Bava Kamma 113

אבל איתיה במתא לא דאמרינן אימר לא אמרו ליה דאמרי אשכחינהו שליחא דבית דין ואמר ליה

But if the defendant is in the city, the court does not ostracize him for failing to respond to a summons conveyed through a woman or a neighbor, as we say: Perhaps they did not tell him of the court’s summons, as they said to themselves: Since the defendant is in the city, a court agent has already found him and told him. As a result, these unofficial messengers will not deliver the court’s summons to the defendant at all.

ולא אמרן אלא דלא חליף אבבא דבי דינא אבל חליף אבבא דבי דינא לא אמרי אשכחוה בי דינא ואמרי ליה

And similarly, we said that the court will ostracize one who does not respond to a summons conveyed through a woman or a neighbor only in a case where he does not pass by the court’s entrance on his way home, but if he does pass by the court’s entrance, the court does not ostracize him. This is because it is possible that the unofficial messengers will say to themselves: Since he passes by the courthouse, the court has already found him and told him.

ולא אמרן אלא דאתי ביומיה אבל לא אתי ביומיה לא אימא אישתלויי אשתלי

And furthermore, we said that the court will ostracize one who does not respond to a summons only in a case where he comes home on the same day that the woman or neighbor is sent to deliver the court summons. But if he does not come home on the same day, he is not ostracized, because it is possible to say that they forgot to notify him.

אמר רבא האי מאן דכתיב עליה פתיחא על דלא אתי לדינא עד דאתי לדינא לא מקרעינן ליה על דלא ציית לדינא עד דציית לא מקרעינן ליה ולא היא כיון דאמר צייתנא קרעינן ליה

Rava said: With regard to one who had a document of ostracism written about him due to the fact that he did not come to court, we do not tear up the document for him until he actually comes to court, and it is not enough for him to simply commit to appearing. Similarly, if the document of ostracism was written due to the fact that he did not obey the ruling of the court, we do not tear it up for him until he actually obeys the ruling. The Gemara comments: This second statement is not so. Rather, once he has acquiesced and said: I will obey, we immediately tear up the document for him.

אמר רב חסדא קובעים זמן שני וחמישי ושני זמנא וזמנא בתר זמנא ולמחר כתבינן

Rav Ḥisda said: The court sets a date for an individual to appear in court on the upcoming Monday. And if he does not appear, they set a date for that Thursday, and if he does not appear, they set a date for the following Monday, so that he has a second date and then a third date after the first date. And if he does not appear in court by the third date, then on the next day we write a document of ostracism.

רב אסי איקלע בי רב כהנא חזא ההיא איתתא דאזמנה לדינא בפניא ובצפרא כתיב עלה פתיחא אמר ליה לא סבר לה מר להא דאמר רב חסדא קובעין זמן שני וחמישי ושני

The Gemara relates that Rav Asi happened to come to the house of Rav Kahana. He saw that there was a certain woman whom Rav Kahana had summoned to appear in court in the evening, but she did not appear, and in the morning Rav Kahana wrote a document of ostracism concerning her. Rav Asi said to him: Does the Master not hold in accordance with that which Rav Ḥisda says, that the court sets a date for the coming Monday, and then Thursday, and then the following Monday before it issues a document of ostracism?

אמר ליה הני מילי גברא דאניס וליתיה במתא אבל איתתא כיון דאיתה במתא ולא אתיא מורדת היא

Rav Kahana said to him: That matter applies only with regard to a man, as he is a victim of circumstance and is not always in the city due to his vocational activities. But in the case of a woman, since she is always in the city, when she does not come to court the first time she is immediately considered rebellious, and the court may issue a document of ostracism right away.

אמר רב יהודה לא יהבינא זמנא לא ביומי ניסן ולא ביומי תשרי לא במעלי יומא טבא ולא במעלי שבתא אבל מניסן לבתר יומי ניסן וביומי תשרי לבתר תשרי קבעינן ממעלי שבתא לבתר מעלי שבתא לא קבעינן מאי טעמא בעבידתיה דשבתא טריד

Continuing the discussion of court dates, Rav Yehuda says: The court does not set a date for legal proceedings during the days of Nisan, nor during the days of Tishrei, and also not on the eve of a Festival nor the eve of Shabbat because these are busy times. But during Nisan we may set a court date to take place after Nisan, and likewise, during Tishrei we may set a court date to take place after Tishrei. By contrast, on the eve of Shabbat we do not set a court date to take place after the eve of Shabbat. What is the reason for this? It is because one is preoccupied with his work in preparation for Shabbat and it is possible that he will forget about the court summons.

