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Today's Daf Yomi

March 9, 2017 | 讬状讗 讘讗讚专 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Batra 46

Raba’s opinion – that a worker (like a launderer) can claim that a contested item in his possession is his own if it was not given to him in the presence of witnesses – is disproved from our mishna. If one gets the wrong item back from the worker, can one use it? 聽What if one takes the wrong jacket after a party? 聽A sharecropper cannot have a chazaka聽on land even if he received the full produce for 3 years. 聽This case is limited to a sharecroper who has worked on the field for years. 聽Other cases 聽specific sharecroppers聽and whether or not they can create a chazaka are brought.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 讗讜诪谉 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讬讙讜 讚讗讬 讘注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇拽讜讞讛 讛讬讗 讘讬讚讬 诪讛讬诪谉 谞诪讬 讗讗讙专讬讛

Rather, is it not referring to a case where there are no witnesses to the transfer, and it teaches that the craftsman is deemed credible? Since if he had wanted to he could have said to him: It is purchased and that is why it is in my possession, he is deemed credible with regard to his claim about his fee as well. This supports the ruling of Rabba that if there are no witnesses, the craftsman is deemed credible if he says that the item belongs to him.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜讛讜讗 讚诇讗 专讗讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually, perhaps the baraita is referring to a case where there are no witnesses to the transfer, but it is specifically referring to a case where the owner did not see the cloak in the possession of the craftsman, who could consequently deny ever having received it from the owner. Therefore, it is not a proof in support of the ruling of Rabba that the craftsman would be deemed credible even if there are witnesses that it is currently in his possession.

诪转讬讘 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗讜诪谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗讜诪谉 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讛讗 讗讞专 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k raises an objection to Rabba鈥檚 ruling from Shmuel鈥檚 paraphrase of the mishna: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership of property in his possession. This indicates that it is specifically a craftsman who does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, but another person in similar circumstances has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讗讞专 讗诪讗讬 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 讗讜诪谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗

What are the circumstances in which this would apply? If it is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the person in question received the item from another, why is it that another person has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, when there are witnesses that he received this item as a deposit? Rather, is it not referring to a case where there are no witnesses, and yet, the mishna teaches: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. This indicates that a craftsman does not establish the presumption of ownership under any circumstances, contrary to the ruling of Rabba. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation, and his ruling is rejected.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 谞转讞诇驻讜 诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讘讻诇讬诐 讘讘讬转 讛讗讜诪谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讛诇讛 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 砖诇讜 讘讘讬转 讛讗讘诇 讗讜 讘讘讬转 讛诪砖转讛 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讛诇讛 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 砖诇讜 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗

搂 The Gemara discusses another halakha pertaining to the giving of an item to a craftsman. The Sages taught: If one鈥檚 utensils were mistakenly switched with another鈥檚 utensils in the house of a craftsman, this one who received the wrong utensils may use them until the time when that one, whose utensils he received, comes and takes his. But if his utensils and another鈥檚 utensils were mistakenly switched in a house of mourning or in a house of a wedding feast, this one who took the wrong utensils may not use them in the interim, i.e., until the time when that one, whose utensils he took, comes and takes his. The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause where he may use the utensils, and what is different in the latter clause where he may not?

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜讛 讬转讬讘谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚讞讘讬讘讬 讜讗诪专 诇讬 讜讻讬 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 注砖讜讬 诇讜诪专 诇讗讜诪谉 诪讻讜专 诇讬 讟诇讬转讬

Rav said: I was sitting before my uncle, Rav 岣yya, and he said the explanation to me: And is a person not likely to say to the craftsman: Sell my cloak for me after you finish repairing it? It is possible that the craftsman mistakenly sold the utensils of another client instead, and gave to that other client the utensils that should have been sold. Since the owner of these utensils received the money from the sale of the other client鈥檚 utensils, the craftsman has a right to give the remaining utensils to the other client in the interim. This reasoning does not apply in the case of the house of mourning or a wedding feast, where one simply took utensils belonging to another.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诇讗 讜讛讜讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟诇讬转 住转诐 讗讘诇 讟诇讬转讱 诇讗 讛讗讬 诇讗讜 讟诇讬转 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗

