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Today's Daf Yomi

June 20, 2016 | 讬状讚 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 20

Study Guide Bava Kamma 20. What types of damages fall into the category of eating. 聽If eating is exempt in public property, what happens if an item rolled from public to private or vice-versa. 聽If the animal ate food in the public domain, the owner is exempt. 聽However if he benefited from what he ate, the owner is responsible to pay the amount that the owner benefited. 聽This leads the gemara to raise a basic question about one who lives in a friend’s property without his knowledge, does he need to pay him rent or not? 聽One benefits and the other has not lost anything by that – does he need to pay?


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讛讛讜讗 讘专讞讗 讚讞讝讗 诇讬驻转讗 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讚谞讗 住专讬讱 住诇讬拽 讗讻诇讛 诇诇讬驻转讗 讜转讘专讬讛 诇讚谞讗 讞讬讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 讗诇讬驻转讗 讜讗讚谞讗 谞讝拽 砖诇诐 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讜专讞讬讛 诇诪讬讻诇 诇讬驻转讗 讗讜专讞讬讛 谞诪讬 诇住专讜讻讬 讜诇诪住诇拽

The Gemara relates: There was a certain goat that saw a turnip on top of a clay barrel [dedanna]. It climbed and went up and ate the turnip, and in doing so it broke the barrel. Rava obligated the owner of the goat to pay the full cost of the damage, both for the turnip and for the barrel. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that he held the owner fully liable for the clay barrel as well as for the turnip? After all, breaking barrels is not the typical behavior of a goat. The Gemara answers: Since it is typical for the goat to eat the turnip, it is also typical for it to climb and go up in order to get it. Consequently, breaking the vessel is categorized as Eating.

讗诪专 讗讬诇驻讗 讘讛诪讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻砖讟讛 爪讜讗专讛 讜讗讻诇讛 诪注诇 讙讘讬 讞讘专转讛 讞讬讬讘转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讘讬 讞讘专转讛 讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬

Ilfa says: If a domesticated animal was in the public domain, and it stretched out its neck and ate from a sack of produce that was loaded on the back of another animal, its owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: The back of the other animal is considered like the courtyard of the injured party, and for this reason the owner of the animal is liable for damage classified as Eating there.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讛讬转讛 拽讜驻转讜 诪讜驻砖诇转 诇讗讞讜专讬讜 讜驻砖讟讛 爪讜讗专讛 讜讗讻诇讛 诪诪谞讜 讞讬讬讘转 讻讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘拽讜驻爪转 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘拽讜驻爪转

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports his opinion (Tosefta 1:7): If a person was standing in the public domain, and his basket containing food was slung behind his back, and an animal stretched out its neck and ate from it, its owner is liable. The Gemara rejects this: This baraita does not support Ilfa鈥檚 opinion, because one could explain that the case in that baraita is as Rava says in a different situation: The ruling is stated with regard to a jumping animal; here also it can be suggested that the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a jumping animal, and since the animal engaged in atypical behavior it is classified as a case of Goring as opposed to a case of Eating. For damage classified as Goring, the owner of the animal is liable for his animal鈥檚 actions in the public domain, although he pays only half the cost of the damage.

讜讛讬讻讗 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 讗讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讘讛诪讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讛诇讻讛 讜讗讻诇讛 驻讟讜专讛 注诪讚讛 讜讗讻诇讛 讞讬讬讘转 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讚讗讜专讞讬讛 讛讜讗 注诪讚讛 谞诪讬 讗讜专讞讬讛 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘拽讜驻爪转

The Gemara asks: And where, i.e., in what context, was Rava鈥檚 interpretation initially stated? The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that which Rabbi Oshaya says: If a domesticated animal was walking along and eating in the public domain its owner is exempt, but if it was standing and eating he is liable. The Gemara questions this ruling: What is different if it was walking? Is it because eating while walking is the typical behavior of an animal? But standing and eating is also typical behavior. Rava says: Rabbi Oshaya鈥檚 ruling is stated with regard to a jumping animal, which is not typical behavior for the animal.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讙诇讙诇 诪讛讜 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 注诪讬专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜拽讗 诪转讙诇讙诇 讜讗转讬 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诪讗讬

Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If an animal was rolling, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case about which Rabbi Zeira inquires? The Gemara answers: For example, if there was a sheaf of grain on private property, and it was rolled along by the animal and the sheaf went from the private property into the public domain, and the animal ate it there, what is the halakha? Should this be treated as a case of Eating on private property, rendering the owner of the animal liable, or should it be treated as a case of Eating in the public domain, thereby exempting him from liability?

