Bava Batra 87
וְלַגּוֹרֶן יָפֶה סֶלַע – אָסוּר לֵהָנוֹת הֵימֶנּוּ. אֲבָל אִם שְׂכָרוֹ מֵהַיּוֹם בְּדִינָר לְיוֹם, וְלַגּוֹרֶן יָפֶה סֶלַע – מוּתָּר.
and a day of a laborer’s work during the harvest is worth a sela, the equivalent of four silver dinars, for each day, it is prohibited to derive benefit from him, i.e., one may not employ the laborer under these conditions. The reason is that this is akin to taking interest, as the laborer works and receives less than he is entitled to in exchange for early payment. But if one hires him already from now to work for one dinar a day for an extended period of time, including the harvest season, and the work of a laborer during the harvest is worth a sela, this is permitted.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ ״כּוֹר בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים, סְאָה בְּסֶלַע אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לָךְ״ – רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן קָנָה; הָכָא נָמֵי – קַמָּא קַמָּא מִיפְסָק פְּסַק, וְאָסוּר לֵהָנוֹת הֵימֶנּוּ; מִדִּינָר לְיוֹם וְלַגּוֹרֶן יָפֶה סֶלַע – מוּתָּר?! אַמַּאי? וְהָא אֲגַר ״נְטַר לִי״ הוּא!
And if it enters your mind, as Rav and Shmuel claim, that if a seller said: I am selling you one kor for thirty sela, each se’a for one sela, he cannot fully renege on the sale in the middle of the transaction, as the buyer acquires each se’a one by one as it is measured, then the halakha in this case should be different. Here too, as he does not agree to one large sum but fixes a price for each day, one by one, it is akin to taking interest, as the laborer works and receives less than he is entitled to in exchange for early payment. And therefore, it should be prohibited to derive benefit from him. Whereas the baraita states: If one hires him from now to work for one dinar a day over an extended period of time, including the harvest, and one day of a laborer’s work during the harvest is worth one sela, this is permitted. Why is it permitted? But isn’t it payment for waiting, i.e., for advancing the money to the laborer?
אָמַר רָבָא: וְתִסְבְּרָא?! זַלְזוֹלֵי בִּשְׂכִירוּת מִי אֲסִיר?! מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא?
Rava said: And how can you understand the baraita in that manner? Is it prohibited for one to lower his hiring price and receive lower wages in order to ensure that he is employed? This arrangement is not a form of interest and violates no prohibition. The Gemara asks: If this is not considered taking interest, then what is different in the first clause, where the laborer is not employed immediately and this arrangement is prohibited, and what is different in the latter clause, where it is permitted?
רֵישָׁא דְּלָא קָא עָבֵיד בַּהֲדֵיהּ מֵהַשְׁתָּא, מִיחֲזֵי כִּי אֲגַר ״נְטַר לִי״; סֵיפָא דְּקָא עָבֵיד בַּהֲדֵיהּ מֵהַשְׁתָּא, לָא מִיחֲזֵי כִּי אֲגַר ״נְטַר לִי״.
The Gemara explains: In the first clause, as the laborer does not work with him from now, it has the appearance of payment for waiting, i.e., advancing the money to the laborer. In the latter clause, as the laborer works with him from now, it does not have the appearance of payment for waiting.
וְאִם הָיָה מְחוּבָּר בְּקַרְקַע, וְתָלַשׁ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – קָנָה. מִשּׁוּם דְּתָלַשׁ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – קָנָה?! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לֵךְ, יַפֵּה לְךָ קַרְקַע כׇּל שֶׁהוּא, וְקָנֵי כֹּל מַה שֶּׁעָלֶיהָ.
