Bava Kamma 18

בהתיז צרורות ובפלוגתא דסומכוס ורבנן קמיפלגי

The dispute concerns a case where the chicken propelled pebbles from underfoot as it was hopping, and it is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Sumakhos and the Rabbis, cited earlier, that the tanna’im in the baraita disagree. One tanna holds that the owner pays the full cost of the damage for pebbles propelled by an animal in the course of its walking, and the other tanna holds that its owner pays half the cost of the damage.

תא שמע תרנגולין שהיו מחטטין בחבל דלי ונפסק החבל ונשבר הדלי משלמין נזק שלם שמע מינה בתר מעיקרא אזלינן תרגמא אחבל

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an additional attempt to resolve the dilemma from a baraita: In a case where chickens were pecking at the rope tied to a bucket and the rope was severed and the bucket fell and broke, the owner of the chickens pays the full cost of the damage. Conclude from the baraita that we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage in determining liability for damage. The Gemara rejects this conclusion, and one cannot adduce proof from the baraita. Interpret instead that the reference in the baraita is to the damage caused to the rope, while the owner pays only half the cost of the damage for breaking the bucket.

והא חבל משונה הוא דמאוס בלישה והא נשבר דלי קתני אלא סומכוס היא דאמר צרורות נזק שלם משלם

The Gemara asks: But isn’t eating a rope atypical behavior for a chicken, and therefore it should be classified within the primary category of Goring, not the primary category of Eating? Why then must the owner of the chicken pay the full cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The reference in the baraita is to a case where the rope was filthy [ma’us] with kneaded dough, and in those circumstances it is typical for a chicken to peck at it. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna teach in the baraita: And the bucket broke, indicating that the dispute is with regard to damage done to the bucket, not to the rope? The Gemara explains: Rather, this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: In the case of pebbles propelled by an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

אי סומכוס אימא סיפא ניתז ממנו שבר ונפל על כלי אחר ושברה על הראשון משלם נזק שלם ועל האחרון משלם חצי נזק ואי סומכוס מי אית ליה חצי נזק

The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, say the latter clause of the baraita: If a shard was propelled from the bucket broken by a chicken and it fell upon another vessel and broke it, the owner of the chicken pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, and half the cost of the damage for the second one. And if the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, is he of the opinion that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles?

וכי תימא שאני ליה לסומכוס בין נזק כחו לכח כחו ואלא הא דבעי רב אשי כח כחו לסומכוס ככחו דמי או לאו ככחו דמי

And if you would say that there is a difference, according to Sumakhos, between damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action, e.g., pebbles, and damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by its action, e.g., damage caused by the shard of the bucket, and in the latter case Sumakhos concedes that the owner pays half the cost of the damage, that would result in a difficulty. The Gemara asks: But what of this dilemma raised by Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action?

תפשוט ליה דלאו ככחו דמי

Why did Rav Ashi state his dilemma; why did he not resolve the dilemma and conclude that according to Sumakhos its status is not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action? Since Rav Ashi does not resolve the dilemma based on this baraita, apparently, Sumakhos does not distinguish between the two types of force.

אלא לאו רבנן היא שמע מינה בתר מעיקרא אזלינן

The Gemara suggests: Rather, is it not so that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and conclude from the baraita that we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage when determining one’s liability for the damage. Therefore, an owner is liable for any damage resulting from his animal’s typical behavior, and he pays the full cost of the damage done to the bucket even if the damage took place in another location.

אמר רב ביבי בר אביי דקאזיל מיניה מיניה

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: There is no proof from the baraita, as it could be explained that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the bucket is continually propelled from the impetus of the chicken, who caused the bucket to break. That is why the ruling in the baraita is that the owner of the chicken pays the full cost of the damage. The dilemma with regard to the case where an animal treads upon a vessel that rolls away and breaks elsewhere remains unresolved.

בעי רבא חצי נזק צרורות מגופו משלם או מעלייה משלם מגופו משלם דלא אשכחן חצי נזק דמשלם מעלייה או דלמא מעלייה משלם דלא אשכחן כאורחיה דמשלם מגופיה

§ Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of a walking animal, does the owner of the animal pay restitution exclusively from the body of the animal, just as one pays half the cost of the damage caused by an innocuous ox with regard to damage categorized under the primary category of Goring? Or does he pay restitution from his superior–quality land, as he does for other forms of damage? The Gemara elaborates: Does he pay restitution exclusively from the body of the animal, as we do not find any case where one pays half the cost of the damage from his superior–quality land? Or perhaps he pays restitution from his superior–quality land, as we do not find any case where an animal causes damage in its typical manner where the owner pays restitution exclusively from the body of his animal?