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪砖讜讬 诪拽爪转讜 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪拽爪转讜 讘讞讜抓 讗讻诇讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘转 讗讻诇讛 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪转讙诇讙诇 讜讗转讬 诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讗讻诇讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘转 注诇 诪讛 砖讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from a baraita, as Rabbi 岣yya taught: If a load of food was located partly inside the property of its owner and partly outside of his property, i.e., in the public domain, and an animal ate inside the private property, its owner is liable, as this is a case of damage classified as Eating on the property of the injured party. But if the animal ate outside, its owner is exempt, in accordance with the halakhot of Eating in the public domain. What, is it not that the case is one where the food was rolling along, and the halakha follows the location where it was actually eaten? The Gemara explains: No, say instead: It ate, and for that which was initially inside the private property, its owner is liable even if the food rolled out of the private property, and for that which was initially outside, its owner is exempt.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘驻转讬诇讛 讚讗住驻住转讗

If you wish, say instead that there is a different resolution: When Rabbi 岣yya stated his ruling it was with regard to a long stalk of fodder [de鈥檃spasta] that was partly inside and partly outside at the time it was consumed, and as the animal ate it the entire stalk was pulled to where the animal was standing.

讗讻诇讛 讻住讜转 讜讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner must pay for half the cost of the damage. In what case is this statement said? It is said when the animal ate them while located on the property of the injured party, but if he ate them in the public domain the owner of the animal is exempt from liability.

讗讛讬讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讻讜诇讛讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜砖讬谞讛 讘讜 驻讟讜专

The Gemara asks: To which case is this referring? In which case is one exempt from liability if the damage occurred in the public domain? Rav said: It is referring to all of the cases. One is exempt from liability in the public domain even if his animal ate garments or vessels, despite the fact that this is an unusual thing for the animal to do and therefore eating garments or vessels should be classified as a case of Goring, which would normally result in liability when it occurs in the public domain. What is the reason for this? Rav answers his own question by stating a principle: With regard to anyone who deviates from normative behavior in his actions, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt from liability. In this case, the injured party left his garments or vessels in the public domain and thereby deviated from normative behavior, and therefore the owner of the animal that acted atypically and ate them is exempt from liability.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜讬专拽讜转 讗讘诇 讻住讜转 讜讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘转

And Shmuel said: They taught in the mishna that one is exempt from liability for damage caused in the public domain only in a case where his animal ate fruit or vegetables, in accordance with the halakhot of Eating in the public domain, but if the animal ate garments or vessels in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay for half the cost of the damage. Since this is atypical animal behavior, it is classified as a case of Goring, for which the owner of the animal is liable even if it occurs in the public domain.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讻讜诇讛讜 讜讗讝讚讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖转讬 驻专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讞转 专讘讜爪讛 讜讗讞转 诪讛诇讻转 讘注讟讛 诪讛诇讻转 讘专讘讜爪讛 驻讟讜专讛 专讘讜爪讛 讘诪讛诇讻转 讞讬讬讘转

And similarly, Reish Lakish said, in accordance with the opinion of Rav: The exemption discussed in the mishna was said in reference to all of the cases. And Reish Lakish follows his own line of reasoning, as Reish Lakish says: If there were two cows in the public domain, one prone and one walking, and the walking cow kicked the prone cow, its owner is exempt from liability; but if the prone cow kicked the walking cow, its owner is liable. This indicates that Reish Lakish accepts the principle: Anyone who deviates from normative behavior, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt. Since it is atypical behavior for a cow to lie down in the public domain, even if the walking cow also behaved atypically and kicked the prone cow, its owner is exempt from liability.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜讬专拽讜转 讗讘诇 讻住讜转 讜讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘转

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: They taught in the mishna that one is exempt from liability in the public domain only if his animal ate fruit or vegetables, but if the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner is liable to pay for half the cost of the damage.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖转讬 驻专讜转 诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讜转 注讘讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪谞讞讬 讙诇讬诪讬 讜诪转驻讞讬 讗讘诇 讘讛诪讛 诇讗讜 讗讜专讞讛

