Bava Batra 138
כָּאן בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרָא, כָּאן בְּשׁוֹתֵק מֵעִיקָּרָא וּלְבַסּוֹף צוֹוֵחַ.
Here, in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, it is a case where he is shouting in protest at the outset. As soon as he is given the deed of gift he states that he does not want it. In this case, he does not receive the property. There, in Shmuel’s statement, it is a case where he is initially silent when he receives the deed of gift, and is ultimately shouting in protest that he does not want it. In this case he acquires the gift before he protests, so it is his.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: זִיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, וְשָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח – בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבָּנַן,
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that if the owner transfers ownership of the property to him through another person, who performs an act of acquisition for this other party in his presence, and he was initially silent, i.e., when the act of acquisition is performed, but ultimately shouted in protest when the property is actually given to him, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְאַחֵר, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״; אִם הָיָה רַבָּן שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר הַלָּה: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.
This is as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 8:1): If one wrote a document granting his property to another, and there were slaves among his property, and the other person said: I do not want them, if their second master, i.e., the recipient, was a priest, they partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, as his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once the other person said: I do not want them, the giver or his heirs have already acquired them, and they are the slaves’ owners.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: וְתַנָּא קַמָּא – אֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ?!
And we discussed the baraita: And does the first tanna hold that he acquires them even if he is standing and shouting in protest that he does not want them? That is not reasonable.
אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא קָנֵי. שָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּקָנֵי.
Rava says, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who says: In a case where he is shouting in protest at the outset, when he is given the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire them. In a case where he was silent at the time and ultimately shouted in protest, everyone agrees that he acquired them.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי – שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר וְשָׁתַק, וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח; דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִדִּשְׁתֵיק – קְנִינְהוּ; וְהַאי דְּקָא צָוַוח – מִהְדָּר הוּא דְּקָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
When they disagree it is in a case when he transfers ownership to him through another person, and the recipient was there and was silent, and ultimately, when he actually receives the slaves, he shouted in protest. As the first tanna holds that once he was initially silent, he acquired them, and the fact that he is shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. His acquisition cannot be canceled in this manner. If he does not want to own the slaves, he can sell them, give them away, or emancipate them.
וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ; וְהַאי דְּלָא צָוַוח עַד הַשְׁתָּא – דְּסָבַר: כִּי לָא מָטוּ לִידִי, מַאי אֶצְוַוח.
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent; he never intended to acquire the slaves. And the reason that he did not shout in protest until now is that he reasoned: As long as they did not enter my possession, to what end will I shout?
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר: ״תְּנוּ מָאתַיִם זוּז לִפְלוֹנִי, וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת לִפְלוֹנִי, וְאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת לִפְלוֹנִי״ – אֵין אוֹמְרִין: כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם בִּשְׁטָר, זוֹכֶה. לְפִיכָךְ, יָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – גּוֹבֶה מִכּוּלָּם.
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 9:6): If a person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and three hundred to so-and-so, and four hundred to so-and-so, in this case one does not say that whoever appears first in the deed acquires his money first. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against the one who gave the gifts, and it becomes clear that the money given was pledged to a creditor, then the creditor collects from all of them.
אֲבָל אָמַר: ״תְּנוּ מָאתַיִם זוּז לִפְלוֹנִי, וְאַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי, וְאַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי״ – אוֹמְרִין: כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם בַּשְּׁטָר, זוֹכֶה. לְפִיכָךְ, יָצָא עָלָיו שְׁטַר חוֹב – גּוֹבֶה מִן הָאַחֲרוֹן. אֵין לוֹ – גּוֹבֶה מִשֶּׁלְּפָנָיו. אֵין לוֹ – גּוֹבֶה מִשֶּׁלִּפְנֵי פָנָיו.
But if a person on his deathbed said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, and after him, to so-and-so, and after him, to so-and-so, then one says: Anyone who appears first in the deed gains. Therefore, if a promissory note emerged against the giver, the creditor first collects from the last one of the recipients. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the previous recipient. If he does not have enough to repay the debt, he collects from the recipient listed before the previous recipient.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר: ״תְּנוּ מָאתַיִם זוּז לִפְלוֹנִי בְּנִי בְּכוֹר, כָּרָאוּי לוֹ״ – נוֹטְלָן, וְנוֹטֵל אֶת בְּכוֹרָתוֹ. אִם אָמַר: ״בִּבְכוֹרָתוֹ״ – יָדוֹ עַל הָעֶלְיוֹנָה; רָצָה – נוֹטְלָן, רָצָה – נוֹטֵל בְּכוֹרָתוֹ.
