Bava Batra 131

Bava Batra 131

מִגְמָר נָמֵי לָא תִּגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ – דְּאֵין לַדַּיָּין אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁעֵינָיו רוֹאוֹת.

but do not learn from it either, as a judge has only what his eyes see as the basis for his ruling. One must rule according to his own understanding.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ? כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה – בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע, דְּבַר אוֹרוֹתֵי הוּא; אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא – לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא אֲפִילּוּ בְּבָרִיא נָמֵי?

§ Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person who bequeaths his estate to one of his sons, how should the court rule? Should it be reasoned that when Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that the bequeathal is valid, he said so specifically with regard to the case of a person on his deathbed, since he is capable of bequeathal, as the verse: “In the day that he causes his sons to inherit” (Deuteronomy 21:16), from which the validity of this bequeathal is derived, is referring specifically to the time of one’s death; but in the case of a healthy person, he did not say his ruling? Or perhaps he stated his ruling even in the case of a healthy person.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי נָתָן לְרַבִּי: שְׁנִיתֶם מִשְׁנַתְכֶם כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה! דִּתְנַן: לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״בְּנִין דִּיכְרִין דְּיִהְוֹין לִיךְ מִינַּאי, אִינּוּן יִרְתוּן כֶּסֶף כְּתוּבְּתִיךְ יוֹתֵר עַל חוּלַקְיהוֹן דְּעִם אֲחוּהוֹן״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁתְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין הוּא.

Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: Come and hear a resolution of your dilemma from a baraita, as Rabbi Natan said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: You taught in your Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 52b): If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and consequently takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka that one may add to the share of some of his sons at the expense of the others.

וְאָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי: ״יִסְּבוּן״ תְּנַן.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: We did not learn that the male children she has from him will inherit the money of the marriage contract; that version is not accurate. Rather, we learned that they will take the money of the marriage contract, as a gift. When a bequeathal is worded in this manner, it is valid in any event, as stated in the previous mishna (126b).

וְאָמַר רַבִּי: יַלְדוּת הָיְתָה בִּי וְהֵעַזְתִּי פָּנַי בְּנָתָן הַבַּבְלִי – אֶלָּא דְּקַיְימָא לַן: בְּנִין דִּכְרִין לָא טָרְפָא מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי; אִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ ״יִסְּבוּן״ תְּנַן, אַמַּאי לָא טָרְפָא מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדִי? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: ״יִרְתוּן״ תְּנַן.

The baraita continues: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later retracted his response, and said: My response was because of immaturity that I had in me, and I was insolent in the presence of Rabbi Natan the Babylonian by responding in a manner that is incorrect. It is incorrect for the following reason: But since we maintain that concerning an obligation detailed in a marriage document ensuring inheritance rights of a woman’s male children, the beneficiaries do not repossess liened property that has been sold, one can infer that they do not receive the money as a gift. As, if it enters your mind that we learned in the mishna that they will take the money as a gift, why don’t they repossess liened property? The gift was given to them before the property was sold to others. Rather, conclude from this claim that we learned in the mishna that they will inherit the money.

מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאִית לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֲפִילּוּ בְּבָרִיא.

Rav Mesharshiyya concludes: Of whom have you heard that he holds this opinion that one can add to the inheritance of some of his sons at the expense of the others? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and conclude from the mishna in Ketubot that his ruling applies even with regard to a healthy person, as one does not write a marriage contract on his deathbed. This resolves Rava’s dilemma.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״יִסְּבוּן״, וּבֵין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״יִרְתוּן״, הָא אֵין אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם!

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can one prove that the mishna in tractate Ketubot is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? Whether according to the one who says that the correct version of the mishna is: They will take, and whether according to the one who says the correct version of the mishna is: They will inherit, the mishna is difficult, for the following reason: A person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world. How can the husband confer rights to his property to children that have yet to be born?

וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם, הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְדָבָר שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בָּעוֹלָם, אֲבָל לְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּעוֹלָם – לֹא!