§ The mishna teaches: And if the flax was attached to the ground and he detached any amount, he has acquired it. The Gemara asks: Is it correct to say that due to the fact that he detached any amount, he acquired it? If he does not perform an act of acquisition with all of the flax, how can he acquire all of it? Rav Sheshet said: Here we are dealing with a case where the seller said to him: Go and clear for yourself any amount of land, and thereby acquire everything that is on it. When the buyer clears the land by detaching the flax from the ground, he is considered to be renting the land and thereby acquires all the flax that grows on it.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר יַיִן וָשֶׁמֶן לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְהוּקְרוּ אוֹ שֶׁהוּזְלוּ, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְמַלֵּאת הַמִּדָּה – לַמּוֹכֵר. מִשֶּׁנִּתְמַלֵּאת הַמִּדָּה – לַלּוֹקֵחַ. וְאִם הָיָה סַרְסוּר בֵּינֵיהֶן, נִשְׁבְּרָה הֶחָבִית – נִשְׁבְּרָה לַסַּרְסוּר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who sells food or drink that has an established price, such as wine and oil, to another, and the price rises or falls and the buyer or the seller wishes to renege on the sale, if the price changed before the measuring vessel is filled, the merchandise still belongs to the seller and he can cancel the sale. Once the measuring vessel is filled the merchandise belongs to the buyer, and the seller can no longer cancel the sale. And if there was a middleman [sarsur] between them and the barrel belonging to the middleman, being used to measure the merchandise, broke during the transaction and the merchandise is ruined, it broke for the middleman, i.e., he is responsible for the ruined merchandise.
וְחַיָּיב לְהַטִּיף לוֹ שָׁלֹשׁ טִיפִּין. הִרְכִּינָהּ וּמִיצֵּית – הֲרֵי הוּא שֶׁל מוֹכֵר. וְהַחֶנְווֹנִי – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לְהַטִּיף שָׁלֹשׁ טִיפִּין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת עִם חֲשֵׁכָה – פָּטוּר.
The mishna teaches an additional halakha with regard to sales: And anyone who sells wine, oil, or similar liquids is obligated, after he transfers the liquid into the buyer’s vessel, to drip for him three extra drops from the measure. After he drips those three drops, if he turned the barrel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid that it contained, this belongs to the seller and he is not required to give these last drops to the buyer. And a storekeeper is not obligated to drip three drops, because he is too busy to do this constantly. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sale occurs on Shabbat eve as nightfall arrives, one is exempt from dripping these three drops, as there is a need to complete the transaction before Shabbat begins.
גְּמָ׳ הָא מִדָּה, דְּמַאן? אִילֵּימָא מִדָּה דְלוֹקֵחַ, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְמַלֵּאת מִדָּה – לַמּוֹכֵר?! מִדָּה דְלוֹקֵחַ הִיא! וְאֶלָּא מִדָּה דְמוֹכֵר? מִשֶּׁנִּתְמַלֵּאת מִדָּה – לַלּוֹקֵחַ?! מִדָּה דְמוֹכֵר הִיא!
GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies the mishna’s statement that the sale occurs once the measuring vessel is filled. This measuring vessel, to whom does it belong? If we say that the measuring vessel belongs to the buyer, why does the mishna teach that before the measuring vessel is filled the merchandise still belongs to the seller? Since it is the measuring vessel of the buyer, he should acquire everything that is placed in his vessel, whether or not it is filled. But if we say that the measuring vessel belongs to the seller, why does the mishna teach that once the measuring vessel is filled the merchandise belongs to the buyer? Since it is the measuring vessel of the seller, the merchandise has yet to enter the possession of the buyer.
אָמַר רַבִּי אִלְעָא: בְּמִדַּת סַרְסוּר. וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם הָיָה סַרְסוּר בֵּינֵיהֶם, נִשְׁבְּרָה הֶחָבִית – נִשְׁבְּרָה לַסַּרְסוּר; מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא לָאו בְּסַרְסוּר עָסְקִינַן! רֵישָׁא – מִדָּה בְּלֹא סַרְסוּר, סֵיפָא – בְּסַרְסוּר עַצְמוֹ.
