Bava Batra 24
בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁל כְּרָמִים; דְּאִם אִיתָא דְּמֵעָלְמָא אָתֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּמִידַּדֵּי – לָא מָצֵי אָתֵי; דְּכׇל דְּמִידַּדֵּי וַהֲדַר חָזֵי לֵיהּ לְקִינֵּיהּ – מִידַּדֵּי, וְאִי לָא – לָא מִידַּדֵּי.
We are dealing with a path that passes between vineyards, and these two dovecotes are situated there. As, if it is so that you claim the chick came from anywhere else in the world, since it only hops, it could not have come there. The reason is that any bird that hops and turns and sees its nest will continue to hop; but if it does not see its nest because it has gone too far, it will not hop farther. Consequently, this found chick that hops must have come from one of these two dovecotes.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: דָּם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בַּפְּרוֹזְדוֹר – סְפֵיקוֹ טָמֵא, שֶׁחֶזְקָתוֹ מִן הַמָּקוֹר. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא עֲלִיָּיה, דִּמְקָרְבָא!
Abaye said: We learn in a mishna (Nidda 17b) as well that one follows the majority rather than proximity: With regard to blood that is found in the corridor [baperozdor], i.e., the cervical canal, and it is uncertain whether or not it is menstrual blood, it is ritually impure as menstrual blood, as there is a presumption that it came from the uterus, which is the source of menstrual blood. And this is the halakha even though there is an upper chamber, which empties into the canal, which is closer.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: רוֹב וּמָצוּי קָא אָמְרַתְּ? רוֹב וּמָצוּי לֵיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר.
Rava said to Abaye, in response to this claim: You state a proof from a case where the factors of majority and frequency are both present. When there is majority and frequency, there is no one who says that one ignores the majority and follows proximity. Here, not only is the blood from the uterus greater in quantity, it also passes through the canal more frequently, as blood generally does not come from the upper chamber.
דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: דָּם הַנִּמְצָא בַּפְּרוֹזְדוֹר, חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו עַל בִּיאַת מִקְדָּשׁ, וְשׂוֹרְפִין עָלָיו אֶת הַתְּרוּמָה.
Rava cites a proof for his statement. As Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: Blood that is found in the corridor is considered definite menstrual blood, and therefore if she engages in sexual intercourse, both she and her partner would be liable as a result of it to receive karet for entering the Temple intentionally when ritually impure or to bring an offering for entering unwittingly. And one burns teruma due to it, if the woman touches such produce. Evidently, the status of this blood is not considered uncertain.
וְאָמַר רָבָא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִדְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא – תְּלָת: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רוֹב וְקָרוֹב הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רוּבָּא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִיתָא לִדְרַבִּי זֵירָא –
And Rava says: Learn from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya said three conclusions: Learn from his statement that when the relevant factors are majority and proximity, follow the majority; and learn from his statement that the halakha that one follows the majority applies by Torah law, as teruma is burned in this case on account of the blood and she is liable to receive karet if she enters the Temple in this state; and learn from his statement that there is a source for that which Rabbi Zeira said.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת.
This statement of Rabbi Zeira was issued in reference to a case discussed in tractate Ketubot (15a). If there are ten stores in a city, nine of which sell kosher meat and one of which sells non-kosher meat, and one found meat outside the stores and he does not know from which store it came, one follows the majority. The Gemara there suggests that perhaps one follows the majority only in a case where the gates of the city are unlocked, when the meat could have come to the city from the majority of kosher meat outside in a circumstance where the majority of the meat sold in the surrounding area was kosher. In this case there are two majorities, the majority of kosher meat stores inside the city, and the majority from outside. The Gemara there explains that Rabbi Zeira says that even if the city gates are locked one follows the majority, and the meat is kosher, as there is a no need for a double majority.
דְּהָא אִשָּׁה – דְּכִי דַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת דָּמְיָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.
The Gemara elaborates: The two cases are analogous, as the woman here is considered like the locked gates of the city, i.e., there is only a single majority, and even so we follow the majority.
וְהָא רָבָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר: רוֹב וּמָצוּי לֵיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר! הֲדַר בֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵהַהִיא.
