Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

June 10, 2016 | 讚壮 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Kamma 10

In what way is the ox more stringent/unique than the other cases? 聽In what way is the pit more stringent? 聽And in what way is fire more stringent? 聽If you are partially responsible for damages, you need to pay full damages. 聽What case is this referring to? 聽A braita explains: if one digs a pit 9 handbreadths deep and someone digs it one more handbreadth and then an animal falls in and dies, only the last person is responsible. 聽What about other similar cases? 聽Why aren’t they listed? 聽Various cases are brought in which there is similar possible joint responsibility and it is discussed who is the one who is responsible, including a case where 10 people hit someone else and cause his death.

讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘砖讜专

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Ox as op-posed to Fire, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox.

讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讗砖 砖讛砖讜专 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 讜讞讬讬讘 讘砖诇砖讬诐 砖诇 注讘讚 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛 诪住专讜 诇讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘砖讜专 砖讛讗砖 诪讜注讚转 诪转讞讬诇转讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘砖讜专

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Ox as opposed to the category of Fire is that if an ox kills a Jew the owner is liable to pay a ransom, and for killing a slave the owner is liable to pay thirty sela. Furthermore, in such a case, once the court hears the evidence and the verdict of the ox is complete and the court rules that the ox must be killed, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the ox. And if one transfers his ox to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and it causes damage, he is liable. All of this is not so with regard to a fire. And the stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox is that the one responsible for the fire is considered forewarned from its inception, which is not so with regard to an ox.

讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 讜讞讜诪专 讘讘讜专 诪讘讗砖

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Fire as opposed to the category of Pit, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Pit as opposed to Fire.

讞讜诪专 讘讘讜专 诪讘讗砖 砖转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 诪住专讜 诇讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 讚专讻讛 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讜诪讜注讚转 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讜讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Pit as opposed to the category of Fire is that its initial formation, e.g., its digging, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and if one transfers it to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and it causes damage, one is liable. This is not so with regard to a fire. The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to a pit.

讜诇讬转谞讬 讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛砖讜专 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 讗转 讛讻诇讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

The Gemara asks: But let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that if the ox damages vessels, the ox鈥檚 owner is liable to pay for the vessels, which is not so with regard to a pit, which incurs liability for its owner only for damage it causes to people and to animals but not to vessels.

讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚诪讞讬讬讘 注诇 谞讝拽讬 讻诇讬诐 讘讘讜专

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita taught? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable also for damage caused to vessels by his pit.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 讚专讻讛 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讜诪讜注讚 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讜讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 注爪讬诐 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讻诇讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 讗诪专转 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 注诇 谞讝拽讬 讻诇讬诐 讘讘讜专

The Gemara challenges this: If the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, try to say and explain accordingly the latter clause, which states: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it. This is not so with regard to a pit. The Gemara clarifies: Something that is fitting for it, what are these? Pieces of wood. Something that is not fitting for it, what are these? Vessels. And yet the baraita concludes: This is not so with regard to a pit, which indicates that liability is not incurred for damage done to vessels by one鈥檚 pit. The Gemara presents the difficulty: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn鈥檛 you say that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for damage caused to vessels by his pit?

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜转谞讗 讜砖讬讬专 诪讗讬 砖讬讬专 讚讛讗讬 砖讬讬专 砖讬讬专 讟诪讜谉

Rather, actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the additional stringency mentioned is true but was not mentioned because the tanna taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this? As a tanna would never omit just a single case, perforce there must be more. The Gemara explains: He also omitted the case of damage done to a concealed item. Liability is incurred for damage done to a concealed item only when it was caused through a category of damage other than fire. If it is damaged by a fire that one lit, he is exempt.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讻诇讬诐 讗诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬讞讻讛 谞讬专讜 讜住讻住讻讛 讗讘谞讬讜

The Gemara suggests another explanation of the baraita: If you wish, say that actually the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and explain that the term: Something that is not fitting for it, in the baraita, does not serve to include vessels; with regard to vessels there is no distinction between Fire and Pit. Rather, it serves to include a case where a fire scorched another person鈥檚 plowed field or singed [sikhsekha] his stones, which are ways of causing damage that cannot be caused by a pit.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讬转谞讬 讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛砖讜专 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 砖讜专 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

Rav Ashi objects to this suggestion: If so, let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that in the primary category of Ox one is liable if his ox damages another鈥檚 ox that is in the category of disqualified consecrated animals, i.e., an animal set aside to be an offering that was disqualified from use and then redeemed. He is liable despite the fact that even after being redeemed it retains a degree of sanctity. This is not so with regard to damage caused by a pit to a disqualified consecrated animal, as in that case he is not liable for the damage caused.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚砖讬讬专 讛讱 砖讬讬专 谞诪讬 讛讱 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 砖讬讬专 讚讛讗讬 砖讬讬专

Rav Ashi explains his objection: Granted, if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then since the tanna omitted that case of damage done to vessels, he also omitted this case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals. But if you say that the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, what else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this?

砖讬讬专 讚砖 讘谞讬专讜 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚砖 讘谞讬专讜 诇讗讜 砖讬讜专讗 讛讜讗 讚讛转谞讗 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person in order to cause damage. Since the damage was intentional it is included in the primary category of Goring and so one is liable. This manner of causing damage cannot be done by a pit. The Gemara rejects this: If one claims that the tanna omitted the case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals only due to the fact that he also omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person, that is not a sufficient justification. The latter case is not an additional independent omission, as it is included in that which is taught in that baraita: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. The fact that there is no case in the category of Pit corresponding to an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field is addressed by this clause.

