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Today's Daf Yomi

September 11, 2016 | ื—ืณ ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืขืดื•

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 103

An opinion of the people in Israel is brought that claims that if a middleman changes from what the buyer wants, the buyer cannot acquire the item because the seller had no intent to give rights to the buyer – his intent was on the middleman. ย A braita is brought to contradict that claim – however it is explained that the issue in the braita was not the same. ย A case with Rav was brought to support their opinion but then it was explained that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. ย The ishna discusses an asham gezeila – in a case where someone steals and swears that he didn’t and later regrets it and admits that he lied, he must make sure to return the item to the original owner, even if it means it will cost him money to travel to find the owner.


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ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ื–ื™ืžื ื ืื—ืจื™ืชื™ ื•ืื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ

the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner of the field. But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืฉื“ื” ื‘ืฉื ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ื–ื™ืžื ื ืื—ืจื™ืชื™ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžื™ื“ืข ื™ื“ืขืช ื“ืื ื ืœื ืคืฉืื™ ืฉืงื™ืœื ื ื•ืคื ื—ื™ื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื ื“ืงื‘ืขื™ื ื ื•ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื‘ื›ื“ื™ ืœื ืฉื“ื™ื ื ืืœื ืื“ืขืชื ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืœื™ื” ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืขื ื™ื™ื ื ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœืš ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ื”ื”ื•ื ื“ื–ื‘ื ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ื•ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืœืš ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื

The Gemara clarifies the baraita: The Master said: In the case of one who purchases a field in the name of another, the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t this obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the purchaser can say to the seller: You knew that I took, i.e., purchased, the field for myself, and it was merely for protection [ufanaแธฅya] that I desired to obtain ownership by claiming to purchase it in the name of the other person, and I do not throw out money for naught. Rather, it was with the intention that you will write another document for him, i.e., the seller, stating that I purchased the field. The baraita therefore teaches us that the seller can say to him: I have performed a matter for you together with the one in whose name you purchased the field, and let him write you another document.

ื•ืื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืœืกื”ื“ื™ ืงืžื™ื” ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื—ื–ื• ื“ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืงื ื‘ืขื™ื ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืฉื˜ืจื ืžื”ื™ืืš ื“ืงื ืฉืงืœืช ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ืงืืžืจืช ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื”ื›ื™ ื˜ืจื—ื™ ื•ืืžืจื™ ืœื”ื• ืœืขื“ื™ื ืงืžืš ื“ืžื™ื ืš ื”ื•ื ื“ืงื ื‘ืขื™ื ื

The Gemara discusses Abayeโ€™s interpretation of the latter clause of the baraita, which states: But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again. Isnโ€™t that obvious? No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the purchaser said to the witnesses in front of the seller: You can see that I require another document. Lest you say that the seller can say to him: I thought that it was a document from the one in whose name you purchased the field that you were saying you required, and not from me. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the purchaser can say to him: It was for this that I took the trouble and said to the witnesses, in front of you, that I require another document, as it is from you that I require the document.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื™ื”ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื ืื›ื™ืชื ื ืœืกื•ืฃ ืื™ื™ืงืจ ื›ื™ืชื ื ื–ื‘ื ื™ื” ืžืจื•ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ื›ื™ืชื ื ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžื” ืืขื‘ื™ื“ ืื™ื–ื™ืœ ืื™ืฉืงื™ืœ ื–ื•ื–ืื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื ื™ ืืžืจื™ ื”ืื™ ื›ื™ืชื ื ื“ื›ื”ื ื ื”ื•ื ื–ื™ืœ ืฉืงื•ืœ ื•ืื™ ืœื ืœื ืชืฉืงื•ืœ

ยง The Gemara mentions a related incident: Rav Kahana gave money to a salesman in exchange for flax, and temporarily left the flax in the possession of the seller. Ultimately, the flax appreciated in value and the owner of the flax sold it for a greater profit on behalf of Rav Kahana, intending to give him all of the money. Rav Kahana then came before Rav, and said to him: What should I do? Should I go and take my money, or would doing so have the appearance of collecting interest for a loan? Rav said to Rav Kahana: If, when they sold the flax, they said: This flax is Kahanaโ€™s, go take the money, as in such a case it is as though the flax was purchased directly from you. But if they did not say this, do not take the money, since you would be receiving a greater sum of money than you provided, and this would appear to be a loan repaid with interest.