תא שמע הידוס אינו מועד ויש אומרים הרי זה מועד הידוס סלקא דעתך אלא לאו הידוס והתיז

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: With regard to hopping, a chicken is not deemed forewarned. And some say that it is forewarned. The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: Does it enter your mind to raise the possibility that a chicken is not forewarned with regard to hopping? Hopping is the typical manner of movement for chickens. Rather, is it not that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused the damage?

ובהא קמיפלגי מאן דאמר אינו מועד קסבר מגופו משלם ומאן דאמר מועד קסבר מעלייה משלם

And it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: The one who says that the chicken is not deemed forewarned holds that its owner pays restitution from the body of the animal, as is the halakha when an innocuous animal gores, while the one who says that the chicken is forewarned holds that he pays restitution from his superior–quality land, as is the halakha when a forewarned animal causes damage. According to this analysis, Rava’s dilemma is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

לא בפלוגתא דסומכוס ורבנן קמיפלגי

The Gemara rejects this: No, perhaps the dispute in the baraita is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Sumakhos and the Rabbis with regard to the legal status of damage caused by a force generated by the animal’s action. It is with regard to the similarity of damage caused by an action performed by an animal’s body to the case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused the damage that the tanna’im in the baraita disagree.

תא שמע הכלב שנטל חררה והלך לגדיש ואכל החררה והדליק את הגדיש על החררה משלם נזק שלם ועל הגדיש משלם חצי נזק

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from a mishna (21b): If the dog took a loaf [ḥarara] that was baking on hot coals and went to a stack of grain to eat the loaf, and the dog ate the loaf and ignited the stack of grain with one of the coals attached to the loaf, the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage for the damage to the loaf, as it is classified in the primary category of Eating, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the damage to the stack of grain. Rabbi Elazar says: He pays the full cost of the damage for the damage to the stack of grain as well.

מאי טעמא לאו משום דהויא להו צרורות ותני עלה משלם חצי נזק מגופו

What is the reason that the first tanna holds that the owner pays half the cost of the damage caused to the stack of grain? Is it not due to the fact that it is analogous to propelling pebbles, as the coal fell from the loaf held in its mouth and ignited the grain? And it is taught in a baraita in that regard that when the first tanna said that he pays half the cost of the damage, he pays restitution exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of his animal. Apparently, half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles is paid from the body of the animal that caused the damage.

ותסברא לרבי אלעזר נזק שלם מגופיה מי אשכחן

The Gemara rejects this explanation: And can you understand the baraita in that way? According to that understanding, with regard to Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with the first tanna and holds that the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage caused to the grain, do we find anywhere that according to Rabbi Elazar one pays restitution exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of his animal?

אלא כגון דשני בהא בגחלת ורבי אלעזר סבר לה כרבי טרפון דאמר משונה קרן בחצר הניזק נזק שלם משלם

Rather, the baraita can be explained in a case where the dog acted atypically with this coal with which he lit the stack of grain. Since the dog’s behavior was atypical, the damage is classified under the primary category of Goring, not under the category of Eating. And Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says in a mishna (24b): The halakha of Goring in the courtyard of the injured party is atypical, as there, the owner of the ox pays the full cost of the damage, in contrast to half the cost of the damage that he pays when it transpires in the public domain. Nevertheless, since it was an innocuous animal that caused the damage, restitution is paid from its body.

ולא היא מאי טעמא מוקמת לה כרבי טרפון משום נזק שלם

The Gemara rejects that explanation: But that is not so. What is the reason that you interpreted that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon? It is due to the difficulty presented by the halakha that he pays the full cost of the damage exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of the animal, which would not be so according to Rabbi Elazar.

רבי אלעזר סבר כסומכוס דאמר צרורות נזק שלם משלם וסבר לה כרבי יהודה דאמר צד תמות במקומה עומדת וכי קתני מגופו אצד תמות

The Gemara suggests: There is an alternative explanation. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says that one pays the full cost of the damage caused by pebbles, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to a forewarned ox: The aspect of innocuousness, which dictates that the owner pays half the cost of the damage from the body of the ox, remains intact. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the owner of a forewarned ox pays half the cost of the damage from the body of his ox and half the cost of the damage from his superior–quality land. And when the tanna of the baraita teaches that the owner pays restitution from the body of his animal, the reference is to the aspect of innocuousness, i.e., half the cost of the damage. He pays the other half from his superior–quality land as he would in the case of any forewarned animal.