The Gemara asks: But Rava is the one who says with regard to the case of the blood that when there is majority and frequency, there is no one who says that one ignores the majority and follows the proximity. In other words, Rava rejected this case as proof of the principle that one follows the majority even when it is not frequent. Here, by contrast, Rava claims that one can learn from the ruling of Rabbi Ḥiyya that one follows the majority by Torah law. The Gemara answers: Rava retracted that claim in favor of the opinion that one follows the majority in all cases.
אִיתְּמַר: חָבִית שֶׁצָּפָה בַּנָּהָר, אָמַר רַב: נִמְצֵאת כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל – מוּתָּר, כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ נׇכְרִים – אֲסִירָא. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ נִמְצֵאת כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל – אֲסִירָא; אֵימוֹר מֵהַאי דְּקִרָא אֲתַאי.
§ It was stated: In the case of a barrel of wine that was found floating in a river, and the status of the wine was unknown, Rav says: If it was found opposite a town of which the majority of residents are Jews, the wine is permitted, as it can be assumed that the wine belongs to a Jew. If it was found opposite a town of which the majority are gentiles, it is forbidden, as it presumably belongs to a gentile. And Shmuel says: It is forbidden even if it was found opposite a town of which the majority are Jews. Why? Regardless of where it was found, one can say that it came from that place called Dekira, where the majority of people are gentiles. In other words, there is a distinct possibility that a floating barrel came from far away.
לֵימָא בִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא?
The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, in that one Sage, Shmuel, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, and he rules based on the majority, which in this case includes even distant locales, and one Sage, Rav, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, which is why he rules based on proximity.
לָא; דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: אִם אִיתָא דְּמֵהַאי דְּקִרָא אֲתַאי, עִקּוּלֵי וּפָשׁוֹרֵי הֲוָה מַטְבְּעִי לַהּ. וּמָר סָבַר: חֲרִיפָא דְּנַהֲרָא נְקַט וַאֲתַאי.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; everyone agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, and here they disagree about this: As one Sage, Rav, holds that if it is so, that the barrel came from that place called Dekira, this cannot be, as the currents and bays of the river, where the river flow is weak, would have sunk it. Therefore, it is logical that the barrel came from a nearby town. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that perhaps the force of the river caught the barrel and brought it, as it is evident that the flow of a river can bring items from far away.
הָהוּא חַצְבָּא דְחַמְרָא דְּאִישְׁתְּכַח בְּפַרְדֵּיסָא דְעׇרְלָה, שַׁרְיֵא רָבִינָא. לֵימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר לַהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא?
The Gemara relates that Ravina deemed permitted a certain barrel of wine that was found hidden in a vineyard where there were orla grapes, and he was not concerned that the wine might be from the grapes of that vineyard. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina that one follows the majority of vineyards, which are not orla, rather than proximity?
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִי מִיגְּנִיב מִינֵּהּ – אַצְנוֹעֵי בְּגַוֵּיהּ לָא מַצְנְעִי. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי חַמְרָא, אֲבָל עִינְבֵי – מַצְנְעִי.
The Gemara answers: It is different there, as, if thieves had stolen the barrel from that very vineyard they would not have hidden it there. Since the barrel was hidden there, it is reasonable to assume that it was stolen from somewhere else. The Gemara comments: And this matter, that thieves would not hide a stolen barrel in the same vineyard from which they stole it, applies only to wine; but they would hide grapes there, as grapes are not readily identifiable by the owner. Consequently, there is a concern that grapes found hidden there might be from that same vineyard.
הָנְהוּ זִיקֵי דְחַמְרָא דְּאִשְׁתְּכַחוּ בֵּי קוּפָאֵי, שְׁרַנְהוּ רָבָא. לֵימָא לָא סָבַר לַהּ לִדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּרוּבָּא
The Gemara further relates that there were these jugs of wine that were found between vines [bei kofa’ei] of a Jew. Rava deemed the contents permitted and was unconcerned that they might be wine owned by a gentile. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rava does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, who says that one follows the majority, in this case gentiles? The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the majority
דְּשָׁפוֹכָאֵי – יִשְׂרָאֵל נִינְהוּ. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּרַבְרְבֵי, אֲבָל זוּטְרֵי – אֵימוֹר מֵעוֹבְרֵי דְרָכִים נְפוּל. וְאִי אִיכָּא רַבְרְבֵי בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ – אֵימוֹר בַּאֲבַרְוָרֵי הֲוָה מַנְּחִי.