ื›ืžืืŸ ื›ื‘ื ื™ ืžืขืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืžื™ ื”ื•ื“ื™ืขื• ืœื‘ืขืœ ื—ื˜ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืงื ื” ื—ื˜ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืขืœ ืžืขื•ืช

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion was Ravโ€™s ruling? Was it only in accordance with the opinion of the people of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who say: Who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? As the Gemara taught earlier, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael hold that the sale can be performed on anotherโ€™s behalf only if such an arrangement is explicitly stated at the time of the transaction. In this case as well, if the seller did not explicitly state that the money would belong to Rav Kahana, all the money from the sale would be acquired by the seller, who would then be prohibited to give it to Rav Kahana due to the appearance of paying interest.

ืื˜ื• ืžื™ ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืืจื‘ืข ื•ืฉืงื™ืœ ืชืžื ื™ ื›ื™ืชื ื ืžืžื™ืœื ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ื™ืงืจ ืžื™ื’ื–ืœ ื’ื–ืœื•ื” ื•ืชื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื”ื’ื–ืœื ื™ืŸ ืžืฉืœืžื™ืŸ ื›ืฉืขืช ื”ื’ื–ืœื”

The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that Rav Kahana gave four dinars and took eight in return? He did not lend money to the seller. Rather, the flax appreciated in value by itself, and when the seller sold it he robbed Rav Kahana of his flax, and we learned in a mishna (93b) that all robbers pay compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. Therefore, according to all opinions the seller owes Rav Kahana the value of the flax at the time the seller sold it for its appreciated value, and Rav Kahanaโ€™s accepting the money would not constitute collecting interest for a loan.

ืืžืจื™ ื”ืชื ืืžื ื” ื”ื•ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžืฉื›ื™ื” ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืœื›ื™ืชื ื ื•ืจื‘ ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืืžื ื” ื‘ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืืžื ื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ื

Having rejected the previous explanation of Ravโ€™s ruling, the Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case. The Sages say: There, it was a matter of trust, as the seller was paid in advance and Rav Kahana did not pull the flax as an act of acquisition, or perform any other formal act of acquisition. Consequently, at the time of the second sale the flax belonged to the seller. And Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: One may make an arrangement of trust with regard to the delivery of items such as produce, i.e., one may pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the produce at a later date, but one may not make an arrangement of trust with regard to money, i.e., one may not pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the value of the produce at a later date, as this has the appearance of collecting interest.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื’ื•ื–ืœ ืืช ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ื™ื•ืœื™ื›ื ื• ืื—ืจื™ื• ืœืžื“ื™ ืœื ื™ืชืŸ ืœื ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื ืœืฉืœื•ื—ื• ืื‘ืœ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœืฉืœื™ื— ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื ืžืช ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื•

MISHNA: One who robs another of an item having the value of at least one peruta and takes a false oath to the robbery victim claiming his innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must bring the money, which includes the principal together with an additional one-fifth payment, to the robbery victim, even if this necessitates following after him to a distant place like Medea. The robber may not give the payment to the robbery victimโ€™s son to return it to the robbery victim, and neither may he give it to his agent, but he may give the payment to an agent of the court. And if the robbery victim dies, he returns it to his heirs.

ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ืœื ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื–ื” ื•ืขืœ ื–ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืคื—ื•ืช ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื‘ืงืจืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืœืš ืื—ืจื™ื• ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืœื ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื–ื” ื•ืขืœ ื–ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื‘ืงืจืŸ ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืœืš ืื—ืจื™ื•

If he gave the robbery victim the principal value of the stolen item but did not give him the additional one-fifth payment, or if the owner forgave him concerning the principal but did not forgive him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of less than one peruta of the principal, he need not pursue him to repay the remaining debt. By contrast, if he gave the robbery victim the additional one-fifth payment but did not give him the principal, or if the robbery victim forgave him concerning the additional one-fifth payment but did not forgive him concerning the principal, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of one peruta of the principal, he must pursue him to repay the remaining debt.

ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ

If the robber gave the robbery victim the principal and took a false oath to him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, asserting that he had already paid it,

ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืžืฉืœื ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืขืœ ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชืžืขื˜ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื”

then the additional one-fifth is considered a new principal obligation. The robber pays an additional one-fifth payment apart from the additional one-fifth payment about which he had taken a false oath. If he then takes a false oath concerning the second one-fifth payment, he is assessed an additional one-fifth payment for that oath, until the principal, i.e., the additional one-fifth payment about which he has most recently taken the false oath, is reduced to less than the value of one peruta.

