Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain
In cases of uncertainty, Jewish law generally follows the majority. This is the case where there is a concrete majority before us (רובא דאיתא קמן), such as a majority of judges who rule one. It is also the case where a statistical majority (רובא דליתא קמן) creates a legal presumption, such as the legal assumption that a married pregnant woman has conceived via her husband rather than someone else. In such cases, the law asserts that רוב בעילות אחר הבעל – the statistical majority of sexual unions of a married woman is with her husband. This is a reasonable way of resolving uncertainty. However, Avodah Zarah 34b and 40b introduce the surprising approach of Rabbi Meir who is not content to follow the majority when it comes to statistical realities. He believes that halakha should account for statistical minorities as well. For instance, even if most people one do/become/experience X, some people do/become/experience Y. And that minority experience should impact our halakhic decisionmaking!
What is the logic behind this approach? Is he simply being strict? Is there something else behind this? Moreover, what are the parameters of an approach like this? How minor is too minor?
Questions? Comments? Email dinanddaf@gmail.com
Avodah Zarah 34b, 40b –חיישינן למיעוטא
Listen here:
Watch here:
Sources:
-
- 3 concepts:
חזקה = legal presumption based on status quo ante
רוב = statistical or concrete majority
מיעוט = statistical or concrete minority
- עבודה זרה מ:
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַצְּלָמִים אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן נֶעֱבָדִין פַּעַם אַחַת בְּשָׁנָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ מַקֵּל אוֹ צִפּוֹר אוֹ כַדּוּר…
MISHNA: All statues are forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from them, because they are worshipped at least once a year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The only type of statue that is forbidden is any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry…
גְּמָ׳ אִי דְּנֶעֱבָדִין פַּעַם אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָיוּ עוֹבְדִין אוֹתָהּ פַּעַם אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא — גָּזַר שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם, וְרַבָּנַן דְּלָא חָיְישִׁי לְמִיעוּטָא — לָא גָּזְרוּ שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם.
GEMARA: If it is true that the statues to which Rabbi Meir is referring are worshipped at least once a year, what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit deriving benefit from them? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In Rabbi Meir’s locale, people would worship statues once a year. And therefore, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one must be concerned for a statistical minority (see Yevamot 61b), issued a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places, because of the local where people do worship such statues. And the Rabbis, by contrast, who do not maintain that one must be concerned for a statistical minority, did not issue a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places due to that locale where people do worship such statues.
Origins?
- יבמות סא:
וְהָתַנְיָא: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין. ״אִישׁ״ כְּתִיב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ. אֶלָּא מַאי טַעְמָא אֵין מְיַבְּמִין?
And is it not taught in a baraita: An underage boy and an underage girl may not perform ḥalitza or levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You spoke well when you said that they may not perform ḥalitza, as the term “man” is written in the passage of ḥalitza (Deuteronomy 25:7–10), which limits the halakha to an adult male, and we draw a parallel between a woman and a man. However, what is the reason that they may not perform levirate marriage?
[אָמַר לָהֶם:] קָטָן — שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְלוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִין בְּעֶרְוָה…
Rabbi Meir said to them: An underage boy may not perform levirate marriage lest he be found to be a eunuch, i.e., one who is incapable of fathering children for his late brother. Similarly, an underage girl may not perform levirate marriage lest she be found to be sexually underdeveloped and thus infertile when she grows up. In either case, this would result in them sleeping with a forbidden relative….
Parameters: Not מיעוטא דמיעוטא
- עבודה זרה לד:
וּגְבִינַת בֵּית אוּנְיָיקֵי. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָסְרוּ גְּבִינַת אוּנְיָיקֵי? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרוֹב עֲגָלִים שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ עִיר נִשְׁחָטִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. מַאי אִירְיָא רוֹב עֲגָלִים? אֲפִילּוּ מִיעוּט נָמֵי, דְּהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר חָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא!
The mishna teaches: And cheese of Beit Unyaki is prohibited. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Why did they prohibit deriving benefit from the cheese of Beit Unyaki? It is because most of the calves of that city are slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, and the milk curdled in their stomach contents is prohibited.
The Gemara asks: Why does this explanation specifically mention most calves? Even if a statistical minority of calves are slaughtered for idol worship, this would also be reason enough, as Rabbi Meir, who is the tanna of unattributed opinions in a mishna, is generally concerned about a minority.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ רוֹב — אִיכָּא מִיעוּט.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִיעוּט, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא רוֹב עֲגָלִים דְּאֵין נִשְׁחָטִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְאִיכָּא נָמֵי שְׁאָר בְּהֵמוֹת דְּאֵין נִשְׁחָטִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — הָוֵה לֵיהּ מִיעוּטָא דְּמִיעוּטָא, וּמִיעוּטָא דְּמִיעוּטָא לָא חָיֵישׁ רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
If you say that the reason for the prohibition is due to a majority of calves slaughtered for idol worship, then despite the fact that the majority of animals in general used to curdle cheese are not slaughtered for idolatrous purposes, there are nevertheless a minority of animals altogether, i.e., the majority of calves, that are, and this minority of calves are cause for concern according to Rabbi Meir.
But if you say that Rabbi Meir prohibits the cheese due to a minority of calves, since there are a majority of calves that are not slaughtered for idol worship, and there are also a wider majority of the remaining animals used to curdle milk that are not slaughtered for idol worship at all, this would constitute a minority of a minority, and Rabbi Meir is not concerned for a minority of a minority. Since only a particular minority of animals used to curdle cheese, i.e., calves, are ever slaughtered for idolatry, and even within that group, only a minority are actually slaughtered, even Rabbi Meir would not be concerned.
