Bava Kamma 13

לישני הא רבי יוסי הגלילי הא רבנן

let Ravina answer Rava’s objection by saying: This baraita, which states that an offering of lesser sanctity is the property of its owner and may be sold even when the Temple stands, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and it is referring to a case where the animal is still alive. And that qualification of the mishna by Rav Naḥman, that the sale of an unblemished firstborn animal when the Temple is standing is invalid, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion.

(אמר ליה) מתנות כהונה קאמרת שאני מתנות כהונה דכי קא זכו משלחן גבוה קא זכו

The Gemara answers: He said to him that this is not difficult: Do you speak of gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, of which a firstborn animal is an example? Gifts of the priesthood are different from other offerings of lesser sanctity, as when the priests receive their portions, they receive them from the table of the Most High. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili claims that the act of consecration of an animal as an offering of lesser sanctity does not nullify one’s ownership of the animal. The sanctity of a firstborn offering takes effect with its birth, so it may be that it was never owned; rather, it is reasonable that the Torah provided the priest only with the right and the obligation to partake of it after it is sacrificed.

גופא ומעלה מעל בה׳ לרבות קדשים קלים שהם ממונו דברי רבי יוסי הגלילי בן עזאי אומר לרבות את השלמים אבא יוסי בן דוסתאי אומר לא אמר בן עזאי אלא בבכור בלבד

§ The Gemara considers the matter itself: The baraita teaches: Concerning one who steals another’s property and takes a false oath denying he has done so, incurring the obligation to bring a guilt-offering, the verse states: “And commits a trespass against the Lord, and deals falsely with his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The verse serves to include a case in which one denies having in his possession offerings of lesser sanctity, which are the property of their owners, and are included in the phrase “and deals falsely with his neighbor.” This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering.

אמר מר בן עזאי אומר לרבות את השלמים למעוטי מאי

The Master said in the baraita: Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. The Gemara asks: Ben Azzai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to peace-offerings, is to exclude what?

אילימא למעוטי בכור השתא ומה שלמים שטעונים סמיכה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושוק אמרת ממון בעלים הוא בכור מבעיא

If we say it is to exclude a firstborn offering, because he holds that a firstborn is not the property of the priest, one could reject this, as the sanctity of a firstborn offering is a lesser sanctity than that of a peace-offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to peace-offerings, which have a higher degree of sanctity such that they require placing hands on the head of the offering and are accompanied by libations and the waving of their breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together, you nevertheless say that it is the property of the owners, is it necessary to state that with regard to a firstborn offering, for which these halakhot do not apply, that the priest has ownership of it?

אלא אמר רבי יוחנן למעוטי מעשר

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Azzai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering, i.e., every tenth animal of one’s flock that is designated as tithe for those ten animals and is sacrificed as an offering of lesser sanctity. Animal tithes are excluded because ben Azzai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock.

כדתניא בבכור נאמר לא תפדה ונמכר תם חי ובעל מום חי ושחוט במעשר נאמר לא יגאל ואינו נמכר לא חי ולא שחוט לא תם ולא בעל מום

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it.

רבינא מתני לה אסיפא אבא יוסי בן דוסתאי אומר לא אמר בן עזאי אלא בבכור בלבד למעוטי מאי

Ravina taught the preceding discussion with regard to the last clause of the baraita: Abba Yosei ben Dostai says that ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara asks: Abba Yosei ben Dostai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to a firstborn offering, is to exclude what?

אילימא למעוטי שלמים השתא ומה בכור שקדוש מרחם ממונו הוא שלמים מבעיא

If we say it is to exclude peace-offerings, because he holds that they are not the property of the one who consecrated them as offerings, one could reject this, as the sanctity of peace-offerings is a lesser sanctity than that of a firstborn offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to a firstborn offering, which is already sanctified upon its emergence from the womb yet nevertheless is the property of the priest, is it necessary to state that peace-offerings are the property of those who consecrated them, where the animals were already the property of its owner before they were consecrated?

אמר רבי יוחנן למעוטי מעשר

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Abba Yosei ben Dostai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering. Animal tithes are excluded because Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock.