Rav Pappa explains: And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, this statement applies specifically in a case where he transfers the item to an entity, i.e., a person, that is in the world; but with regard to transferring ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world, e.g., to his children that have yet to be born, this statement does not apply. Therefore, the ruling of the mishna is difficult according to all opinions.

אֶלָּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין שָׁאנֵי; הָכָא נָמֵי – תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין שָׁאנֵי!

Rav Pappa explains: Rather, evidently a stipulation of the court is different. Since this clause of the marriage contract was instituted by rabbinic ordinance, it is not subject to the standard halakhot of transferring property, and one can transfer ownership of an item to an entity that is not yet in the world. Accordingly, here too, with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka and the Rabbis, a stipulation of the court is different, and even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, one can bequeath the money of his wife’s marriage contract to the male children she will have from him in any manner he chooses. Consequently, there is no proof that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מַפֵּיק לַהּ בִּלְשׁוֹן ״יִרְתוּן״.

Abaye said to him: The assertion that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka is due to the fact that it expresses this bequeathal with the wording: They will inherit, as opposed to: They will take. This indicates that a person can normally apportion his inheritance to his sons in any manner he wishes, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

הֲדַר אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא דַּאֲמַרִי, דִּתְנַן: לֹא כָּתַב לָהּ ״בְּנָן נוּקְבָן דְּיִהְוְיָין לִיכִי מִינַּאי, יִהְוְיָין יָתְבָן בְּבֵיתִי וְיִתַּזְנָן מִנִּכְסַאי עַד דְּתִילַּקְחָן לְגוּבְרִין״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהוּא תְּנַאי בֵּית דִּין.

Abaye then said: That which I said is not correct. The expression: They will inherit, is appropriate even according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as we learned in the continuation of that mishna that even if the husband did not write for his wife: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.

וְהָוֵה לָזֶה בְּמַתָּנָה וְלָזֶה בִּירוּשָׁה, וְכֹל לָזֶה בִּירוּשָּׁה וְלָזֶה בְּמַתָּנָה – אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן מוֹדוּ.

And since these two clauses are written adjacent to each other in the marriage contract, it is effectively a case where one bequeaths his estate to two people: To this one, the daughters, as a gift, and to that one, the sons, as an inheritance. And in any case where one bequeaths his estate to this person as an inheritance and to that person as a gift, even the Rabbis concede that the bequest is valid even if it is to people who are not his heirs, as it is considered a gift with regard to both recipients.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נְחוּמִי וְאִית דְּאָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָה בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, לְאַבָּיֵי:

Rav Naḥumi, and some say it was Rav Ḥananya bar Minyumi, said to Abaye:

מִמַּאי דִּבְחַד בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקוּן? דִּלְמָא בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקוּן!

From where do you conclude that both clauses, the one for the benefit of the sons and the one for the benefit of the daughters, were instituted by one court and are therefore each read in light of the other? Perhaps they were instituted by two different courts and are unrelated to each other. Accordingly, the wording of the gift and the wording of the inheritance are not part of the same statement.

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים בַּכֶּרֶם בְּיַבְנֶה: הַבָּנִים יִירְשׁוּ וְהַבָּנוֹת יִזּוֹנוּ; מָה הַבָּנִים אֵינָן יוֹרְשִׁין אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אֲבִיהֶם, אַף בָּנוֹת לֹא יִזּוֹנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אֲבִיהֶן.

The Gemara answers: This possibility should not enter your mind, as the former clause of that mishna teaches (Ketubot 49a): A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance. This interpretation was interpreted by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages of the vineyard in Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father’s estate, these two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after their father’s death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from their father’s property only after their father’s death.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּחַד בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקוּן, הַיְינוּ דְּיָלְפִינַן תַּקָּנָה מִתַּקָּנָה. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקוּן, הֵיכִי יָלְפִינַן תַּקָּנָה מִתַּקָּנָה?

The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the two clauses were instituted by one court, this is the reason that we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, under the assumption that a court institutes ordinances in a consistent manner. But if you say that they were instituted by two distinct courts operating in different periods, how can we derive the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance?