讛讻砖专转讬 讘诪拽爪转 谞讝拽讜

搂 The mishna states: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讻砖专转讬 诪拽爪转 谞讝拽讜 讞讘转讬 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜 讻讛讻砖专 讻诇 谞讝拽讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 转砖注讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇注砖专讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘

The Sages taught a baraita that elucidates the mishna鈥檚 ruling: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. How so? In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the depth at which a pit, according to halakha, can cause death, only the latter individual is liable for injuries and death caused by the pit. Although the pit was already able to cause injury before the second individual deepened it, since by deepening it he increased its capacity to cause damage, he becomes liable for any damage it causes.

讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 转砖注讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇注砖专讛 讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗讞专 讗讞专讜谉 诇诪讬转讛 讗讞专 砖谞讬讛诐 诇谞讝拽讬谉

The Gemara suggests: And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, only the latter individual is liable for both injuries and death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to death caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the latter individual. With regard to damage caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the two of them.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇诪讬转讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa said: The baraita refers only to a digger鈥檚 liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous, i.e., it is in accordance with the opinions of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬诪讗 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇诪讬转讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

There are those who say that the preceding discussion took a slightly different form: The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rav Pappa answered and said: The baraita refers only to a digger鈥檚 liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜转讜 诇讬讻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 诪住专 砖讜专讜 诇讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜驻砖注 讘讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜讛讝讬拽 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Zeira objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But are there no more cases? But isn鈥檛 there the case of one who transferred his ox to five individuals in order for them to safeguard it, and one of them was negligent in his duties and the ox caused damage? Isn鈥檛 this individual liable for all the damage? This seems to be an additional example of the principle in the mishna that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for pay-ments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were the one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讬谞讟专 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讛讜 拽注讘讬讚 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 诪讬谞讟专 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚

The Gemara rejects the possibility that the mishna could be referring to this case: What are the circumstances in which the negligent watchman bears full liability? If we say that without him the ox would not have been properly safeguarded because the ox was particularly strong and it took all five individuals to safeguard it, it is obvious that the negligent individual is liable for all the damage. The reason is that he alone, through his negligence, caused all the damage, not just part of it. Rather, the case must be where even without him the ox would still have been sufficiently safeguarded. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by not safeguarding it? It was still safeguarded without him, so he should not be liable for even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 诪专讘讛 讘讞讘讬诇讛

Rav Sheshet objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But isn鈥檛 there also the case of a fire that was left unattended by its owner and someone else augmented the fire by adding a bundle of wood to it, thereby increasing the capacity of the fire to cause damage to another鈥檚 field? Even though he only increased the fire鈥檚 capacity to damage, he is liable for any damage it causes. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna鈥檚 principle that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for payments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances?

讗讬 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讗讝诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 讗讝诇讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 注讘讬讚

If the fire would not have spread to another person鈥檚 field without him adding bundles the fire, it is obvious that he alone is liable for the damage because he alone did everything that led to the damage. Rather, the case must be one where the fire would have spread even without him. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by adding bundles of wood? The fire would have spread without him, so he did not cause even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讞诪砖讛 砖讬砖讘讜 注诇 住驻住诇 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖讘专讜讛讜 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讬砖讘 注诇讬讜 讜砖讘专讜 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 驻驻讗 讘专 讗讘讗

Rav Pappa objects to the claim of the baraita that the mishna refers only to one specific case: But isn鈥檛 there also that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case in which five people were sitting on one bench [safsal] and it did not break, and then one additional person came and sat upon it and broke it with his added weight, the latter individual is liable for all the damage. And Rav Pappa said by way of clarification that this applies in a case where the last individual to sit down was as heavy as Pappa bar Abba. Since he could have potentially broken it even on his own, he had no right to use it. In this case, even though the weight of the first five individuals was presumably a contributing factor in causing the damage, since the damage was ultimately caused by the additional weight of the last individual, he is liable for all of the damage. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna鈥檚 principle, and the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讗讬转讘专 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讗讬转讘专 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances? If we say that without him the bench would never have broken under the weight of the first five people, then it is obvious that the last individual is liable for all the damage, as ultimately it was his action alone that caused the damage. Rather, it must be that even without him the bench would have broken under the weight of the first five people, and the last individual sat down just as it was about to break. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do, i.e., why should he be liable at all? It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

住讜祝 住讜祝 诪转谞讬转讗 讛讬讻讗 诪转专爪讗

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how is the baraita cited by Rav Pappa to be explained? As the Gemara explained, the ruling of the baraita is understandable only if it is referring to a case where the bench would not have broken without him. But if that is the case, as the Gemara noted, it is obvious and therefore unnecessary to state it.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讬 诪讬转讘专 讘转专讬 砖注讬 讜讛砖转讗 讗讬转讘专 讘讞讚讗 砖注讛 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讗转 讛讜讬 讬转讘讬谞谉 讟驻讬 驻讜专转讗 讜拽讬讬诪讬谉

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a case where without him it would have broken in two hours, and now it broke in one hour. The baraita teaches that the last individual alone is liable and not the first five, as they can say to the last individual: Were it not for you, we would have sat a little bit more and then stood up; consequently, the bench would never have broken. Therefore, it was ultimately you who caused the bench to break, and therefore only you are liable.