of those who pour wine from barrels into jugs are Jews, and therefore it is reasonable that the wine belongs to a Jew. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to large jugs. But if they were small jugs, one can say that they were dropped by travelers, most of whom are gentiles, and therefore the jugs of wine are forbidden. And if there are large jugs among the found jugs, say that they all belong to Jews, as travelers do not usually carry large jugs; it can be assumed that the small ones were placed to balance the donkey’s load, and the jugs all fell together.
מַתְנִי׳ מַרְחִיקִין אֶת הָאִילָן מִן הָעִיר עֶשְׂרִים וְחָמֵשׁ אַמָּה, וּבֶחָרוּב וּבַשִּׁקְמָה – חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה. אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל אִילַן סְרָק חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה. וְאִם הָעִיר קָדְמָה – קוֹצֵץ, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דָּמִים; וְאִם אִילָן קָדַם – קוֹצֵץ, וְנוֹתֵן דָּמִים; סָפֵק זֶה קָדַם וְסָפֵק זֶה קָדַם – קוֹצֵץ, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דָּמִים.
MISHNA: One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from the city, and in the cases of a carob tree and of a sycamore tree, which have a great many branches, they must be distanced fifty cubits. Abba Shaul says: Every barren tree must be distanced fifty cubits. And if the city preceded the tree, as one later planted the tree alongside the city, he cuts down the tree, and the city does not give money to the tree’s owner in compensation. And if the tree preceded the city, which expanded after one planted the tree until it reached the tree, he cuts down the tree and the city gives money to its owner. If it is uncertain whether this one was first or that one was first, he cuts down the tree and the city does not give money.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר עוּלָּא: מִשּׁוּם נוֹיֵי הָעִיר. וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּאֵין עוֹשִׂין שָׂדֶה מִגְרָשׁ, וְלֹא מִגְרָשׁ שָׂדֶה!
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that one must distance a tree from a city? Ulla says: It is due to the beauty of the city, as it is unattractive for a city’s walls to be obscured by tree branches. The Gemara suggests: And let him derive this halakha from the statement in tractate Arakhin (33b) that one may neither convert a field of a city into an open area surrounding the city, nor may one convert an open area into a field, as these have fixed places and measurements (see Numbers 35:1–8). If one plants trees in a city’s open area, he thereby turns the open area into a field.
לָא צְרִיכָא – לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר דְּאָמַר: עוֹשִׂין שָׂדֶה מִגְרָשׁ וּמִגְרָשׁ שָׂדֶה, הָכָא מִשּׁוּם נוֹיֵי הָעִיר לָא עָבְדִינַן.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to supply the reason given by Ulla according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: One may convert a field into an open area, and an open area into a field. Here, we do not plant trees, due to the beauty of the city.
וּלְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי, דְּאָמְרִי: אֵין עוֹשִׂין שָׂדֶה מִגְרָשׁ וְלֹא מִגְרָשׁ שָׂדֶה – הָנֵי מִילֵּי זְרָעִים, אֲבָל אִילָנוֹת עָבְדִינַן; וְהָכָא מִשּׁוּם נוֹיֵי הָעִיר – לָא.
And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who say that one may not convert a field into an open area, nor convert an open area into a field, one can say that this matter applies only to seeds, i.e., one may not plant seeds in a city’s open area and thereby turn it into a field. But with regard to trees, we do plant them in an open area. But here we do not plant trees, due to the beauty of the city.
וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּשָׁאנֵי בֵּין זְרָעִין לְאִילָנוֹת? דְּתַנְיָא: קַרְפֵּף יוֹתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם שֶׁהוּקַּף לְדִירָה;
And from where do you say, i.e., on what basis do you maintain, that there is a difference between seeds and trees? As it is taught in a baraita that discusses the halakhot of Shabbat: With regard to an enclosure [karpef ] whose area is greater than two beit se’a but that was enclosed from the outset for the purpose of residence, it is permitted to carry within it on Shabbat regardless of its size, as it is considered a private domain.
