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Daf Yomi

February 12, 2024 | 讙壮 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 102

Today’s daf is sponsored by Hinda Herman in loving memory of her mother, Ethel Rosenthal’s yahrzeit. “Among the many mitzvot my mother performed, the mitzvah of Hachnasat Orchim was most dear to her. We miss you every day!!”

Baruch Matir Asurim. Today’s daf is dedicated to the continued good health of the two hostages rescued last night, Fernanado Marman and Louis Har. We continue to pray for the safe return of all the others.

Does intent play a role in determining whether or not fruits have the sanctity of the shmita year, kedushat shviit? If wood is cut for firewood, since it is consumed before one benefits from it, it does not have the kedushat shviit in the shmita year, as is it different from food where one benefits as it is consumed. However if one cuts wood for heat or to make a flame, as its benefit comes with its consumption, does it have kedushat shviit? On the other hand, since wood is generally cut for firewood, is all wood treated as if it was cut for firewood, regardless of the intent? This issue is a subject of debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi regarding different uses for wine. Rabbi Yosi rules that if grapes are picked for other uses, such as for soaking flax, where the benefit is after its consumption, the fruits do not have kedushat shviit, and can therefore be used for soaking flax and other uses. However, intent only plays a role if it is a use that is needed by everyone. If it is a use that is only for sick people or only for wealthy people, then even according to Rabbi Yosi, intent does not play a role and the fruits will have kedushat shviit. Rav Huna ruled like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha on one issue and like Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna. Rav Yosef heard his rulings and got upset at him for stating the obvious regarding Rabbi Yehuda as there is a rule that if there is a debate in one Mishna and then an unattributed (stam) Mishna states one of the opinions, it is clear we rule by that opinion. Since Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling appears in Bava Metzia, the next Masechet, it is clear that we rule like Rabbi Yehuda. If so, how did Rav Huna explain the need to issue that ruling? If one hires a messenger to buy a type of grain and the messenger buys a different type, what is the law? Two braitot bring two different rulings and Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree on how to reconcile the two. Is it the same debate as between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna or are both according to Rabbi Meir but each braita is referring to a different purpose of the agency – in one it was for eating and in the other for investment/resale purposes. In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s interpretation explaining one of the braitas like Rabbi Yehuda – how could the sale be valid as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? Rabbi Abahu explains why there is a distinction regarding this issue when the agent performs the action requested and when the agent doesn’t perform the action requested and brings a tanaitic source to prove it. Rabbi Abba rejects his proof and two difficulties are raised against his rejection until he modifies his statement and succeeds in rejecting Rabbi Abahu’s proof.

住转诐 注爪讬诐 诇讛住拽讛 讛谉 注讜诪讚讬谉


Unspecified wood exists for fuel, i.e., charcoal, so its benefit follows its consumption.


讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜注爪讬诐 诇讛住拽讛 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讜住专讬谉 驻讬专讜转 砖讘讬注讬转 诇讗 诇诪砖专讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 砖讘讬注讬转 诇转讜讱 讛诪砖专讛 讜诇转讜讱 讛讻讘讜住讛


Rav Kahana says: And the matter of whether kindling wood, whose benefit follows its consumption, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is a dispute among the tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Shevi鈥檌t 6:25): One may not transfer Sabbatical Year produce, e.g., wine, to another person; neither for soaking flax to prepare it for spinning, as the benefit derived from the flax follows its soaking, when the soaked and spun thread is woven into a garment; nor for laundering with it, as the benefit derived follows the laundering when one wears the clean clothes. Soaking the flax or laundering the garment in wine is considered the consumption of the wine, as it is no longer potable. And Rabbi Yosei says: One may transfer to another Sabbatical Year produce for soaking and for laundering.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪砖专讛 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讻诐 诇讻诇 爪专讻讬讻诐


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for the statement of the Rabbis? The verse states with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: 鈥淔or food鈥 (Leviticus 25:6), from which it is inferred: But not for soaking; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not for laundering. And Rabbi Yosei says that it is permitted, as the verse also states: 鈥淔or you,鈥 from which it is inferred: For you, for all your needs, even for soaking and for laundering.


讜专讘谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讻诐 诇讻诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诇讗讻诇讛 讘诪讬 砖讛谞讗转讜 讜讘讬注讜专讜 砖讜讬谉 讬爪讗讜 诪砖专讛 讜讻讘讜住讛 砖讛谞讗转谉 讗讞专 讘讬注讜专谉


The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔or you鈥? How do they explain that term? The Gemara answers: From that term 鈥渇or you鈥 it is derived: 鈥淔or you,鈥 similar to 鈥渇or food,鈥 i.e., the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, which excludes soaking and laundering, where the items鈥 benefit follows their consumption.


讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讗讻诇讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讻砖讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讻诐 讛专讬 讻讘讜住讛 讗诪讜专 讛讗 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讗讻诇讛 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗


The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yosei as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔or food鈥? Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: That term is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita, as it is taught: The verse states: 鈥淔or food,鈥 but not for a poultice [melogema]. The baraita continues: Do you say 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for a poultice, or perhaps it is only 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for laundering? When the verse says: 鈥淔or you,鈥 laundering is already stated as permitted since it includes all of one鈥檚 bodily needs. How do I realize the meaning of that which the verse states: 鈥淔or food鈥? It is 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for a poultice.


