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Today's Daf Yomi

June 8, 2017 | 讬状讚 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Batra 137

The gemara聽says that there is a tannaitic debate (between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) regarding the same issue that Rabbi Yochanan and ReishLakish were debating – when one acquires the produce it is like he acquires the item itself or not, meaning does he have rights to sell it? 聽Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if one sold it, the sale would be valid even though in the case discussed, he thinks one should not be able to sell it ab initio. 聽Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on this issue with one exception. 聽He also added a few聽cases that would be included also within this psak. 聽The gemara then discusses cases regarding one who received an etrog as a gift or took from the estate’s funds before they were divided. 聽 Is one able to fulfill the mitzva or not? 聽Is a gift given upon condition that it be returned, considered a gift?

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讬专讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讻专 讜讗讻诇 讛砖谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇砖谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara answers: The halakha in this case is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m; as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who said: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, and the first recipient entered the property and sold it and consumed the profits, the second recipient repossesses the property from the purchasers, as the property belongs to him after the death of the first recipient; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The second recipient receives only that which the first beneficiary left, since his sale is valid.

讜专诪讬谞讛讬 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讬讜专讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讜讻专 讜讗讜讻诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讗诇讗 讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 讘诇讘讚

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one says: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, the first one may enter the property and sell it and consume the profits; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The first one has only the right of consumption of the produce.

拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讗讚专讘讬 讜讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

This statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is difficult as it is contradicted by the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and this statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is difficult as it is contradicted by the other statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Their opinions in the latter baraita seem to be the opposite of those in the former baraita.

讚专讘讬 讗讚专讘讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 诇讙讜驻讗 讛讗 诇驻讬专讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讗 讚讬注讘讚

The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is not difficult; this ruling that the first one cannot sell it is referring to the property itself, and that ruling that he can sell it is referring to the produce. The apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the other statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not difficult either; this statement, that the first has only the right to consume the produce, is referring to his rights ab initio, whereas that statement, that if he sold the property the second one gets nothing, is referring to the halakha after the fact.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬讝讛讜 专砖注 注专讜诐 讝讛 讛诪砖讬讗 注爪讛 诇诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬诐 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Abaye says: Who is a cunning wicked person? This is one who provides advice to sell property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Although Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale is valid, he does not permit one to do so ab initio, as that would deprive the second designated recipient of the property. Therefore, one who advises the first recipient to do so is considered a cunning wicked person.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诪讜讚讛 砖讗诐 谞转谞谉 讘诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that if the first recipient gave the property to another as the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which case no formal act of acquisition is required, he has done nothing; the second recipient can repossess the property from the one to whom it was given.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜讻讘专 拽讚诪讜 讗讞专讬讱

What is the reason? Abaye says: The recipient of the gift of a person on his deathbed acquires it only after the person鈥檚 death, and in this case, the acquisition of the recipient resulting from the statement of: After you, i.e., the second designated recipient, has already preceded the acquisition of the first one.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗 讗讬转诪专 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诪讗讬诪转讬 拽谞讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 注诐 讙诪专 诪讬转讛 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara asks: But did Abaye actually say this, that the gift of a person on his deathbed takes effect only after his death? But wasn鈥檛 it stated in an amoraic dispute concerning the matter: From when does the recipient of the gift of a person on his deathbed acquire it? Abaye says: With the completion of death, i.e., at the moment he dies; and Rava says: After the completion of death.

讛讚专 讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讛讛讬讗 诪诪讗讬 讚诪讛讛讬讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讚诇诪讗 诪讛讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛

The Gemara answers: Abaye retracted that latter statement. The Gemara asks: From where is it known that he retracted that statement? Perhaps he retracted this, i.e., the statement that the recipient acquires it only after the person鈥檚 death, and his conclusion is that he acquires it at the moment of his death.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚转谞谉 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara answers: That possibility should not enter your mind, as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 72b): If a man on his deathbed says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after I die, he has said nothing. The divorce does not take effect after his death. Evidently, when one gives instructions on his deathbed, his intention is for them to be effective after he dies.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讜 讘讛谉 注讘讚讬诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讬专讜转

Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that if the first recipient sells the property, the sale is valid, and this is the halakha even if there were Canaanite slaves included in the property and the first recipient emancipated them.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇诪讬注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讱 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the giver would have said to him: I did not give you my Canaanite slaves to transgress a prohibition, as it is prohibited to emancipate Canaanite slaves, Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that he has the legal right to do so.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注砖讗谉 转讻专讬讻讬谉 诇诪转 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇砖讜讬谞讛讜 讗讬住讜专讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讱 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rav Yosef says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel even if he made the gift into shrouds for a corpse. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the giver would have said to him: I did not give you my possessions to render them into items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, but rather so that you may use and enjoy them, and Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that he may do so.