נִזְרַע רוּבּוֹ – הֲרֵי הוּא כְּגִינָּה, וְאָסוּר; נִיטַּע רוּבּוֹ – הֲרֵי הוּא כְּחָצֵר, וּמוּתָּר.
If subsequently the greater part of it was sown with seed crops, it is considered like a garden, which is not a place of residence, and it is prohibited to carry anything within it on Shabbat. If the greater part of it was planted with trees, it is considered like a courtyard, which is a place of dwelling, and it is permitted to carry there on Shabbat. This shows that planting trees in an enclosure does not transform the area into a field, as is the case when seeds are planted.
וְאִם הָעִיר קָדְמָה – קוֹצֵץ וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דָּמִים וְכוּ׳. מַאי שְׁנָא גַּבֵּי בּוֹר, דְּקָתָנֵי – קוֹצֵץ וְנוֹתֵן דָּמִים; וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: קוֹצֵץ וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דָּמִים?
§ The mishna teaches: And if the city preceded the tree he cuts down the tree, and the city does not give money. The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a cistern, that the tanna of another mishna (25b) teaches that if one plants a tree next to a neighbor’s existing cistern, the owner of the tree cuts down the tree and the owner of the cistern gives money; and what is different here that the mishna teaches that the owner of the tree cuts down the tree and the city does not give money?
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: קִידְרָא דְּבֵי שׁוּתָּפֵי – לָא חַמִּימָא וְלָא קָרִירָא.
Rav Kahana said, citing a popular aphorism: A pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold, i.e., no one takes responsibility for an item that belongs to several people, as opposed to a single individual. Here too, there is no specific person who will pay for the tree.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הֶזֵּיקָא דְּרַבִּים מֵהֶזֵּיקָא דְּיָחִיד!
The Gemara asks: And what is the difficulty to begin with? Perhaps damage caused to public property is different from damage caused to the property of an individual. Consequently, when one’s tree causes damage to the public he is not compensated for having to cut it down, whereas he does receive payment when his tree damages a private cistern.
אֶלָּא אִי אִיתְּמַר דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, אַסֵּיפָא אִיתְּמַר – אִם הָאִילָן קָדַם, קוֹצֵץ וְנוֹתֵן דָּמִים. וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: הַבוּ לִי בְּרֵישָׁא דְּמֵי, וַהֲדַר אִיקּוֹץ! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: קִידְרָא דְּבֵי שׁוּתָּפֵי – לָא חַמִּימָא וְלָא קָרִירָא.
Rather, if Rav Kahana’s comment was stated in this context, it was stated about the latter clause: If the tree preceded the city, he cuts down the tree and the city gives money to its owner. Concerning this halakha one could ask: And let the tree owner say to the city residents: Give me money first and then I will cut down the tree. In this context, Rav Kahana said: A pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold. If the owner of the tree is entitled to wait until he had first collects money, a good deal of time would pass before the tree would be cut down. Therefore, a community need not collect money and pay immediately, unlike an individual.
סָפֵק זֶה קָדַם וְסָפֵק זֶה קָדַם – קוֹצֵץ וְאֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן דָּמִים. מַאי שְׁנָא מִבּוֹר, דְּאָמְרַתְּ: לֹא יָקוֹץ?
§ The mishna teaches that if it is uncertain whether this one was first or that one was first, he cuts down the tree and the city does not give money. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that of a tree alongside a cistern, concerning which you said in the mishna (25b) that in a case of uncertainty the owner of the tree need not cut down the tree?
הָתָם – דְּוַדַּאי לָאו לְמִיקַּץ קָאֵי, סְפֵיקוֹ נָמֵי לָא אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ ״קוֹץ״; הָכָא – דְּוַדַּאי לְמִיקַּץ קָאֵי, סְפֵיקוֹ נָמֵי אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ ״קוֹץ״. וְאִי מִשּׁוּם דְּמֵי – אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה וּשְׁקוֹל.