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Yo岣nan does not accept Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion even in the case of the two cows? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually it is possible that Rabbi Yo岣nan accepts the opinion of Reish Lakish, but he distinguishes between the cases. In the case of garments, it is common for people to put their cloaks down in the public domain in order to rest [umitpe岣], and this is not considered atypical behavior. But it is not common for an animal to lie down in the public domain, and since this animal behaved in an atypical manner, no liability is borne by the owner of the walking cow for engaging in atypical behavior and kicking the prone cow.

讜讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 讜讻讜壮 讜讻诪讛 专讘讛 讗诪专 讚诪讬 注诪讬专 专讘讗 讗诪专 讚诪讬 砖注讜专讬诐 讘讝讜诇

搂 The mishna teaches: And if the animal derives benefit from eating another鈥檚 produce in the public domain, although the owner is exempt from paying for the damage it caused, nevertheless the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derives. The Gemara asks: And how much is this payment, i.e., how is it calculated? Rabba says: It is the value of, i.e., the amount one would pay, for an equal quantity of stalks of hay or straw. This is because the owner can claim that had his animal not eaten the produce, he would have fed it inexpensive straw, so the animal鈥檚 benefit is limited to the cost of the straw that it would have eaten. Rava says: If the animal ate barley, his owner must pay the value of the barley, i.e., as that is typical animal food, but based on the cheapest price available in the market.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讬 讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪砖诇诪转 讗诇讗 讚诪讬 注诪讬专 讘诇讘讚

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba and it is taught in a different baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava. It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba: Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i said: The animal鈥檚 owner pays only the value of stalks of straw.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 诪讛 砖谞讛谞讬转 讻讬爪讚 讗讻诇讛 拽讘 讗讜 拽讘讬讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 转砖诇诐 讚诪讬讛谉 讗诇讗 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讻诪讛 讗讚诐 专讜爪讛 诇讛讗讻讬诇 诇讘讛诪转讜 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 专讙讬诇 诇驻讬讻讱 讗讻诇讛 讞讟讬谉 讗讜 讚讘专 讛专注 诇讛 驻讟讜专讛

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava (Tosefta 1:7): If the animal derived benefit from eating another鈥檚 produce, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived. How so? If the animal ate one kav or two kav of grain, we do not say that he should pay their value. Rather, the court estimates how much a person would pay in order to feed his animal typical food fit for it to eat, even if this particular animal does not usually eat that food, as its owner gives it cheaper food. Therefore, if the animal ate barley, which is typical animal fare, even though it does not usually do so, its owner must pay compensation for the barley that was eaten, at its cheapest market price. Therefore, if the animal ate wheat or another item that is detrimental to it, so that it did not derive any benefit, if this occurred in the public domain the owner is exempt from all liability.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诇讗 讛讜讬转 讙讘谉 讘讗讜专转讗 讘转讞讜诪讗 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 诪讬诇讬 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 诪讬诇讬 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 讗讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱

搂 In connection to the principle stated in the mishna, that if the animal derives benefit the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived, the Gemara relates: Rav 岣sda said to Rami bar 岣ma: You were not with us at night within our boundary when we raised dilemmas concerning exceptional matters. Rami bar 岣ma said to him: What are the exceptional matters you discussed? Rav 岣sda said to him: With regard to one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge or permission, must he pay him rent for living there or does he not need to pay him rent?

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 讝讛 诇讗 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 讞住专

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this question? If we say that the case concerns a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, i.e., if the squatter would not have lived there the owner would have kept it vacant, and the man squatting there is someone who would not have rented other living quarters because he has other lodgings available to him for free, then it is a case where this one, the squatter, does not derive benefit, and that one, the owner, does not suffer a loss; in that case certainly no payment is necessary. Rather, say that the discussion concerns a case of a courtyard that stands to be rented out, and the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters. If so, then this is a case where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and in that case he certainly must make payment. The dilemma was not with regard to either of these circumstances.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 诪讗讬 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞住专转讬讱 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in the case of a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, but the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters had he not squatted in this property. What is the halakha in this case? Is the squatter legally able to say to the owner of the courtyard: What loss have I caused you, as you would not have rented it out anyway? Or perhaps the owner of the courtyard is legally able to say to the squatter:

讛讗 讗讬转讛谞讬转

You have derived benefit from my property, as by living there you saved the money you otherwise would have had to pay in order to rent out a different courtyard, and therefore you must pay me for the benefit you derived.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讛讬讗 讛讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讻讬 转砖诪砖 诇讬 砖拽诇 住讜讚专讬讛 讻专讱 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 诪讛 砖谞讛谞讬转

Rami bar 岣ma said to him: This dilemma is not new; rather, it is discussed in the mishna, and the mishna already provided a solution. Rav 岣sda asked him: To which mishna are you referring? Rami bar 岣ma said to him: After you serve me, I will tell you. Rav 岣sda took hold of Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 scarf [suderei] and folded it, as an act of service. Rami bar 岣ma then said to him: This is the mishna: If the animal derives benefit, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that the animal derived. This demonstrates that one who derives benefit must pay for the benefit he derives, even if the injured party is not entitled to payment for his loss.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诪讛 诇讗 讞诇讬 讜诇讗 诪专讙讬砖 讙讘专讗 讚诪专讬讛 住讬讬注讬讛 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讚诪讬 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 拽讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讛讗讬 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 讞住专 讜讛讗讬 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讛讜讗

Rava said: How little does a man who has the assistance of his Lord have to worry or be concerned about the possibility that his opinion may not be accepted, as even though the dilemma that was raised is in fact not similar to the case in the mishna quoted by Rami bar 岣ma, Rav 岣sda nevertheless accepted it from him. This case in the mishna, about the animal eating produce in the public domain, is where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and that case of the squatter living in the courtyard, is where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss.

讜专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 住转诐 驻讬专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗驻拽讜专讬 诪驻拽专 诇讛讜

The Gemara asks: And what does Rami bar 岣ma think? Why does he equate the two cases? The Gemara explains: He holds that if produce is left in the public domain without specification with regard to its ownership, it is assumed that the owner has rendered it ownerless. The owner does not expect to derive benefit from the produce, and therefore when the animal ate it he suffered no loss. Consequently, it is a case where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, and it is comparable to the case of the squatter in the courtyard.

转谞谉 讛诪拽讬祝 讞讘讬专讜 诪砖诇砖 专讜讞讜转讬讜 讜讙讚专 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗转 讛砖谞讬讛 讜讗转 讛砖诇讬砖讬转 讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 讛讗 专讘讬注讬转 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜

The Gemara attempts to cite conclusive evidence from another case: We learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 4b): If one鈥檚 fields surround the fields of another on three sides, and he fenced in the first, the second, and the third field, thereby providing protection also to the other man鈥檚 field, the court does not obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the costs of the fence, as he can claim that he does not derive benefit from it, since his field remains exposed on the fourth side. The Gemara infers: But this indicates that if his fields surrounded the inner field on all four sides, and the owner of the outer fields fenced the field on the fourth side as well, the court does obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the expenses.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讞讬讬讘 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讙专诪转 诇讬 讛拽讬驻讗 讬转讬专讗

The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay for that benefit. In this case, the owner of the inner field benefits from the fence while the owner of the outer field does not suffer a loss, because in any event he would have needed to build those fences, and the owner of the inner field is obligated to share in the expense. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the outer field can say to the owner of the inner field: Your field caused me to have to build the fence with a larger circumference than I would have otherwise needed to had your field not been there, and therefore your field caused me an additional expense. This case is therefore similar to those where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诐 注诪讚 谞讬拽祝 讜讙讚专 讗转 讛专讘讬注讬转 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗转 讛讻诇 讟注诪讗 讚讙讚专 谞讬拽祝 讛讗 诪拽讬祝 驻讟讜专

The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna. Rabbi Yosei said: If the owner of the surrounded, i.e., inner, field arose and enclosed the fourth side on his own, the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it, as through his actions he demonstrated that he was interested in having the fence installed. The Gemara infers from this: The reason the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it is because the owner of the surrounded field arose and enclosed the fourth side himself. By inference, had the owner of the surrounding field built the fourth fence, the owner of the inner field would be exempt.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 驻讟讜专 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬 住讙讬 诇讬 讘谞讟讬专讗 讘专 讝讜讝讗