אמר רב נחמן לא יהבינן זמנא לא לבני כלה בכלה ולא לבני ריגלא בריגלא כי הוו אתו לקמיה דרב נחמן אמר להו וכי לדידכו כנופייכו והאידנא דאיכא רמאי חיישינן

Rav Naḥman says: We do not set a court date for participants in the kalla, the gatherings for Torah study during Elul and Adar, during the months of the kalla, nor for participants in the public discourses prior to the Festival during the period leading up to the Festival. The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rav Naḥman during the kalla period in order to make legal claims against others, he would say to them: Did I gather you here for your own needs? No, I gathered you to participate in Torah study. The Gemara adds: But now that there are scoundrels, who do not come to study Torah but rather to avoid trial, we are concerned that they will continue to evade prosecution, and therefore we summon them to court even during these time periods.

אם היה דבר שיש בו אחריות חייב לשלם מתני ליה רבי לרבי שמעון בריה לא דבר שיש בו אחריות ממש אלא אפילו פרה וחורש בה חמור ומחמר אחריו חייבין להחזיר מפני כבוד אביהן

§ The mishna teaches, with regard to one who left a stolen item to his children, if the item was something that may serve as a legal guarantee of a loan, the heirs are obligated to pay the owner. The Gemara states that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would teach this mishna to Rabbi Shimon, his son, and explain that it does not refer only to something that can actually serve as a guarantee for a loan, i.e., land. Rather, it refers even to a cow that he plows with, or a donkey that he drives by directing it from behind, which the heirs are obligated to return because of the honor of their father, so that people will not continually point out that the inheritance was stolen and thereby disgrace their deceased parent.

בעי מיניה רב כהנא מרב מטה ומיסב עליה שולחן ואוכל עליו מהו אמר לו תן לחכם ויחכם עוד

Rav Kahana raises a dilemma before Rav: If the robber left his heirs a stolen item that is used in relative privacy, such as a bed that he lies on or a table upon which he eats, rather than something as conspicuous as a large animal, what is the halakha? Are the heirs obligated to return it to its owner? Rav said to him: “Give to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser” (Proverbs 9:9), meaning that from the fact that the heirs must return a cow and a donkey, one can infer that they must also return a bed and a table.

מתני׳ אין פורטין לא מתיבת המוכסין ולא מכיס של גבאין ואין נוטלין מהם צדקה אבל נוטל הוא מתוך ביתו או מן השוק

MISHNA: One may not exchange larger coins for smaller ones from the trunk of customs collectors nor from the purse of tax collectors, and one may not take charity from them, as they are assumed to have obtained their funds illegally. But one may take money from the collector’s house or from money he has with him in the market that he did not take from his collection trunk or purse.

גמ׳ תנא אבל נותן לו דינר ונותן לו את השאר

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against exchanging money from the trunk of a customs collector: But one may give the customs collector a dinar as payment for a debt that amounts to less than a dinar, and when the collector gives him change, he may accept it.

ומוכסין והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא

It was taught in the mishna that one may not exchange money from the trunks of customs collectors, which are assumed to include stolen funds. The Gemara questions this ruling: But doesn’t Shmuel say that the law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., halakha requires Jews to obey the laws of the state in which they live. Accordingly, the customs are collected legally and it should be permitted to make use of the funds.

אמר רבי חנינא בר כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי רבי ינאי אמרי במוכס העומד מאליו

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed by the governor on the amount he may collect, and he collects as he pleases. Alternatively, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who stands on his own, i.e., he was not appointed by the government but, on his own, he forces people to give him money.

איכא דמתני לה אהא לא ילבש אדם כלאים אפילו על גבי עשרה בגדים להבריח בו את המכס מתניתין דלא כרבי עקיבא דתניא אסור להבריח את המכס רבי שמעון אומר משום רבי עקיבא מותר להבריח את המכס

The Gemara notes: There are those who teach the statements of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai with regard to this following mishna (Kilayim 9:2) and its attendant discussion. The customs collectors would not levy a duty for the garments one was wearing. In light of this, the mishna teaches: A person may not wear a garment made of diverse kinds, i.e., a combination of wool and linen, even if he wears it on top of ten garments, in order to avoid paying customs. It was noted that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a baraita: It is prohibited to avoid paying customs by wearing a garment of diverse kinds. Rabbi Shimon says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: It is permitted to avoid paying customs in this manner.