讜诇讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬 诇讗讜 讗转讜谉 讘讚讬讚讬 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讬转讘专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because in that situation the last individual would have a valid counterclaim: But let him say to them: Were it not for you continuing to sit on the bench after I sat down, the bench would not have broken, as under my weight alone it would not have broken. Accordingly, we should share the liability for damaging it.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘讛讚讬 讚住诪讬讱 讘讛讜 转讘专

The Gemara offers a different suggestion: No, it is necessary in a case where instantaneously, as he was leaning upon the other five people, the bench broke.

驻砖讬讟讗

The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that he alone is liable, as his action alone caused the damage, and the other five could not have done anything to prevent it as he was leaning upon them.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讞讜 诇讗讜 讻讙讜驻讜 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讞讜 讻讙讜驻讜 讚诪讬 讚讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讙讜驻讜 转讘专 讻讞讜 谞诪讬 转讘专

The Gemara explains: The ruling is necessary lest you say that when one causes damage with one鈥檚 direct force it is not equivalent to a situation where one causes damage with one鈥檚 body. If he broke the bench by actually sitting down upon it, his action would be considered a direct act of damage completed with his body and he alone would be liable even though the other peoples鈥 weight was a contributing factor. In this case, since he broke the bench by merely leaning upon the others sitting there, it is his force that led to the damage, not his body, and one might have thought that since the weight of the others certainly contributed to the breakage they should share liability. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that causing damage with one鈥檚 direct force is equivalent to causing damage with one鈥檚 body. And it teaches that the halakha is that anywhere that one would be liable if his body broke something, one is also liable if his force broke something.

讜转讜 诇讬讻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛讻讜讛讜 注砖专讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讘注砖专 诪拽诇讜转 讘讬谉 讘讘转 讗讞转 讘讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讜诪转 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讗讜诪专 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 诪驻谞讬 砖拽讬专讘 讗转 诪讬转转讜

The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna鈥檚 ruling aside from the one listed in the baraita: And are there not more cases? But isn鈥檛 there also the case of that which is taught in a baraita: If one was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether they beat him simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt from liability for killing him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Where they beat him sequentially, the last individual to beat him alone is liable, because he hastened his death. In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man鈥檚 death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn鈥檛 the baraita also mention this case?

讘拽讟诇讗 诇讗 拽诪讬讬专讬

The Gemara explains: The baraita is not speaking of one鈥檚 liability to receive the death penalty, only of one鈥檚 liability to pay damages.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽诪讬讬专讬 讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讗讜拽讬诪谞谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讜讻专讘谞谉 诪讜拽诪讬谞谉 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讜诇讗 讻专讘谞谉 诇讗 诪讜拽诪讬谞谉

And if you wish, say instead that the baraita is not speaking of an issue that is the subject of a dispute. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it? But didn鈥檛 we uphold that the case stated in the baraita concerning a pit is subject to a dispute, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but of the Rabbis? The Gemara explains: We will interpret the baraita to be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but we will not interpret it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In other words, although we will interpret the baraita as referring to a case that is subject to a dispute, that applies only if it is in accordance with the majority opinion in that dispute.

讞讘转讬 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜 讞讘转讬 讘谞讝拽讜 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜

搂 The mishna teaches: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage. The Gemara notes that the mishna does not teach: I am liable for the damage it caused, rather: I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused. The Hebrew terms: Payments of restitution [tashlumim], and: To complete [lehashlim], share the same Hebrew root. This alludes to the halakha that the payment of damages is required only in order to complete the injured party鈥檚 compensation, which is already partially accounted for, as the injured party is able to recover his dead animal鈥檚 current value by selling its carcass. Accordingly, the one liable for the damage is not required to pay the animal鈥檚 prior value; rather, he must pay only the difference in its value from before it was damaged and its current state.

转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 诪讟驻诇讬谉 讘谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara notes: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The mishna uses the term: Payments of restitution for damage, as opposed to simply stating: One is liable for the damage caused, to allude to the halakha that the one who is liable must pay only for the decrease in the value of the animal. This assumes that the injured party is able to recover his animal鈥檚 current value by selling the carcass. Therefore, the mishna teaches that the owner of the injured animal attends to, i.e., retains ownership of, the animal carcass so that, if he wishes to, he may sell it and keep the proceeds.

诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诪讻讛 谞驻砖 讘讛诪讛 讬砖诇诪谞讛 讗诇 转拽专讬 讬砖诇诪谞讛 讗诇讗 讬砖诇讬诪谞讛

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami said: As the verse states: 鈥淥ne who strikes an animal shall pay for it [yeshallemenna]鈥 (Leviticus 24:18). Do not read the final word yeshallemenna, meaning he shall pay for it; rather, read it as though it were vocalized as yashlimenna, meaning he shall complete it, to teach that he shall complete the injured party鈥檚 compensation, which is already partially accounted for by the injured party鈥檚 right to sell his animal鈥檚 carcass.