The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the inner field can say to the owner of the surrounding fields: For me, the protection of a fence worth a dinar would have been sufficient; I did not wish to pay for such an expensive fence.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讘讬转 讜讛注诇讬讬讛 砖诇 砖谞讬诐 砖谞驻诇讜 讗诪专 讘注诇 讛注诇讬讬讛 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讘谞讜转 讜讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 讛专讬 讘注诇 讛注诇讬讬讛 讘讜谞讛 讘讬转 讜讬讜砖讘 讘讛 注讚 砖讬转谉 诇讜 讬爪讬讗讜转讬讜

The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Bava Metzia 117a): If a house and its upper story, which belonged to two separate people, collapsed, necessitating that the entire structure be rebuilt, and the owner of the upper story told the owner of the lower story of the house to build the lower story again so that he could rebuild the upper story, but the owner of the lower story does not want to do so, the owner of the upper story may build the lower story of the house and live in it until the owner of the lower story will pay him for his expenses, and only then will he be required to vacate the lower story of the house and build the upper story.

讬爪讬讗讜转讬讜 讛讜讗 讚诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讗 砖讻专讜 诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 驻讟讜专 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讘讬转讗 诇注诇讬讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚

The Gemara infers: It is all of his expenses that the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to pay him, and he does not subtract from the amount compensation for rent for the time that the owner of the upper story lived in the lower story of the house. Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt, as the owner of the upper story derived benefit from living in the lower story, while the owner of the lower story did not suffer a loss, since he said he did not need it. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there because the lower story of the house is subjugated to the upper story, because it also serves as the foundation of the upper story, and therefore the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to provide lodging to the owner of the upper story in the interim.

转讗 砖诪注 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讝讛 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讞讬讬讘 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 砖讞专讜专讬转讗 讚讗砖讬讬转讗

The Gemara attempts another resolution. Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna, in which Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the first tanna and holds that the owner of the upper story may not reside in the lower story of the house without payment. Rabbi Yehuda says: A proof that the owner of the upper story must pay rent is from the halakha that even this one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge must pay him rent. Conclude from the mishna that when this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there, as there it is possible to claim that the owner of the lower story suffers a loss due to the blackening of the walls, as when a person lives in a home, the value of the house depreciates due to the use.

砖诇讞讜讛 讘讬 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讜讻讬 诪讛 注砖讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 讞住专讜 讜诪讛 讛讝讬拽讜 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 谞转讬讬砖讘 讘讚讘专 讛讚专 砖诇讞讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 讻讜诇讬讛 讛讗讬 砖诇讞讜 诇讬 讜讗讝诇讬 讗讬诇讜 讗砖讻讞讬 讘讛 讟注诪讗 诇讗 砖诇讞谞讗 诇讛讜

This dilemma was not successfully resolved so they sent it to the academy of Rabbi Ami to ask his opinion. Rabbi Ami said: And what did this squatter do to the owner? What loss did he cause him? How did he damage him? Rav Ami holds that if this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, no payment is necessary. When asked about this dilemma, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said: Let us consider the matter. After waiting and not receiving a response they sent the question to Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba again. He said: They keep sending me this dilemma; had I found a response to their question, would I not have sent them a reply? They should have realized that Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba did not have an answer for them.

讗转诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专

It was stated that the amora鈥檌m discussed this matter: Rav Kahana says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He need not pay him rent, and Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He must pay him rent.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 诇讗讜 讘驻讬专讜砖 讗转诪专 讗诇讗 诪讻诇诇讗 讗转诪专 讚转谞谉 谞讟诇 讗讘谉 讗讜 拽讜专讛 砖诇 讛拽讚砖 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 诪注诇

Rav Pappa said: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu, citing Rabbi Yo岣nan, was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated from an inference that Rabbi Abbahu drew from something that Rabbi Yo岣nan said in a different context. As we learned in a mishna (Me鈥檌la 5:4): If the treasurer of consecrated property took for himself a stone or a cross beam that had been consecrated, he has not violated the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. This is because his act of taking the stone or the beam has not effectively removed it from within the jurisdiction of Temple property, as any item under his control is in the possession of the Temple treasury.