The Gemara answers: There, if it were a case of certainty the tree would not be subject to being cut down; therefore, in a case of uncertainty too, we do not say to the owner of the tree: Cut it down. In that case, if the tree preceded the cistern, the owner of the tree would not be required to cut it down. Here, if it were a case of certainty, the tree would be subject to being cut down even if it preceded the city, and the only uncertainty is whether or not the owner of the tree would need to be compensated. Consequently, in a case of uncertainty too, we say to the owner of the tree: Cut it down. And if the owner of the tree lodges a claim due to the value of the tree, as he wants compensation for it, we say to him: Bring proof that your tree came first, and take your money. Since he has no proof, he does not receive any money.
מַתְנִי׳ מַרְחִיקִין אֶת גּוֹרֶן קָבוּעַ מִן הָעִיר חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה. לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם גּוֹרֶן קָבוּעַ בְּתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יֵשׁ לוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה לְכׇל רוּחַ; וּמַרְחִיק מִנְּטִיעוֹתָיו שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ וּמִנִּירוֹ, בִּכְדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יַזִּיק.
MISHNA: One must distance a permanent threshing floor fifty cubits from the city, so that the chaff will not harm the city’s residents. Furthermore, a person should not establish a permanent threshing floor even on his own property unless he has fifty cubits of open space in every direction. And one must distance a threshing floor from the plantings of another and from another’s plowed field far enough that it does not cause damage.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: סֵיפָא אֲתָאן לְגוֹרֶן שֶׁאֵינוֹ קָבוּעַ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the mishna, which states a fixed measurement for the distance of a threshing floor from a city, and what is different in the latter clause, which does not provide a measurement but simply states in general terms: Enough that it does not cause damage? Abaye said: In the latter clause we arrive at the case of a threshing floor that is not permanent. This threshing floor must be far enough from a neighbor that it does not cause damage to his property.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי גּוֹרֶן שֶׁאֵינוֹ קָבוּעַ? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹרֶה בְּרַחַת.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a threshing floor that is not permanent? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It refers to any threshing floor where one processes such a small quantity of grain that he does not winnow with a winnowing shovel, but employs some other method that does not scatter the chaff as far. This is one resolution of the contradiction.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מַה טַּעַם קָאָמַר – מַאי טַעְמָא מַרְחִיקִין גּוֹרֶן קָבוּעַ מִן הָעִיר חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה? כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יַזִּיק.
Rav Ashi said that the phrase: Enough that it does not cause damage, is not referring to a distance but provides an explanation. In other words, the tanna is saying: What is the reason for the ruling of the first clause, as follows: What is the reason that one must distance a permanent threshing floor fifty cubits from the city? It must be far enough away that it does not cause damage.
מֵיתִיבִי: מַרְחִיקִין גּוֹרֶן קָבוּעַ מִן הָעִיר, חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה. וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמַּרְחִיקִין מִן הָעִיר חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה, כָּךְ מַרְחִיקִין מִדִּלּוּעָיו, וּמִקִּשּׁוּאָיו, וּמִנְּטִיעוֹתָיו, וּמִנִּירוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יַזִּיק. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי – נִיחָא, אֶלָּא לְאַבָּיֵי קַשְׁיָא! קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Abaye from a baraita: One must distance a permanent threshing floor fifty cubits from the city; and just as one distances it fifty cubits from the city, so too does one distance it fifty cubits from the gourds, cucumbers, plantings, and plowed field of another, enough that it does not cause damage. Granted, this works out well according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, as he claims that in both clauses the same distance is required: One must move a threshing floor fifty cubits from a plowed field and from those plantings. But according to the explanation of Abaye, it is difficult. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult.
בִּשְׁלָמָא מִמִּקְשׁוֹאָיו וּמִדְּלוֹעָיו – דְּאָזֵיל אַבְקָא וְאָתֵי בְּלִיבֵּיהּ, וּמְצַוֵּי לֵיהּ; אֶלָּא מִנִּירוֹ – אַמַּאי? אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר זַבְדָּא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר זוּטְרָא: מִפְּנֵי
The Gemara asks with regard to the baraita: Granted, one must distance his threshing floor from his neighbor’s cucumbers and gourds, as the chaff from the threshing floor goes and penetrates into the heart of the flower and dries it out. But why must one distance the threshing floor from another’s plowed field? Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said, and some say it was Rabbi Abba bar Zutra: It is because