A legal presumption of status quo ante helps the minority beat the majority
- משנה טהרות ג:ח
תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְצַד הָעִסָּה וְהַבָּצֵק בְּיָדוֹ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר. וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִים, שֶׁדֶּרֶךְ הַתִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ…
A child was found next to dough with a piece of dough in his hand: Rabbi Meir says that the dough is ritually pure; But the sages say that it is ritually impure, since it is the nature of a child to slap the dough…
- קידושין פ.
מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת, וּסְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה אִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא. וְרַבָּנַן: מִיעוּטָא כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, רוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה – רוּבָּא עֲדִיף.
What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a statistical majority of children will slap the dough while a statistical minority will not, and the dough itself maintains its presumed status of purity (as it was before the child was there). Add the statistical minority to the presumption of purity, and the statistical majority has been nicked. (Therefore, the dough is considered ritually pure.) But the Rabbis consider the statistical minority as nonexistent, and thus it is a case of majority (will slap the dough and make it impure) vs. the presumption that the dough is ritually pure (based on what it had been before the child showed up), and in such cases of majority vs. presumption, majority wins.
A legal presumption of status quo ante at least makes the minority equally strong as the majority
- יבמות קיט.
משנה: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וְצָרָתָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ״ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם עַד שֶׁתֵּדַע שֶׁמָּא מְעוּבֶּרֶת הִיא צָרָתָהּ
MISHNA: In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife traveled to a country overseas, and witnesses came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry any other man, and she also shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether the rival wife is pregnant.
הָיְתָה לָהּ חָמוֹת — אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. יָצְתָה מְלֵיאָה — חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת.
If she had a mother-in-law overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, she need not be concerned that a brother has been born. But if her mother-in-law departed from her town pregnant, this widow should be concerned that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even in such a case she need not be concerned and may marry whomever she wishes.
גמרא לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא יַבּוֹמֵי לָא, דְּדִלְמָא מִיעַבְּרָא, וְקָפָגְעָה בְּאֵשֶׁת אָח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אֶלָּא לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, אַמַּאי? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב נָשִׁים, וְרוֹב נָשִׁים מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת!
Gemara: It was taught in the mishna: She shall not marry any other man and shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether her rival wife is pregnant. Granted, she may not enter into levirate marriage, because perhaps her rival wife is pregnant, and if so, this widow would encounter the Torah prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. But why should she not marry another man? Follow the majority of women, and as most women become pregnant and give birth, it is probable that her rival wife did have a child.
לֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?…
Shall we say that the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority? There is a statistical minority of women who do not give birth, and Rabbi Meir takes this statistical minority into consideration and requires the widow to wait and clarify whether or not she is required to enter into levirate marriage…
…אָמַר רָבָא:
…Rava said:
(דף קיט:)
רֵישָׁא, חֲזָקָה לְיִיבּוּם, וְרוּבָּא לַשּׁוּק. וַחֲזָקָה לָא עֲדִיף כִּי רוּבָּא. וְאַיְיתִי מִיעוּטָא דְּמַפִּילוֹת סְמוֹךְ לַחֲזָקָה, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ פַּלְגָא וּפַלְגָא — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם.
In the first clause of the mishna, the legal presumption is that this widow is obligated to enter into levirate marriage, but in a majority of cases she will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public, because it is statistically probable that her rival wife had a child. A legal presumption is not as significant as a majority, meaning that the majority carries more weight than the presumption, and she should be permitted to marry immediately. But bring the minority who miscarry into consideration, and join this to the legal presumption, and it becomes similar to an even balance of half and half. Those who miscarry detract from the strength of the majority, causing it to be equal in legal significance to the legal presumption. Therefore, the ruling is that she shall not marry any man who is not her yavam and she shall not enter into levirate marriage either.
סֵיפָא, חֲזָקָה לַשּׁוּק, וְרוּבָּא לַשּׁוּק. וְהָוֵי לֵיהּ זְכָרִים מִיעוּטָא דְמִיעוּטָא, וּמִיעוּטָא דְמִיעוּטָא — לָא חָיֵישׁ רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
However, in the latter clause, the legal presumption is that the widow is permitted to marry a man from the general public, since her late husband had no brothers initially. And in a majority of cases her mother-in-law will not have had another son, and therefore the widow will actually be permitted to marry a man from the general public. Consequently, the possibility that her husband has a brother, necessitating levirate marriage, is not taken into account because it is a minority of a minority, i.e., it is a minority and it contradicts the legal presumption, and even Rabbi Meir is not concerned about a minority of a minority.
Does the Minority Need the Legal Presumption in Order to Win?
תוספות יבמות קיט: ד”ה סיפא
…והא דנקט דבעינן ברישא חזקה בהדי מיעוטא לא בעינן הכי אלא שלא תהא חזקה מסייעתא לרוב דאז הוי המיעוט מיעוט דמיעוט.
…And that which is claimed that we need the legal presumption to support the statistical minority, we don’t need this. But it cannot be that the legal presumption actively supports the statistical majority because they the statistical minority because a minority of a minority.
- 3 concepts:
Hadran’s Beyond the Daf shiurim are also available by podcast on
Beyond the Daf is where you will discover enlightening shiurim led by remarkable women, delving deep into the intricacies of Talmudic teachings, and exploring relevant and thought-provoking topics that arise from the Daf.