谞转谞讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讗 诪注诇 讜讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 诪注诇 讘谞讗讛 诇转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 诪注诇 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 转讞转讬讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

If the treasurer gave it to another as a gift, he has then misused consecrated property, as he removed it from the possession of the Temple and conveyed it into the possession of another. But the other man, who received the item, has not misused a consecrated item until he actually uses the item. If the treasurer himself built it into his house, he has not violated the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property until he has lived beneath it for an amount of time worth one peruta.

讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖讛谞讬讞讛 注诇 驻讬 讗专讜讘讛

And Shmuel said: And this is the halakha provided that he placed it over the skylight, as were he to have built it into the actual structure of the house, he would have violated the prohibition of misuse with the very act of construction, as by doing so he effects a change in the stone itself. By contrast, when he places the stone in a place from which it is easy to remove it and give it back, then as long as he has not lived beneath it, he has not, as yet, misused consecrated property.

讜讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 讜砖转拽 诇讬讛

And Rabbi Abbahu sat before Rabbi Yo岣nan and was saying in the name of Shmuel: That is to say, one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge must pay him rent, similar to the treasurer who resides beneath the consecrated beam without detracting from the value of the beam in any way but has nevertheless violated the prohibition of misuse since he has derived personal benefit from it. And Rabbi Yo岣nan remained silent and offered him no reply.

讗讬讛讜 住讘专 诪讚砖转讬拽 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讗砖讙讜讞讬 诇讗 讗砖讙讞 讘讬讛

Rabbi Abbahu thought that since he was silent, this must mean he concedes to his conclusion, and therefore, from then on he would cite this opinion in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan. But that is not so. The reason Rabbi Yo岣nan was silent was because he did not pay attention to Rabbi Abbahu and did not bother to contradict his opinion on the issue. In truth Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion is as was reported in his name by Rav Kahana, that a squatter living on someone else鈥檚 premises without his permission and without causing him any loss does not need to pay the owner any rent.

讻讚专讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讛拽讚砖 砖诇讗 诪讚注转

The Gemara explains the distinction between that case and the case of the consecrated stone or beam. The reason the treasurer of consecrated property is considered to have misused consecrated property by deriving benefit from it is in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: Consecrated property from which one derived benefit without the Temple treasury鈥檚 knowledge

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 20

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 20

讛讛讜讗 讘专讞讗 讚讞讝讗 诇讬驻转讗 讗驻讜诪讗 讚讚谞讗 住专讬讱 住诇讬拽 讗讻诇讛 诇诇讬驻转讗 讜转讘专讬讛 诇讚谞讗 讞讬讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 讗诇讬驻转讗 讜讗讚谞讗 谞讝拽 砖诇诐 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讜专讞讬讛 诇诪讬讻诇 诇讬驻转讗 讗讜专讞讬讛 谞诪讬 诇住专讜讻讬 讜诇诪住诇拽

The Gemara relates: There was a certain goat that saw a turnip on top of a clay barrel [dedanna]. It climbed and went up and ate the turnip, and in doing so it broke the barrel. Rava obligated the owner of the goat to pay the full cost of the damage, both for the turnip and for the barrel. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that he held the owner fully liable for the clay barrel as well as for the turnip? After all, breaking barrels is not the typical behavior of a goat. The Gemara answers: Since it is typical for the goat to eat the turnip, it is also typical for it to climb and go up in order to get it. Consequently, breaking the vessel is categorized as Eating.

讗诪专 讗讬诇驻讗 讘讛诪讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻砖讟讛 爪讜讗专讛 讜讗讻诇讛 诪注诇 讙讘讬 讞讘专转讛 讞讬讬讘转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讙讘讬 讞讘专转讛 讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬

Ilfa says: If a domesticated animal was in the public domain, and it stretched out its neck and ate from a sack of produce that was loaded on the back of another animal, its owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: The back of the other animal is considered like the courtyard of the injured party, and for this reason the owner of the animal is liable for damage classified as Eating there.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讛讬转讛 拽讜驻转讜 诪讜驻砖诇转 诇讗讞讜专讬讜 讜驻砖讟讛 爪讜讗专讛 讜讗讻诇讛 诪诪谞讜 讞讬讬讘转 讻讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘拽讜驻爪转 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘拽讜驻爪转