Rabbi Ela says: The mishna is referring to a case where the measuring vessel belongs to the middleman. The middleman lends it to the seller, and once it is filled it is loaned to the buyer so that he can transfer its contents into his vessels. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: And if there was a middleman between them and the barrel broke, it broke for the middleman, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are not dealing with a middleman. The Gemara answers: The first clause addresses a measuring vessel belonging to a middleman without the presence of the middleman at the transaction, whereas the latter clause is concerned with a middleman himself, who is present at the sale and therefore accepts responsibility for the barrel and its contents.
הִרְכִּינָהּ וּמִיצֵּית – הֲרֵי הוּא שֶׁל מוֹכֵר. כִּי סָלֵיק רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לִזְעֵירִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי כָּאן תַּנָּא דְּאַתְנְיֵיהּ רַב מִדּוֹת? אַחַוְיֵיהּ רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי. אָמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ? דִּתְנַן: הִרְכִּינָהּ וּמִיצִּיתָ – הֲרֵי הוּא שֶׁל מוֹכֵר,
§ The mishna teaches that if he turned the barrel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid within it, this liquid belongs to the seller. The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Elazar ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he found Ze’eiri and said to him: Who here is the tanna to whom Rav taught this halakha with regard to measures? Ze’eiri showed him Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to Rabbi Elazar: What is it about this halakha that poses a difficulty for you? Rabbi Elazar said to him that the problem is that we learned in the mishna: If he turned the barrel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid within it, that liquid belongs to the seller.
וְהָתְנַן, הִרְכִּינָהּ וּמִיצָּהּ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּרוּמָה!
But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Terumot 11:8): If one poured oil or wine of teruma from one vessel to another and turned the vessel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid inside, this is teruma and must be given to the priest? This indicates that the last remnants of the liquid in the vessel belong to the one who receives the oil or wine, not the owner, i.e., the seller. Why, then, does the mishna here teach that the last remnants belong to the seller?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: מִשּׁוּם יֵאוּשׁ בְּעָלִים נָגְעוּ בָּהּ.
Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to Rabbi Elazar: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabbi Abbahu says: Due to of the despair of the owner, who relinquishes his right to such a small amount of wine or oil, the Sages touched upon it and ruled that any remnants extracted from the vessel belong to the seller? By contrast, with regard to teruma, which is forbidden to non-priests, the despair of the buyer is irrelevant, and therefore anything that remains in the vessels is teruma.
וְהַחֶנְווֹנִי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לְהַטִּיף וְכוּ׳. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי, וּלְקוּלָּא; אוֹ דִלְמָא אַסֵּיפָא קָאֵי, וּלְחוּמְרָא?
§ The mishna teaches: And a storekeeper is not obligated to drip three drops. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sale occurs on Shabbat eve as nightfall arrives, one is exempt from dripping these three drops. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause of the mishna, and if so his ruling is lenient, as the mishna states that one must drip three drops and he states that on Shabbat eve one is exempt from doing so? Or perhaps he is referring to the latter clause and is stringent, as the mishna teaches that a storekeeper is always exempt, whereas Rabbi Yehuda rules that this is the halakha only on Shabbat eve?
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת עִם חֲשֵׁכָה – חֶנְווֹנִי פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחֶנְווֹנִי טָרוּד.