讜诪讛 专讗讬转 诇专讘讜转 讛讻讘讜住讛 讜诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讛诪诇讜讙诪讗 诪专讘讛 讗谞讬 讗转 讛讻讘讜住讛 砖砖讜讛 讘讻诇 讗讚诐 讜诪讜爪讬讗 讗谞讬 讗转 讛诪诇讜讙诪讗 砖讗讬谞讜 砖讜讛 讘讻诇 讗讚诐


The baraita continues. Should one ask: And what did you see that led you to include the use of Sabbatical Year produce for laundering and to exclude the use of Sabbatical Year produce as a poultice? Perhaps the opposite should be said. The baraita answers: I include the use for laundering, which applies equally to every person, as everyone needs clean clothes, and I exclude the use as a poultice, which does not apply equally to every person; it is only for the ill or wounded.


讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讬诇讜祝 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇注砖讜转 诪诪谞讛 讗驻讬拽讟讜讬讝讬谉 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗讬 讻专讘谞谉 讗讬讻讗 谞诪讬 诪砖专讛 讜讻讘讜住讛


In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: 鈥淔or food,鈥 but not for a poultice; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not for sprinkling wine in one鈥檚 house to provide a pleasant fragrance; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not to make an emetic [apiktevizin] from it to induce vomiting? In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, is there not also soaking and laundering that should have been excluded from the baraita, as in the Rabbis鈥 opinion the use of Sabbatical Year produce for those purposes is forbidden?


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛砖讘讞 讻讜壮 (住讬诪谉 住讘谉)


搂 The mishna (100b) teaches that if the owner gave wool to a dyer to dye it red and instead he dyed it black, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the dyer鈥檚 expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. If the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. The Gemara provides a mnemonic device, the acrostic saban, for the names of the Sages involved in the following incident; each letter in the acrostic represents the middle letter of one of the names: Samekh, Rav Yosef; beit, Rabbi Abba; nun, Rav Huna.


讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗讞讜专讬 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rabbi Abba, and they were both sitting before Rav Huna. And Rav Huna was sitting and saying: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讗讛讚专讬谞讛讜 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗驻讬讛 讗诪专 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讬讞讬讚 讜专讘讬诐 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬诐 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛诇讻讛 讻讬讞讬讚


Rav Yosef turned his face in disdain of Rav Huna鈥檚 statement. He said: Granted, stating that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that there is a principle that when there is a dispute between an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many. Rav Huna therefore teaches us that in this case the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, despite the fact that he is an individual.


专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪诇讜讛 讘砖讟专 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪讛谉 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 谞驻专注讬谉 诪讛谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 讻诪爪讬诇 诪讬讚诐


The Gemara interrupts Rav Yosef鈥檚 remark and asks: What is the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 to which Rav Huna is referring? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says that with regard to a loan with a promissory note, one may not collect the loan from gentiles near the time of their holidays, but with regard to a loan by oral agreement, one may collect from gentiles even near the time of their holidays, because the creditor is considered as one who salvages money from their possession.


讗诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诐 讛讬讗 讜诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诐 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐


But with regard to the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need it? This is an example of the Mishna recording a dispute, and afterward recording only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion. And the principle is that when the Mishna records a dispute, and afterward records only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion, then the halakha is in accordance with the unattributed opinion.


诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讘讘讗 拽诪讗 诇爪讘讜注 诇讜 讗讚讜诐 讜爪讘注讜 砖讞讜专 砖讞讜专 讜爪讘注讜 讗讚讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讚诪讬 爪诪专讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛砖讘讞 讬转专 注诇 讛讬爪讬讗讛 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗转 讛讬爪讬讗讛 讜讗诐 讛讬爪讬讗讛 讬转讬专讛 注诇 讛砖讘讞 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗转 讛砖讘讞 讜住转诐 讘讘讘讗 诪爪讬注讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛 讜讻诇 讛讞讜讝专 讘讜 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛


The Gemara identifies the dispute and the unattributed mishna. The dispute is found in tractate Bava Kamma: If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the expenses, the owner of the wool gives the expenses to the dyer. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. And the unattributed mishna appears in tractate Bava Metzia, as we learned in a mishna there (76a): Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges from an agreement is at a disadvantage. This unattributed mishna accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a craftsman who deviates from his assignment receives either the expenses or the enhancement, whichever is of lesser value.


讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讜住转诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讛讬讗 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗讬 讛讻讬 讻诇 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诪讗 谞讬诪讗 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讜住转诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讛讬讗


The Gemara asks: And being that this is a dispute and afterward an unattributed opinion, why did Rav Huna find it necessary to state that the halakha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that the Mishna is not sequential and, in fact, this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute. And why does Rav Yosef disagree? He disagrees because if that is so, then with regard to every case where a dispute is recorded and afterward an unattributed opinion is recorded, let us say: The Mishna is not sequential, and this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute.


讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讘讞讚讗 诪住讻转讗 讗讘诇 讘转专讬 诪住讻转讜转 讗诪专讬谞谉 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讜诇讛 谞讝讬拽讬谉 讞讚讗 诪住讻转讗 讛讬讗


And Rav Huna would respond: The situation where we do not say that the Mishna is not sequential, i.e., where we say that the Mishna is sequential, is only when both mishnayot appear in one tractate, but when they appear in two different tractates we say that the Mishna is not sequential. Since these mishnayot are found in two different tractates, Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia, the assumption is that the Mishna is not sequential. And Rav Yosef would respond: All of Nezikin, i.e., Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, is one tractate.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讙讘讬 讛诇讻转讗 驻住讬拽转讗 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛 讜讻诇 讛讞讜讝专 讘讜 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛


And if you wish, say that even if Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia are to be considered two separate tractates, Rav Yosef would still hold that Rav Huna鈥檚 statement was unnecessary because it is taught as one of a pair of established halakhot: Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage. Since this ruling was taught with another, established halakha, it is apparent that this is also an established halakha.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛谞讜转谉 诪注讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讜


搂 The Gemara notes another dispute concerning one who deviates from the terms of an agreement. The Sages taught in the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 4:20): One who gives money to his agent


诇讬拽讞 诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜诇拽讞 诪讛诐 砖注讜专讬谉 砖注讜专讬谉 讜诇拽讞 诪讛诐 讞讟讬谉 转谞讬讗 讞讚讗 讗诐 驻讞转讜 驻讞转讜 诇讜 讜讗诐 讛讜转讬专讜 讛讜转讬专讜 诇讜 讜转谞讬 讞讚讗 讗诐 驻讞转讜 驻讞转讜 诇讜 讜讗诐 讛讜转讬专讜 讛讜转讬专讜 诇讗诪爪注


to purchase wheat for him, which he plans to sell at a profit, and instead the agent purchased barley with the money, or if he gave his agent money to purchase barley and instead he purchased wheat with the money, two baraitot issue discordant rulings with regard to the halakha. It is taught in one baraita that if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit is for the agent as well, as he is considered to have abrogated his status as an agent by deviating from the instructions. And it is taught in one baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 4:20) that if there was an agreement that both parties would split the profits from the transaction, if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit goes to the middle, i.e., the agent and the investor split the profit.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


To reconcile the baraitot, Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This is not difficult. This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 讗讬谞讜 拽讜谞讛


Rabbi Yo岣nan explains his rationale: This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a change by an agent that deviates from the terms of his assignment means that the agent acquires the item in question for himself, as in the case of one who was paid to dye wool red but dyed it black. In this case as well, when the agent purchases wheat instead of barley, or vice versa, he acquires the grain for himself. And this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a change by an agent which deviates from the terms of his assignment does not mean that the agent acquires the item in question for himself. It is acquired by the one who appointed the agent, and they split the profits as agreed. But the agent is held responsible for any loss incurred, due to his deviation from the instructions.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讘诪讬讚讬 讚讞讝讬 诇讬讛 诇讙讜驻讬讛 讗讘诇 诇住讞讜专讛 诇讗 讗诪专


Rabbi Elazar objects to this explanation: From where do you say that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda extends to the case of these baraitot? Perhaps Rabbi Meir says that a change by an agent from the terms of his assignment results in the acquisition of the item by the agent only with regard to an item that is fit for use by the one who appointed the agent himself, such as wool dyed the wrong color, which is now not usable for its intended purpose. But Rabbi Meir does not say his ruling with regard to an item purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, since it is intended to be sold for a profit in any event, and the transaction would take effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讗 讜讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讻讗谉 诇住讞讜专讛


Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: Both this baraita and that baraita are written in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is not difficult. Here, in the first baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for eating, and since the one who appointed the agent desired wheat, he does not acquire the barley. There, in the second baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, and the transaction takes effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


诪讞讻讜 注诇讛 讘诪注专讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讻讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇讘注诇 讞讟讬谉 砖讬拽谞讛 讞讟讬谉 诇讘注诇 诪注讜转 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 住住专讟讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讞讟讬谉 谞诪讬 诇讗


The Gemara notes that they laughed at it in the West, Eretz Yisrael, at the explanation of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a deviation by an agent from the terms of his assignment does not result in the acquisition of the item for the agent himself: And who informed the owner of the wheat, i.e., the seller, that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? If the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else鈥檚 behalf, how would the one who appointed the agent acquire the wheat? Rav Shmuel bar Sasrati objects to this rationale: If so, then even in a case where the agent was sent to purchase wheat and he purchased wheat, the one who appointed the agent should not acquire the wheat, since the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else鈥檚 behalf.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讗谞讬 讞讟讬谉 讜讞讟讬谉 讚砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讚诪讬


Rabbi Abbahu said: The case of an agent who was assigned to purchase wheat and purchased wheat is different, as the agent is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like the customer, i.e., the one who appointed him, and it is as though the latter has purchased the grain himself.


转讚注 讚转谞谉 讗讞讚 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 讜讗讞讚 讛诪注专讬讱 讗转 注爪诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 讘讻住讜转 讘谞讬讜 讜诇讗 讘爪讘注 砖爪讘注 诇砖诪谉 讜诇讗 讘住谞讚诇讬诐 讞讚砖讬诐 砖诇拽讞谉 诇砖诪谉


Rabbi Abbahu further explains: Know that the agent is viewed as an extension of the one who appointed him, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 24a): Concerning both one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasury does not have any rights with regard to the donor鈥檚 wife鈥檚 clothing; and not with regard to his children鈥檚 clothing; and not with regard to new clothes colored with dye that the donor dyed for his wife or children; and not with regard to new sandals that the donor purchased for his wife or children. Presumably, the treasurer has no right to these items because they are for the personal use of the donor鈥檚 wife and children, and are considered as if owned by them.


