Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain
Sanhedrin 37b discusses the problem of using circumstantial evidence in capital cases, while allowing it in financial cases. Why should there be a difference between these two types of cases? What is the relationship to dis/allowing circumstantial evidence and seeking justice?
Sanhedrin 37b
Dr. Elana Stein Hain – dinanddaf@hadran.org.il
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- סנהדרין לז:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד מֵאוֹמֶד? אוֹמֵר לָהֶן: שֶׁמָּא כָּךְ רְאִיתֶם? שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתֶּם אַחֲרָיו, וּמְצָאתֶם סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָמוֹ מְטַפְטֵף, וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר. אִם כָּךְ רְאִיתֶם – לֹא רְאִיתֶם כְּלוּם.
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: How does the court describe testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the witnesses: Perhaps you saw this man about whom you are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. If you saw only this, it is as if you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder.
תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח: אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי אֶחָד שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתִּי אַחֲרָיו וְרָאִיתִי סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָמוֹ מְטַפְטֵף וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר. וְאָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: רָשָׁע, מִי הֲרָגוֹ לָזֶה? אוֹ אֲנִי אוֹ אַתָּה. אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים יוּמַת הַמֵּת״. הַיּוֹדֵעַ מַחְשָׁבוֹת יִפָּרַע מֵאוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ שֶׁהָרַג אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. אָמְרוּ: לֹא זָזוּ מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁבָּא נָחָשׁ וְהִכִּישׁוֹ וָמֵת…
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said as an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not once see one person pursue another into a ruin, and I pursued him and saw a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. And I said to him: Wicked person, who has killed this man? Either you or I. But what can I do, since your blood is not given over to me, as the Torah states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and I did not witness you killing him. The One Who knows one’s thoughts shall punish this man who killed another. The Sages said: They did not move from there before a snake came and bit the murderer, and he died…
מֵאוֹמֶד וְכוּ׳. בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הוּא דְּלָא אָמְדִינַן, הָא בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת אָמְדִינַן. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי אַחָא, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִידּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ.
The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law the court warns the witnesses not to testify based on conjecture. The Gemara comments: One can infer that it is only in cases of capital law that we do not rule based on conjecture, but in cases of monetary law, we do rule based on conjecture. In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there was a rutting male camel that was rampaging among other camels, and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage caused. The baraita indicates that Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law are decided based on conjecture.
- תוספתא בבא קמא ג:ו
שור שהיה רועה ויצא שור אחר אחריו, נמצא הרועה זה שמת, אפילו זה מנוגח וזה מועד לנגיחה, זה מנושך וזה מועד לנשיכה – פטור. רבי אחא אומר: גמל שהיה אוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל מת שם – חייב, בידוע שזה המיתו.
An ox that was grazing and another ox went after it, and the first ox was found dead: even if the dead ox was gored and the other ox is already established as a gorer, if the dead ox was bitten and the other ox is already established as a biter – [the owner] is exempt. R. Aha says, if there was a rutting male camel that was rampaging among other camels, and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage caused.
- תוספתא סנהדרין ח
כיצד אומד? שמא תאמר ראינוהו שרץ אחר חברו וסייף בידו נכנס מפניו לחנות נכנס אחריו לחנות ונכנסנו אחריו ומצאנהו הרוג וסייף ביד הרוצח ומטונף דם שמא תאמרו אם לאו מי הרגו? אמר שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חברו וסייף בידו נכנס מפניו לחורבה ונכנס אחריו ונכנסתי אחריו ומצאתיהו הרוג והסייף ביד הרוצח והטיף דם נמתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה אראה בנחמה אם לא או אני או אתה הרגנוהו אבל מה אעשה לך דאין דינך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים י״ט:ט״ו) על פי שני עדים או על פי שלשה עדים יומת המת אלא יודע מחשבות הוא יפרע מאותו האיש לא זז משם עד שנשכו נחש ומת.
What is considered circumstantial evidence? Lest you say — we saw him with a sword in his hand running after his fellow. [The latter] entered a store in front of him, [the pursuer] entered after him, and we entered after him and found him killed, and a sword was in the hand of the murderer, stained with blood; lest you say — if not him, who killed him? Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach said, “I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not [once] see one person with a sword in his hand running after his fellow. [The latter] entered a ruin in front of him, [the pursuer] entered after him, and I entered after him and found him killed, and a sword was in the hand of the murderer, dripping with blood. And I said to him, ‘Wicked person, who has killed this one? Either you or I killed him. But what can I do to you, since your punishment is not given over to me. As behold, the Torah stated, by the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death (Deuteronomy 19:15). Rather, the One who knows one’s thoughts will punish this man.’” They did not move from there before a snake came and bit him, and he died.