כדתניא בבכור נאמר לא תפדה ונמכר תם חי ובעל מום חי ושחוט במעשר נאמר לא יגאל ואינו נמכר לא חי ולא שחוט לא תם ולא בעל מום

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it.

הא בבכור בלבד קאמר קשיא

The Gemara asks: How can one claim that Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that peace-offerings are also owned by those who consecrated them? Doesn’t Abba Yosei ben Dostai say: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

רבא אמר מאי נכסים שאין בהן מעילה נכסים שאין בהן דין מעילה ומאי נינהו דהדיוט

§ The Gemara cites an alternative explanation of the mishna’s statement: Rava said: What does the mishna mean when it says: One is liable only for damage caused to property for which, were one to use it for a mundane purpose, one would not be liable for the misuse of consecrated property? It is referring to property that is not at all subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property, and what is that? It is referring to any property of an ordinary person, which has no sanctity at all.

וליתני דהדיוט קשיא

The Gemara asks: But then let the mishna teach explicitly: One is liable only for damage caused to property of an ordinary individual. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

אמר רבי אבא שלמים שהזיקו גובה מבשרן ואינו גובה מאימוריהן

§ Rabbi Abba says: With regard to the case of an innocuous animal that was consecrated as a peace–offering and that caused damage, the injured party collects damages from its meat, i.e., from the portion of the offering that would have been eaten by its owners. This is in accordance with the general halakha that the payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is collected exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the ox and not from any other property of its owner. But he does not collect the damages from the sacrificial portions.

פשיטא אימורין לגבוה סלקי

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that one collects exclusively from the meat portion and not from the sacrificial portions, as those are to be offered up to God?

לא צריכא לגובה מבשרן כנגד אימורים

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that there is no collection from the owner’s meat portions corresponding to the sacrificial portions. Payment for damage caused by an innocuous animal is half the amount of the damages, and can be no more than the value of the animal itself. Rabbi Abba is teaching that when assessing the damage to determine the amount to be paid, one deems the owner responsible only according to his share of the animal, i.e., the meat portions, in relation to the animal as a whole.

אליבא דמאן

Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis engage in a dispute concerning the halakha in a case in which an ox pushed another animal into a pit (see 53a). If it were an innocuous ox, for which the Torah limits the owner’s liability to half the damages, the Rabbis rule that liability is incurred exclusively by the owner of the ox, i.e., he pays half the value of the damage, and the owner of the pit is entirely exempt. Rabbi Natan holds that since the damage was caused jointly by the ox and the pit, the owner of the ox need pay only half of what he would pay if his animal had been solely responsible, i.e., a quarter of the damages. Rabbi Natan further rules that the remaining sum can then be fully recovered from the owner of the pit, i.e., he pays the remaining three-quarters of the damages. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion, of those tanna’im, does Rabbi Abba state his ruling?

אי אליבא דרבנן פשיטא הא אמרי כי ליכא לאשתלומי מהאי לא משתלמא מהאי

If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then it is obvious and there is no need to state it, as didn’t the Rabbis say: Whenever, for whatever reason, the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this party, it is not recovered from that party, i.e., even though the injured party suffered the loss of the full value of his animal and recovered only half its value from the owner of the ox, he may not demand the remaining sum from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, where the injured party cannot collect damages from the sacrificial portions, he cannot recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering.

ואי אליבא דרבי נתן הא אמר כי ליכא לאשתלומי מהאי משתלם מהאי

And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, doesn’t he say: Whenever the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this one, it is recovered from that one, i.e., since the owner of the ox pays only a quarter of the damages, the remaining sum can be recovered from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, since the injured party cannot collect payment from the sacrificial portions, he should be able to recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering, in contrast to the ruling of Rabbi Abba.

אי בעית אימא רבי נתן איבעית אימא רבנן

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan, and if you wish, say his ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis.

איבעית אימא רבנן הני מילי בתרי גופי אבל בחד גופא מצי אמר ליה מכל היכא דבעינן משתלמנא

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis, as one might have thought that this matter, the ruling of the Rabbis, applies only where the damage is caused by two bodies, such as an ox and a pit. But where the damage is caused by one body, as in the case of damage caused by a an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, the injured party can say to the owner of the animal: From anywhere that I want to, I will recover my losses, and accordingly, the injured party could collect the full cost of the damage from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that this is not the halakha.