讜讗诪讗讬 诇讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇爪讘注 砖讬拽谞讛 爪讘注讜 诇讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 [讚砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬讚 讗砖转讜 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬] 砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讚诪讬


Rabbi Abbahu continues: And why is it so, i.e., why is it that the wife is considered the owner of the dyed clothing for which the husband paid? Here also, let us say: Who informed the dyer that he should transfer his dye to the wife? Rather, is it not because we say that the husband is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like an extension of his wife鈥檚 hand? Here also, in the case of one who purchases grain for another, the agent is performing his assignment, and is like an extension of the customer鈥檚 hand.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 讻诇 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 讗讬谉 讚注转讜 注诇 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜


The Gemara rejects this explanation. Rabbi Abba said: No, the reason for the ruling of the mishna is that the intention of anyone who consecrates his property is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, i.e., he does not intend to consecrate those items.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜讻讬 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 转驻讬诇讬讜 讜转谞谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 诪注诇讬谉 诇讜 转驻讬诇讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬谉 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 转驻讬诇讬谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 住讘专 诪爪讜讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚谞讗 讜讗讬谉 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛


Rabbi Zeira objects to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation: And is it the intention of a person who consecrates his property to do so upon his phylacteries? Presumably not. And we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 23b) that with regard to one who consecrates all of his property, his phylacteries are evaluated for him and consecrated. Apparently, lack of intent to consecrate a particular item does not prevent its consecration. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Yes, the intention of a person who consecrates his property is upon his phylacteries, because one who consecrates his property thinks to himself: I am performing a mitzva, and he therefore intends to include his phylacteries; but the intention of a person is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, due to the enmity that would be engendered if he consecrated their clothing.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讜砖注讬讗 讜讛诇讗 讞讬讬讘讬 注专讻讬谉 砖谞讜 讻讗谉 讜转谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬 注专讻讬谉 诪诪砖讻谞讬谉 讗讜转谉


Rav Oshaya also objects to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation: But is it not so that the matter of those who are obligated in valuations was taught here in the mishna, and we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21a): Concerning those who are obligated in valuations, the Temple treasury seizes collateral from them to force them to fulfill their vow.


讜讻讬 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 注爪诪讜 诇诪砖讻谞讜


And is the intention of a person upon himself to allow the treasurer to seize collateral from him? Presumably not. Nevertheless, collateral is seized from him, proving that one鈥檚 intention does not prevent consecration. Accordingly, even if it is assumed that he does not intend to consecrate the clothing of his wife or children, the clothing should nevertheless be consecrated. Why, then, is the clothing of his wife or children not consecrated?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讻诇 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讛拽谞讛 诇讛谉 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诪注讬拽专讗


Rather, Rabbi Abba also holds that the reason the clothing is not consecrated is not due to his intent, and he said a different explanation: Anyone who consecrates his property becomes as one who transferred his wife鈥檚 and his children鈥檚 clothing to them at the outset. Therefore, the clothing did not belong to him at the time that he consecrated his property.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 讞讘讬专讜 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪讻讜专


搂 The Gemara presents another situation in which one makes a purchase involving a third party. The Sages taught: In the case of one who purchases a field in the name of another, he is not compelled to sell it. But if he said to him at the time of the sale: I will purchase the field on the condition that he will sell it to me, he is compelled to sell it.


诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖诐 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗转 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专


Noting the ambiguity of this statement, the Gemara asks: What is it saying? Rav Sheshet said that this is what it is saying: With regard to one who purchases a field from another, claiming that he is acting in the name of the Exilarch or another dominant figure, so that others will be discouraged from contesting the sale, the Exilarch is not compelled to sell it to him, i.e., the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field belongs to the purchaser. But if the purchaser said to the seller: I will purchase the field on the condition that the Exilarch will provide me with that documentation, the Exilarch is compelled to sell it to him, i.e., to provide him with the documentation.


讗诪专 诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 诪讻诇诇 讚诪拽谞讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讗 讚讘谞讬 诪注专讘讗 讚讗诪专讬 讜讻讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇讘注诇 讞讟讬谉 砖讬拽谞讛 讞讟讬谉 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转


The Gemara questions Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation. The Master said: With regard to one who purchases a field in the name of the Exilarch, the Exilarch is not compelled to sell it to him. Since the baraita teaches only that the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field is his, it can be understood by inference that the purchaser has nevertheless acquired the field for himself. Let us say that this interpretation of the baraita disagrees with the statement of the residents of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who say: And who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the customer? Since the seller assumed he was selling the field to the Exilarch, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael would hold that the sale does not take effect.


讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讜讚注讬讛 诇讘注诇 砖讚讛 讜讗讜讚注讬谞讛讜 诇住讛讚讬


The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to this inference that it is surmised that the baraita is in conflict with the opinion of the Sages of Eretz Yisrael, it is not difficult, as it can be said that the baraita is discussing a case where the purchaser informed the owner of the field and informed the witnesses that he intends to purchase the field for himself.


讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 讗诪讗讬 讜诇讬诪讗 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇讗 讬拽专讬讬讻讜 讘注讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讝讬诇讜转讬讬讻讜 讘注讬谞讗


The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation for a different reason. Rather, say that the latter clause is difficult, as it states that if the purchaser said to the seller: I will purchase the field on the condition that the Exilarch will sell it to me, the Exilarch is compelled to sell it to him. Why should the Exilarch be compelled to provide the purchaser with documentation? But let the Exilarch say: I do not desire your esteem nor do I desire your disgrace, i.e., I am not involved in your affairs. Since the Exilarch had not been party to the negotiations, how can a stipulation stated by the purchaser render him obligated?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 讞讘讬专讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗


Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: With regard to one who purchases a field in the name of his friend, the Exilarch,


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Bava Kamma 102

住转诐 注爪讬诐 诇讛住拽讛 讛谉 注讜诪讚讬谉


Unspecified wood exists for fuel, i.e., charcoal, so its benefit follows its consumption.


讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜注爪讬诐 诇讛住拽讛 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬谉 诪讜住专讬谉 驻讬专讜转 砖讘讬注讬转 诇讗 诇诪砖专讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 砖讘讬注讬转 诇转讜讱 讛诪砖专讛 讜诇转讜讱 讛讻讘讜住讛


Rav Kahana says: And the matter of whether kindling wood, whose benefit follows its consumption, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is a dispute among the tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Shevi鈥檌t 6:25): One may not transfer Sabbatical Year produce, e.g., wine, to another person; neither for soaking flax to prepare it for spinning, as the benefit derived from the flax follows its soaking, when the soaked and spun thread is woven into a garment; nor for laundering with it, as the benefit derived follows the laundering when one wears the clean clothes. Soaking the flax or laundering the garment in wine is considered the consumption of the wine, as it is no longer potable. And Rabbi Yosei says: One may transfer to another Sabbatical Year produce for soaking and for laundering.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪砖专讛 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讻诐 诇讻诇 爪专讻讬讻诐


The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for the statement of the Rabbis? The verse states with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: 鈥淔or food鈥 (Leviticus 25:6), from which it is inferred: But not for soaking; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not for laundering. And Rabbi Yosei says that it is permitted, as the verse also states: 鈥淔or you,鈥 from which it is inferred: For you, for all your needs, even for soaking and for laundering.


讜专讘谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讻诐 诇讻诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诇讗讻诇讛 讘诪讬 砖讛谞讗转讜 讜讘讬注讜专讜 砖讜讬谉 讬爪讗讜 诪砖专讛 讜讻讘讜住讛 砖讛谞讗转谉 讗讞专 讘讬注讜专谉


The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔or you鈥? How do they explain that term? The Gemara answers: From that term 鈥渇or you鈥 it is derived: 鈥淔or you,鈥 similar to 鈥渇or food,鈥 i.e., the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, which excludes soaking and laundering, where the items鈥 benefit follows their consumption.


讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 诇讗讻诇讛 讗诪专 诇讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讻讘讜住讛 讻砖讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讻诐 讛专讬 讻讘讜住讛 讗诪讜专 讛讗 诪讛 讗谞讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讗讻诇讛 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗


The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yosei as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔or food鈥? Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: That term is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita, as it is taught: The verse states: 鈥淔or food,鈥 but not for a poultice [melogema]. The baraita continues: Do you say 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for a poultice, or perhaps it is only 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for laundering? When the verse says: 鈥淔or you,鈥 laundering is already stated as permitted since it includes all of one鈥檚 bodily needs. How do I realize the meaning of that which the verse states: 鈥淔or food鈥? It is 鈥渇or food鈥 but not for a poultice.


讜诪讛 专讗讬转 诇专讘讜转 讛讻讘讜住讛 讜诇讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讛诪诇讜讙诪讗 诪专讘讛 讗谞讬 讗转 讛讻讘讜住讛 砖砖讜讛 讘讻诇 讗讚诐 讜诪讜爪讬讗 讗谞讬 讗转 讛诪诇讜讙诪讗 砖讗讬谞讜 砖讜讛 讘讻诇 讗讚诐


The baraita continues. Should one ask: And what did you see that led you to include the use of Sabbatical Year produce for laundering and to exclude the use of Sabbatical Year produce as a poultice? Perhaps the opposite should be said. The baraita answers: I include the use for laundering, which applies equally to every person, as everyone needs clean clothes, and I exclude the use as a poultice, which does not apply equally to every person; it is only for the ill or wounded.


讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇诪诇讜讙诪讗 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讬诇讜祝 诇讗讻诇讛 讜诇讗 诇注砖讜转 诪诪谞讛 讗驻讬拽讟讜讬讝讬谉 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗讬 讻专讘谞谉 讗讬讻讗 谞诪讬 诪砖专讛 讜讻讘讜住讛


In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: 鈥淔or food,鈥 but not for a poultice; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not for sprinkling wine in one鈥檚 house to provide a pleasant fragrance; 鈥渇or food,鈥 but not to make an emetic [apiktevizin] from it to induce vomiting? In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, is there not also soaking and laundering that should have been excluded from the baraita, as in the Rabbis鈥 opinion the use of Sabbatical Year produce for those purposes is forbidden?