The Sages taught in a baraita: If there was a person on his deathbed who said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, my firstborn son, as is appropriate for him, the firstborn takes the two hundred dinars and takes his portion as a firstborn as well. If he said: Give my firstborn son two hundred dinars for his portion as a firstborn, he does not receive both, but he has the advantage; if he wants, he takes the two hundred dinars, and if he wants, he takes his portion as a firstborn.
וּשְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר: ״תְּנוּ מָאתַיִם זוּז לִפְלוֹנִית אִשְׁתִּי, כָּרָאוּי לָהּ״ – נוֹטַלְתָּן, וְנוֹטֶלֶת אֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. אִם אָמַר ״בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ״ –
The baraita continues: And similarly, if there was a person on his deathbed who said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, my wife, as is appropriate for her, she takes the two hundred dinars and takes payment of her marriage contract as well. If he said: Give her two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract,
יָדָהּ עַל הָעֶלְיוֹנָה; רָצָה – נוֹטַלְתָּן, רָצָה – נוֹטֶלֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
she has the advantage; if she wants, she takes the two hundred dinars, and if she wants, she takes payment of her marriage contract.
וּשְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר: ״תְּנוּ מָאתַיִם זוּז לִפְלוֹנִי בַּעַל חוֹבִי, כָּרָאוּי לוֹ״ – נוֹטְלָן, וְנוֹטֵל אֶת חוֹבוֹ. וְאִם אָמַר: ״בְּחוֹבוֹ״ – נוֹטְלָן בְּחוֹבוֹ.
The baraita continues: And if there was a person on his deathbed who said: Give two hundred dinars to so-and-so, my creditor, as is appropriate for him, the creditor takes the two hundred dinars and takes payment of the debt as well. But if he said: Give him two hundred dinars as payment for the debt, he takes the two hundred dinars as payment for the debt.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר ״כָּרָאוּי לוֹ״ – נוֹטְלָן וְנוֹטֵל אֶת חוֹבוֹ?! וְדִלְמָא ״כָּרָאוּי לוֹ בְּחוֹבוֹ״ קָאָמַר!
The Gemara asks: Because he says: As is appropriate for him, he takes the two hundred dinars and takes payment of the debt as well? But perhaps he was saying: As is appropriate for him as payment for the debt, and meant only to specify the amount of the debt.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר לִי הוּנָא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דְּדָיֵיק לִישָּׁנָא יַתִּירָא;
Rav Naḥman said: Rav Huna said to me: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who expounds superfluous language. Rabbi Akiva holds that if one uses unnecessary words, he apparently intended to add a matter.
דִּתְנַן: וְלֹא אֶת הַבּוֹר וְלֹא אֶת הַדּוּת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכָּתַב לוֹ עוּמְקָא וְרוּמָא. וְצָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.
As we learned in a mishna (64a): One who sells a house without specification has sold neither the pit nor the cistern [dut] with it, even if he writes for the buyer in the bill of sale: With its depth and its height. This is because anything that is not part of the house, like pits and cisterns, must be explicitly mentioned in the contract or else they remain in the seller’s possession. And therefore the seller must purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his, because he has sold the area of the house along with the house itself, and he no longer has permission to walk there. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ. וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ ״חוּץ מֵאֵלּוּ״ – שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ.
And the Rabbis say: The seller need not purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain, as this is certainly included in what he has withheld for himself from the sale. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when the seller says to the buyer in the bill of sale: I am selling you this house apart from the pit and the cistern, he need not purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain. Since the seller unnecessarily emphasized that the pit and the cistern are not included in the sale, he presumably intended to reserve for himself the right of access to them.
אַלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא צְרִיךְ, וְקָאָמַר – לְטַפּוֹיֵי מִלְּתָא קָאָתֵי; הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא צְרִיךְ, וְקָאָמַר – לְטַפּוֹיֵי מִלְּתָא קָא אָתֵי.