איבעית אימא רבי נתן התם הוא דאמר ליה בעל שור לבעל הבור אנא תוראי בבירך אשכחתיה מאי דלית לי לאשתלומי מהיאך משתלימנא מינך

And if you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan: It is only there that the owner of the damaged ox can say to the owner of the pit: Since I found my ox in your pit, ultimately you bear responsibility for any damage, and therefore whatever I cannot recover from the other one, i.e., the owner of the ox, I will recover from you.

אבל הכא מי מצי אמר בשר אזיק אימורין לא אזיק

But here, in the case of damage caused by an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, is the injured party actually able to say: Only the meat of the animal caused damage but the sacrificial portions did not cause damage? Since the entire animal caused the damage, he does not collect the full cost of the damage from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering.

אמר רבא תודה שהזיקה גובה מבשרה ואינו גובה מלחמה

Rava says: In the case of an innocuous animal consecrated as a thanks-offering that caused damage, the injured party collects damages from its meat, i.e., from the portion of the offerings that would have been eaten by the one who brought the offering, but he does not collect from its bread, i.e., from the offering of forty loaves of bread that accompanies the sacrifice of the animal.

לחם פשיטא

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he does not collect from the bread? The bread is not part of the animal that caused damage.

סיפא אצטריך ליה ניזק אוכל בשר ומתכפר מביא לחם

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to state this because of the latter clause of his ruling, which states: The injured party eats the meat portions of the offering according to the value of the damages owed to him, but the one achieving atonement, i.e., the one bringing the offering, brings the bread.

הא נמי פשיטא מהו דתימא כיון דלחם הכשירא דזבח הוא לימא ליה את אכלת בשר ואנא אייתי לחם קא משמע לן דלחם חיובא דבעלים הוא

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this also obvious? Why should anyone else bring the bread? The Gemara explains: Lest you say, since the bread is a necessary qualifying factor for the thanks-offering, as without it one does not fulfill one’s obligation, let the owner of the offering say to the one eating it, why should you eat the meat and I bring the bread? If you wish to eat, you should bring the bread. Therefore, Rava teaches us that the offering of the loaves of bread is the obligation of the owners of the offering.

נכסים שהן של בני ברית

§ The mishna teaches: One is liable only for damage caused to property that belongs to members of the covenant.

למעוטי מאי אי למעוטי דגוי הא קתני לה לקמן שור של ישראל שנגח שור של גוי פטור תנא והדר מפרש

The Gemara asks: This clause serves to exclude what? If it serves to exclude the property of a gentile, isn’t that already explicitly taught in the mishna below (37b): In the case of an ox of a Jew that gored an ox of a gentile, the Jew is exempt. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches this as a principle in the mishna here and then explains it in greater detail in the mishna below.

נכסים המיוחדין למעוטי מאי אמר רב יהודה למעוטי זה אומר שורך הזיק וזה אומר שורך הזיק

The mishna continues: One is liable only for assigned property. The Gemara asks: This clause serves to exclude what? Rav Yehuda said: This clause serves to exclude a case in which an animal is injured but it is unclear which of two oxen, owned by different people, caused the damage. The owner of this ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. And the owner of that ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. Since it cannot be proven which ox actually caused the damage, neither owner is liable. The intention of the mishna is that one is liable only where the belligerent ox is assigned to, i.e., is known to be the property of, a specific individual.

הא תני לקמן היו שנים רודפין אחר אחד זה אומר שורך הזיק וזה אומר שורך הזיק שניהם פטורין תני והדר מפרש

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that explicitly taught in the mishna below (35a): If two oxen were seen pursuing a single ox, and then the single ox is found to be injured, and the owner of this ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. And the owner of that ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. In such a case, both of them are exempt since it is uncertain which one is guilty. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches this as a principle in the mishna here and then explains it in greater detail in the mishna below.