讚专砖 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗转专讜讙 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 谞讟诇讜 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讘讗谞讜 诇诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rav Na岣an bar Rav 岣sda taught: If one said to another: This etrog is given to you as a gift, and after you die, to so-and-so, and the first recipient then took it and fulfilled his obligation of taking the four species on the first day of Sukkot with it, when one is obligated to take species that belong to him, in this case, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as to the nature of the ownership of the first recipient. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion that he cannot sell the etrog, it is not considered entirely his, and he does not fulfill his obligation by taking it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that he can sell it, he fulfills his obligation.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜诪专 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 讛讻讗

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k objects to this statement, reasoning that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only there, in the case of: After you, with regard to the nature of the recipient鈥檚 ownership; as one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered like ownership of the item itself, and the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered like ownership of the item itself. But here, with regard to the etrog,

讗讬 诪讬驻拽 诇讗 谞驻讬拽 讘讬讛 诇诪讗讬 讬讛讘讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛

if he does not fulfill his obligation with it, for what purpose did the owner give it to him?

讗诇讗 诪讬驻拽 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚谞驻讬拽 讘讬讛 诪讻专讛 讗讜 讗讻诇讛 讘讗谞讜 诇诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rather, with regard to fulfilling his obligation, everyone agrees that he fulfills his obligation with it. It is only in a case where the first recipient sold it or consumed it, that we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if he sold it, the second recipient can repossess the etrog from the purchaser, and if he consumed it he must pay the second recipient its value, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he owes nothing to the second recipient, as the etrog belongs to him.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讗讞讬谉 砖拽谞讜 讗转专讜讙 讘转驻讜住转 讛讘讬转 谞讟诇讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讗诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讗讜讻诇讜 讬爪讗 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 诇讗 讬爪讗

Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In a case of brothers who acquired an etrog with money from the jointly held property of the estate, and one of them took it on Sukkot and attempted to fulfill his obligation with it, the halakha depends on the limits of his ownership of the etrog: If he may eat it, i.e., his brothers allow him to do so, he has fulfilled his obligation to perform the mitzva, and if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

讜讚讜拽讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗转专讜讙 诇讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 讗讘诇 驻专讬砖 讗讜 专诪讜谉 诇讗

And this is specifically in a case where there is an etrog for each and every one of the brothers; but if the other brothers get merely a quince or a pomegranate, he has not fulfilled his obligation even if he has the right to eat it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗转专讜讙 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 谞讟诇讜 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讛讞讝讬专讜 讬爪讗 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讗 讬爪讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讞讝讬专 砖诪讛 诪转谞讛

Rava says: If one person said to another: This etrog is given to you as a gift on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it on Sukkot and attempted to fulfill his obligation with it, if he ultimately returned it, he has fulfilled his obligation; if he did not return it, he has not fulfilled his obligation, as he did not fulfill the condition, thereby retroactively invalidating the gift. The Gemara explains that Rava teaches us that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a valid gift.

讛讛讬讗 讗讬转转讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讛 讚讬拽诇讗 讘讗专注讗 讚专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讻诇 讗讬诪转 讚讛讜转 讗讝诇讗 诇诪讬讙讝专讬讛 讛讜讛 拽驻讬讚 注讬诇讜讛 讗拽谞讬转讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讻诇 砖谞讬 讞讬讬讜 讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讗拽谞讬讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讘谞讜 拽讟谉

搂 The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who had a palm tree on the land of Rav Beivai bar Abaye. Whenever she would go to harvest the produce from it, he would get angry at her for trampling on his crops. Since she did not wish to anger him, she decided to temporarily waive her right to the tree鈥檚 produce, and transferred ownership of it to him for all the years of his life, so that after his death she would once again be able to harvest the produce. He then went and transferred it to his minor son, so that it would remain in his family even following his death.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪砖讜诐 讚讗转讜 诪诪讜诇讗讬 讗诪专讬转讜 诪讬诇讬 诪讜诇讬讗转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讗讘诇 诇注爪诪讜 诇讗