Rav 岣yya, son of Rav Na岣an, said: They taught that it is permitted to use the utensils only if the craftsman himself gave them to his customer, as in that case, the above reasoning applies. But if the craftsman鈥檚 wife or children gave them to him, the customer may not use the utensils, as it is likely that they were given to him in error. And even if the craftsman himself gave the utensils to his customer, we said that it is permitted for him to use them only in a case where the craftsman said to him, for example: I am returning a cloak, without specification. But if the craftsman said to him: I am returning your cloak, then he may not use it, as this is not his cloak, and clearly it was given to him in error.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讗 转讗 讗讞讜讬 诇讱 专诪讗讬 讚驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讘 诇讬 住专讘诇讗讬 诇讗 讛讬讜 讚讘专讬诐 诪注讜诇诐 讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬 住讛讚讬 讚讞讝讬讜讛 讙讘讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讛 讗驻拽讬谞讬讛 讜谞讞讝讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讘专讗 诇讗 诪驻讬拽谞讗 诇讬讛

搂 The Gemara presents another statement with regard to craftsmen. Abaye said to Rava: Come and I will show you what the swindlers of Pumbedita do. There was a case where the owner of an item said to a craftsman: Give me back my cloak [sarbelai] that I gave you to repair, and the craftsman replied: These matters never occurred. The owner responded: But I have witnesses who saw it in your possession. The craftsman said to the owner: That was a different cloak that they saw. The witnesses are uncertain as to whether it was really his cloak. The owner then said: Bring it out and we will see it, so as to determine whose it is. The craftsman said to the owner: In truth, I will not bring it out, as you have no valid claim to the cloak and I am not willing to show you another鈥檚 property. This is the trickery to which Abaye referred, as it is not a sincere response, and the craftsman merely wishes to keep the cloak.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rava said to Abaye: The craftsman is saying well to the owner, and his claim will be accepted,

专讗讛 转谞讬讗

as it is taught in the earlier baraita that the owner has a valid claim only when he, and witnesses, saw his cloak in the possession of the launderer and can definitively identify it. He cannot state a claim based on the mere possibility that it is his. This validates the claim of the craftsmen of Pumbedita.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗讬 讞讻讬诐 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛 专讗讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪讗讬 转驻讬住转 诇讬讛 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转 诇讱 讙讘讗讬 讛砖转讗 讗驻拽讬谞讛讜 讜砖讬诪讬谞讛讜 砖拽讜诇 讗转 讚讬讚讱 讜讗砖拽讜诇 讗谞讗 讚讬讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讻谞讗 诇砖讜诪讗 讚讬讚讱 讻讘专 砖诪讜讛 拽诪讗讬 讚拽诪讱

Rav Ashi said: And if the owner is clever, he will render the situation into one of his having seen his cloak, as the owner can say to the craftsman: Why are you holding it? Is it not due to the fact that there is money of yours with me, and you are using the cloak as a means of collecting the debt that I owe you? Now bring out my cloak before the appraisers and they will appraise its value, and then you take what is rightfully yours, and I will take what is rightfully mine. When the craftsman presents the cloak, the ruling will change, as the owner will have seen the cloak. Rav A岣, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: If the craftsman is clever, he can say to the owner: I do not need your appraisal, as the earlier ones who preceded you already appraised it and determined that its value does not exceed that of your debt to me.