במתניתא תנא פרט לנכסי הפקר היכי דמי אילימא דנגח תורא דידן לתורא דהפקר מאן תבע ליה אלא דנגח תורא דהפקר לתורא דידן

It was taught in a baraita in explanation of the mishna that the term assigned property serves to exclude ownerless property. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances in which the mishna teaches that one is exempt? If we say it is referring to a case where an ox belonging to us, i.e., to a Jew, gored an ownerless ox, it is obvious that the owner bears no liability, as who is claiming damages from him? Rather, it must be referring to a case where an ownerless ox gored an ox belonging to us, and it teaches that the injured party does not have a right to damages.

ליזיל וליתיה בשקדם וזכה בו אחר

The Gemara asks: What is the point of this halakha? If the injured party wishes to recover his losses, let him go and take the belligerent ox for himself, since it is currently ownerless. The Gemara explains: The mishna teaches that the injured party does not have any right to the ox, in order to teach that in a case where another person preceded him and acquired it, the injured party has no claim to it.

רבינא אמר למעוטי נגח ואחר כך הקדיש נגח ואחר כך הפקיר

Ravina said an alternative interpretation of the mishna: The term assigned property serves to exclude a case in which an ox gored and subsequently its owner consecrated it, or where it gored and subsequently its owner declared it ownerless. Since the owners did not own the ox at the time the case was brought before the court, they are exempt from paying. Ravina explains that this is the intention of the mishna: That one is liable only when the property that caused the damage was owned by a responsible party both when it caused the damage and when it was tried. In this case, at the time of the court hearing it was not owned by a responsible party, as it was either consecrated or ownerless.

תניא נמי הכי יתר על כן אמר רבי יהודה אפילו נגח ואחר כך הקדיש נגח ואחר כך הפקיר פטור שנאמר והועד בבעליו והמית איש וגו׳ עד שתהא מיתה והעמדה בדין שוין כאחד

It is also taught in a baraita: The halakha is that an ox that kills a person is stoned to death. The mishna states (44b) that this does not apply to an ox consecrated to the Temple or an ownerless ox. Moreover, Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if an ox gored and its owner subsequently consecrated it to the Temple, or if an ox gored and its owner subsequently declared it ownerless, the owner is exempt from liability, as it is stated: “And if the ox was wont to gore in time past, and had been forewarned with its owner, and he had not guarded it in, and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). The repetition of the reference to the owner at the beginning and end of the verse indicates that the ox is not stoned unless the ox’s status as the owner’s property at the time of the death of the victim and at the time of the owner’s standing trial is the same, i.e., the ox is owned by a responsible party for both events.

וגמר הדין לא בעינן הא השור יסקל בגמר דין הוא דכתיב

The Gemara asks: But do we not also require that the ox’s status be the same at the time of the verdict? Isn’t the phrase: “The ox shall be stoned” written with regard to the time of the verdict?

אלא אימא עד שתהא מיתה והעמדה בדין וגמר דין שוין כאחד

Rather, say that the owner of the ox is exempt unless the ox’s status as the owner’s property at the time of the death of the victim and at the time of the owner’s standing trial and at the verdict is the same, i.e., the ox is owned by a responsible party for all three events.

חוץ מרשות המיוחדת למזיק דאמר ליה תורך ברשותי מאי בעי

§ The mishna teaches: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage. The Gemara explains the reason for this: This is because the one liable for the damage can say to the injured party: What did your ox want in my domain? One does not have to guard his ox from causing damage within his own property, since another person’s animal has no right to be there.

ורשות הניזק והמזיק

The mishna continues: And one is liable for damage caused in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage.

אמר רב חסדא אמר אבימי חצר השותפין חייב בה על השן ועל הרגל והכי קאמר חוץ מרשות המיוחדת למזיק דפטור ורשות הניזק והמזיק כשהזיק חב המזיק

The Gemara cites a dispute concerning this case that results in two different ways of interpreting the mishna: Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: With regard to a courtyard designated for the joint use of two partners, either one of them is liable for damage caused by the ox of one partner to the property of the other partner while in it, both for the category of Eating and for the category of Trampling. And accordingly, this is what the mishna is saying: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage, as he is exempt there; but in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one responsible for the damage, when he causes damage, the one who is responsible for the damage is obligated to pay damages. The statement in the mishna concerning a domain designated for joint use is the beginning of the following clause and introduces a case in which one is liable for damage.