What is the logic?
- בבא בתרא צג. Similar to following Rov/Majority
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: שׁוֹר שֶׁהָיָה רוֹעֶה, וְנִמְצָא שׁוֹר הָרוּג בְּצִדּוֹ; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁזֶּה מְנוּגָּח וְזֶה מוּעָד לִיגַּח, זֶה מְנוּשָּׁךְ וְזֶה מוּעָד לִישּׁוֹךְ; אֵין אוֹמְרִים: בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה נְגָחוֹ וְזֶה נְשָׁכוֹ. רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים, וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִדּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of an ox that was grazing and another ox that was found killed at its side, even though this dead ox has been gored and that grazing ox is forewarned with regard to goring, or this dead ox has been bitten and that grazing ox is forewarned with regard to biting, nevertheless one does not say that it is evident that this grazing ox gored the dead ox or that grazing ox bit it, despite the fact such behavior is typical for the ox; rather, one cannot draw any definite conclusions. Rabbi Aḥa says that in the case of a rutting male camel that is rampaging among other camels and another camel that was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, as such behavior is typical for a rutting camel. Therefore, the owner of that camel is liable.
סַבְרוּהָ דְּרוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ; לֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אַחָא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא?
Those who suggested the parallel between the tannaitic dispute and the dispute between Rav and Shmuel assumed that a majority and a logical presumption about whether an event will happen are equivalent in their capacity to determine the facts of a case. Consequently, let us say that Rav, who says that one follows the majority in monetary matters, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa, who follows a presumption to determine the facts of a case, and that Shmuel, who says that one does not follow the majority in monetary matters, holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who does not follow a presumption.
- שו”ת הרא”ש סח, כג. Similar to following umdena de-muchach
וכן בכמה מקומות הלכו חכמי הגמרא בתר אומדנא דמוכח; גבי שטר מברחת, וכן גבי מי שכתב כל נכסיו לאחר ואח”כ נודע לו שיש לו בן, וכן מתנת שכיב מרע בכולה, וההוא גברא דזבין נכסיה אדעתא למיסק לארעא דישראל, וגמל האוחר בין הגמלים.
Likewise in a number of places, the sages of the Talmud followed an evident presumption: regarding a contract written to alienate one’s assets; regarding one who wrote all of their possessions to another person and only later found out that he has a son; likewise the gift of a person on their deathbed (when giving away all); and someone who sold their possessions in order to move to Israel; and a camel in heat among other camels [and another camel is found dead nearby].
- שו”ת מהרי”ק, שורש קכט
Joseph Colon ben Solomon Trabotto, (15th c. France)
דודאי דכל היכא שהמעשה מבורר אצל הדיינים אלא שאנו מסופקין באומדן דעת הנותן או המוכר או המגרשה אזלינן בתר אומדנא, אבל היכא דלא נתברר גוף המעשה אצל הדיינים כי ההיא דגמל אוחר כו’ דאין ידוע לנו אם נגחו ואם לאו אלא מתוך אומד בהא ודאי פליגו רבנן עליה דרבי אחא וקיימא לן כוותייהו לדעת הפוסקים הנזכר למעלה
Certainly whenever the situation is clear to the judges, but we are only uncertain about presumptions regarding the thought process of the giver or the seller or the person issuing a divorce, we follow presumptions; but where the actual situation is unclear to the judges, as in the case of the camel in heat, etc., where it is unknown to us whether it gored the other camel or not except by way of inference, in such a case, the rabbis certainly disagreed with Rabbi Aha and we follow them according to the halakhic decisors mentioned above.
Not so fast: Maybe we do follow circumstantial evidence to establish injury!
- שבועות מד:
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה – נִשְׁבָּעִין וְלֹא מְשַׁלְּמִין. וְאֵלּוּ נִשְׁבָּעִין וְנוֹטְלִין: הַשָּׂכִיר, וְהַנִּגְזָל, וְהַנֶּחְבָּל, וְשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, וְחֶנְוָנִי עַל פִּנְקָסוֹ.
MISHNA: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt oneself from a monetary claim. But the following litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims to not have received wages; one who was robbed and sues the accused robber; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the injuring party; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. And a storekeeper relying on their ledger also takes an oath and gets paid.
- שבועות מו:
נֶחְבָּל כֵּיצַד. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְחַבֵּל בְּעַצְמוֹ, אֲבָל בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְחַבֵּל בְּעַצְמוֹ – נוֹטֵל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה.
How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? (If witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole, but left injured, the injured party may take an oath and receive compensation.) Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught thatone he needs to take an oath in order to receive compensation only if one was injured in a place where one is able to injure oneself, but if one was injured in a place where one is unable to injure oneself, one receives compensation without taking an oath.
וְנֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא בְּכוֹתֶל נִתְחַכֵּךְ! תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שֶׁעָלְתָה לוֹ נְשִׁיכָה בְּגַבּוֹ וּבֵין אַצִּילֵי יָדָיו. וְדִלְמָא אַחֵר עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? דְּלֵיכָּא אַחֵר.
Perhaps the person scraped against a wall and caused their own injury! Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a case where, for example, one has a bite on their back or on their elbows, which must have been caused by someone else. And perhaps a different person did it, and not the defendant! This is a case where there is no other person present besides the defendant.
Not so fast: Maybe R. Aha thinks we follow circumstantial evidence even in capital cases!
- שבועות לד.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: ״וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע״ – בְּעֵדוּת הַמִּתְקַיֶּימֶת בִּרְאִיָּה בְּלֹא יְדִיעָה וּבִידִיעָה בְּלֹא רְאִיָּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִידּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ. דְּאִי אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַחָא, בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח!
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there is a rutting male camel that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.
דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שָׁטַח: אֶרְאֶה בְּנֶחָמָה אִם לֹא רָאִיתִי אֶחָד שֶׁרָץ אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְחוּרְבָּה, וְרַצְתִּי אַחֲרָיו, וּמָצָאתִי סַיִיף בְּיָדוֹ וְדָם מְטַפְטֵף וְהָרוּג מְפַרְפֵּר; אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ: רָשָׁע! מִי הֲרָגוֹ לָזֶה? אוֹ אֲנִי, אוֹ אַתָּה!
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.
אֲבָל מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה, שֶׁאֵין דָּמְךָ מָסוּר בְּיָדִי, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים יוּמַת הַמֵּת״. אֶלָּא הַמָּקוֹם יִפָּרַע מִמְּךָ. אָמְרוּ: לֹא זָזוּ מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ וָמֵת.
But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.
- תוספות שבועות לז: ד”ה דאי
משכחת לה אומדנא בדיני נפשות לכולי עלמא, כמו שעלתה לו נשיכה על ראשו ונקב קרום של מוח דאפילו רבנן מודו בהאי אומדנא כדמוכח בפרק כל הנשבעין לקמן (דף מו,ב) כגון שעלתה לו נשיכה על גבו ובין אצילי ידיו.
We do find the use of circumstantial evidence in a case according to everyone (i.e., not just Rav Aha), e.g., If someone has a bite on their head, a perforation on their brain meninges; in that case, even the rabbis would admit that it is like an evident presumption in the chapter “All who swear (46b)” like when a person has a bite on their back or on their elbows.
- שו”ת עזרת כהן, כטR. Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook
ועדיפא אפילו מהאומדנא דשמעון בן שטח, דשם אע”פ שהענין מוכיח טובא מכל מקום יש מקום לומר שההרוג איבד את עצמו לדעת בסייף זה המטפטף, ואח”כ לקח אותו זה הרודף בידו, אלא שהוא נגד השכל מתוך האומדנא, אבל כשעלתה לו נשיכה בקרום של מוח, ולא היו שם כי אם הנרצח והאחר, אז הדבר ברור בתורת ידיעה דהוא כמו ראיה שזה הרגו…
And this is more convincing than the circumstantial evidence of Shimon ben Shetach’s story, for in that case even though it is pretty evident, it is possible to say that the deceased person purposely killed themself with this bloody sword, and only afterwards did the pursuer pick it up, only that it is against the common sense of the circumstantial evidence. When, however, someone has a bite on the meninges of their brain, and there is no one there but the two of them, then it is clear in the sense of knowing that it is like proof that this person committed the murder…
- שו”ת חלקת יעקב אה”ע, מט.- וראו גם בדבריו שם או”ח, קצב; שם, יו”ד, לד.
Rabbi Mordechai Yakov Breisch, Av Beit Din Zurich (1895 – 1976)
מכל הנ”ל חזינן דאומדנא מבוררת נקרא בגדר ידיעה בלא ראיה דמהני לענין ממון ולשיטת התוספות הנ”ל אף בדיני נפשות ולשיטת הפוסקים הנ”ל אף לענין קידושין ואשת איש, א”כ מכל שכן לענין עדות אשה דלא בעי עדות גמורה דמהני ידיעה בלא ראיה.
From all this we have seen that a clear presumption is understood as being known even without being seen, and it is effective in the case of financial litigation. And according to Tosofot, it is effective even in a case of capital litigation; and according to the aforementioned decisors even regarding betrothal and marital status; if so, how much more so regarding the testimony of a woman where full testimony is not required – there knowledge without seeing is effective as well.
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