The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat eve at nightfall a storekeeper is exempt because the storekeeper is busy. This proves that Rabbi Yehuda was referring to the latter clause of the mishna, i.e., he exempts the storekeeper from dripping the drops only on Shabbat eve.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ אֶת בְּנוֹ אֵצֶל חֶנְווֹנִי וּפוֹנְדְּיוֹן בְּיָדוֹ, וּמָדַד לוֹ בְּאִיסָּר שֶׁמֶן וְנָתַן לוֹ אֶת הָאִיסָּר; שָׁבַר אֶת הַצְּלוֹחִית וְאִבֵּד אֶת הָאִיסָּר – חֶנְווֹנִי חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹטֵר, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן שְׁלָחוֹ. וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַצְּלוֹחִית בְּיַד הַתִּינוֹק וּמָדַד חֶנְווֹנִי לְתוֹכָהּ – שֶׁחֶנְווֹנִי פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who sends his son to a storekeeper with a pundeyon, a coin worth two issar, in his hand, and the storekeeper measured oil for him for one issar and gave him the second issar as change, and the son broke the jug and lost the issar, the storekeeper must compensate the father, as he gave the jug and coin to one who is not halakhically competent. Rabbi Yehuda exempts him from liability, as he holds that the father sent his son in order to do this, i.e., to bring back the jug and coin. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a case when the jug is in the hand of the child and the storekeeper measured the oil into it that the storekeeper is exempt if the child breaks the jug.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּאִיסָּר וָשֶׁמֶן, בְּהָא פְּלִיגִי – דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לְאוֹדוֹעֵי שַׁדְּרֵיהּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: לְשַׁדּוֹרֵי לֵיהּ שַׁדְּרֵיהּ; אֶלָּא שָׁבַר צְלוֹחִית – אֲבֵדָה מִדַּעַת הִיא!
GEMARA: Granted, with regard to the issar and the oil, one can explain that they disagree over this matter: As the Rabbis hold that the father sent his son to inform the storekeeper that he needed oil but did not intend for the storekeeper to send the oil with the boy. For this reason, if the storekeeper gave the child the oil he is liable for its loss. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that he sent his son so that the storekeeper would send him back with the oil, and therefore the storekeeper is exempt from liability. But if the child broke the jug, why do the Rabbis hold that the storekeeper is responsible for it? It is a deliberate loss on the part of the father, as he entrusted the jug to his young son, who is not responsible enough to care for it.
אָמַר רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: הָכָא בְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת מוֹכֵר צְלוֹחִיּוֹת עָסְקִינַן, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁנְּטָלָהּ חֶנְווֹנִי עַל מְנָת לְבַקְּרָהּ; וּכְדִשְׁמוּאֵל – דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַנּוֹטֵל כְּלִי מִן הָאוּמָּן עַל מְנָת לְבַקְּרוֹ, וְנֶאֱנַס בְּיָדוֹ – חַיָּיב.
Rav Hoshaya said: Here we are dealing with a proprietor who sells jugs, and the father sent his son with a jug in case the store owner might want to buy it. And this is a case where the storekeeper took the jug in order to examine it, and the ruling is in accordance with a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: With regard to one who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to examine it and buy it if he chooses, and an accident occurred while it was in his possession and it broke, he is liable to pay restitution for the vessel. He has the halakhic status of a borrower, and therefore he bears financial responsibility for the loss.
לֵימָא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל תַּנָּאֵי הִיא?! אֶלָּא רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הָכָא בְּחֶנְווֹנִי מוֹכֵר צְלוֹחִיּוֹת עָסְקִינַן; וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, וְרַבָּנַן לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the opinion of Shmuel is subject to a dispute between tanna’im? Since Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis, his opinion evidently differs from that of Shmuel. Rather, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say that the disagreement in the mishna should be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a storekeeper who sells jugs, and the father sent his son to buy from him a jug filled with oil. And Rabbi Yehuda follows his line of reasoning, as explained above, that the father sent his son to bring back the merchandise, and the Rabbis follow their line of reasoning, that the father sent the son to inform the storekeeper what he needed, but not to carry it back.
אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא – מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַצְּלוֹחִית בְּיַד הַתִּינוֹק, וּמָדַד חֶנְווֹנִי לְתוֹכָהּ – שֶׁחֶנְווֹנִי פָּטוּר. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ לְאוֹדוֹעֵי שַׁדְּרֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אַבָּיֵי בַּר אָבִין וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר אָבִין דְאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן –
The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the last clause: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda in a case when the jug was in the hand of the child, and the storekeeper measured the oil into it, that the storekeeper is exempt. Why would the Rabbis rule that the storekeeper is exempt? But you said that the father sent his son only to inform the storekeeper of his order, but he did not intend for the storekeeper to give anything to his son. Rather, Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Avin both say that the disagreement in the mishna should be explained as follows: With what are we dealing here?