בשלמא לענין כלאים בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דבר שאין מתכוין מותר ומר סבר דבר שאין מתכוין אסור אלא להבריח בו את המכס מי שרי והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא

The Gemara comments: Granted, with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, they disagree about this: One Sage, i.e., Rabbi Akiva, holds that an unintentional act is permitted. In this case, the prohibition is to benefit from wearing the garment, and that is not his intent, as his intention is merely to avoid paying the customs duties. Therefore, it is permitted. And one Sage, i.e., the first tanna in the baraita, holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. But is it ever permitted to avoid customs? Doesn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law?

אמר רבי חנינא בר כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי רבי ינאי אמרי במוכס העומד מאליו

In answer to this question, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The dispute in the baraita is with regard to a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed on the amount he may collect. Alternatively, Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The dispute is with regard to a customs collector who stands on his own, i.e., who is self-appointed.

ואיכא דמתני אהא נודרין להרגין ולחרמין ולמוכסין שהיא של תרומה שהיא של בית מלך אף על פי שאינה של תרומה אף על פי שאינה של מלך ולמוכסין והאמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא

The Gemara notes: And there are those who teach the statements of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai with regard to this mishna (Nedarim 27b): One may vow before murderers, plunderers, and customs collectors in order to reinforce the claim that a certain item that is being commandeered is teruma, or that it belongs to the king’s house, and thereby avoid its seizure, despite the fact that it is not teruma or that it does not belong to the king’s house. It was asked: Can it be that it is permitted to pronounce such a vow before customs collectors? But doesn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law? It should therefore be prohibited to state such a vow before the customs collectors.

אמר רבי חנינא בר כהנא אמר שמואל במוכס שאין לו קצבה דבי רבי ינאי אמרי במוכס העומד מאליו

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The mishna in Nedarim issues its ruling with regard to a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed on the amount he may collect. Alternatively, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna issues its ruling with regard to a customs collector who stands on his own.

רב אשי אמר במוכס גוי דתניא ישראל וגוי שבאו לדין אם אתה יכול לזכהו בדיני ישראל זכהו ואמור לו כך דינינו בדיני גוים זכהו ואמור לו כך דינכם ואם לאו באין עליו בעקיפין דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר אין באין עליו בעקיפין מפני קידוש השם

Rav Ashi said: The mishna issues its ruling with regard to a gentile customs collector, whom one may deceive, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a Jew and a gentile who approach the court for judgment in a legal dispute, if you can vindicate the Jew under Jewish law, vindicate him, and say to the gentile: This is our law. If he can be vindicated under gentile law, vindicate him, and say to the gentile: This is your law. And if it is not possible to vindicate him under either system of law, one approaches the case circuitously, seeking a justification to vindicate the Jew. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and says: One does not approach the case circuitously in order to vindicate the Jew due to the sanctification of God’s name, as God’s name will be desecrated if the Jewish judge employs dishonest means.

ורבי עקיבא טעמא דאיכא קידוש השם הא ליכא קידוש השם באין

The Gemara infers from this baraita: And even according to Rabbi Akiva, the reason that the court does not employ trickery in order to vindicate the Jew is only because there is the consideration of the sanctification of God’s name. Consequently, if there is no consideration of the sanctification of God’s name, the court does approach the case circuitously. Apparently, it is permitted to deceive a gentile.

וגזל גוי מי שרי והתניא אמר רבי שמעון דבר זה דרש רבי עקיבא כשבא מזפירין מנין לגזל גוי שהוא אסור תלמוד לומר אחרי נמכר גאלה תהיה לו

The Gemara challenges this assertion: But is robbery from a gentile permitted? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said that Rabbi Akiva taught this matter when he came from Zephirin: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to rob a gentile? It is from the fact that the verse states with regard to a Jew who has been sold as a slave to a gentile: “After he is sold he may be redeemed” (Leviticus 25:48),

שלא ימשכנו ויצא יכול יגלום עליו תלמוד לומר וחשב עם קנהו ידקדק עם קונהו

indicating that one should not take a Hebrew slave by force and thereby allow him to leave the gentile’s jurisdiction. Rather, the Jew must be freed by legal means. One might have thought that it is permitted to deceive him in order to free the Jew. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall reckon with him that bought him” (Leviticus 25:50), in order to teach that one must be precise in the financial dealings with the purchaser of a Hebrew slave, and one must pay him the appropriate sum without employing any form of deception. This indicates that it is prohibited to steal from a gentile.