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ בִּתְרֵי בֵּי דִינָא אִיתְּקוּן; וּבֵי דִינָא בָּתְרָא תַּקּוּן כְּבֵי דִינָא קַמָּא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תִּקְשֵׁה תַּקַּנְתָּא אַתַּקַּנְתָּא.

The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where is it assumed that they were instituted by one court? Actually, I will say to you that perhaps the two clauses were instituted by two separate courts, and nevertheless Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya derived the halakhot of one ordinance from the halakhot of the other ordinance, because the latter court presumably instituted its ordinance in accordance with the format of the former court, so that one should not ask about contradictions between one ordinance and the other ordinance. With regard to the halakhot of inheritance, there is no reason to read the two clauses in light of the other.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפָּא.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A person on his deathbed who writes a document granting all his property to his wife has merely rendered her a steward. The assumption is that he did not intend to deprive his heirs of their entire inheritance. Rather, he intended to appoint her as a steward in charge of the property, so that the heirs will honor her.

פְּשִׁיטָא, בְּנוֹ הַגָּדוֹל – לֹא עֲשָׂאוֹ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס. בְּנוֹ הַקָּטָן מַאי?

The Gemara discusses similar cases: It is obvious that if one writes a document granting all his property to his adult son, he does not intend to give him the entire inheritance, but to have him distribute it among his brothers. Rather, he has merely rendered him a steward [apotropos]. If he writes it to his minor son, what is the halakha? Is it still assumed that his intention is to appoint him as a steward, or is that implausible since a minor boy is not yet capable of assuming this position and therefore the father apparently intended to bequeath to him the entire inheritance?

אִיתְּמַר, רַב חֲנִילַאי בַּר אִידֵּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֲפִילּוּ בְּנוֹ קָטָן הַמּוּטָּל בַּעֲרִיסָה.

It was stated that Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi says that Shmuel says that even if one wrote a document granting all his property to his minor son who is lying in his crib, he does not receive the entire inheritance. Rather, the father presumably intended to appoint him as a steward when he reached adulthood, so that the other heirs would honor him.

פְּשִׁיטָא, בְּנוֹ וְאַחֵר – אַחֵר בְּמַתָּנָה, וּבְנוֹ אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס. אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאַחֵר – לְאַחֵר בְּמַתָּנָה, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס.

The Gemara states: It is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his son and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his son a steward to oversee the property of his brothers, with whom he shares the other half. Similarly, if he wrote a document granting all his property to his wife and another person, he intended to give the other person half the property as a gift, and to appoint his wife a steward to oversee the other half of the property for his sons.

אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה – בְּמַתָּנָה.

Furthermore, it is obvious that if one wrote a document granting all his property to his betrothed wife, whom he did not yet wed, or to his former wife, whom he had divorced, he intended to give it to them as a gift, as he had no reason to have his heirs honor them.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בַּת אֵצֶל הַבָּנִים, וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל הָאַחִים, וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל בְּנֵי הַבַּעַל, מַהוּ?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wrote a document granting all his property to his daughter before his sons, in a case where he has sons who would inherit from him, or to his wife before his brothers, or to his wife before the husband’s sons who are not her sons, what is the halakha? Is it assumed that his intention was to appoint her as a steward or to give her the property as a gift?

אָמַר רָבִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בְּכוּלְּהוּ לֹא קָנָה, לְבַר מֵאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה וְאִשְׁתּוֹ גְּרוּשָׁה. רַב עַוִּירָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: בְּכוּלְּהוּ קָנֵי, לְבַר מֵהָאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל הָאַחִין וְאִשָּׁה אֵצֶל בְּנֵי הַבַּעַל.

Ravina said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient did not acquire the property. Rather, he or she was merely appointed a steward, except for the cases of his betrothed wife and his former wife whom he divorced. By contrast, Rav Avira said in the name of Rava that in all of these cases the recipient acquired the property, except for the cases of his wife before his brothers and his wife before the husband’s sons, where he clearly intended only to appoint her as a steward.