Bava Kamma 19

Bava Kamma 19

וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר יֵשׁ הַעֲדָאָה, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין הַעֲדָאָה?

And it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, the first tanna in the baraita cited by Rami bar Yeḥezkel, holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage, Rav Yosef, holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles.

לָא; בְּחַד זִמְנָא, וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּסוֹמְכוֹס וְרַבָּנַן קָמִיפַּלְגִי. וְהָא מְשׁוּנֶּה הוּא! דְּאִית בֵּיהּ בִּזְרָנֵי.

The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the rooster or animal damaged the vessel one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning compensation for damage caused by pebbles. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it atypical behavior for an animal to insert its head into a glass vessel, and isn’t all atypical behavior classified within the category of Goring, meaning that the owner should be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The case is one where there were seeds in the vessel, and therefore the rooster extending its head into the vessel is considered typical behavior.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: יֵשׁ שִׁנּוּי לִצְרוֹרוֹת לִרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק, אוֹ אֵין שִׁנּוּי לִצְרוֹרוֹת לִרְבִיעַ נֶזֶק?

Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: Is there any halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, and therefore if an animal propelled pebbles in an atypical manner its owner is liable to pay one-quarter of the damage, i.e., half the restitution for damage caused by pebbles? Or, is there no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, and therefore, even in an atypical case, the owner pays the standard restitution of half the cost of the damage?

תִּפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדְּרָבָא, דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: יֵשׁ הַעֲדָאָה לִצְרוֹרוֹת, אוֹ אֵין הַעֲדָאָה לִצְרוֹרוֹת? מִכְּלָל דְּאֵין שִׁנּוּי.

The Gemara answers: Resolve Rav Ashi’s dilemma from Rava’s dilemma, as Rava raises a dilemma: Is there forewarning for pebbles, or is there no forewarning for pebbles? Based on that dilemma, one may conclude by inference that there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to pebbles propelled by an animal, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, as, were that the case, forewarning would lead to an animal owner’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage.

דִּלְמָא רָבָא ״אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר״ קָאָמַר – אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר אֵין שִׁנּוּי, יֵשׁ הַעֲדָאָה, אוֹ אֵין הַעֲדָאָה? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava stated his dilemma employing the style of: If you say. If you say that there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to propelling pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage, and the owner pays half the cost of the damage in every case, is there forewarning for pebbles, meaning that after three incidents the owner pays the full cost of the damage, or is there no forewarning for pebbles? According to that understanding, the halakha with regard to Rav Ashi’s dilemma cannot be inferred from Rava’s dilemma. Rav Ashi’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: כֹּחַ כֹּחוֹ לְסוֹמְכוֹס, כְּכֹחוֹ דָּמֵי אוֹ לָא?

Rav Ashi raises another dilemma with regard to pebbles: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, that one pays the full cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action?

מִי גְּמִיר הֲלָכָה – וּמוֹקֵי לַהּ בְּכֹחַ כֹּחוֹ, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא גְּמִיר הֲלָכָה כְּלָל? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara elaborates: Did Sumakhos learn the halakha that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles as a tradition transmitted to Moses at Sinai, and he interprets that tradition as applying in a case where the damage was caused by a force generated by a force generated by the action of an animal? By contrast, in a typical case of damage caused by pebbles, which is an example of a force generated by the action of an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, as it is a subcategory of Trampling. Or perhaps he did not learn any halakha as a tradition in this regard at all, and therefore even in a case where the damage was caused by a force generated by a force generated by the action of an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, as it is a subcategory of Trampling. The Gemara concludes: This dilemma, too, shall stand unresolved.

הָיְתָה מְבַעֶטֶת, אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ צְרוֹרוֹת מְנַתְּזִין מִתַּחַת רַגְלֶיהָ, וְשָׁבְרָה אֶת הַכֵּלִים – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵיכִי קָאָמַר?