讗专讬住 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗诪讗讬 注讚 讛讗讬讚谞讗 驻诇讙讗 讜讛砖转讗 讻讜诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讗专讬住讬 讘转讬 讗讘讜转

搂 The Gemara discusses a ruling that it paraphrases from the mishna: A sharecropper does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership of property in his possession. Why not? Isn鈥檛 it so that until that time, while he was definitely working as a sharecropper, he consumed only half of the produce of the land, and now, for the past three years, he consumed all of its produce? He should be able to establish the presumption of ownership by consuming more produce than a sharecropper does. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to family sharecroppers. This type of sharecropper, who works for a family for many years, gathers all of the produce into his property, and then returns the landowner鈥檚 share. Therefore, his collecting all of the produce into his property does not establish the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗专讬住 砖讛讜专讬讚 讗专讬住讬谉 转讞转讬讜 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞砖 讚谞讞转讬 讗专讬住讬 诇讗专注讬讛 讜砖转讬拽

Rav Na岣an says: A sharecropper who installed other sharecroppers in his place has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. What is the reason? It is that it is not common for a person to see that unknown sharecroppers have been installed in his land and remain silent. If the prior owner did not lodge a protest, it indicates that the sharecropper is the owner of the land.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗专讬住 砖讞诇拽 诇讗专讬住讬谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讬诪讜专 讛专诪谞讬讗 讘注诇诪讗 砖讜讬讜讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: A sharecropper who divided among different sharecroppers does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership by that act. What is the reason? It is that one can say that the landowner merely appointed him as an administrator [harmanya], and there is no indication that he is acting as an owner.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬注拽讘 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 讗专讬住 诪注讬讚 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讚 讛讜讛 讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 拽诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗专讬住 诪注讬讚 讜讛转谞讬讗 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讚

The Gemara relates: Rav Na岣an bar Rav 岣sda sent this message to Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov: Our teacher, instruct us. Can a sharecropper testify with regard to the ownership of a field of which he is a sharecropper, or can he not testify, as he is biased in his testimony? Rav Yosef was sitting before Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov and said to him: This is what Shmuel said: A sharecropper can testify. Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov said to him: But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that a sharecropper cannot testify?

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗讬讻讗 驻讬专讗 讘讗专注讗 讜讛讗 讚诇讬讻讗 驻讬专讗 讘讗专注讗

Rav Yosef answered: It is not difficult. This baraita, which states that he cannot testify, is referring to a case where there is produce on the land. Therefore, he is biased in his testimony, as, if the current owner will lose possession of the land, the sharecropper will lose his right to consume the produce. And that statement of Shmuel that he can testify is referring to a case where there is no produce on the land, and he is not biased in his testimony.

(注诪诇拽 住讬诪谉)

搂 The Gemara presents the word Amalek as a mnemonic for the cases discussed in the baraita. It stands for: Ayin, guarantor [arev]; mem, creditor [malve]; lamed, buyer [loke鈥檃岣]; kuf, unconditional guarantor [kablan].

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 注专讘 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜讛 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪诇讜讛 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜讛 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬

The Sages taught: A guarantor can testify for the benefit of the debtor that the latter owns a particular parcel of land, but that is the halakha only if the debtor has other land from which the creditor can collect the debt. Otherwise, he is biased in his testimony, as the creditor could collect from him if the debtor were to lose ownership of this land. A creditor can testify for the benefit of the debtor that the latter owns a particular parcel of land, but that is the halakha only if the debtor has other land from which the creditor can collect. Otherwise, he is biased in his testimony, as this land is the only land available for collection.

诇讜拽讞 专讗砖讜谉 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜拽讞 砖谞讬 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬

Similarly, if two people purchase land from one seller, the first buyer can testify for the benefit of the second buyer if someone else were to claim that the land was his, but that is the halakha only if the second buyer has other land that he purchased from the same seller either concurrent with or subsequent to the first buyer鈥檚 purchase of the land in question. A creditor of the seller can collect a debt from the land that the seller sold most recently. Therefore, if the second buyer purchased only the land in question from the seller, the first buyer is biased in his testimony, as the second buyer鈥檚 ownership of the land prevents the creditor from collecting a debt from the land from the first buyer.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Batra 46