אמר רב יוסף לא קשיא הא בגוי הא בגר תושב

The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult, as this ruling that permits the court to deceive a gentile is issued with regard to a regular gentile, whereas that verse, which teaches that it is prohibited to deceive a gentile, is stated with regard to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav].

אמר ליה אביי והא תרוייהו גבי הדדי כתיבי לא לך אלא לגר שנאמר לגר ולא לגר צדק אלא לגר תושב שנאמר לגר תושב

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: How is it possible to differentiate between a gentile and a ger toshav? Aren’t both of them written next to each other, indicating that the same halakha pertains to both? As it is taught in a baraita: One who violates the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year will be punished by having to resort to selling himself as a slave. And he will sell himself not to you, but to a stranger, as it is stated: “And sell himself unto the stranger” (Leviticus 25:47), and not to a stranger who is a convert, but to a ger toshav, as it is stated: “And sell himself unto the stranger who is a settler [ger toshav] with you” (Leviticus 25:47).

משפחת גר זה הגוי כשהוא אומר או לעקר זה הנמכר לעבודה זרה

The verse continues and states: “Or to the offshoot of a stranger’s family.” When it says “a stranger’s family,” this is referring to the gentile family members of a ger toshav, who are idolaters. When it says “or to the offshoot,” this is referring to a Jew who is sold to idol worship, i.e., to work in a temple dedicated to idolatry. Since it is subsequently stated: “He shall reckon with him that bought him” (Leviticus 25:50), it is apparent that this reckoning applies equally to each of the above, including the gentile. This contradicts Rav Yosef’s answer.

אלא אמר רבא לא קשיא כאן בגזילו וכאן בהפקעת הלוואתו

Rather, Rava said: It is not difficult because here, in the case of the slave, the halakha is stated with regard to an actual act of robbery committed against a gentile, but there, in the case of the baraita, where it would be permitted to employ deception if not for the desecration of God’s name, the halakha is stated with regard to abrogating his loan. Abrogating a loan owed to a gentile is permitted because it does not entail actually taking money.

אמר ליה אביי עבד עברי הפקעת הלוואתו הוא רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא עבד עברי גופו קנוי

Abaye said to Rava: The release of a Hebrew slave from his gentile master is akin to the abrogation of his loan. The purchase price paid by the master is considered as a loan that the slave pays back over the years of his servitude until he goes free at the Jubilee. Consequently, deceptively bringing about his early release is akin to abrogating a loan, yet Rabbi Akiva derives from the verse that it is prohibited to do so. The Gemara answers that Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rava says: The body of a Hebrew slave is owned by his master, and retaking him from the gentile by deceptive means would therefore constitute actual robbery.

אמר רב ביבי בר גידל אמר רבי שמעון חסידא גזל גוי אסור אבידתו מותרת גזילו אסור דאמר רב הונא מנין לגזל הגוי שהוא אסור שנאמר ואכלת את כל העמים אשר ה׳ אלהיך נתן לך בזמן שהן מסורים בידך ולא בזמן שאינם מסורין בידך

The Gemara cites another statement related to stealing from a gentile. Rav Beivai bar Giddel says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: It is prohibited to rob a gentile, but it is permitted to retain his lost item, i.e., one is not required to return it to him. The Gemara examines the basis for each of these rulings: It is prohibited to rob a gentile, as Rav Huna says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to rob a gentile? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And you shall consume all the peoples that the Lord your God shall deliver unto you” (Deuteronomy 7:16), indicating that it is permitted to consume the other nations’ property only when they are delivered into your hand, i.e., in times of war, but not when they are not delivered into your hand.

אבידתו מותרת דאמר רב חמא בר גוריא אמר רב מנין לאבידת הגוי שהיא מותרת שנאמר לכל אבדת אחיך לאחיך אתה מחזיר ואי אתה מחזיר לגוי

It is permitted to retain his lost item, as Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: From where is it derived that it is permitted to retain the lost item of a gentile? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item: “With every lost thing of your brother’s” (Deuteronomy 22:3), indicating that it is only to your brother that you return a lost item, but you do not return a lost item to a gentile.