专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛砖讘讞 讻讜壮 (住讬诪谉 住讘谉)


搂 The mishna (100b) teaches that if the owner gave wool to a dyer to dye it red and instead he dyed it black, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the dyer鈥檚 expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. If the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. The Gemara provides a mnemonic device, the acrostic saban, for the names of the Sages involved in the following incident; each letter in the acrostic represents the middle letter of one of the names: Samekh, Rav Yosef; beit, Rabbi Abba; nun, Rav Huna.


讬转讬讘 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗讞讜专讬 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讬转讬讘 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rabbi Abba, and they were both sitting before Rav Huna. And Rav Huna was sitting and saying: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讗讛讚专讬谞讛讜 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗驻讬讛 讗诪专 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讬讞讬讚 讜专讘讬诐 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬诐 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛诇讻讛 讻讬讞讬讚


Rav Yosef turned his face in disdain of Rav Huna鈥檚 statement. He said: Granted, stating that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that there is a principle that when there is a dispute between an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many. Rav Huna therefore teaches us that in this case the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣, despite the fact that he is an individual.


专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 拽专讞讛 讗讜诪专 诪诇讜讛 讘砖讟专 讗讬谉 谞驻专注讬谉 诪讛谉 诪诇讜讛 注诇 驻讛 谞驻专注讬谉 诪讛谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 讻诪爪讬诇 诪讬讚诐


The Gemara interrupts Rav Yosef鈥檚 remark and asks: What is the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 to which Rav Huna is referring? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kor岣 says that with regard to a loan with a promissory note, one may not collect the loan from gentiles near the time of their holidays, but with regard to a loan by oral agreement, one may collect from gentiles even near the time of their holidays, because the creditor is considered as one who salvages money from their possession.


讗诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇诪讛 诇讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诐 讛讬讗 讜诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诐 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐


But with regard to the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need it? This is an example of the Mishna recording a dispute, and afterward recording only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion. And the principle is that when the Mishna records a dispute, and afterward records only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion, then the halakha is in accordance with the unattributed opinion.


诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讘讘讗 拽诪讗 诇爪讘讜注 诇讜 讗讚讜诐 讜爪讘注讜 砖讞讜专 砖讞讜专 讜爪讘注讜 讗讚讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讚诪讬 爪诪专讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛砖讘讞 讬转专 注诇 讛讬爪讬讗讛 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗转 讛讬爪讬讗讛 讜讗诐 讛讬爪讬讗讛 讬转讬专讛 注诇 讛砖讘讞 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讗转 讛砖讘讞 讜住转诐 讘讘讘讗 诪爪讬注讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛 讜讻诇 讛讞讜讝专 讘讜 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛


The Gemara identifies the dispute and the unattributed mishna. The dispute is found in tractate Bava Kamma: If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the expenses, the owner of the wool gives the expenses to the dyer. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. And the unattributed mishna appears in tractate Bava Metzia, as we learned in a mishna there (76a): Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges from an agreement is at a disadvantage. This unattributed mishna accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a craftsman who deviates from his assignment receives either the expenses or the enhancement, whichever is of lesser value.


讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讜住转诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讛讬讗 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗讬 讛讻讬 讻诇 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 住转诪讗 谞讬诪讗 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讜住转诐 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讛讬讗


The Gemara asks: And being that this is a dispute and afterward an unattributed opinion, why did Rav Huna find it necessary to state that the halakha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that the Mishna is not sequential and, in fact, this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute. And why does Rav Yosef disagree? He disagrees because if that is so, then with regard to every case where a dispute is recorded and afterward an unattributed opinion is recorded, let us say: The Mishna is not sequential, and this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute.


讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬谉 住讚专 诇诪砖谞讛 讘讞讚讗 诪住讻转讗 讗讘诇 讘转专讬 诪住讻转讜转 讗诪专讬谞谉 讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讜诇讛 谞讝讬拽讬谉 讞讚讗 诪住讻转讗 讛讬讗


And Rav Huna would respond: The situation where we do not say that the Mishna is not sequential, i.e., where we say that the Mishna is sequential, is only when both mishnayot appear in one tractate, but when they appear in two different tractates we say that the Mishna is not sequential. Since these mishnayot are found in two different tractates, Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia, the assumption is that the Mishna is not sequential. And Rav Yosef would respond: All of Nezikin, i.e., Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, is one tractate.


讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讙讘讬 讛诇讻转讗 驻住讬拽转讗 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛 讜讻诇 讛讞讜讝专 讘讜 讬讚讜 注诇 讛转讞转讜谞讛


And if you wish, say that even if Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia are to be considered two separate tractates, Rav Yosef would still hold that Rav Huna鈥檚 statement was unnecessary because it is taught as one of a pair of established halakhot: Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage. Since this ruling was taught with another, established halakha, it is apparent that this is also an established halakha.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛谞讜转谉 诪注讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讜


搂 The Gemara notes another dispute concerning one who deviates from the terms of an agreement. The Sages taught in the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 4:20): One who gives money to his agent


诇讬拽讞 诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜诇拽讞 诪讛诐 砖注讜专讬谉 砖注讜专讬谉 讜诇拽讞 诪讛诐 讞讟讬谉 转谞讬讗 讞讚讗 讗诐 驻讞转讜 驻讞转讜 诇讜 讜讗诐 讛讜转讬专讜 讛讜转讬专讜 诇讜 讜转谞讬 讞讚讗 讗诐 驻讞转讜 驻讞转讜 诇讜 讜讗诐 讛讜转讬专讜 讛讜转讬专讜 诇讗诪爪注


to purchase wheat for him, which he plans to sell at a profit, and instead the agent purchased barley with the money, or if he gave his agent money to purchase barley and instead he purchased wheat with the money, two baraitot issue discordant rulings with regard to the halakha. It is taught in one baraita that if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit is for the agent as well, as he is considered to have abrogated his status as an agent by deviating from the instructions. And it is taught in one baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 4:20) that if there was an agreement that both parties would split the profits from the transaction, if there was a loss, the loss is for the agent, and if there was a profit, the profit goes to the middle, i.e., the agent and the investor split the profit.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛


To reconcile the baraitot, Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This is not difficult. This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.


讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜谞讛 讜讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 砖讬谞讜讬 讗讬谞讜 拽讜谞讛


Rabbi Yo岣nan explains his rationale: This first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a change by an agent that deviates from the terms of his assignment means that the agent acquires the item in question for himself, as in the case of one who was paid to dye wool red but dyed it black. In this case as well, when the agent purchases wheat instead of barley, or vice versa, he acquires the grain for himself. And this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a change by an agent which deviates from the terms of his assignment does not mean that the agent acquires the item in question for himself. It is acquired by the one who appointed the agent, and they split the profits as agreed. But the agent is held responsible for any loss incurred, due to his deviation from the instructions.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讘诪讬讚讬 讚讞讝讬 诇讬讛 诇讙讜驻讬讛 讗讘诇 诇住讞讜专讛 诇讗 讗诪专


Rabbi Elazar objects to this explanation: From where do you say that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda extends to the case of these baraitot? Perhaps Rabbi Meir says that a change by an agent from the terms of his assignment results in the acquisition of the item by the agent only with regard to an item that is fit for use by the one who appointed the agent himself, such as wool dyed the wrong color, which is now not usable for its intended purpose. But Rabbi Meir does not say his ruling with regard to an item purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, since it is intended to be sold for a profit in any event, and the transaction would take effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讗 讜讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 诇讗讻讬诇讛 讻讗谉 诇住讞讜专讛


Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: Both this baraita and that baraita are written in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is not difficult. Here, in the first baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for eating, and since the one who appointed the agent desired wheat, he does not acquire the barley. There, in the second baraita, it is discussing grain purchased for subsequent sale as merchandise, and the transaction takes effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


诪讞讻讜 注诇讛 讘诪注专讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讻讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇讘注诇 讞讟讬谉 砖讬拽谞讛 讞讟讬谉 诇讘注诇 诪注讜转 诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 住住专讟讬 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讟讬谉 讜讞讟讬谉 谞诪讬 诇讗


The Gemara notes that they laughed at it in the West, Eretz Yisrael, at the explanation of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a deviation by an agent from the terms of his assignment does not result in the acquisition of the item for the agent himself: And who informed the owner of the wheat, i.e., the seller, that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? If the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else鈥檚 behalf, how would the one who appointed the agent acquire the wheat? Rav Shmuel bar Sasrati objects to this rationale: If so, then even in a case where the agent was sent to purchase wheat and he purchased wheat, the one who appointed the agent should not acquire the wheat, since the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else鈥檚 behalf.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讗谞讬 讞讟讬谉 讜讞讟讬谉 讚砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讚诪讬


Rabbi Abbahu said: The case of an agent who was assigned to purchase wheat and purchased wheat is different, as the agent is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like the customer, i.e., the one who appointed him, and it is as though the latter has purchased the grain himself.


转讚注 讚转谞谉 讗讞讚 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 讜讗讞讚 讛诪注专讬讱 讗转 注爪诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜诇讗 讘讻住讜转 讘谞讬讜 讜诇讗 讘爪讘注 砖爪讘注 诇砖诪谉 讜诇讗 讘住谞讚诇讬诐 讞讚砖讬诐 砖诇拽讞谉 诇砖诪谉


Rabbi Abbahu further explains: Know that the agent is viewed as an extension of the one who appointed him, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 24a): Concerning both one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasury does not have any rights with regard to the donor鈥檚 wife鈥檚 clothing; and not with regard to his children鈥檚 clothing; and not with regard to new clothes colored with dye that the donor dyed for his wife or children; and not with regard to new sandals that the donor purchased for his wife or children. Presumably, the treasurer has no right to these items because they are for the personal use of the donor鈥檚 wife and children, and are considered as if owned by them.


讜讗诪讗讬 诇讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇爪讘注 砖讬拽谞讛 爪讘注讜 诇讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗诪专讬谞谉 [讚砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬讚 讗砖转讜 讚诪讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬] 砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讜讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讚诪讬


Rabbi Abbahu continues: And why is it so, i.e., why is it that the wife is considered the owner of the dyed clothing for which the husband paid? Here also, let us say: Who informed the dyer that he should transfer his dye to the wife? Rather, is it not because we say that the husband is performing his assignment and, as such, he is like an extension of his wife鈥檚 hand? Here also, in the case of one who purchases grain for another, the agent is performing his assignment, and is like an extension of the customer鈥檚 hand.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 诇讗 讻诇 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 讗讬谉 讚注转讜 注诇 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜


The Gemara rejects this explanation. Rabbi Abba said: No, the reason for the ruling of the mishna is that the intention of anyone who consecrates his property is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, i.e., he does not intend to consecrate those items.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讜讻讬 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 转驻讬诇讬讜 讜转谞谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 诪注诇讬谉 诇讜 转驻讬诇讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗讬谉 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 转驻讬诇讬谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 住讘专 诪爪讜讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚谞讗 讜讗讬谉 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛


Rabbi Zeira objects to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation: And is it the intention of a person who consecrates his property to do so upon his phylacteries? Presumably not. And we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 23b) that with regard to one who consecrates all of his property, his phylacteries are evaluated for him and consecrated. Apparently, lack of intent to consecrate a particular item does not prevent its consecration. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Yes, the intention of a person who consecrates his property is upon his phylacteries, because one who consecrates his property thinks to himself: I am performing a mitzva, and he therefore intends to include his phylacteries; but the intention of a person is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, due to the enmity that would be engendered if he consecrated their clothing.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讜砖注讬讗 讜讛诇讗 讞讬讬讘讬 注专讻讬谉 砖谞讜 讻讗谉 讜转谞谉 讞讬讬讘讬 注专讻讬谉 诪诪砖讻谞讬谉 讗讜转谉


Rav Oshaya also objects to Rabbi Abba鈥檚 explanation: But is it not so that the matter of those who are obligated in valuations was taught here in the mishna, and we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21a): Concerning those who are obligated in valuations, the Temple treasury seizes collateral from them to force them to fulfill their vow.


讜讻讬 讚注转讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 注诇 注爪诪讜 诇诪砖讻谞讜


And is the intention of a person upon himself to allow the treasurer to seize collateral from him? Presumably not. Nevertheless, collateral is seized from him, proving that one鈥檚 intention does not prevent consecration. Accordingly, even if it is assumed that he does not intend to consecrate the clothing of his wife or children, the clothing should nevertheless be consecrated. Why, then, is the clothing of his wife or children not consecrated?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讻诇 讛诪拽讚讬砖 谞讻住讬讜 谞注砖讛 讻诪讬 砖讛拽谞讛 诇讛谉 讻住讜转 讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诪注讬拽专讗


Rather, Rabbi Abba also holds that the reason the clothing is not consecrated is not due to his intent, and he said a different explanation: Anyone who consecrates his property becomes as one who transferred his wife鈥檚 and his children鈥檚 clothing to them at the outset. Therefore, the clothing did not belong to him at the time that he consecrated his property.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 讞讘讬专讜 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 诇诪讻讜专


搂 The Gemara presents another situation in which one makes a purchase involving a third party. The Sages taught: In the case of one who purchases a field in the name of another, he is not compelled to sell it. But if he said to him at the time of the sale: I will purchase the field on the condition that he will sell it to me, he is compelled to sell it.


诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖诐 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 讗诪专 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗转 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专


Noting the ambiguity of this statement, the Gemara asks: What is it saying? Rav Sheshet said that this is what it is saying: With regard to one who purchases a field from another, claiming that he is acting in the name of the Exilarch or another dominant figure, so that others will be discouraged from contesting the sale, the Exilarch is not compelled to sell it to him, i.e., the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field belongs to the purchaser. But if the purchaser said to the seller: I will purchase the field on the condition that the Exilarch will provide me with that documentation, the Exilarch is compelled to sell it to him, i.e., to provide him with the documentation.


讗诪专 诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 讗讬谉 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 诪讻诇诇 讚诪拽谞讗 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讗 讚讘谞讬 诪注专讘讗 讚讗诪专讬 讜讻讬 诪讬 讛讜讚讬注讜 诇讘注诇 讞讟讬谉 砖讬拽谞讛 讞讟讬谉 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转


The Gemara questions Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation. The Master said: With regard to one who purchases a field in the name of the Exilarch, the Exilarch is not compelled to sell it to him. Since the baraita teaches only that the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field is his, it can be understood by inference that the purchaser has nevertheless acquired the field for himself. Let us say that this interpretation of the baraita disagrees with the statement of the residents of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who say: And who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the customer? Since the seller assumed he was selling the field to the Exilarch, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael would hold that the sale does not take effect.


讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讜讚注讬讛 诇讘注诇 砖讚讛 讜讗讜讚注讬谞讛讜 诇住讛讚讬


The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to this inference that it is surmised that the baraita is in conflict with the opinion of the Sages of Eretz Yisrael, it is not difficult, as it can be said that the baraita is discussing a case where the purchaser informed the owner of the field and informed the witnesses that he intends to purchase the field for himself.


讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 注诇 诪谞转 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇诪讻讜专 讗诪讗讬 讜诇讬诪讗 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇讗 讬拽专讬讬讻讜 讘注讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讝讬诇讜转讬讬讻讜 讘注讬谞讗


The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation for a different reason. Rather, say that the latter clause is difficult, as it states that if the purchaser said to the seller: I will purchase the field on the condition that the Exilarch will sell it to me, the Exilarch is compelled to sell it to him. Why should the Exilarch be compelled to provide the purchaser with documentation? But let the Exilarch say: I do not desire your esteem nor do I desire your disgrace, i.e., I am not involved in your affairs. Since the Exilarch had not been party to the negotiations, how can a stipulation stated by the purchaser render him obligated?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 砖讚讛 讘砖诐 讞讘讬专讜 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗


Rather, Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: With regard to one who purchases a field in the name of his friend, the Exilarch,


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