专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讗诐 讟专祝 讬讟专祝 讬讘讗讛讜 注讚 讛讟专驻讛 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 注讚 讟专驻讛 讬砖诇诐 讟专驻讛 注爪诪讛 诇讗 讬砖诇诐

Rav Kahana said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee who did not fulfill his duty to safeguard it, and the animal was attacked by a wild beast: 鈥淚f it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness, the torn animal he shall not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:12). Rav Kahana expounds the verse to mean that he shall pay only up until the value of the torn animal; but he shall not pay for the torn animal itself. In other words, he pays only the difference in value between the animal before it was injured and its current torn state. If the owner of the injured animal wishes to fully recover his loss he must sell the animal鈥檚 carcass and keep the proceeds.

讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇谞讬讝拽

岣zkiyya said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a person鈥檚 ox that fatally gored another ox: 鈥淗e shall pay an ox for the ox, and the carcass shall be his鈥 (Exodus 21:36), meaning the carcass belongs to the injured party, the owner of the gored animal.

讜讻谉 转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇谞讬讝拽 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇谞讬讝拽 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇诪讝讬拽 讗诪专转 诇讗 讻讱 讛讬讛

And similarly, the school of 岣zkiyya taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his鈥 (Exodus 21:36). The verse means the carcass belongs to the injured party. Do you say it belongs to the injured party? Or perhaps it belongs only to the one liable for the damage? To this suggestion, you should say: It could not have been that.

诪讗讬 诇讗 讻讱 讛讬讛

The Gemara asks: What does the baraita mean by: It could not have been that?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 谞讘讬诇讛 讚诪讝讬拽 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 转讞转 讛砖讜专 讜诇讬砖转讜拽 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇谞讬讝拽

Abaye said: If it enters your mind to say that the animal carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage, let the Merciful One write: 鈥淗e shall pay an ox for the ox,鈥 and then be silent and state no more. Why do I need the verse to continue: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his鈥? Conclude from it that the carcass belongs to the injured party.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 讬砖诇诪谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讗讘诇 讟专驻讛 讚砖讻讬讞讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to have multiple sources for this halakha, as if the Merciful One wrote only: 鈥淥ne who strikes an animal shall pay for it,鈥 I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is an uncommon occurrence. But in the case of a torn animal, which is a common occurrence, I will say that his liability should not be limited to the difference in value between what the animal had been worth and the carcass, but he should pay for the entire value of the injured animal. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讟专驻讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讬诇讗 讗讘诇 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 讚讘讬讚讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And if the Torah had taught us only the case of a torn animal, I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because the damage occurred by itself, i.e., it was not directly caused by the one liable for it. But in the case of one who strikes an animal, who does so by direct action, I will say that his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讛讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讜讛讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讬诇讗 讗讘诇 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 讚砖讻讬讞讗 讜讘讬讚讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And if the Torah had taught us only these two cases, I could claim that only in those cases does one have to pay for only part of the damage, this one because it is an uncommon occurrence, and that one because the damage occurred by itself. But in a case where one鈥檚 ox gores another鈥檚 ox, of which the Torah states: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 which is a common occurrence, and the damage is considered to have been inflicted by its owner鈥檚 direct action, since it was under his guard, I will say his liability should not be limited.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讜谞讗 拽讗 诪讝讬拽 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讘讙讜驻讗 诪讝讬拽 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if the Torah had taught us only the case in the verse 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is one鈥檚 property that causes damage. But here, in the case of one who strikes another鈥檚 animal, where one causes damage with one鈥檚 own body, I will say his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha in each case.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诇专讘 讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 谞讘讬诇讛 讚诪讝讬拽 讛讜讬讗

Rav Kahana said to Rav: But according to the statement of 岣zkiyya, as explained by Abaye, the only reason the injured party retains ownership of the carcass is that the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 but were it not for that I would say that the carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage.

讛砖转讗 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讻诪讛 讟专讬驻讜转 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 诪专 讬砖讬讘 诇专讘讜转 砖讜讛 讻住祝 讜讗驻讬诇讜 住讜讘讬谉 讚讬讚讬讛 诪讘注讬讗

Rav Kahana questions the need for the Torah to teach this: Now, if the one liable for the damage had in his possession the carcasses of several torn animals, he could give the injured party a carcass as payment, as the Master said above (7a): The verse states: 鈥淗e shall recompense鈥 (Exodus 21:34), to include items worth money, and even bran, a relatively inferior commodity, as valid items with which to pay restitution. Is it necessary for the Torah to teach that he can pay restitution with his, i.e., the injured party鈥檚, animal carcass? Granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party seems pointless, because even had the Torah granted it to the one liable for the damage, he could give it to the injured party as payment.

诇讗 谞爪专讻讗 讗诇讗 诇驻讞转 谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara explains: It is necessary only for the issue of who sustains the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass between its death and when the case is brought before the court. By granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party from the moment of the animal鈥檚 death, the Torah limits the damages to the difference between the value of the animal when it was alive and its value immediately after it is killed, irrespective of what happens to the carcass afterward.

诇讬诪讗 驻讞转 谞讘讬诇讛 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 讟专祝 讬讟专祝 讬讘讬讗讛讜 注讚

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the issue of the diminishing value of the carcass is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee and was attacked by a wild beast: 鈥淚f it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness [ed]鈥 (Exodus 22:12).

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bava Kamma 10

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 10

讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘砖讜专

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Ox as op-posed to Fire, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox.

讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讗砖 砖讛砖讜专 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 讜讞讬讬讘 讘砖诇砖讬诐 砖诇 注讘讚 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 讗住讜专 讘讛谞讗讛 诪住专讜 诇讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘砖讜专 砖讛讗砖 诪讜注讚转 诪转讞讬诇转讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘砖讜专

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Ox as opposed to the category of Fire is that if an ox kills a Jew the owner is liable to pay a ransom, and for killing a slave the owner is liable to pay thirty sela. Furthermore, in such a case, once the court hears the evidence and the verdict of the ox is complete and the court rules that the ox must be killed, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the ox. And if one transfers his ox to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and it causes damage, he is liable. All of this is not so with regard to a fire. And the stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox is that the one responsible for the fire is considered forewarned from its inception, which is not so with regard to an ox.

讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 讜讞讜诪专 讘讘讜专 诪讘讗砖

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Fire as opposed to the category of Pit, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Pit as opposed to Fire.

讞讜诪专 讘讘讜专 诪讘讗砖 砖转讞讬诇转 注砖讬讬转讜 诇谞讝拽 诪住专讜 诇讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讗砖 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 讚专讻讛 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讜诪讜注讚转 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讜讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Pit as opposed to the category of Fire is that its initial formation, e.g., its digging, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and if one transfers it to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and it causes damage, one is liable. This is not so with regard to a fire. The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to a pit.

讜诇讬转谞讬 讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛砖讜专 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 讗转 讛讻诇讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

The Gemara asks: But let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that if the ox damages vessels, the ox鈥檚 owner is liable to pay for the vessels, which is not so with regard to a pit, which incurs liability for its owner only for damage it causes to people and to animals but not to vessels.

讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚诪讞讬讬讘 注诇 谞讝拽讬 讻诇讬诐 讘讘讜专

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita taught? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable also for damage caused to vessels by his pit.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 讚专讻讛 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽 讜诪讜注讚 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讜讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 注爪讬诐 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讻诇讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗 讗诪专转 诪讞讬讬讘 讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 注诇 谞讝拽讬 讻诇讬诐 讘讘讜专

The Gemara challenges this: If the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, try to say and explain accordingly the latter clause, which states: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it. This is not so with regard to a pit. The Gemara clarifies: Something that is fitting for it, what are these? Pieces of wood. Something that is not fitting for it, what are these? Vessels. And yet the baraita concludes: This is not so with regard to a pit, which indicates that liability is not incurred for damage done to vessels by one鈥檚 pit. The Gemara presents the difficulty: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn鈥檛 you say that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for damage caused to vessels by his pit?

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讜转谞讗 讜砖讬讬专 诪讗讬 砖讬讬专 讚讛讗讬 砖讬讬专 砖讬讬专 讟诪讜谉

Rather, actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the additional stringency mentioned is true but was not mentioned because the tanna taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this? As a tanna would never omit just a single case, perforce there must be more. The Gemara explains: He also omitted the case of damage done to a concealed item. Liability is incurred for damage done to a concealed item only when it was caused through a category of damage other than fire. If it is damaged by a fire that one lit, he is exempt.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诇讗讜 诇讗转讜讬讬 讻诇讬诐 讗诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 诇讬讞讻讛 谞讬专讜 讜住讻住讻讛 讗讘谞讬讜

The Gemara suggests another explanation of the baraita: If you wish, say that actually the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and explain that the term: Something that is not fitting for it, in the baraita, does not serve to include vessels; with regard to vessels there is no distinction between Fire and Pit. Rather, it serves to include a case where a fire scorched another person鈥檚 plowed field or singed [sikhsekha] his stones, which are ways of causing damage that cannot be caused by a pit.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诇讬转谞讬 讞讜诪专 讘砖讜专 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛砖讜专 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 砖讜专 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬谉 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专

Rav Ashi objects to this suggestion: If so, let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that in the primary category of Ox one is liable if his ox damages another鈥檚 ox that is in the category of disqualified consecrated animals, i.e., an animal set aside to be an offering that was disqualified from use and then redeemed. He is liable despite the fact that even after being redeemed it retains a degree of sanctity. This is not so with regard to damage caused by a pit to a disqualified consecrated animal, as in that case he is not liable for the damage caused.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讗讬讬讚讬 讚砖讬讬专 讛讱 砖讬讬专 谞诪讬 讛讱 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讗讬 砖讬讬专 讚讛讗讬 砖讬讬专

Rav Ashi explains his objection: Granted, if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then since the tanna omitted that case of damage done to vessels, he also omitted this case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals. But if you say that the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, what else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this?

砖讬讬专 讚砖 讘谞讬专讜 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚砖 讘谞讬专讜 诇讗讜 砖讬讜专讗 讛讜讗 讚讛转谞讗 砖讻谉 讚专讻讜 诇讬诇讱 讜诇讛讝讬拽

The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person in order to cause damage. Since the damage was intentional it is included in the primary category of Goring and so one is liable. This manner of causing damage cannot be done by a pit. The Gemara rejects this: If one claims that the tanna omitted the case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals only due to the fact that he also omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person, that is not a sufficient justification. The latter case is not an additional independent omission, as it is included in that which is taught in that baraita: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. The fact that there is no case in the category of Pit corresponding to an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field is addressed by this clause.