ואימא הני מילי היכא דלא אתי לידיה דלא מחייב לאהדורי בתרה אבל היכא דאתי לידיה אימא ליהדרה אמר רבינא ומצאתה דאתאי לידיה משמע תניא רבי פנחס בן יאיר אומר במקום שיש חילול השם אפילו אבידתו אסור

The Gemara questions this derivation: But say that this applies only where the item has not yet come into the Jew’s hand, as he is not obligated to pursue it in an effort to find the lost item and return it. But in a case where the item had already come into his hand, say that he must return it to the gentile. The Gemara answers that Ravina said: It is understood from the verse itself, as it states: “And so shall you do with every lost thing of your brother’s, which he has lost, and you have found” (Deuteronomy 22:3), which indicates that the verse refers even to an item that has already come into one’s hand. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir says: In a case where there is a concern that retention of an article lost by a gentile will result in the desecration of God’s name, it is prohibited even to retain a gentile’s lost item.

אמר שמואל טעותו מותרת כי הא דשמואל זבן מגוי לקנא דדהבא במר דפרזלא בארבע זוזי ואבלע ליה חד זוזא

The Gemara adds: Shmuel says that it is permitted to financially benefit from a business error of a gentile, i.e., it need not be returned. The Gemara notes that this is like that incident where Shmuel purchased a golden bowl [lakna] from a gentile in exchange [bemar] for the price of an iron bowl, which was four dinars, and Shmuel included one additional dinar in the payment so that the gentile would not realize his mistake.

רב כהנא זבן מגוי מאה ועשרים חביתא במאה ואבלע ליה חד זוזא אמר ליה חזי דעלך קא סמיכנא רבינא זבן דיקלא הוא וגוי לצלחא אמר ליה לשמעיה קדם ואייתי מעיקרו דגוי מניינא ידע

The Gemara relates another incident: Rav Kahana purchased one hundred and twenty barrels from a gentile for the price of one hundred barrels, and he included one additional dinar in the payment. Rav Kahana said to him: Take note that I am relying upon you to check that the transaction has been carried out properly. The Gemara records a third episode: Ravina and a gentile purchased a palm tree together in order to chop it up and split the wood between them. Ravina said to his attendant: Hurry and precede the gentile so that you can bring my share of the wood from the trunk of the tree, which is thicker than the upper part of the tree, as the gentile knows only the number of logs that he is due to receive and will not realize that you are taking thicker pieces.

רב אשי הוה קאזיל באורחא חזא שיבשא דגופנא בפרדיסא ותלי בה קיטופי דעינבי אמר ליה לשמעיה זיל חזי אי דגוי נינהו אייתי אי דישראל נינהו לא אייתי לי שמע ההוא גוי דהוה יתיב בפרדיסא אמר ליה דגוי שרי אמר ליה גוי שקיל דמי ישראל לא שקיל דמי

The Gemara relates a final anecdote: Rav Ashi was traveling on the road and he saw a branch of a grapevine in an orchard, and there were clusters of grapes hanging on it. He said to his attendant: Go see to whom these clusters belong. If they are owned by a gentile, bring some to me, but if they are owned by a Jew, do not bring me any. A certain gentile who was sitting in the orchard overheard Rav Ashi’s instructions. The gentile said to him: Is it permitted to steal the property of a gentile? Rav Ashi said to him: A gentile takes money for his grapes, and I intended to pay for them, but a Jew does not take money for his grapes and I did not want to take them without paying for them.

גופא אמר שמואל דינא דמלכותא דינא אמר רבא תדע דקטלי דיקלי וגשרי גישרי ועברינן עלייהו

§ The Gemara relates to the matter of civil law itself. Shmuel says: The law of the kingdom is the law, and the halakhic principle is that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they reside. Rava said: Know that this principle is true from the fact that the municipal authorities cut down palm trees without the consent of their owners and construct bridges from them, and yet we cross over them. Evidently, the wood is not considered stolen property, which one is prohibited from using, because the law of the kingdom is the law.

אמר ליה אביי ודלמא משום דאייאוש להו מינייהו מרייהו אמר ליה אי לא דינא דמלכותא דינא היכי מייאשי

Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps the reason the bridges may be used is because their owners despaired of retrieving them and not because the law of the kingdom is the law. Rava said to Abaye: If not for the fact that the law of the kingdom is the law, how would the despair of the owners of the trees allow us to use the bridges? The fact that the owners have despaired of retrieving their wood does not effect a transfer of property, and it therefore still belongs to them.