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Beivai bar Abaye: Is it because you descend from truncated [mula鈥檈i] people, as Rav Beivai鈥檚 family traced their lineage to Eli, all of whose descendants were condemned to premature death (see I聽Samuel 2:31), that you speak truncated [mulyata] and unsound matters? Even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that in a case where one says: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, if the first recipient sells the property the sale is valid, says so only in a case where it was to be given to another person; but if the giver said that it will return to himself, he did not say that the first recipient can sell it, as the giver clearly intended to maintain his ownership of the property. Accordingly, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, held that Rav Beivai鈥檚 sale did not take effect.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讜专 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 讛拽讚讬砖讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 诪讜拽讚砖 讜诪讜讞讝专

Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: If one said to another: This ox is given to you as a gift on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient consecrated it and then returned it to him, it is consecrated and returned. The consecration takes effect, and although the owner may not use it, nevertheless it is considered returned and the condition is fulfilled.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讗讬 讗讛讚专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 讞住专讬讛 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 讛讗 讗讛讚专讬讛 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 诪讬讚讬 讚讞讝讬 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: What did he return to him? The ox was not returned to the possession of the giver, as it is consecrated. Rav Na岣an said to him: And what did he cause him to lose? He returned the ox. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We must rule in this case based on what we see. If the giver said to the recipient: On the condition that you return it, it is considered returned, as he returned it. But if he said to him: On the condition that you return it to me, he was effectively saying to him that he must return something fit for him to use. Consequently, the consecration prevents the condition from being fulfilled, and both the gift and the consecration are retroactively nullified.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讛诇讛 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讛谉 拽谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诪讚 讜爪讜讜讞 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one writes a document granting his property to another, and the other person says: I do not want it, he acquires it, and this is the halakha even if he is standing and shouting in protest that he does not want it. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he does not acquire it.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 诪诪诇 讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: And they do not disagree with each other:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Batra 137

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Bava Batra 137

转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜讬专讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讻专 讜讗讻诇 讛砖谞讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇砖谞讬 讗诇讗 诪讛 砖砖讬讬专 专讗砖讜谉

The Gemara answers: The halakha in this case is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m; as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who said: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, and the first recipient entered the property and sold it and consumed the profits, the second recipient repossesses the property from the purchasers, as the property belongs to him after the death of the first recipient; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The second recipient receives only that which the first beneficiary left, since his sale is valid.

讜专诪讬谞讛讬 谞讻住讬 诇讱 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讬讜专讚 专讗砖讜谉 讜诪讜讻专 讜讗讜讻诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇专讗砖讜谉 讗诇讗 讗讻讬诇转 驻讬专讜转 讘诇讘讚

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one says: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, the first one may enter the property and sell it and consume the profits; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The first one has only the right of consumption of the produce.

拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讗讚专讘讬 讜讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

This statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is difficult as it is contradicted by the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and this statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is difficult as it is contradicted by the other statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Their opinions in the latter baraita seem to be the opposite of those in the former baraita.

讚专讘讬 讗讚专讘讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 诇讙讜驻讗 讛讗 诇驻讬专讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 诇讻转讞诇讛 讛讗 讚讬注讘讚

The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is not difficult; this ruling that the first one cannot sell it is referring to the property itself, and that ruling that he can sell it is referring to the produce. The apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the other statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not difficult either; this statement, that the first has only the right to consume the produce, is referring to his rights ab initio, whereas that statement, that if he sold the property the second one gets nothing, is referring to the halakha after the fact.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬讝讛讜 专砖注 注专讜诐 讝讛 讛诪砖讬讗 注爪讛 诇诪讻讜专 讘谞讻住讬诐 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Abaye says: Who is a cunning wicked person? This is one who provides advice to sell property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Although Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale is valid, he does not permit one to do so ab initio, as that would deprive the second designated recipient of the property. Therefore, one who advises the first recipient to do so is considered a cunning wicked person.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诪讜讚讛 砖讗诐 谞转谞谉 讘诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that if the first recipient gave the property to another as the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which case no formal act of acquisition is required, he has done nothing; the second recipient can repossess the property from the one to whom it was given.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诇讗 拽谞讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜讻讘专 拽讚诪讜 讗讞专讬讱

What is the reason? Abaye says: The recipient of the gift of a person on his deathbed acquires it only after the person鈥檚 death, and in this case, the acquisition of the recipient resulting from the statement of: After you, i.e., the second designated recipient, has already preceded the acquisition of the first one.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 讜讛讗 讗讬转诪专 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 诪讗讬诪转讬 拽谞讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 注诐 讙诪专 诪讬转讛 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 诪讬转讛

The Gemara asks: But did Abaye actually say this, that the gift of a person on his deathbed takes effect only after his death? But wasn鈥檛 it stated in an amoraic dispute concerning the matter: From when does the recipient of the gift of a person on his deathbed acquire it? Abaye says: With the completion of death, i.e., at the moment he dies; and Rava says: After the completion of death.