§ The mishna teaches: If the animal was kicking while it was walking, or it occurred that pebbles were inadvertently propelled from under its feet and those pebbles broke vessels, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is the tanna of the mishna speaking?

הָיְתָה מְבַעֶטֶת וְהִזִּיקָה בְּבִיעוּטָהּ, אוֹ צְרוֹרוֹת כְּאוֹרְחַיְיהוּ – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְרַבָּנַן הִיא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָיְתָה מְבַעֶטֶת וְהִזִּיקָה בְּבִיעוּטָהּ, אוֹ צְרוֹרוֹת מֵחֲמַת בִּיעוּט – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, הָא כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וּמַנִּי – סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא?

The Gemara elaborates: Is the tanna saying that if the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, which is a subcategory of Goring, or if the animal was walking and propelled pebbles in its typical manner, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage, and, accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one pays half the cost of damage caused by pebbles? Or perhaps the tanna is saying: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, or if the animal propelled pebbles due to its kick and the pebbles caused damage, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. Accordingly, one may infer: But if the animal propelled pebbles as it was walking in its typical manner, the owner pays the full cost of the damage, and if so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos.

תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא: דָּרְסָה עַל הַכְּלִי וּשְׁבָרַתּוּ, וְנָפַל הַשֶּׁבֶר עַל כְּלִי אַחֵר וּשְׁבָרוֹ – עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וְעַל הָאַחֲרוֹן חֲצִי נֶזֶק. וְאִי סוֹמְכוֹס, מִי אִית לֵיהּ חֲצִי נֶזֶק?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the latter clause of the mishna: If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel. And if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, does he hold that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles?

וְכִי תֵּימָא ״רִאשׁוֹן״ – רִאשׁוֹן לְהַתָּזָה, וְ״שֵׁנִי״ – שֵׁנִי לְהַתָּזָה; וְשָׁאנֵי לֵיהּ לְסוֹמְכוֹס בֵּין כֹּחוֹ לְכֹחַ כֹּחוֹ;

And if you would say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, and can be understood as follows: The first vessel, concerning which the owner of the animal pays the full cost of the damage, is the first vessel damaged following the propelling of shards from the vessel upon which the animal trod, i.e., the second vessel that was broken. And the second vessel, concerning which the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage, is the second vessel following the propelling of shards from the vessel upon which the animal trod, i.e., the third vessel that was broken by shards from the second vessel. And the reason for the difference in liability is that there is a difference, according to Sumakhos, between damage caused by a force generated by the action of an animal, for which the owner pays the full cost of the damage, and damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by its action, for which he pays for only half the cost of the damage.

אֶלָּא הָא דְּבָעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: כֹּחַ כֹּחוֹ לְסוֹמְכוֹס, כְּכֹחוֹ דָּמֵי אוֹ לָאו כְּכֹחוֹ דָּמֵי? תִּפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ דְּלָאו כְּכֹחוֹ דָּמֵי!

But if one were to say this explanation, what can be said of that dilemma which Rav Ashi raised: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, that one pays the full cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action? Why does he have a dilemma? Let him resolve from here that its status is not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action.

רַב אָשֵׁי כְּרַבָּנַן מוֹקֵי לַהּ, וּבָעֵי לַהּ הָכִי – הָיְתָה מְבַעֶטֶת וְהִזִּיקָה בְּבִיעוּטָהּ, אוֹ צְרוֹרוֹת כְּאוֹרְחַיְיהוּ – חֲצִי נֶזֶק. הָא מֵחֲמַת בִּיעוּט – רְבִיעַ נֶזֶק, וְיֵשׁ שִׁנּוּי;

The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rav Ashi interprets the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of propelled pebbles, and he raises this dilemma: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick, which is a subcategory of Goring, or if the animal was walking and propelled pebbles in its typical manner, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. Accordingly, one may infer: But if the pebbles were propelled due to a kick, the owner pays one-quarter of the damage. And there is halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to a case of pebbles, resulting in its owner being liable to pay only one-quarter of the damage.

אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָיְתָה מְבַעֶטֶת וְהִזִּיקָה בְּבִיעוּטָהּ, אוֹ צְרוֹרוֹת מֵחֲמַת בִּיעוּט – חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְאֵין שִׁנּוּי? תֵּיקוּ.

Or perhaps the tanna is saying: If the animal was kicking and caused damage directly with its kick or if the animal propelled pebbles due to its kick and the pebbles caused damage, the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. And there is no halakhic significance to deviation from typical behavior with regard to a case of pebbles. The Gemara concludes: Rav Ashi’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל מֵרַבִּי אַמֵּי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ מֵרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: הָיְתָה מְהַלֶּכֶת בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לָהּ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מְנַתֶּזֶת, וּבִעֲטָה וְהִתִּיזָה וְהִזִּיקָה, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לַהּ – אוֹרְחַיהּ הוּא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא מֵחֲמַת בִּיעוּט קָמְנַתְּזָה צְרוֹרוֹת? תֵּיקוּ.

§ Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami, and some say that it was before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: If the animal was walking in a place where it is impossible for it to walk without propelling pebbles as it proceeds, and it kicked and propelled pebbles and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Does one say that since it is impossible for it to walk without propelling pebbles, propelling pebbles is its typical manner in that situation and the halakha in this case would be the same as any case of pebbles? Or perhaps, since now, in any event, the pebbles were propelled due to a kick, it is different. The Gemara concludes: Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי זֵירָא: הָיְתָה מְהַלֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וּבִעֲטָה וְהִתִּיזָה וְהִזִּיקָה, מַהוּ? לְקֶרֶן מְדַמֵּינַן לֵיהּ – וְחַיֶּיבֶת, אוֹ דִלְמָא תּוֹלָדָה דְרֶגֶל הוּא – וּפְטוּרָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא, תּוֹלָדָה דְרֶגֶל הוּא.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If the animal was walking in the public domain and it kicked and propelled pebbles and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we liken the damage in this instance to Goring, since the action was performed with intent, and therefore the owner of the animal is liable even though the incident transpired in the public domain? Or perhaps, since this is a case of pebbles, it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling and the owner is exempt from liability in the public domain. Rabbi Zeira said to him: It stands to reason that it is a subcategory of Trampling.

הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲקִירָה אֵין כָּאן, הַנָּחָה יֵשׁ כָּאן?!

Rabbi Yirmeya continued and asked Rabbi Zeira another question: If an animal propelled pebbles in the public domain and caused damage on private property, what is the halakha? Rabbi Zeira said to him, employing terminology from the halakhot of Shabbat: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Since the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain, the owner is exempt from liability for any damage that it causes. The fact that the damage occurred on private property is not relevant.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הָיְתָה מְהַלֶּכֶת בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְהִתִּיזָה, בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חַיָּיב. מַאי, לָאו הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים? לָא, הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: עֲקִירָה אֵין כָּאן, הַנָּחָה יֵשׁ כָּאן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲדַרִי בִּי.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s first statement, that one is exempt from liability for one’s animal propelling pebbles in the public domain because it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling, from a baraita: If an animal was walking along the way and it propelled pebbles, whether it was on private property and whether it was in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay damages. What, is it not a case where the pebbles were propelled in the public domain and caused damage in the public domain? Rabbi Zeira replied: No, the reference is to a case where the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and caused damage on private property. Rabbi Yirmeya asked him: But didn’t you say: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I retract my previous statement, as there is proof from the baraita that there is liability in that case.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: דָּרְסָה עַל הַכְּלִי וּשְׁבָרַתּוּ, וְנָפַל הַשֶּׁבֶר עַל כְּלִי אַחֵר וּשְׁבָרוֹ – עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וְעַל הָאַחֲרוֹן מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק, אֲבָל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – עַל הָרִאשׁוֹן פְּטוּרָה וְעַל הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיֶּיבֶת. מַאי, לָאו הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים?

