה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה״.
Ameimar says: The halakha is that if one litigant wants to go to the place of the Assembly and the other does not, the latter is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that he is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city? Ameimar answered: This statement applies in a case where the borrower said to the lender: Let us go to the place of the Assembly; in that case, the debtor is compelled to be judged in his city. But if the lender requests to go to the place of the Assembly, his request is accepted, as it is stated: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7).
שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ לְמָר עוּקְבָא: לִדְזִיו לֵיהּ כְּבַר בִּתְיָה, שְׁלָם. עוּקְבָן הַבַּבְלִי קְבַל קֳדָמַנָא: יִרְמְיָה אָחִי הֶעֱבִיר עָלַי אֶת הַדֶּרֶךְ. אִמְרוּ לוֹ: הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בִּטְבֶרְיָא.
The Sages sent a letter to Mar Ukva, the Exilarch in Babylonia, which stated: To he who has light upon him, like Moses, who is called the son of Bithiah, Shalom. The letter continued: Ukvan the Babylonian complained before us as follows: Yirmeya, my brother, came past me, i.e., did me a great evil. And therefore tell Yirmeya; induce him [hassiuhu] to see our face in Tiberias, where we will judge his case.
הָא גוּפָא קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ ״אִמְרוּ לוֹ״, אַלְמָא דַּיְּינוּהּ אַתּוּן. ״הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בִּטְבֶרְיָא״, אַלְמָא שַׁדְּרוּהּ הָכָא.
The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult to understand. You said: Tell him. Apparently the intention was: Judge him yourselves in Babylonia. But then the letter states: Induce him to see our face in Tiberias. Apparently the intention was: Send him here.
(אֶלָּא), הָכִי קָאָמְרִי: אֱמַרוּ לֵיהּ, דַּיְּינוּהּ אַתּוּן. אִי צָיֵית – צָיֵית, וְאִי לָא – הַשִּׂיאוּהוּ וְיִרְאֶה פָּנֵינוּ בִּטְבֶרְיָא.
Rather, this is what the Sages were saying: Tell him, i.e., judge him yourselves. If he listens to the court, he listens, and the issue is resolved. But if he does not listen, induce him to see our face in Tiberias.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת הֲוָה, וּבְבָבֶל לָא דָּיְינִי דִּינֵי קְנָסוֹת. וְהָא דִּשְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ הָכִי – כְּדֵי לַחֲלוֹק כָּבוֹד לְמָר עוּקְבָא.
Rav Ashi said: That is not the correct understanding of the letter. Rather, it was a case pertaining to the halakhot of fines, and in Babylonia the courts do not adjudicate in cases pertaining to the halakhot of fines, as there are no ordained judges there; such Sages are found only in Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, it was necessary to send the case to Eretz Yisrael. And the fact that they sent the letter to Mar Ukva using this wording, as though he were capable of adjudicating the case himself, was in order to give honor to Mar Ukva, who was a Sage and a leader. They hinted to him that he could not judge this case and that he therefore had to send the defendant to Eretz Yisrael.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ זֶה בּוֹרֵר.