讛讚专 讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讛讛讬讗 诪诪讗讬 讚诪讛讛讬讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讚诇诪讗 诪讛讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛

The Gemara answers: Abaye retracted that latter statement. The Gemara asks: From where is it known that he retracted that statement? Perhaps he retracted this, i.e., the statement that the recipient acquires it only after the person鈥檚 death, and his conclusion is that he acquires it at the moment of his death.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚转谞谉 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 讗诐 诪转讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诪讞讜诇讬 讝讛 讝讛 讙讬讟讱 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara answers: That possibility should not enter your mind, as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 72b): If a man on his deathbed says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after I die, he has said nothing. The divorce does not take effect after his death. Evidently, when one gives instructions on his deathbed, his intention is for them to be effective after he dies.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讜 讘讛谉 注讘讚讬诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗谉 诇讞讬专讜转

Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that if the first recipient sells the property, the sale is valid, and this is the halakha even if there were Canaanite slaves included in the property and the first recipient emancipated them.

驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇诪讬注讘讚 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讱 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the giver would have said to him: I did not give you my Canaanite slaves to transgress a prohibition, as it is prohibited to emancipate Canaanite slaves, Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that he has the legal right to do so.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注砖讗谉 转讻专讬讻讬谉 诇诪转 驻砖讬讟讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 诇砖讜讬谞讛讜 讗讬住讜专讬 讛谞讗讛 诇讗 讬讛讘讬 诇讱 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rav Yosef says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel even if he made the gift into shrouds for a corpse. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 that obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the giver would have said to him: I did not give you my possessions to render them into items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, but rather so that you may use and enjoy them, and Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that he may do so.

讚专砖 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗转专讜讙 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 讜讗讞专讬讱 诇驻诇讜谞讬 谞讟诇讜 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讘讗谞讜 诇诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rav Na岣an bar Rav 岣sda taught: If one said to another: This etrog is given to you as a gift, and after you die, to so-and-so, and the first recipient then took it and fulfilled his obligation of taking the four species on the first day of Sukkot with it, when one is obligated to take species that belong to him, in this case, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as to the nature of the ownership of the first recipient. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion that he cannot sell the etrog, it is not considered entirely his, and he does not fulfill his obligation by taking it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that he can sell it, he fulfills his obligation.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚诪专 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜诪专 住讘专 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 讛讻讗

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k objects to this statement, reasoning that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only there, in the case of: After you, with regard to the nature of the recipient鈥檚 ownership; as one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered like ownership of the item itself, and the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered like ownership of the item itself. But here, with regard to the etrog,

讗讬 诪讬驻拽 诇讗 谞驻讬拽 讘讬讛 诇诪讗讬 讬讛讘讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛

if he does not fulfill his obligation with it, for what purpose did the owner give it to him?

讗诇讗 诪讬驻拽 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚谞驻讬拽 讘讬讛 诪讻专讛 讗讜 讗讻诇讛 讘讗谞讜 诇诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讬 讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

Rather, with regard to fulfilling his obligation, everyone agrees that he fulfills his obligation with it. It is only in a case where the first recipient sold it or consumed it, that we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if he sold it, the second recipient can repossess the etrog from the purchaser, and if he consumed it he must pay the second recipient its value, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he owes nothing to the second recipient, as the etrog belongs to him.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讛讗讞讬谉 砖拽谞讜 讗转专讜讙 讘转驻讜住转 讛讘讬转 谞讟诇讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讗诐 讬讻讜诇 诇讗讜讻诇讜 讬爪讗 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 诇讗 讬爪讗

Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In a case of brothers who acquired an etrog with money from the jointly held property of the estate, and one of them took it on Sukkot and attempted to fulfill his obligation with it, the halakha depends on the limits of his ownership of the etrog: If he may eat it, i.e., his brothers allow him to do so, he has fulfilled his obligation to perform the mitzva, and if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