讛讻砖专转讬 讘诪拽爪转 谞讝拽讜

搂 The mishna states: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讻砖专转讬 诪拽爪转 谞讝拽讜 讞讘转讬 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜 讻讛讻砖专 讻诇 谞讝拽讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 转砖注讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇注砖专讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘

The Sages taught a baraita that elucidates the mishna鈥檚 ruling: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. How so? In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the depth at which a pit, according to halakha, can cause death, only the latter individual is liable for injuries and death caused by the pit. Although the pit was already able to cause injury before the second individual deepened it, since by deepening it he increased its capacity to cause damage, he becomes liable for any damage it causes.

讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 转砖注讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇注砖专讛 讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讗讞专 讗讞专讜谉 诇诪讬转讛 讗讞专 砖谞讬讛诐 诇谞讝拽讬谉

The Gemara suggests: And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, only the latter individual is liable for both injuries and death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to death caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the latter individual. With regard to damage caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the two of them.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇诪讬转讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa said: The baraita refers only to a digger鈥檚 liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous, i.e., it is in accordance with the opinions of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬诪讗 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇诪讬转讛 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

There are those who say that the preceding discussion took a slightly different form: The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rav Pappa answered and said: The baraita refers only to a digger鈥檚 liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜转讜 诇讬讻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 诪住专 砖讜专讜 诇讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讜驻砖注 讘讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讜讛讝讬拽 讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Zeira objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But are there no more cases? But isn鈥檛 there the case of one who transferred his ox to five individuals in order for them to safeguard it, and one of them was negligent in his duties and the ox caused damage? Isn鈥檛 this individual liable for all the damage? This seems to be an additional example of the principle in the mishna that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for pay-ments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were the one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讬谞讟专 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬讛讜 拽注讘讬讚 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 诪讬谞讟专 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚

The Gemara rejects the possibility that the mishna could be referring to this case: What are the circumstances in which the negligent watchman bears full liability? If we say that without him the ox would not have been properly safeguarded because the ox was particularly strong and it took all five individuals to safeguard it, it is obvious that the negligent individual is liable for all the damage. The reason is that he alone, through his negligence, caused all the damage, not just part of it. Rather, the case must be where even without him the ox would still have been sufficiently safeguarded. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by not safeguarding it? It was still safeguarded without him, so he should not be liable for even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 诪专讘讛 讘讞讘讬诇讛

Rav Sheshet objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But isn鈥檛 there also the case of a fire that was left unattended by its owner and someone else augmented the fire by adding a bundle of wood to it, thereby increasing the capacity of the fire to cause damage to another鈥檚 field? Even though he only increased the fire鈥檚 capacity to damage, he is liable for any damage it causes. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna鈥檚 principle that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for payments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances?

讗讬 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讗讝诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 讗讝诇讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 注讘讬讚

If the fire would not have spread to another person鈥檚 field without him adding bundles the fire, it is obvious that he alone is liable for the damage because he alone did everything that led to the damage. Rather, the case must be one where the fire would have spread even without him. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by adding bundles of wood? The fire would have spread without him, so he did not cause even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讞诪砖讛 砖讬砖讘讜 注诇 住驻住诇 讗讞讚 讜诇讗 砖讘专讜讛讜 讜讘讗 讗讞讚 讜讬砖讘 注诇讬讜 讜砖讘专讜 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 驻驻讗 讘专 讗讘讗

Rav Pappa objects to the claim of the baraita that the mishna refers only to one specific case: But isn鈥檛 there also that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case in which five people were sitting on one bench [safsal] and it did not break, and then one additional person came and sat upon it and broke it with his added weight, the latter individual is liable for all the damage. And Rav Pappa said by way of clarification that this applies in a case where the last individual to sit down was as heavy as Pappa bar Abba. Since he could have potentially broken it even on his own, he had no right to use it. In this case, even though the weight of the first five individuals was presumably a contributing factor in causing the damage, since the damage was ultimately caused by the additional weight of the last individual, he is liable for all of the damage. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna鈥檚 principle, and the baraita should have mentioned it.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 诇讗 讗讬转讘专 驻砖讬讟讗 讗诇讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讗讬转讘专 诪讗讬 拽注讘讬讚

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances? If we say that without him the bench would never have broken under the weight of the first five people, then it is obvious that the last individual is liable for all the damage, as ultimately it was his action alone that caused the damage. Rather, it must be that even without him the bench would have broken under the weight of the first five people, and the last individual sat down just as it was about to break. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do, i.e., why should he be liable at all? It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

住讜祝 住讜祝 诪转谞讬转讗 讛讬讻讗 诪转专爪讗

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how is the baraita cited by Rav Pappa to be explained? As the Gemara explained, the ruling of the baraita is understandable only if it is referring to a case where the bench would not have broken without him. But if that is the case, as the Gemara noted, it is obvious and therefore unnecessary to state it.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讬 诪讬转讘专 讘转专讬 砖注讬 讜讛砖转讗 讗讬转讘专 讘讞讚讗 砖注讛 讚讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗讜 讗转 讛讜讬 讬转讘讬谞谉 讟驻讬 驻讜专转讗 讜拽讬讬诪讬谉

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a case where without him it would have broken in two hours, and now it broke in one hour. The baraita teaches that the last individual alone is liable and not the first five, as they can say to the last individual: Were it not for you, we would have sat a little bit more and then stood up; consequently, the bench would never have broken. Therefore, it was ultimately you who caused the bench to break, and therefore only you are liable.