ื•ื›ืŸ ื‘ืคืงื“ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื• ื‘ืคืงื“ื•ืŸ ืื• ื‘ืชืฉื•ืžืช ื™ื“ ืื• ื‘ื’ื–ืœ ืื• ืขืฉืง ืืช ืขืžื™ืชื• ืื• ืžืฆื ืื‘ื“ื” ื•ื›ื—ืฉ ื‘ื” ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืขืœ ืฉืงืจ ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืžืฉืœื ืงืจืŸ ื•ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืืฉื

And such is the halakha with regard to a deposit, as it is stated: โ€œIf anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deals falsely with it, and swears to a lieโ€ฆhe shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to itโ€ (Leviticus 5:21โ€“24). This one must pay the principal and an additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.

ื’ืžืณ ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืœื ืžื ื™ ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ื•ื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื•ืชื™ ื’ื–ืœ ืžื ื™ื— ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ืœื ื–ื• ื“ืจืš ืžื•ืฆื™ืืชื• ืžื™ื“ื™ ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ [ื•ืื—ื“]

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a robber took a false oath that he did not rob, he must travel even as far as Medea in order to repay the robbery victim. This indicates that if he takes an oath to the robbery victim, yes, he is required to go to any length to repay his obligation, but if he did not take an oath to him, no, he does not have to do so. Whose opinion is this? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon and not the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna (Yevamot 118b): If one robbed one of five people and he does not know which of them he robbed, and each one of the five says: He robbed me, the robber places the stolen item between them and withdraws from them; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression. He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five.

ืžื ื™ ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืืžืจ ืžื ื™ื— ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna written? If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, it is not so, because even though the robber took a false oath that he did not rob, Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws; it is not his responsibility to ensure that it reaches the robbery victim. If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, it is also not so, because even though the robber did not necessarily take a false oath, Rabbi Akiva says: He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, while the mishna rules that his obligation is contingent upon his having taken the false oath.

ืœืขื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ื™ื ื•ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื”ื•ื ื“ืงืืžืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืฉืจ ื”ื•ื ืœื• ื™ืชื ื ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืืฉืžืชื•

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and when Rabbi Akiva says that the robber is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, it is only in a case where the robber took a false oath that Rabbi Akiva says this. What is the reason? As the verse states with regard to one who takes a false oath concerning a financial obligation: โ€œUnto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, on the day of his being guiltyโ€ (Leviticus 5:24). The halakha that the guilty party must make a rigorous effort to return what he owes is stated in the case of one who took a false oath, and Rabbi Akiva would state his ruling only in that case.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืื•ืžืจ ืชืงื ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื”ืชืงื™ื ื• ืฉืื ื”ื™ืชื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžืฉืœื ืงืจืŸ ื•ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืœื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžื‘ื™ื ืืฉืžื• ื•ืžืชื›ืคืจ ืœื•

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Tarfon rule that a robber who took a false oath is not required to pay all claimants, being that the verse indicates otherwise? The Gemara answers: Even though he took a false oath and by Torah law is obligated to return the stolen item to the robbery victim, the Sages instituted an ordinance allowing him to place it between the five possible victims, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The Sages instituted a great ordinance stating that if the expense required to return a stolen item to the victim is greater than the principal, the robber may pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to the court, and he then brings his guilt-offering and achieves atonement for himself. This ordinance would apply here as well, as the expense required to pay all five claimants is greater than the principal.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ื™ื“ืข ืœืžืืŸ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื“ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ืœืžืจื™ื” ื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื“ืœื ื™ื“ืข ืœืžืืŸ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื“ืœื ื”ื“ืจ ืžืžื•ื ื ืœืžืจื™ื” ืœื ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื

The Gemara asks: And doesnโ€™t Rabbi Akiva agree that the Sages instituted this ordinance? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that when the Sages instituted the ordinance, they did so only for cases where the robber knows whom he robbed, as in such cases he is definitely returning the money to its owner by depositing it with the court, who will convey it to the robbery victim. But in the case of one who robbed one of five people, where he does not know whom he robbed, and where, by merely placing the stolen item between the five of them the money is not returned to its owner, the Sages did not institute an ordinance.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืขืœ ืฉืœืงื— ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ืœืงื— ืฉืžื ื™ื— ื“ืžื™ ืžืงื— ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ืขืœ ืžื” ื ื—ืœืงื• ืฉื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ื’ื–ืœ ืฉืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ื— ื“ืžื™ ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืชืงื ื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“

Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. The baraita in the Tosefta (Yevamot 14:2) states that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree with regard to one who purchased an item from one of five people and does not know from which of them he purchased it, as both agree that in this case he places the money of the purchase between them and withdraws. Since the purchaser has not transgressed, he is not penalized by being required to suffer the loss of paying each of them. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagree with regard to one who robbed one of five people, and he does not know from which of them he robbed the item, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws, and Rabbi Akiva says: He has no remedy, i.e., he has not fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item, until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of them.

ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืžื” ืœื™ ืœืงื— ืžื” ืœื™ ื’ื–ืœ

Rav Huna bar Yehuda states his objection: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically with regard to one who took a false oath, what is the difference to me if he purchased an item from another, and what is the difference to me if he robbed him? In either case he has transgressed the prohibition against taking a false oath denying his obligation, and he should be penalized by being required to ensure that the one to whom he owes the money receives it.

ื•ืขื•ื“ ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ื—ืกื™ื“ ืื—ื“ ืฉืœืงื— ืžืฉื ื™ ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื” ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ืœืงื— ื•ื‘ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื• ื”ื ื— ื“ืžื™ ืžืงื—ืš ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ื”ืกืชืœืง ื‘ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืชืงื ื” ืขื“ ืฉืชืฉืœื ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื—ืกื™ื“ ืžื™ ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื‘ืฉื™ืงืจื

And Rava raises another objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. There was an incident involving a certain pious man who purchased an item from one of two people, and he did not know from which of them he purchased the item, and he came before Rabbi Tarfon for a ruling. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Place the money of your purchase between them and withdraw. He then came before Rabbi Akiva, who said to him: You have no remedy until you pay each and every one, i.e., both of them. And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically where the purchaser took a false oath, does a pious man take a false oath? It seems from this incident that Rabbi Akiva rules he must pay all potential owners regardless of whether or not he took a false oath.

ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื•ื”ื“ืจ ื”ื•ื™ ื—ืกื™ื“ ื•ื”ื ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ื—ืกื™ื“ ืื—ื“ ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ืœืขืื™ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ืœืขืื™ ื—ืกื™ื“ื™ื ื“ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื”ื•ื•

And if you would say that perhaps he took a false oath and later became a pious man, but isnโ€™t there a tradition that anywhere that we say: There was an incident involving a certain pious man, the pious man is either Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava or Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, were both pious men from the beginning.

ืืœื ืœืขื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืฉืจ ื”ื•ื ืœื• ื™ืชื ื ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืืฉืžืชื• ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืงื ื™ืก

Due to these objections, the Gemara offers an alternative explanation. Rather, the mishna here is actually in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Tarfon concedes that a robber must pay every potential owner in a case where he took a false oath, as is the case in the mishna here. What is the reason? As the verse states: โ€œUnto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, in the day of his being guiltyโ€ (Leviticus 5:24). This verse, which requires one to go to any length to return money owed, is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath concerning his financial obligation. And Rabbi Akiva, who said in the mishna in tractate Yevamot that a robber must pay all potential owners even though he did not take a false oath, agrees that the verse is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath, but holds that the Sages penalize the robber by obligating him to pay them all in any event.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืžื›ื“ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืœื ืกื’ื™ื ื“ืœื ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืœื ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื ืžื™ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ืœืฉื ื™ื ื’ื–ืœืชื™ ืื—ื“ ืžื›ื ืžื ื” ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืื™ื–ื” ืžื›ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื–ื” ืžื ื” ื•ืœื–ื” ืžื ื”

The Gemara questions this explanation of the mishna: But if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, after all, the mere fact that it is a case where he took a false oath is not sufficient to obligate him to pay the additional one-fifth and to bring a guilt-offering if it is a case where he did not also admit that he took a false oath and owes the money. Therefore, why would the mishna here specifically state: And he took a false oath? Even without taking the false oath, the robber should also be obligated to pursue the owner as a result of his having admitted his obligation. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Tarfon concedes that in a case where a robber says to two people: I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars and I do not know which of you it was, he gives one hundred dinars to this person and one hundred dinars to that person,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 103

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 103

ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ื–ื™ืžื ื ืื—ืจื™ืชื™ ื•ืื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ

the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner of the field. But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner.

ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื”ืœื•ืงื— ืฉื“ื” ื‘ืฉื ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ื–ื™ืžื ื ืื—ืจื™ืชื™ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžื™ื“ืข ื™ื“ืขืช ื“ืื ื ืœื ืคืฉืื™ ืฉืงื™ืœื ื ื•ืคื ื—ื™ื ื‘ืขืœืžื ื”ื•ื ื“ืงื‘ืขื™ื ื ื•ื–ื•ื–ื™ ื‘ื›ื“ื™ ืœื ืฉื“ื™ื ื ืืœื ืื“ืขืชื ื“ื›ืชื‘ ืœื™ื” ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืขื ื™ื™ื ื ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืœืš ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ื”ื”ื•ื ื“ื–ื‘ื ืช ืœื™ื” ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ื•ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืœืš ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื

The Gemara clarifies the baraita: The Master said: In the case of one who purchases a field in the name of another, the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time. The Gemara asks: Isnโ€™t this obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the purchaser can say to the seller: You knew that I took, i.e., purchased, the field for myself, and it was merely for protection [ufanaแธฅya] that I desired to obtain ownership by claiming to purchase it in the name of the other person, and I do not throw out money for naught. Rather, it was with the intention that you will write another document for him, i.e., the seller, stating that I purchased the field. The baraita therefore teaches us that the seller can say to him: I have performed a matter for you together with the one in whose name you purchased the field, and let him write you another document.