讜讚讜拽讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讗转专讜讙 诇讻诇 讞讚 讜讞讚 讗讘诇 驻专讬砖 讗讜 专诪讜谉 诇讗

And this is specifically in a case where there is an etrog for each and every one of the brothers; but if the other brothers get merely a quince or a pomegranate, he has not fulfilled his obligation even if he has the right to eat it.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗转专讜讙 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 谞讟诇讜 讜讬爪讗 讘讜 讛讞讝讬专讜 讬爪讗 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 诇讗 讬爪讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇讛讞讝讬专 砖诪讛 诪转谞讛

Rava says: If one person said to another: This etrog is given to you as a gift on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it on Sukkot and attempted to fulfill his obligation with it, if he ultimately returned it, he has fulfilled his obligation; if he did not return it, he has not fulfilled his obligation, as he did not fulfill the condition, thereby retroactively invalidating the gift. The Gemara explains that Rava teaches us that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a valid gift.

讛讛讬讗 讗讬转转讗 讚讛讜讛 诇讛 讚讬拽诇讗 讘讗专注讗 讚专讘 讘讬讘讬 讘专 讗讘讬讬 讻诇 讗讬诪转 讚讛讜转 讗讝诇讗 诇诪讬讙讝专讬讛 讛讜讛 拽驻讬讚 注讬诇讜讛 讗拽谞讬转讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讻诇 砖谞讬 讞讬讬讜 讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讗拽谞讬讬讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讘谞讜 拽讟谉

搂 The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who had a palm tree on the land of Rav Beivai bar Abaye. Whenever she would go to harvest the produce from it, he would get angry at her for trampling on his crops. Since she did not wish to anger him, she decided to temporarily waive her right to the tree鈥檚 produce, and transferred ownership of it to him for all the years of his life, so that after his death she would once again be able to harvest the produce. He then went and transferred it to his minor son, so that it would remain in his family even following his death.

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪砖讜诐 讚讗转讜 诪诪讜诇讗讬 讗诪专讬转讜 诪讬诇讬 诪讜诇讬讗转讗 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 讗讘诇 诇注爪诪讜 诇讗

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Beivai bar Abaye: Is it because you descend from truncated [mula鈥檈i] people, as Rav Beivai鈥檚 family traced their lineage to Eli, all of whose descendants were condemned to premature death (see I聽Samuel 2:31), that you speak truncated [mulyata] and unsound matters? Even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that in a case where one says: My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so, if the first recipient sells the property the sale is valid, says so only in a case where it was to be given to another person; but if the giver said that it will return to himself, he did not say that the first recipient can sell it, as the giver clearly intended to maintain his ownership of the property. Accordingly, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, held that Rav Beivai鈥檚 sale did not take effect.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 砖讜专 讝讛 谞转讜谉 诇讱 讘诪转谞讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 讛拽讚讬砖讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 诪讜拽讚砖 讜诪讜讞讝专

Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: If one said to another: This ox is given to you as a gift on the condition that you return it to me, and the recipient consecrated it and then returned it to him, it is consecrated and returned. The consecration takes effect, and although the owner may not use it, nevertheless it is considered returned and the condition is fulfilled.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪讗讬 讗讛讚专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 讞住专讬讛 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 讛讗 讗讛讚专讬讛 讗讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讞讝讬专讛讜 诇讬 诪讬讚讬 讚讞讝讬 诇讬讛 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rava said to Rav Na岣an: What did he return to him? The ox was not returned to the possession of the giver, as it is consecrated. Rav Na岣an said to him: And what did he cause him to lose? He returned the ox. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We must rule in this case based on what we see. If the giver said to the recipient: On the condition that you return it, it is considered returned, as he returned it. But if he said to him: On the condition that you return it to me, he was effectively saying to him that he must return something fit for him to use. Consequently, the consecration prevents the condition from being fulfilled, and both the gift and the consecration are retroactively nullified.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讜转讘 谞讻住讬讜 诇讗讞专 讜讗诪专 讛诇讛 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讛谉 拽谞讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诪讚 讜爪讜讜讞 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 拽谞讛

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one writes a document granting his property to another, and the other person says: I do not want it, he acquires it, and this is the halakha even if he is standing and shouting in protest that he does not want it. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says that he does not acquire it.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 诪诪诇 讜诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: And they do not disagree with each other:

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