讜诇讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬 诇讗讜 讗转讜谉 讘讚讬讚讬 诇讗 讛讜讛 诪讬转讘专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because in that situation the last individual would have a valid counterclaim: But let him say to them: Were it not for you continuing to sit on the bench after I sat down, the bench would not have broken, as under my weight alone it would not have broken. Accordingly, we should share the liability for damaging it.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讘讛讚讬 讚住诪讬讱 讘讛讜 转讘专

The Gemara offers a different suggestion: No, it is necessary in a case where instantaneously, as he was leaning upon the other five people, the bench broke.

驻砖讬讟讗

The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that he alone is liable, as his action alone caused the damage, and the other five could not have done anything to prevent it as he was leaning upon them.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讞讜 诇讗讜 讻讙讜驻讜 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讞讜 讻讙讜驻讜 讚诪讬 讚讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讙讜驻讜 转讘专 讻讞讜 谞诪讬 转讘专

The Gemara explains: The ruling is necessary lest you say that when one causes damage with one鈥檚 direct force it is not equivalent to a situation where one causes damage with one鈥檚 body. If he broke the bench by actually sitting down upon it, his action would be considered a direct act of damage completed with his body and he alone would be liable even though the other peoples鈥 weight was a contributing factor. In this case, since he broke the bench by merely leaning upon the others sitting there, it is his force that led to the damage, not his body, and one might have thought that since the weight of the others certainly contributed to the breakage they should share liability. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that causing damage with one鈥檚 direct force is equivalent to causing damage with one鈥檚 body. And it teaches that the halakha is that anywhere that one would be liable if his body broke something, one is also liable if his force broke something.

讜转讜 诇讬讻讗 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛讻讜讛讜 注砖专讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讘注砖专 诪拽诇讜转 讘讬谉 讘讘转 讗讞转 讘讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讜诪转 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讗讜诪专 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 讞讬讬讘 诪驻谞讬 砖拽讬专讘 讗转 诪讬转转讜

The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna鈥檚 ruling aside from the one listed in the baraita: And are there not more cases? But isn鈥檛 there also the case of that which is taught in a baraita: If one was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether they beat him simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt from liability for killing him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Where they beat him sequentially, the last individual to beat him alone is liable, because he hastened his death. In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man鈥檚 death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn鈥檛 the baraita also mention this case?

讘拽讟诇讗 诇讗 拽诪讬讬专讬

The Gemara explains: The baraita is not speaking of one鈥檚 liability to receive the death penalty, only of one鈥檚 liability to pay damages.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘驻诇讜讙转讗 诇讗 拽诪讬讬专讬 讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讗讜拽讬诪谞谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讜讻专讘谞谉 诪讜拽诪讬谞谉 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讗 讜诇讗 讻专讘谞谉 诇讗 诪讜拽诪讬谞谉

And if you wish, say instead that the baraita is not speaking of an issue that is the subject of a dispute. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 it? But didn鈥檛 we uphold that the case stated in the baraita concerning a pit is subject to a dispute, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but of the Rabbis? The Gemara explains: We will interpret the baraita to be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but we will not interpret it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In other words, although we will interpret the baraita as referring to a case that is subject to a dispute, that applies only if it is in accordance with the majority opinion in that dispute.

讞讘转讬 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜 讞讘转讬 讘谞讝拽讜 诇讗 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讘转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽讜

搂 The mishna teaches: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage. The Gemara notes that the mishna does not teach: I am liable for the damage it caused, rather: I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused. The Hebrew terms: Payments of restitution [tashlumim], and: To complete [lehashlim], share the same Hebrew root. This alludes to the halakha that the payment of damages is required only in order to complete the injured party鈥檚 compensation, which is already partially accounted for, as the injured party is able to recover his dead animal鈥檚 current value by selling its carcass. Accordingly, the one liable for the damage is not required to pay the animal鈥檚 prior value; rather, he must pay only the difference in its value from before it was damaged and its current state.

转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 转砖诇讜诪讬 谞讝拽 诪诇诪讚 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 诪讟驻诇讬谉 讘谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara notes: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The mishna uses the term: Payments of restitution for damage, as opposed to simply stating: One is liable for the damage caused, to allude to the halakha that the one who is liable must pay only for the decrease in the value of the animal. This assumes that the injured party is able to recover his animal鈥檚 current value by selling the carcass. Therefore, the mishna teaches that the owner of the injured animal attends to, i.e., retains ownership of, the animal carcass so that, if he wishes to, he may sell it and keep the proceeds.

诪谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诪讻讛 谞驻砖 讘讛诪讛 讬砖诇诪谞讛 讗诇 转拽专讬 讬砖诇诪谞讛 讗诇讗 讬砖诇讬诪谞讛

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami said: As the verse states: 鈥淥ne who strikes an animal shall pay for it [yeshallemenna]鈥 (Leviticus 24:18). Do not read the final word yeshallemenna, meaning he shall pay for it; rather, read it as though it were vocalized as yashlimenna, meaning he shall complete it, to teach that he shall complete the injured party鈥檚 compensation, which is already partially accounted for by the injured party鈥檚 right to sell his animal鈥檚 carcass.