אמר ליה רב סמא בריה דרב אשי לרבינא אימור דשמעת ליה לרבי יהודה בתם ונעשה מועד במועד מתחילתו

Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda stated that the aspect of innocuousness remains intact with regard to damage categorized under the primary category of Goring, where the ox was initially innocuous and then became forewarned. In the case of propelled pebbles, which is a subcategory of Trampling, where the ox is forewarned from the outset,

מי שמעת ליה

did you hear him distinguish between the different parts of the payment? There is no aspect of innocuousness in the case of pebbles.

אלא כי קאמר רבי אלעזר נזק שלם כגון דאייעד ובהא קמיפלגי מר סבר יש העדאה לצרורות ומר סבר אין העדאה לצרורות

Rather, when Rabbi Elazar says that the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage in a case that is similar to one of propelled pebbles, he was referring to a case where the owner of the animal was forewarned with regard to this matter. And they disagree about this point: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that there is forewarning with regard to propelling pebbles; therefore, if there was testimony given in court that a particular animal regularly propels pebbles in the course of its walking, the animal is deemed forewarned and its owner pays the full cost of the damage. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that there is no forewarning with regard to pebbles. Apparently, payment for damage caused by pebbles is paid from the body of the animal.

אלא הא דבעי רבא יש העדאה לצרורות או אין העדאה לצרורות אי לרבנן אין העדאה לצרורות אי לרבי אלעזר יש העדאה לצרורות

The Gemara asks: But if this is the case, then the dilemma raised by Rava concerning whether there is forewarning for propelling pebbles or there is no forewarning for propelling pebbles, can be resolved from this dispute. If the dilemma is raised according to the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna, there is no forewarning for propelling pebbles. If the dilemma is raised according to Rabbi Elazar, there is forewarning for propelling pebbles.

אמר לך רבא כי מיבעיא לי לדידי אליבא דרבנן דפליגי עליה דסומכוס אבל הכא בין לרבנן בין לרבי אלעזר כסומכוס סבירא להו דאמר צרורות נזק שלם משלם

The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: When I raise the dilemma, I do so specifically according to the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos and hold that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of pebbles; but here in this baraita, both the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna, and Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says that in the case of pebbles, one pays the full cost of the damage.

וטעמא מאי אמור רבנן חצי נזק דשני ולא אייעד ובפלוגתא דרבי טרפון ורבנן קמיפלגי

And what is the reason that the Rabbis say that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of pebbles? It is that in the case of pebbles the animal acted atypically and was not forewarned. And in this baraita, concerning the dog that lit the stack of grain, the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Elazar is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis, i.e., the halakha in the case of damage caused by an innocuous ox on the property of the injured party.

אימור דשמעת ליה לרבי טרפון נזק שלם מגופו מי שמעת ליה

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. Say that you heard that according to Rabbi Tarfon the owner pays the full cost of the damage; but did you hear that according to Rabbi Tarfon restitution is paid only from the body of the animal that caused the damage?

אין מהיכא מייתי לה מקרן מרשות הרבים

The Gemara answers: Yes, Rabbi Tarfon holds that restitution is paid only from the body of the animal that caused the damage. From where does Rabbi Tarfon derive the halakha that when damage is caused by an innocuous ox on the property of the injured party its owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage and not merely half? He derives it via an a fortiori inference from damage categorized as Goring that is caused in the public domain, as explained in the mishna (24b).

דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון

His ruling is based on the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, i.e., a halakha derived from an a fortiori inference cannot be more stringent than the source of that derivation. Since restitution for damage categorized as Goring that is caused in the public domain is paid only from the body of the damaging animal, the same is true with regard to restitution for damage categorized as Goring that is caused on the property of the injured party.

והא רבי טרפון לית ליה דיו

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it clear from that mishna that Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, as, if he accepted that principle, not only would he hold that payment is only from the body of the animal, he would also require payment of half the cost of the damage.