ื•ืื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืขืœ ืžื ืช ื›ื•ืคื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ื›ืจ ืœืžื›ื•ืจ ืคืฉื™ื˜ื ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ืœืกื”ื“ื™ ืงืžื™ื” ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื—ื–ื• ื“ืฉื˜ืจื ืื—ืจื™ื ื ืงื ื‘ืขื™ื ื ืžื”ื• ื“ืชื™ืžื ืžืฆื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืืžื™ื ื ืฉื˜ืจื ืžื”ื™ืืš ื“ืงื ืฉืงืœืช ื‘ืฉืžื™ื” ืงืืžืจืช ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื”ื›ื™ ื˜ืจื—ื™ ื•ืืžืจื™ ืœื”ื• ืœืขื“ื™ื ืงืžืš ื“ืžื™ื ืš ื”ื•ื ื“ืงื ื‘ืขื™ื ื

The Gemara discusses Abayeโ€™s interpretation of the latter clause of the baraita, which states: But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again. Isnโ€™t that obvious? No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the purchaser said to the witnesses in front of the seller: You can see that I require another document. Lest you say that the seller can say to him: I thought that it was a document from the one in whose name you purchased the field that you were saying you required, and not from me. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the purchaser can say to him: It was for this that I took the trouble and said to the witnesses, in front of you, that I require another document, as it is from you that I require the document.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ื™ื”ื‘ ื–ื•ื–ื ืื›ื™ืชื ื ืœืกื•ืฃ ืื™ื™ืงืจ ื›ื™ืชื ื ื–ื‘ื ื™ื” ืžืจื•ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ื›ื™ืชื ื ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืžื” ืืขื‘ื™ื“ ืื™ื–ื™ืœ ืื™ืฉืงื™ืœ ื–ื•ื–ืื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ื›ื™ ืงื ื–ื‘ื ื™ ืืžืจื™ ื”ืื™ ื›ื™ืชื ื ื“ื›ื”ื ื ื”ื•ื ื–ื™ืœ ืฉืงื•ืœ ื•ืื™ ืœื ืœื ืชืฉืงื•ืœ

ยง The Gemara mentions a related incident: Rav Kahana gave money to a salesman in exchange for flax, and temporarily left the flax in the possession of the seller. Ultimately, the flax appreciated in value and the owner of the flax sold it for a greater profit on behalf of Rav Kahana, intending to give him all of the money. Rav Kahana then came before Rav, and said to him: What should I do? Should I go and take my money, or would doing so have the appearance of collecting interest for a loan? Rav said to Rav Kahana: If, when they sold the flax, they said: This flax is Kahanaโ€™s, go take the money, as in such a case it is as though the flax was purchased directly from you. But if they did not say this, do not take the money, since you would be receiving a greater sum of money than you provided, and this would appear to be a loan repaid with interest.

ื›ืžืืŸ ื›ื‘ื ื™ ืžืขืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืžื™ ื”ื•ื“ื™ืขื• ืœื‘ืขืœ ื—ื˜ื™ืŸ ืฉื™ืงื ื” ื—ื˜ื™ืŸ ืœื‘ืขืœ ืžืขื•ืช

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion was Ravโ€™s ruling? Was it only in accordance with the opinion of the people of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who say: Who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? As the Gemara taught earlier, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael hold that the sale can be performed on anotherโ€™s behalf only if such an arrangement is explicitly stated at the time of the transaction. In this case as well, if the seller did not explicitly state that the money would belong to Rav Kahana, all the money from the sale would be acquired by the seller, who would then be prohibited to give it to Rav Kahana due to the appearance of paying interest.