专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讗诐 讟专祝 讬讟专祝 讬讘讗讛讜 注讚 讛讟专驻讛 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 注讚 讟专驻讛 讬砖诇诐 讟专驻讛 注爪诪讛 诇讗 讬砖诇诐

Rav Kahana said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee who did not fulfill his duty to safeguard it, and the animal was attacked by a wild beast: 鈥淚f it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness, the torn animal he shall not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:12). Rav Kahana expounds the verse to mean that he shall pay only up until the value of the torn animal; but he shall not pay for the torn animal itself. In other words, he pays only the difference in value between the animal before it was injured and its current torn state. If the owner of the injured animal wishes to fully recover his loss he must sell the animal鈥檚 carcass and keep the proceeds.

讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 诪讛讻讗 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇谞讬讝拽

岣zkiyya said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a person鈥檚 ox that fatally gored another ox: 鈥淗e shall pay an ox for the ox, and the carcass shall be his鈥 (Exodus 21:36), meaning the carcass belongs to the injured party, the owner of the gored animal.

讜讻谉 转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇谞讬讝拽 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇谞讬讝拽 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇诪讝讬拽 讗诪专转 诇讗 讻讱 讛讬讛

And similarly, the school of 岣zkiyya taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his鈥 (Exodus 21:36). The verse means the carcass belongs to the injured party. Do you say it belongs to the injured party? Or perhaps it belongs only to the one liable for the damage? To this suggestion, you should say: It could not have been that.

诪讗讬 诇讗 讻讱 讛讬讛

The Gemara asks: What does the baraita mean by: It could not have been that?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 谞讘讬诇讛 讚诪讝讬拽 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 转讞转 讛砖讜专 讜诇讬砖转讜拽 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇谞讬讝拽

Abaye said: If it enters your mind to say that the animal carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage, let the Merciful One write: 鈥淗e shall pay an ox for the ox,鈥 and then be silent and state no more. Why do I need the verse to continue: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his鈥? Conclude from it that the carcass belongs to the injured party.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 讬砖诇诪谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讗讘诇 讟专驻讛 讚砖讻讬讞讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to have multiple sources for this halakha, as if the Merciful One wrote only: 鈥淥ne who strikes an animal shall pay for it,鈥 I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is an uncommon occurrence. But in the case of a torn animal, which is a common occurrence, I will say that his liability should not be limited to the difference in value between what the animal had been worth and the carcass, but he should pay for the entire value of the injured animal. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讟专驻讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讬诇讗 讗讘诇 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 讚讘讬讚讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And if the Torah had taught us only the case of a torn animal, I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because the damage occurred by itself, i.e., it was not directly caused by the one liable for it. But in the case of one who strikes an animal, who does so by direct action, I will say that his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讛讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 讜讛讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讬诇讗 讗讘诇 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 讚砖讻讬讞讗 讜讘讬讚讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And if the Torah had taught us only these two cases, I could claim that only in those cases does one have to pay for only part of the damage, this one because it is an uncommon occurrence, and that one because the damage occurred by itself. But in a case where one鈥檚 ox gores another鈥檚 ox, of which the Torah states: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 which is a common occurrence, and the damage is considered to have been inflicted by its owner鈥檚 direct action, since it was under his guard, I will say his liability should not be limited.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 诪砖讜诐 讚诪诪讜谞讗 拽讗 诪讝讬拽 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讘讙讜驻讗 诪讝讬拽 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And if the Torah had taught us only the case in the verse 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is one鈥檚 property that causes damage. But here, in the case of one who strikes another鈥檚 animal, where one causes damage with one鈥檚 own body, I will say his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha in each case.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诇专讘 讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛诪转 讬讛讬讛 诇讜 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 谞讘讬诇讛 讚诪讝讬拽 讛讜讬讗

Rav Kahana said to Rav: But according to the statement of 岣zkiyya, as explained by Abaye, the only reason the injured party retains ownership of the carcass is that the Merciful One wrote: 鈥淎nd the carcass shall be his,鈥 but were it not for that I would say that the carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage.

讛砖转讗 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讻诪讛 讟专讬驻讜转 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 诪专 讬砖讬讘 诇专讘讜转 砖讜讛 讻住祝 讜讗驻讬诇讜 住讜讘讬谉 讚讬讚讬讛 诪讘注讬讗

Rav Kahana questions the need for the Torah to teach this: Now, if the one liable for the damage had in his possession the carcasses of several torn animals, he could give the injured party a carcass as payment, as the Master said above (7a): The verse states: 鈥淗e shall recompense鈥 (Exodus 21:34), to include items worth money, and even bran, a relatively inferior commodity, as valid items with which to pay restitution. Is it necessary for the Torah to teach that he can pay restitution with his, i.e., the injured party鈥檚, animal carcass? Granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party seems pointless, because even had the Torah granted it to the one liable for the damage, he could give it to the injured party as payment.

诇讗 谞爪专讻讗 讗诇讗 诇驻讞转 谞讘讬诇讛

The Gemara explains: It is necessary only for the issue of who sustains the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass between its death and when the case is brought before the court. By granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party from the moment of the animal鈥檚 death, the Torah limits the damages to the difference between the value of the animal when it was alive and its value immediately after it is killed, irrespective of what happens to the carcass afterward.

诇讬诪讗 驻讞转 谞讘讬诇讛 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 讟专祝 讬讟专祝 讬讘讬讗讛讜 注讚

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the issue of the diminishing value of the carcass is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee and was attacked by a wild beast: 鈥淚f it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness [ed]鈥 (Exodus 22:12).

Scroll To Top