והא לא קא עבדי כדאמר מלכא מלכא אמר זילו וקטלו מכל באגי ואינהו אזלו וקטלו מחד באגא

The Gemara questions Rava’s understanding: But the municipal authorities do not act as the king said. The king said: Go and cut down a bit of wood from all the valleys in the area so that each individual loses only a small amount of wood. They, however, disobey the king and go and cut down all the wood needed for the bridge from one valley. Therefore, even if the law of the kingdom is the law, this cannot be the reason that the halakha permits Jews to cross over such bridges, as the authorities are not enforcing the law of the kingdom, but rather their own unlawful inclinations.

שלוחא דמלכא כמלכא ולא טרח ואינהו אפסיד אנפשייהו דאיבעי להו דאינקוט מכוליה באגי ומשקל דמי

The Gemara answers: An agent of a king is like the king himself, and he is not expected to trouble himself to collect wood proportionally from each valley. They, the owners of the land where the wood is cut, cause themselves a loss, as they should collect compensation from all the other residents of the valleys and take money from them for this purpose. Since the land owners whose wood was used have permission to collect compensation from all the residents in the area, the authorities are acting within their rights by confiscating wood from a single location.

אמר רבא מאן דמשתכח בבי דרי פרע מנתא דמלכא והני מילי שותפא אבל אריסא אריסותיה הוא דקא מפיק

Similarly, Rava says: When the king’s agents come to collect the king’s share of the grain from a field owned by several partners, the one who is found in the granary must pay the king’s share for the entire property, as the agents are not expected to locate and exact payment from each individual proprietor separately. The partner who paid may later claim reimbursement from the other owners for covering their share of the tax. And this statement applies only to partners who share ownership of the field. But a sharecropper collects his portion from the crop but does not own a share of the land. Consequently, the tax may not be collected from his produce, and doing so would constitute robbery.

ואמר רבא בר מתא אבר מתא מיעבט והני מילי דברלא ארעא וכרגא דהאי שתא אבל שתא דחליף הואיל ואפייס מלכא חליף

And Rava also says: Property that belongs to a town dweller may be taken as security for the tax owed by another town dweller. And this statement applies only to the property tax and head tax of that year, but with regard to taxes from the previous year, since the king has already been appeased, the ability to take property belonging to someone else has passed. The tax collector has already paid the entire amount he must pay the king for the previous year, and everything else he collects is his own profit. Although he has the right to collect this extra amount, he may not take property for one person as security for the taxes of someone else.

ואמר רבא הני דדיירי דרי בתוך התחום אסור ליקח מהן מאי טעמא משום דמערבא חיותא דמתא בהדייהו

And Rava says: With regard to those gentiles who construct pens for their animals inside the city limits and charge a fee to bring their animals through the fields around the city to fertilize the fields, it is prohibited to purchase animals from them. What is the reason? It is because the livestock of the Jewish residents of the town become intermingled with their livestock, and it is possible that the animal one would buy is actually stolen property.

חוץ לתחום מותר ליקח מהם אמר רבינא אם היו בעלים מרדפים אחריהם אפילו חוץ לתחום אסור

Rava adds: If the pens were outside the city limits, it is permitted to purchase livestock from them, as it is unlikely that a Jew’s livestock became intermingled with the seller’s livestock. Ravina said: If the owners of the livestock were pursuing the animals, then even if the pens were outside the city limits, it is prohibited to purchase livestock from the owners of the pens.

מכריז רבא ואיתימא רב הונא דסלקין לעילא ודנחתין לתתא האי בר ישראל דידע סהדותא לגוי ולא תבעו מיניה ואזל ואסהיד ליה בדיני גוים על ישראל חבריה משמתינן ליה מאי טעמא דאינהו מפקי ממונא

§ Apropos the discussion of legal dealings between Jews and gentiles, the Gemara relates: Rava declared, and some say that it was Rav Huna who declared: All who ascend upward to Eretz Yisrael and all who descend downward to Babylonia agree that in the case of a Jew who knows of evidence concerning the legal claim of a gentile, and the gentile did not demand from him that he testify, and the Jew nevertheless went and testified for him in a gentile court, against his fellow Jew, we excommunicate him. What is the reason that we excommunicate him? It is because they, the gentile courts, expropriate money