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s first statement from the mishna: If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, as its action is classified under the primary category of Trampling, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel. And it is taught in a baraita with regard to this halakha: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the incident transpired on the private property of the injured party; but if it transpired in the public domain, the owner of the animal is exempt from liability for the first vessel, as it is classified as a subcategory of Trampling, and he is liable for the damage to the second vessel. What, is it not that the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and it caused damage in the public domain, indicating that one does not pay for damage caused by pebbles in the public domain?

לֹא, הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. וְהָאָמְרַתְּ עֲקִירָה אֵין כָּאן הַנָּחָה יֵשׁ כָּאן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲדַרִי בִּי.

Rabbi Zeira replied: No, perhaps the reference in the mishna is to a case where the animal propelled the pebbles in the public domain and it caused damage on private property. Rabbi Yirmeya said: But didn’t you say: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I retract my previous statement.

אִינִי?!

Rabbi Yirmeya raises an additional objection to Rabbi Zeira’s statement: Is that so? Is the owner of the animal exempt from liability for pebbles propelled by his animal in the public domain?

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין חֲצִי נֶזֶק חָלוּק לֹא לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְלֹא לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. מַאי, לָאו הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים? לָא; הִתִּיזָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִזִּיקָה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד.

But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Payment of half the cost of the damage is not differentiated between private and public domains, as there is no exemption from payment neither for damage on private property nor for damage in the public domain? What, is this principle not stated even in a case where the animal propelled pebbles in the public domain and caused damage in the public domain? Rabbi Zeira said to him: No, Rabbi Yoḥanan stated this principle in a case where the animal propelled pebbles in the public domain and caused damage on private property.

וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: עֲקִירָה אֵין כָּאן, הַנָּחָה יֵשׁ כָּאן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲדַרִי בִּי. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – אֲקַרַן.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: But didn’t you say: If there is no act of lifting here, is there an act of placing here? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I retract my previous statement. Or, if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said that payment of half the cost of the damage is not differentiated between private and public domains, and there is no exemption from payment neither for damage on private property nor for damage in the public domain, he said it only with regard to damage in the category of Goring, but not with regard to the case of propelled pebbles, for which one is exempt in the public domain.

יָתֵיב רַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה וְרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא אַקִּילְעָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, נְפַק מִילְּתָא מִבֵּינַיְיהוּ: כִּשְׁכְּשָׁה בִּזְנָבָהּ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידַּךְ: וְכִי יֹאחֲזֶנָּה בִּזְנָבָהּ וְיֵלֵךְ?! אִי הָכִי, קֶרֶן נָמֵי, נֵימָא: וְכִי יֹאחֲזֶנָּה בְּקֶרֶן וְיֵלֵךְ?!

§ The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda Nesia and Rabbi Oshaya sat in the antechamber [akil’a] of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia. A matter emerged from among them and one of them raised a dilemma: If an animal swung its tail and thereby caused damage, what is the halakha? The other Sage said to him: Must the owner grasp its tail and walk to prevent the animal from causing damage? Since this is typical behavior for the animal, the owner should be exempt from liability. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to damage in the category of Goring, too, let us say: Must the owner grasp its horn and walk to prevent the animal from causing damage? Nevertheless, the halakha is that the owner is liable for damage in the category of Goring.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! קֶרֶן לָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ, הָא אוֹרְחַיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Damage in the category of Goring is not caused in the course of the typical behavior of the animal. Consequently, the owner is required to prevent his animal from causing damage in that manner. This damage caused by the swinging of an animal’s tail is caused in the course of its typical behavior, and one cannot hold the owner responsible for an animal’s normal behavior.

וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּאוֹרְחַיהּ, מַאי מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? כִּשְׁכּוּשׁ יַתִּירָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: And since that is its typical behavior, what is the dilemma that he raised? Obviously one has no liability for the damage caused by the typical behavior of his animal in the public domain. The Gemara answers: He raised a dilemma with regard to a case of excessive tail swinging; is excessive tail swinging considered typical behavior?

בָּעֵי רַב עֵינָא: כִּשְׁכְּשָׁה בְּאַמָּתָהּ מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַקֶּרֶן – קֶרֶן לָאו יִצְרָא קָתָקֵיף לֵיהּ? הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, קֶרֶן כַּוּוֹנָתוֹ לְהַזִּיק, הָא אֵין כַּוּוֹנָתָהּ לְהַזִּיק? תֵּיקוּ.

Rav Eina raises a dilemma: If an animal swung its penis and caused damage, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say just as it is with regard to Goring: Is it not so in a case of Goring that the animal’s inclination overcame it and caused it to gore? Here too, it is no different: The animal’s inclination overcame it and that is why it caused damage. Or perhaps the cases are different, as in the case of damage in the category of Goring the objective of its action is to cause damage, whereas in this case the objective of its action is not to cause damage. The Gemara concludes: This dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הַתַּרְנְגוֹלִין מוּעָדִין לְהַלֵּךְ כְּדַרְכָּן וּלְשַׁבֵּר וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּקְשַׁר מֵאֵלָיו, אֲבָל קְשָׁרוֹ אָדָם – חַיָּיב.

§ The mishna teaches: Chickens are deemed forewarned with regard to walking in their typical manner and breaking objects. If there was a string tied to a chicken’s leg and it broke a vessel, or if the chicken was hopping in an atypical manner and breaking vessels, its owner pays half the cost of the damage. Rav Huna says: They taught that one pays half the cost of the damage only in a case where the string was tied to the leg of the chicken on its own, i.e., a string became entangled on the leg of a chicken without the involvement of the owner and an item was broken by the string; but if a person tied the string to the chicken, he is liable to pay the full cost of the damage, as the string is in the category of Pit.

נִקְשַׁר מֵאֵלָיו – מַאן חַיָּיב? אִילֵימָא בַּעַל הַדְּלִיל, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאַצְנְעֵיהּ – אָנוּס הוּא! וְאִי לָא אַצְנְעֵיהּ – פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא!

The Gemara asks: If the string was tied on its own, who is liable to pay half the cost of the damage? If we say it is the owner of the string who pays, as the damage was caused by the string, what are the circumstances? If it is a case where the owner of the string concealed the string in a secure place and the chicken became entangled in it, the owner of the string is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and would be exempt from payment. And if he did not conceal it and instead left it exposed where it could become entangled in the feet of a passing chicken, he is negligent and liable as though he actually tied the string to the chicken.

אֶלָּא חַיָּיב בַּעַל תַּרְנְגוֹל? מַאי שְׁנָא כּוּלֵּיהּ נֶזֶק דְּלָא – דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בּוֹר; חֲצִי נֶזֶק נָמֵי, ״אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בּוֹר!

Rather, the case in the mishna is one where the owner of the string concealed it and is exempt from liability, and Rav Huna means that the owner of the chicken is liable. Here too, the question arises: What is different in this case where one is not obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, as it is written (Exodus 21:33): “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein,” he pays the damage, and it is not written: If an ox shall open a pit. This indicates that if an ox opens a pit, the owner of the ox is exempt from liability. With regard to the payment of half the cost of the damage as well, the owner should be exempt from liability, as it is written: “If a man shall open a pit,” and it is not written: If an ox shall open a pit.

אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין בִּדְאַדְּיֵיהּ אַדּוֹיֵי. וְכִי אִתְּמַר דְּרַב הוּנָא – בְּעָלְמָא אִתְּמַר. דְּלִיל הֶפְקֵר – אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: נִקְשַׁר מֵאֵלָיו – פָּטוּר, קְשָׁרוֹ אָדָם – חַיָּיב.