ืื˜ื• ืžื™ ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืืจื‘ืข ื•ืฉืงื™ืœ ืชืžื ื™ ื›ื™ืชื ื ืžืžื™ืœื ื”ื•ื ื“ืื™ื™ืงืจ ืžื™ื’ื–ืœ ื’ื–ืœื•ื” ื•ืชื ืŸ ื›ืœ ื”ื’ื–ืœื ื™ืŸ ืžืฉืœืžื™ืŸ ื›ืฉืขืช ื”ื’ื–ืœื”

The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that Rav Kahana gave four dinars and took eight in return? He did not lend money to the seller. Rather, the flax appreciated in value by itself, and when the seller sold it he robbed Rav Kahana of his flax, and we learned in a mishna (93b) that all robbers pay compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. Therefore, according to all opinions the seller owes Rav Kahana the value of the flax at the time the seller sold it for its appreciated value, and Rav Kahanaโ€™s accepting the money would not constitute collecting interest for a loan.

ืืžืจื™ ื”ืชื ืืžื ื” ื”ื•ืื™ ื•ืœื ืžืฉื›ื™ื” ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืœื›ื™ืชื ื ื•ืจื‘ ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืืžื ื” ื‘ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืืžื ื” ื‘ื“ืžื™ื

Having rejected the previous explanation of Ravโ€™s ruling, the Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case. The Sages say: There, it was a matter of trust, as the seller was paid in advance and Rav Kahana did not pull the flax as an act of acquisition, or perform any other formal act of acquisition. Consequently, at the time of the second sale the flax belonged to the seller. And Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: One may make an arrangement of trust with regard to the delivery of items such as produce, i.e., one may pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the produce at a later date, but one may not make an arrangement of trust with regard to money, i.e., one may not pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the value of the produce at a later date, as this has the appearance of collecting interest.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื’ื•ื–ืœ ืืช ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ื™ื•ืœื™ื›ื ื• ืื—ืจื™ื• ืœืžื“ื™ ืœื ื™ืชืŸ ืœื ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื ืœืฉืœื•ื—ื• ืื‘ืœ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœืฉืœื™ื— ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื ืžืช ื™ื—ื–ื™ืจ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื•

MISHNA: One who robs another of an item having the value of at least one peruta and takes a false oath to the robbery victim claiming his innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must bring the money, which includes the principal together with an additional one-fifth payment, to the robbery victim, even if this necessitates following after him to a distant place like Medea. The robber may not give the payment to the robbery victimโ€™s son to return it to the robbery victim, and neither may he give it to his agent, but he may give the payment to an agent of the court. And if the robbery victim dies, he returns it to his heirs.

ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ืœื ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื–ื” ื•ืขืœ ื–ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืคื—ื•ืช ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื‘ืงืจืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืœืš ืื—ืจื™ื• ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืœื ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืœื ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžื—ืœ ืœื• ืขืœ ื–ื” ื•ืขืœ ื–ื” ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ื‘ืงืจืŸ ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื™ืœืš ืื—ืจื™ื•

If he gave the robbery victim the principal value of the stolen item but did not give him the additional one-fifth payment, or if the owner forgave him concerning the principal but did not forgive him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of less than one peruta of the principal, he need not pursue him to repay the remaining debt. By contrast, if he gave the robbery victim the additional one-fifth payment but did not give him the principal, or if the robbery victim forgave him concerning the additional one-fifth payment but did not forgive him concerning the principal, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of one peruta of the principal, he must pursue him to repay the remaining debt.

ื ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืช ื”ืงืจืŸ ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืขืœ ื”ื—ื•ืžืฉ

If the robber gave the robbery victim the principal and took a false oath to him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, asserting that he had already paid it,

ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืžืฉืœื ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืขืœ ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืชืžืขื˜ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื”

then the additional one-fifth is considered a new principal obligation. The robber pays an additional one-fifth payment apart from the additional one-fifth payment about which he had taken a false oath. If he then takes a false oath concerning the second one-fifth payment, he is assessed an additional one-fifth payment for that oath, until the principal, i.e., the additional one-fifth payment about which he has most recently taken the false oath, is reduced to less than the value of one peruta.

ื•ื›ืŸ ื‘ืคืงื“ื•ืŸ ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื• ื‘ืคืงื“ื•ืŸ ืื• ื‘ืชืฉื•ืžืช ื™ื“ ืื• ื‘ื’ื–ืœ ืื• ืขืฉืง ืืช ืขืžื™ืชื• ืื• ืžืฆื ืื‘ื“ื” ื•ื›ื—ืฉ ื‘ื” ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืขืœ ืฉืงืจ ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืžืฉืœื ืงืจืŸ ื•ื—ื•ืžืฉ ื•ืืฉื

And such is the halakha with regard to a deposit, as it is stated: โ€œIf anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deals falsely with it, and swears to a lieโ€ฆhe shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to itโ€ (Leviticus 5:21โ€“24). This one must pay the principal and an additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.