ורבי אלעזר אמר פטור על השן ועל הרגל והכי קאמר חוץ מרשות המיוחדת למזיק ורשות הניזק והמזיק נמי פטור וכשהזיק חב המזיק לאתויי קרן

And Rabbi Elazar says: In a courtyard designated for joint use, one is exempt for one’s ox causing damage to the property of his partner in the category of Eating, and for one’s ox causing damage to the property of his partner in the category of Trampling. And accordingly, this is what the mishna is saying: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage, and one is also exempt for damage done in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage. The statement in the mishna about a domain designated for joint use is a continuation of the previous clause and adds an additional case in which one is exempt. And the following clause: When one causes damage, the one liable for the damage is obligated to pay damages, serves to add the fact that one is liable for damage in the framework of the category of Goring, which was not previously mentioned in the mishna.

הניחא לשמואל אלא לרב דאמר תנא שור וכל מילי דשור חב המזיק לאתויי מאי

This interpretation of the concluding clause of the mishna, as a reference to Goring, works out well according to Shmuel, in his dispute with Rav (3b) concerning the meaning of Ox and Maveh in the first mishna of this chapter. According to Shmuel they mean Trampling and Eating, respectively, and Goring has yet to be addressed. But according to Rav, who says: The term ox in the mishna includes damage caused by the ox and all matters involving damaging actions that are completed by an ox, including Goring, Eating, and Trampling, Goring is already addressed in the mishna. What is added by the clause: The one liable for the damage is obligated to pay damages?

לאתויי הא דתנו רבנן כשהזיק חב המזיק להביא שומר חנם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר שהזיקה בהמה ברשותן תם משלם חצי נזק ומועד משלם נזק שלם נפרצה בלילה או שפרצוה לסטין ויצתה והזיקה פטור

The Gemara answers: It serves to add that which the Sages taught in a baraita that elucidates the mishna’s statement. The mishna states: When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage. This serves to include the cases of an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, and a renter, in which an animal, e.g., an ox, caused damage while in their possession. If the ox was innocuous, he pays half of the damages, and if it was forewarned, he pays the full damages. If the ox was safely enclosed and a wall broke open at night, or if bandits [listin] broke it open and the ox went out and caused damage, he is exempt from liability.

אמר מר כשהזיק חב המזיק להביא שומר חנם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר היכי דמי

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that the mishna states: When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage. This serves to include the cases of an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, and a renter. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances?

אילימא דאזקיה תורא דמשאיל לתורא דשואל לימא ליה אילו אזיק בעלמא בעית לשלומי את השתא דאזקיה לתורא דידך בעינא לשלומי

If we say that the lender’s ox, which was under the watch of the borrower, injured the borrower’s ox, and the baraita is teaching that the lender is liable to pay the borrower, why is this so? Let the lender say to the borrower: If my ox had injured an ox in the world at large, i.e., someone else’s ox, you, the borrower, would be required to pay, as you were entrusted with safeguarding it. Now that my ox has injured your ox, should I be required to pay?

אלא דאזקיה תורא דשואל לתורא דמשאיל לימא ליה אילו איתזק מעלמא בעית לשלומי כוליה תורא השתא דאזקיה תורא דידך פלגא ניזקא הוא דמשלמת לי

Rather, the case must be that the borrower’s ox injured the lender’s ox, and the baraita is teaching that the borrower is liable to pay. The Gemara asks: According to this interpretation, the baraita teaches that if the belligerent ox was innocuous, the borrower is liable to pay only half of the damages. But why? Let the lender say to the borrower: By borrowing my ox, you undertook full responsibility for it such that if my ox had been injured by an ox from the world at large, you would be required to pay me for the entire value of my ox, irrespective of whether the belligerent ox was considered innocuous or forewarned. Now that it is your ox that injured my ox, should you have to pay only half of the damages? This interpretation of the baraita is also difficult.

לעולם דאזקיה תורא דמשאיל לתורא דשואל והכא במאי עסקינן שקבל עליו שמירת גופו

The Gemara explains: Actually, the case is where the lender’s ox injured the borrower’s ox, and with what are we dealing here? This is a case where the borrower undertook the responsibility of safeguarding the body of the lender’s ox from being injured,