Rather, the case in the mishna is one where the chicken moved the string and thereby caused damage. Since the chicken did not cause damage with its body, the owner pays half the cost of the damage, as he does in a case of pebbles. And when Rav Huna’s distinction between whether the string was tied on its own or by a person was stated, it was stated in a general sense, and not with regard to the halakha in the mishna. With regard to an ownerless string tied to the leg of a chicken, Rav Huna says: If the string was tied to the leg of the chicken on its own, the owner of the chicken is exempt; but if a person tied the string to the chicken, he is liable to pay the full cost of the damage.

מִשּׁוּם מַאי חַיָּיב? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ: מִשּׁוּם בּוֹרוֹ הַמִּתְגַּלְגֵּל בְּרַגְלֵי אָדָם וּבְרַגְלֵי בְהֵמָה.

The Gemara asks: Due to what primary category of damage is he liable? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ says: He is liable due to the fact that although the string is not stationary, as in the standard obstacle in the primary category of Pit, this is an example of his pit that is rolled at the feet of a person and at the hooves of an animal, and that too is a subcategory of Pit.

מַתְנִי׳ כֵּיצַד הַשֵּׁן מוּעֶדֶת? לֶאֱכוֹל אֶת הָרָאוּי לָהּ. הַבְּהֵמָה מוּעֶדֶת לֶאֱכוֹל פֵּירוֹת וִירָקוֹת. אָכְלָה כְּסוּת אוֹ כֵלִים – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק, אֲבָל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: Within the context of the primary category of Eating, for what damage caused with the tooth is an animal deemed forewarned? It is deemed forewarned with regard to eating food items fit for its consumption. The domesticated animal is deemed forewarned with regard to eating fruits and vegetables. If the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. As these are not items fit for its consumption, the animal is not deemed forewarned in this case. In what case is this statement applied, that one pays the full value of the food eaten by the animal? It is a case where the animal ate the food on the property of the injured party; but if the animal ate food in the public domain, the owner of the animal is exempt from liability.

וְאִם נֶהֱנֵית – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית.

And even if the animal ate food in the public domain, if the animal derives benefit from eating another’s produce in the public domain, the owner pays for the benefit that it derives, just not for the full cost of the food.

כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית? אָכְלָה מִתּוֹךְ הָרְחָבָה – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית, מִצִּדֵּי הָרְחָבָה – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה. מִפֶּתַח הַחֲנוּת – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית, מִתּוֹךְ הַחֲנוּת – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה.

Under what circumstances does the owner of the animal pay for the benefit that it derives? If the animal ate produce in the public square in the area before the storefronts, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derives. If the animal ate from food placed at the side of the public square, which is not a public thoroughfare, the owner of the animal pays for what it damaged, as the legal status of that area is like that of the property of the injured party. If the animal ate produce from the entrance of the store, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives, as the status of a store entrance is like that of the public domain. If the animal ate produce from inside the store, its owner pays for what it damaged.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַשֵּׁן מוּעֶדֶת לֶאֱכוֹל אֶת הָרָאוּי לָהּ – כֵּיצַד? בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לַחֲצַר הַנִּיזָּק, וְאָכְלָה אוֹכָלִין הָרְאוּיִין לָהּ וְשָׁתְתָה מַשְׁקִין הָרְאוּיִין לָהּ – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. וְכֵן חַיָּה שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לַחֲצַר הַנִּיזָּק, וְטָרְפָה בְּהֵמָה וְאָכְלָה בָּשָׂר – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: Eating is deemed forewarned in that an animal tends to eat that which is fit for it to eat. How is this applied? In the case of a domesticated animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party and it ate food fit for it to eat, or if it drank drinks fit for it to drink, the owner of the animal must pay the full cost of the damage. And similarly, in the case of an undomesticated animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party and tore apart a domesticated animal and ate its meat there, the owner must pay the full cost of the damage.