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Batra 46

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 讗讜诪谉 诪讛讬诪谉 诪讬讙讜 讚讗讬 讘注讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇拽讜讞讛 讛讬讗 讘讬讚讬 诪讛讬诪谉 谞诪讬 讗讗讙专讬讛

Rather, is it not referring to a case where there are no witnesses to the transfer, and it teaches that the craftsman is deemed credible? Since if he had wanted to he could have said to him: It is purchased and that is why it is in my possession, he is deemed credible with regard to his claim about his fee as well. This supports the ruling of Rabba that if there are no witnesses, the craftsman is deemed credible if he says that the item belongs to him.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜讛讜讗 讚诇讗 专讗讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually, perhaps the baraita is referring to a case where there are no witnesses to the transfer, but it is specifically referring to a case where the owner did not see the cloak in the possession of the craftsman, who could consequently deny ever having received it from the owner. Therefore, it is not a proof in support of the ruling of Rabba that the craftsman would be deemed credible even if there are witnesses that it is currently in his possession.

诪转讬讘 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讗讜诪谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗讜诪谉 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讛讗 讗讞专 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k raises an objection to Rabba鈥檚 ruling from Shmuel鈥檚 paraphrase of the mishna: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership of property in his possession. This indicates that it is specifically a craftsman who does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, but another person in similar circumstances has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讗讞专 讗诪讗讬 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 讜拽转谞讬 讗讜诪谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘讛 转讬讜讘转讗

What are the circumstances in which this would apply? If it is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the person in question received the item from another, why is it that another person has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, when there are witnesses that he received this item as a deposit? Rather, is it not referring to a case where there are no witnesses, and yet, the mishna teaches: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. This indicates that a craftsman does not establish the presumption of ownership under any circumstances, contrary to the ruling of Rabba. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation, and his ruling is rejected.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 谞转讞诇驻讜 诇讜 讻诇讬诐 讘讻诇讬诐 讘讘讬转 讛讗讜诪谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讛诇讛 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 砖诇讜 讘讘讬转 讛讗讘诇 讗讜 讘讘讬转 讛诪砖转讛 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 讬砖转诪砖 讘讛谉 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讛诇讛 讜讬讟讜诇 讗转 砖诇讜 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗

搂 The Gemara discusses another halakha pertaining to the giving of an item to a craftsman. The Sages taught: If one鈥檚 utensils were mistakenly switched with another鈥檚 utensils in the house of a craftsman, this one who received the wrong utensils may use them until the time when that one, whose utensils he received, comes and takes his. But if his utensils and another鈥檚 utensils were mistakenly switched in a house of mourning or in a house of a wedding feast, this one who took the wrong utensils may not use them in the interim, i.e., until the time when that one, whose utensils he took, comes and takes his. The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause where he may use the utensils, and what is different in the latter clause where he may not?

讗诪专 专讘 讛讜讛 讬转讬讘谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚讞讘讬讘讬 讜讗诪专 诇讬 讜讻讬 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 注砖讜讬 诇讜诪专 诇讗讜诪谉 诪讻讜专 诇讬 讟诇讬转讬

Rav said: I was sitting before my uncle, Rav 岣yya, and he said the explanation to me: And is a person not likely to say to the craftsman: Sell my cloak for me after you finish repairing it? It is possible that the craftsman mistakenly sold the utensils of another client instead, and gave to that other client the utensils that should have been sold. Since the owner of these utensils received the money from the sale of the other client鈥檚 utensils, the craftsman has a right to give the remaining utensils to the other client in the interim. This reasoning does not apply in the case of the house of mourning or a wedding feast, where one simply took utensils belonging to another.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诇讗 讜讛讜讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讗诪专谉 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讟诇讬转 住转诐 讗讘诇 讟诇讬转讱 诇讗 讛讗讬 诇讗讜 讟诇讬转 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗

Rav 岣yya, son of Rav Na岣an, said: They taught that it is permitted to use the utensils only if the craftsman himself gave them to his customer, as in that case, the above reasoning applies. But if the craftsman鈥檚 wife or children gave them to him, the customer may not use the utensils, as it is likely that they were given to him in error. And even if the craftsman himself gave the utensils to his customer, we said that it is permitted for him to use them only in a case where the craftsman said to him, for example: I am returning a cloak, without specification. But if the craftsman said to him: I am returning your cloak, then he may not use it, as this is not his cloak, and clearly it was given to him in error.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘讗 转讗 讗讞讜讬 诇讱 专诪讗讬 讚驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 诪讗讬 注讘讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讘 诇讬 住专讘诇讗讬 诇讗 讛讬讜 讚讘专讬诐 诪注讜诇诐 讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬 住讛讚讬 讚讞讝讬讜讛 讙讘讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讛 讗驻拽讬谞讬讛 讜谞讞讝讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讘专讗 诇讗 诪驻讬拽谞讗 诇讬讛

搂 The Gemara presents another statement with regard to craftsmen. Abaye said to Rava: Come and I will show you what the swindlers of Pumbedita do. There was a case where the owner of an item said to a craftsman: Give me back my cloak [sarbelai] that I gave you to repair, and the craftsman replied: These matters never occurred. The owner responded: But I have witnesses who saw it in your possession. The craftsman said to the owner: That was a different cloak that they saw. The witnesses are uncertain as to whether it was really his cloak. The owner then said: Bring it out and we will see it, so as to determine whose it is. The craftsman said to the owner: In truth, I will not bring it out, as you have no valid claim to the cloak and I am not willing to show you another鈥檚 property. This is the trickery to which Abaye referred, as it is not a sincere response, and the craftsman merely wishes to keep the cloak.

讗诪专 专讘讗 砖驻讬专 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛

Rava said to Abaye: The craftsman is saying well to the owner, and his claim will be accepted,

专讗讛 转谞讬讗

as it is taught in the earlier baraita that the owner has a valid claim only when he, and witnesses, saw his cloak in the possession of the launderer and can definitively identify it. He cannot state a claim based on the mere possibility that it is his. This validates the claim of the craftsmen of Pumbedita.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜讗讬 讞讻讬诐 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛 专讗讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪讗讬 转驻讬住转 诇讬讛 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转 诇讱 讙讘讗讬 讛砖转讗 讗驻拽讬谞讛讜 讜砖讬诪讬谞讛讜 砖拽讜诇 讗转 讚讬讚讱 讜讗砖拽讜诇 讗谞讗 讚讬讚讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讻谞讗 诇砖讜诪讗 讚讬讚讱 讻讘专 砖诪讜讛 拽诪讗讬 讚拽诪讱

Rav Ashi said: And if the owner is clever, he will render the situation into one of his having seen his cloak, as the owner can say to the craftsman: Why are you holding it? Is it not due to the fact that there is money of yours with me, and you are using the cloak as a means of collecting the debt that I owe you? Now bring out my cloak before the appraisers and they will appraise its value, and then you take what is rightfully yours, and I will take what is rightfully mine. When the craftsman presents the cloak, the ruling will change, as the owner will have seen the cloak. Rav A岣, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: If the craftsman is clever, he can say to the owner: I do not need your appraisal, as the earlier ones who preceded you already appraised it and determined that its value does not exceed that of your debt to me.