ื’ืžืณ ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื ื ืฉื‘ืข ืœื• ืœื ืžื ื™ ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืชื ื™ื ื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ื•ื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ืื•ืžืจ ืื•ืชื™ ื’ื–ืœ ืžื ื™ื— ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ืœื ื–ื• ื“ืจืš ืžื•ืฆื™ืืชื• ืžื™ื“ื™ ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ [ื•ืื—ื“]

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a robber took a false oath that he did not rob, he must travel even as far as Medea in order to repay the robbery victim. This indicates that if he takes an oath to the robbery victim, yes, he is required to go to any length to repay his obligation, but if he did not take an oath to him, no, he does not have to do so. Whose opinion is this? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon and not the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna (Yevamot 118b): If one robbed one of five people and he does not know which of them he robbed, and each one of the five says: He robbed me, the robber places the stolen item between them and withdraws from them; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression. He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five.

ืžื ื™ ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืืžืจ ืžื ื™ื— ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna written? If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, it is not so, because even though the robber took a false oath that he did not rob, Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws; it is not his responsibility to ensure that it reaches the robbery victim. If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, it is also not so, because even though the robber did not necessarily take a false oath, Rabbi Akiva says: He is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, while the mishna rules that his obligation is contingent upon his having taken the false oath.

ืœืขื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื”ื™ื ื•ื›ื™ ืงืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื”ื•ื ื“ืงืืžืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืฉืจ ื”ื•ื ืœื• ื™ืชื ื ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืืฉืžืชื•

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and when Rabbi Akiva says that the robber is not considered to have returned the stolen item until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of the five, it is only in a case where the robber took a false oath that Rabbi Akiva says this. What is the reason? As the verse states with regard to one who takes a false oath concerning a financial obligation: โ€œUnto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, on the day of his being guiltyโ€ (Leviticus 5:24). The halakha that the guilty party must make a rigorous effort to return what he owes is stated in the case of one who took a false oath, and Rabbi Akiva would state his ruling only in that case.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื ื“ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืฆื“ื•ืง ืื•ืžืจ ืชืงื ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื”ืชืงื™ื ื• ืฉืื ื”ื™ืชื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื™ืชื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื”ืงืจืŸ ืžืฉืœื ืงืจืŸ ื•ื—ื•ืžืฉ ืœื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืžื‘ื™ื ืืฉืžื• ื•ืžืชื›ืคืจ ืœื•

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Tarfon rule that a robber who took a false oath is not required to pay all claimants, being that the verse indicates otherwise? The Gemara answers: Even though he took a false oath and by Torah law is obligated to return the stolen item to the robbery victim, the Sages instituted an ordinance allowing him to place it between the five possible victims, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The Sages instituted a great ordinance stating that if the expense required to return a stolen item to the victim is greater than the principal, the robber may pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to the court, and he then brings his guilt-offering and achieves atonement for himself. This ordinance would apply here as well, as the expense required to pay all five claimants is greater than the principal.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื›ื™ ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ื™ื“ืข ืœืžืืŸ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื“ืงื ืžื”ื“ืจ ืœื™ื” ืžืžื•ื ื ืœืžืจื™ื” ื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื“ืœื ื™ื“ืข ืœืžืืŸ ื’ื–ืœื™ื” ื“ืœื ื”ื“ืจ ืžืžื•ื ื ืœืžืจื™ื” ืœื ืขื‘ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืชืงื ืชื

The Gemara asks: And doesnโ€™t Rabbi Akiva agree that the Sages instituted this ordinance? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that when the Sages instituted the ordinance, they did so only for cases where the robber knows whom he robbed, as in such cases he is definitely returning the money to its owner by depositing it with the court, who will convey it to the robbery victim. But in the case of one who robbed one of five people, where he does not know whom he robbed, and where, by merely placing the stolen item between the five of them the money is not returned to its owner, the Sages did not institute an ordinance.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืœื ื ื—ืœืงื• ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืขืœ ืฉืœืงื— ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ืœืงื— ืฉืžื ื™ื— ื“ืžื™ ืžืงื— ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ืขืœ ืžื” ื ื—ืœืงื• ืฉื’ื–ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื—ืžืฉื” ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ื’ื–ืœ ืฉืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืžื ื™ื— ื“ืžื™ ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ืžืกืชืœืง ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืชืงื ื” ืขื“ ืฉื™ืฉืœื ื’ื–ื™ืœื” ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“

Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. The baraita in the Tosefta (Yevamot 14:2) states that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not disagree with regard to one who purchased an item from one of five people and does not know from which of them he purchased it, as both agree that in this case he places the money of the purchase between them and withdraws. Since the purchaser has not transgressed, he is not penalized by being required to suffer the loss of paying each of them. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagree with regard to one who robbed one of five people, and he does not know from which of them he robbed the item, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He places the stolen item between them and withdraws, and Rabbi Akiva says: He has no remedy, i.e., he has not fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item, until he pays the value of the stolen item to each and every one of them.

ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืžื” ืœื™ ืœืงื— ืžื” ืœื™ ื’ื–ืœ

Rav Huna bar Yehuda states his objection: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically with regard to one who took a false oath, what is the difference to me if he purchased an item from another, and what is the difference to me if he robbed him? In either case he has transgressed the prohibition against taking a false oath denying his obligation, and he should be penalized by being required to ensure that the one to whom he owes the money receives it.

ื•ืขื•ื“ ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ื—ืกื™ื“ ืื—ื“ ืฉืœืงื— ืžืฉื ื™ ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื” ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžืื™ื–ื” ืžื”ืŸ ืœืงื— ื•ื‘ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืืžืจ ืœื• ื”ื ื— ื“ืžื™ ืžืงื—ืš ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื•ื”ืกืชืœืง ื‘ื ืœืคื ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืชืงื ื” ืขื“ ืฉืชืฉืœื ืœื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื—ืกื™ื“ ืžื™ ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื‘ืฉื™ืงืจื

And Rava raises another objection to the explanation that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion specifically in a case where the robber took an oath. There was an incident involving a certain pious man who purchased an item from one of two people, and he did not know from which of them he purchased the item, and he came before Rabbi Tarfon for a ruling. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Place the money of your purchase between them and withdraw. He then came before Rabbi Akiva, who said to him: You have no remedy until you pay each and every one, i.e., both of them. And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling specifically where the purchaser took a false oath, does a pious man take a false oath? It seems from this incident that Rabbi Akiva rules he must pay all potential owners regardless of whether or not he took a false oath.

ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ื•ื”ื“ืจ ื”ื•ื™ ื—ืกื™ื“ ื•ื”ื ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ื‘ื—ืกื™ื“ ืื—ื“ ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื ืื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ืœืขืื™ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ื‘ื ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืจื‘ื™ ืื™ืœืขืื™ ื—ืกื™ื“ื™ื ื“ืžืขื™ืงืจื ื”ื•ื•

And if you would say that perhaps he took a false oath and later became a pious man, but isnโ€™t there a tradition that anywhere that we say: There was an incident involving a certain pious man, the pious man is either Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava or Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Elai, were both pious men from the beginning.

ืืœื ืœืขื•ืœื ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื ื•ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ืœืืฉืจ ื”ื•ื ืœื• ื™ืชื ื ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืืฉืžืชื• ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ ืืฃ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ ื“ืœื ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืงื ื™ืก

Due to these objections, the Gemara offers an alternative explanation. Rather, the mishna here is actually in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Tarfon concedes that a robber must pay every potential owner in a case where he took a false oath, as is the case in the mishna here. What is the reason? As the verse states: โ€œUnto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, in the day of his being guiltyโ€ (Leviticus 5:24). This verse, which requires one to go to any length to return money owed, is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath concerning his financial obligation. And Rabbi Akiva, who said in the mishna in tractate Yevamot that a robber must pay all potential owners even though he did not take a false oath, agrees that the verse is referring specifically to one who takes a false oath, but holds that the Sages penalize the robber by obligating him to pay them all in any event.

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืžื›ื“ื™ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืžื™ืฉืชื‘ืข ืœื ืกื’ื™ื ื“ืœื ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื•ื ืฉื‘ืข ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืœื ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื ืžื™ ื“ืชื ื™ื ืžื•ื“ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ืœืฉื ื™ื ื’ื–ืœืชื™ ืื—ื“ ืžื›ื ืžื ื” ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืื™ื–ื” ืžื›ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื–ื” ืžื ื” ื•ืœื–ื” ืžื ื”

The Gemara questions this explanation of the mishna: But if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, after all, the mere fact that it is a case where he took a false oath is not sufficient to obligate him to pay the additional one-fifth and to bring a guilt-offering if it is a case where he did not also admit that he took a false oath and owes the money. Therefore, why would the mishna here specifically state: And he took a false oath? Even without taking the false oath, the robber should also be obligated to pursue the owner as a result of his having admitted his obligation. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Tarfon concedes that in a case where a robber says to two people: I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars and I do not know which of you it was, he gives one hundred dinars to this person and one hundred dinars to that person,

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