כי לית ליה דיו היכא דמפריך קל וחומר היכא דלא מפריך קל וחומר אית ליה דיו

The Gemara answers: He does not reject the principle. When he does not accept the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, it is in a case where the result of rejecting the principle is that the a fortiori inference is refuted. But in a case where the result of rejecting the principle is that the a fortiori inference is not refuted, but will be applied in a more limited fashion, he accepts the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, in this case the payment of the full cost of the damage, which is derived by means of the a fortiori inference, is paid only from the body of the animal based on the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

גופא בעי רבא יש העדאה לצרורות או אין העדאה לצרורות לקרן מדמינן ליה או דלמא תולדה דרגל הוא

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself, cited earlier. Rava raises a dilemma: Is there forewarning for propelling pebbles, so that the owner would pay the full cost of the damage if he had been forewarned three times, or is there no forewarning for propelling pebbles, and he will always pay half the cost of the damage? The Gemara elaborates: Do we liken the case of propelled pebbles to damage categorized as Goring? Accordingly, when an innocuous ox causes damage by propelling pebbles its owner pays half the cost of the damage, and when a forewarned ox does so the owner pays the full cost of the damage. Or perhaps, is it a subcategory of the primary category of Trampling, which is deemed forewarned from the outset? Accordingly, the owner would always pay half the cost of the damage, as there is no change in status after the third warning.

תא שמע הידוס אינו מועד ויש אומרים הרי זה מועד הידוס סלקא דעתך אלא הידוס והתיז

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution of this dilemma from a baraita: With regard to hopping, a chicken is not deemed forewarned. And some say that it is forewarned. The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: Does it enter your mind to raise the possibility that a chicken is not forewarned with regard to hopping? Hopping is the typical manner of movement for chickens. Rather, is it not that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused damage?

מאי לאו כגון דעבד תלתא זימני ובהא קמיפלגי מר סבר יש העדאה ומר סבר אין העדאה לא בחד זימנא ובפלוגתא דסומכוס ורבנן קמיפלגי

What, is it not referring to a case where the chicken has done so three times? And it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles. According to this analysis, Rava’s dilemma is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken hopped only one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning the compensation for damage caused by pebbles.

תא שמע בהמה שהטילה גללים לעיסה רב יהודה אומר משלם נזק שלם ורבי אלעזר אומר חצי נזק מאי לאו כגון דעבד תלתא זימני ובהא קמיפלגי מר סבר יש העדאה ומר סבר אין העדאה

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution to the dilemma from an amoraic dispute: If an animal dropped excrement onto dough and damaged it, Rav Yehuda says: The owner of the animal pays the full cost of the damage, and Rabbi Elazar says: He pays half the cost of the damage. What, is it not referring to a case where the animal has done so three times? And it is with regard to this that they disagree, as one Sage holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles.

לא בחד זימנא ובפלוגתא דסומכוס ורבנן קמיפלגי והא משונה הוא דדחיק ליה עלמא

The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the animal dropped excrement only one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning compensation for damage caused by pebbles. The Gemara asks: But isn’t this atypical behavior of the animal, and since all behavior that deviates from the norm is classified within the category of Goring, the owner should be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The case is one where the animal was forced into a narrow place and had no alternative to relieving itself onto the dough; therefore, it does not constitute atypical behavior.

ולימא רב יהודה הלכה כסומכוס ולימא רבי אלעזר הלכה כרבנן גללים אצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ובתר גופיה גרירין כגופיה דמי קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: But if the amoraic dispute parallels the tannaitic dispute, let Rav Yehuda say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, and let Rabbi Elazar say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, instead of stating their dispute in the context of the particular case of the animal and the dough. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for them to state their dispute in this case, as there is a novel element concerning excrement. It would enter your mind to say: Since the excrement is drawn after the body of the animal, its legal status is like that of damage caused by its body, not like pebbles propelled by the animal. Therefore, their stating the dispute with regard to excrement teaches us that its status is like that of propelling pebbles. Therefore, the dispute between Rav Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar can be explained as parallel to the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis with regard to pebbles.

תא שמע דתני רמי בר יחזקאל תרנגול שהושיט ראשו לאויר כלי זכוכית ותקע בו ושברו משלם נזק שלם ואמר רב יוסף אמרי בי רב סוס שצנף וחמור שנער ושיבר את הכלים משלם חצי נזק

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution to the dilemma from a baraita: Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: In the case of a rooster that extended its head into the airspace of a glass vessel and crowed in the vessel and broke it with the sound waves, its owner pays the full cost of the damage. And Rav Yosef said that the Sages from the school of Rav say: If a horse neighed or a donkey brayed and the sound waves broke vessels, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. These are cases similar to the case of pebbles, and there is a dispute between the Sages with regard to these cases.

מאי לאו כגון דעבד תלתא זימני

What, is it not referring to a case where the rooster or animal has done so three times?