Apparently, according to Rabbi Akiva, since he did not need to state: Apart from the pit and the cistern, and stated it anyway, the seemingly superfluous statement was coming to add a matter. Since the seller unnecessarily stressed that the pit and cistern are not included in the sale, he must have intended to thereby reserve for himself the right of access. Here too, with regard to the gift given by a person on his deathbed to his creditor, since he did not need to say: As is appropriate for him, and said it anyway, this phrase was coming to add a matter, i.e., that the two hundred dinars are in addition to the debt.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר: ״מָנֶה יֵשׁ לִי אֵצֶל פְּלוֹנִי״ – הָעֵדִים כּוֹתְבִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מַכִּירִין. לְפִיכָךְ, כְּשֶׁהוּא גּוֹבֶה – צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מַכִּירִין, לְפִיכָךְ כְּשֶׁהוּא גּוֹבֶה – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה.
§ The Sages taught (Tosefta 8:18): If there was a person on his deathbed who said: I have one hundred dinars owed to me by so-and-so, the witnesses that hear this may write his statement in a document even if they do not know whether the statement is true. Therefore, when the person’s heir collects the debt, he must bring proof of the debt, as the document written by these witnesses is not regarded as proof. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The witnesses may not write the document unless they know for a fact that the statement is true. Therefore, when the heir collects the debt, he need not bring proof other than the document written by the witnesses, as it has the status of a promissory note.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, אָמַר לִי הוּנָא: תָּנָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כּוֹתְבִין. וְאַף רַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא אָמַר אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם בֵּית דִּין טוֹעִין. אָמַר רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, הִלְכְתָא: אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְבֵית דִּין טוֹעִין.
Rav Naḥman says: Rav Huna told me that the opposite is taught in another baraita: Rabbi Meir says that the witnesses may not write his statement in a document unless they know for a fact that the statement is true, and the Rabbis say that they may write it even if they do not know whether the statement is true; and even Rabbi Meir said that they may not write it only due to the concern that it might be presented before a court that errs and allows the heirs to collect without furnishing additional proof. Rav Dimi of Neharde’a says: The halakha is that there is no concern about the possibility of a court that errs.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִדְּרָבָא? דְּאָמַר רָבָא: אֵין חוֹלְצִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מַכִּירִין, וְאֵין מְמָאֲנִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מַכִּירִין. לְפִיכָךְ כּוֹתְבִין גֵּט חֲלִיצָה וְגֵט מֵיאוּן, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מַכִּירִין.
The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from Rava’s statement? As Rava says: A court may not supervise ḥalitza unless the judges recognize the yavam and yevama. And a court may not supervise a declaration of the refusal of a girl upon her reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father, unless they recognize the girl. Therefore, another court may write a document attesting to the performance of ḥalitza or a document stating that a declaration of refusal was made in a court elsewhere based on the testimony of witnesses even if the judges do not recognize these people, relying on the presumption the first court would not have allowed the act to be performed had they not been sure of the identities of the parties.
מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּחוֹשְׁשִׁין לְבֵית דִּין טוֹעִין?
What is the reason Rava said that the court must recognize the participants in these actions? Is it not due to the concern that a court that errs might write such a document based on the testimony of witnesses without verifying that the participating parties were recognized by the court where the ḥalitza or refusal took place?
לָא; בֵּית דִּינָא בָּתַר בֵּית דִּינָא – לָא דָּיְיקִי, בֵּית דִּינָא בָּתַר עֵדִים – דָּיְיקִי.
The Gemara answers: The two issues are not the same. A court does not normally examine the act of another court, so there is concern that the court where the document is written might assume that the court where the act took place recognized the participating parties. But a court does normally examine the statement of witnesses. Therefore, there is no concern that it will rely on a statement written by witnesses without their knowledge of its accuracy.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאָב תּוֹלֵשׁ וּמַאֲכִיל לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה, וּמַה שֶּׁהִנִּיחַ תָּלוּשׁ – הֲרֵי הוּא שֶׁל יוֹרְשִׁין.
MISHNA: In continuation of the case discussed in the previous mishna of a father who wrote a document granting his property to his son but reserved the rights to the produce during his lifetime, the mishna states that the father may detach produce from the land and feed the produce to whomever he wishes, and what he left detached at the time of his death belongs to all the father’s heirs, not only to this son.
גְּמָ׳ תָּלוּשׁ אִין, מְחוּבָּר לֹא.
GEMARA: The mishna indicates that what the father left detached, yes, it is inherited by all the heirs; but the produce that is connected to the ground at the time of his death, no, it is not inherited by them. Rather, it belongs to the son who received the property.
