A sacrifice brought for a different reason than the original intent is a kosher/valid sacrifice, but it doesn’t remove the obligation for whatever sacrifice from the individual who needs to bring it. Plus, Resh Lakish and his penchant for lying on his stomach in the beit midrash (study hall), presumably as an example of his very simple living. He is named here because of his queries on the above principle regarding a sacrifice brought for the wrong intention. Meaning, if the offering is valid, why wouldn’t it provide atonement for the person offering it? Rabbi Eliezer has an answer, based on a parallel to an offering that was designated by a given individual, but not brought before that person died. With a parallel to the woman who bears a child (with the open question regarding her potential dealth in the interim, given the maternal death rate at the time). Also, other sages weigh in on the same divided opinions – with precedent of a comparable situation, and making suppositions about how Resh Lakish would have responded to a query. Plus, more on the apparently comparable case of a mother’s children and whehther they can effect the atonement …