讗专讬住 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 讗诪讗讬 注讚 讛讗讬讚谞讗 驻诇讙讗 讜讛砖转讗 讻讜诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘讗专讬住讬 讘转讬 讗讘讜转

搂 The Gemara discusses a ruling that it paraphrases from the mishna: A sharecropper does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership of property in his possession. Why not? Isn鈥檛 it so that until that time, while he was definitely working as a sharecropper, he consumed only half of the produce of the land, and now, for the past three years, he consumed all of its produce? He should be able to establish the presumption of ownership by consuming more produce than a sharecropper does. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to family sharecroppers. This type of sharecropper, who works for a family for many years, gathers all of the produce into his property, and then returns the landowner鈥檚 share. Therefore, his collecting all of the produce into his property does not establish the presumption of ownership.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗专讬住 砖讛讜专讬讚 讗专讬住讬谉 转讞转讬讜 讬砖 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞砖 讚谞讞转讬 讗专讬住讬 诇讗专注讬讛 讜砖转讬拽

Rav Na岣an says: A sharecropper who installed other sharecroppers in his place has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. What is the reason? It is that it is not common for a person to see that unknown sharecroppers have been installed in his land and remain silent. If the prior owner did not lodge a protest, it indicates that the sharecropper is the owner of the land.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗专讬住 砖讞诇拽 诇讗专讬住讬谉 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讝拽讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗讬诪讜专 讛专诪谞讬讗 讘注诇诪讗 砖讜讬讜讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan says: A sharecropper who divided among different sharecroppers does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership by that act. What is the reason? It is that one can say that the landowner merely appointed him as an administrator [harmanya], and there is no indication that he is acting as an owner.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬注拽讘 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 讗专讬住 诪注讬讚 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讚 讛讜讛 讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 拽诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗专讬住 诪注讬讚 讜讛转谞讬讗 讗讬谞讜 诪注讬讚

The Gemara relates: Rav Na岣an bar Rav 岣sda sent this message to Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov: Our teacher, instruct us. Can a sharecropper testify with regard to the ownership of a field of which he is a sharecropper, or can he not testify, as he is biased in his testimony? Rav Yosef was sitting before Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov and said to him: This is what Shmuel said: A sharecropper can testify. Rav Na岣an bar Yaakov said to him: But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that a sharecropper cannot testify?

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗讬讻讗 驻讬专讗 讘讗专注讗 讜讛讗 讚诇讬讻讗 驻讬专讗 讘讗专注讗

Rav Yosef answered: It is not difficult. This baraita, which states that he cannot testify, is referring to a case where there is produce on the land. Therefore, he is biased in his testimony, as, if the current owner will lose possession of the land, the sharecropper will lose his right to consume the produce. And that statement of Shmuel that he can testify is referring to a case where there is no produce on the land, and he is not biased in his testimony.

(注诪诇拽 住讬诪谉)

搂 The Gemara presents the word Amalek as a mnemonic for the cases discussed in the baraita. It stands for: Ayin, guarantor [arev]; mem, creditor [malve]; lamed, buyer [loke鈥檃岣]; kuf, unconditional guarantor [kablan].

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 注专讘 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜讛 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪诇讜讛 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜讛 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬

The Sages taught: A guarantor can testify for the benefit of the debtor that the latter owns a particular parcel of land, but that is the halakha only if the debtor has other land from which the creditor can collect the debt. Otherwise, he is biased in his testimony, as the creditor could collect from him if the debtor were to lose ownership of this land. A creditor can testify for the benefit of the debtor that the latter owns a particular parcel of land, but that is the halakha only if the debtor has other land from which the creditor can collect. Otherwise, he is biased in his testimony, as this land is the only land available for collection.

诇讜拽讞 专讗砖讜谉 诪注讬讚 诇诇讜拽讞 砖谞讬 讜讛讜讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬

Similarly, if two people purchase land from one seller, the first buyer can testify for the benefit of the second buyer if someone else were to claim that the land was his, but that is the halakha only if the second buyer has other land that he purchased from the same seller either concurrent with or subsequent to the first buyer鈥檚 purchase of the land in question. A creditor of the seller can collect a debt from the land that the seller sold most recently. Therefore, if the second buyer purchased only the land in question from the seller, the first buyer is biased in his testimony, as the second buyer鈥檚 ownership of the land prevents the creditor from collecting a debt from the land from the first buyer.

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