וּפָרָה שֶׁאָכְלָה שְׂעוֹרִין, וַחֲמוֹר שֶׁאָכַל כַּרְשִׁינִין, וְכֶלֶב שֶׁלִּיקֵּק אֶת הַשֶּׁמֶן, וַחֲזִיר שֶׁאָכַל חֲתִיכָה שֶׁל בָּשָׂר – מְשַׁלְּמִין נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ: כֹּל מִידֵּי דְּלָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ, וְאָכְלָה לֵיהּ עַל יְדֵי הַדְּחָק – שְׁמֵיהּ אֲכִילָה; הַאי שׁוּנָּרָא דַּאֲכַל תַּמְרֵי, וַחֲמָרָא דַּאֲכַיל בִּינִיתָא – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

And in the case of a cow that ate barley, although this is not normally a food that a cow would eat, or in the case of a donkey that ate vetches, i.e., legumes which are usually fed to cows but not to donkeys, or in the case of a dog that licked oil or a pig that ate meat, the owner of the animal must pay the full cost of the damage. Although these animals do not ordinarily consume these items, doing so is not a significant deviation from the animal’s typical behavior. Rav Pappa said: Now that you said that eating anything that is not typical for an animal to eat but it eats it under duress is considered an ordinary act of eating, it can be deduced that in the case of a cat that eats dates or a donkey that is eating fish, the owner must pay the full cost of the damage, despite the fact that these animals do not ordinarily eat these items.

הָהוּא חַמְרָא דַּאֲכַל נַהֲמָא וּפַלְּסֵיהּ לְסַלָּא, חַיְּיבֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם אַנַּהֲמָא, וְאַסַּלָּא חֲצִי נֶזֶק. וְאַמַּאי? כֵּיוָן דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ לְמֵיכַל נַהֲמָא – אוֹרְחֵיהּ נָמֵי לְפַלּוֹסֵי סַלָּא! דַּאֲכַל וַהֲדַר פַּלֵּיס.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain donkey that ate bread and while eating it also broke the basket in which the bread was stored. Rav Yehuda obligated the owner to pay the full cost of the damage for the loss of the bread and half the cost of the damage to the basket. The Gemara asks: But why? Since it is typical for a donkey to eat bread, it is also typical for it to break the basket in which the bread is stored; therefore, the owner should pay the full cost of the damage for the basket as well. The Gemara answers: This case is one where the donkey ate the bread and then afterward broke the basket, a sequence which demonstrates that its intent was to cause damage. The breaking of the basket is therefore a subcategory of Goring, and the owner is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage.

וּפַת אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא?! וּרְמִינְהוּ: אָכְלָה פַּת וּבָשָׂר וְתַבְשִׁיל – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. מַאי, לָאו בִּבְהֵמָה? לֹא, בְּחַיָּה.

The Gemara asks: But is it typical for a donkey to eat bread? The Gemara raises a contradiction against this based on a baraita: If it ate bread or meat or a cooked dish, its owner must pay for half the cost of the damage. What, is it not referring to a domesticated animal and thereby implying that it is not typical for a domesticated animal to eat bread? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is discussing an undomesticated animal, which does not typically eat bread, but a domesticated animal does eat bread.

חַיָּה – בָּשָׂר אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא! דְּמִטְּוֵי. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּטַבְיָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם בִּבְהֵמָה, וּבְפָתוּרָא.

The Gemara questions this explanation: If the baraita is discussing an undomesticated animal, then it is typical for it to eat meat. The Gemara clarifies: The baraita is referring meat that is roasted, and it is not typical for an undomesticated animal to eat roasted meat. Or, if you wish, say instead that the halakha of the baraita is not stated with regard to an undomesticated predator, but with regard to a deer, which does not ordinarily eat meat and bread. Or, if you wish, say that actually it is discussing a domesticated animal, but it is discussing a case where the animal ate at the table, and this is not typical behavior for an animal.