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports his opinion (Tosefta 1:7): If a person was standing in the public domain, and his basket containing food was slung behind his back, and an animal stretched out its neck and ate from it, its owner is liable. The Gemara rejects this: This baraita does not support Ilfa鈥檚 opinion, because one could explain that the case in that baraita is as Rava says in a different situation: The ruling is stated with regard to a jumping animal; here also it can be suggested that the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a jumping animal, and since the animal engaged in atypical behavior it is classified as a case of Goring as opposed to a case of Eating. For damage classified as Goring, the owner of the animal is liable for his animal鈥檚 actions in the public domain, although he pays only half the cost of the damage.

讜讛讬讻讗 讗讬转诪专 讚专讘讗 讗讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讘讛诪讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讛诇讻讛 讜讗讻诇讛 驻讟讜专讛 注诪讚讛 讜讗讻诇讛 讞讬讬讘转 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讛诇讻讛 讚讗讜专讞讬讛 讛讜讗 注诪讚讛 谞诪讬 讗讜专讞讬讛 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘拽讜驻爪转

The Gemara asks: And where, i.e., in what context, was Rava鈥檚 interpretation initially stated? The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that which Rabbi Oshaya says: If a domesticated animal was walking along and eating in the public domain its owner is exempt, but if it was standing and eating he is liable. The Gemara questions this ruling: What is different if it was walking? Is it because eating while walking is the typical behavior of an animal? But standing and eating is also typical behavior. Rava says: Rabbi Oshaya鈥檚 ruling is stated with regard to a jumping animal, which is not typical behavior for the animal.

讘注讬 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转讙诇讙诇 诪讛讜 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讬讬诪讗 注诪讬专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜拽讗 诪转讙诇讙诇 讜讗转讬 诪专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 诪讗讬

Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If an animal was rolling, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case about which Rabbi Zeira inquires? The Gemara answers: For example, if there was a sheaf of grain on private property, and it was rolled along by the animal and the sheaf went from the private property into the public domain, and the animal ate it there, what is the halakha? Should this be treated as a case of Eating on private property, rendering the owner of the animal liable, or should it be treated as a case of Eating in the public domain, thereby exempting him from liability?

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪砖讜讬 诪拽爪转讜 讘驻谞讬诐 讜诪拽爪转讜 讘讞讜抓 讗讻诇讛 讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘转 讗讻诇讛 讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪转讙诇讙诇 讜讗转讬 诇讗 讗讬诪讗 讗讻诇讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讘驻谞讬诐 讞讬讬讘转 注诇 诪讛 砖讘讞讜抓 驻讟讜专讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from a baraita, as Rabbi 岣yya taught: If a load of food was located partly inside the property of its owner and partly outside of his property, i.e., in the public domain, and an animal ate inside the private property, its owner is liable, as this is a case of damage classified as Eating on the property of the injured party. But if the animal ate outside, its owner is exempt, in accordance with the halakhot of Eating in the public domain. What, is it not that the case is one where the food was rolling along, and the halakha follows the location where it was actually eaten? The Gemara explains: No, say instead: It ate, and for that which was initially inside the private property, its owner is liable even if the food rolled out of the private property, and for that which was initially outside, its owner is exempt.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘驻转讬诇讛 讚讗住驻住转讗

If you wish, say instead that there is a different resolution: When Rabbi 岣yya stated his ruling it was with regard to a long stalk of fodder [de鈥檃spasta] that was partly inside and partly outside at the time it was consumed, and as the animal ate it the entire stalk was pulled to where the animal was standing.

讗讻诇讛 讻住讜转 讜讻讜壮

搂 The mishna teaches: If the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner must pay for half the cost of the damage. In what case is this statement said? It is said when the animal ate them while located on the property of the injured party, but if he ate them in the public domain the owner of the animal is exempt from liability.

讗讛讬讬讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗讻讜诇讛讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻诇 讛诪砖谞讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜砖讬谞讛 讘讜 驻讟讜专

The Gemara asks: To which case is this referring? In which case is one exempt from liability if the damage occurred in the public domain? Rav said: It is referring to all of the cases. One is exempt from liability in the public domain even if his animal ate garments or vessels, despite the fact that this is an unusual thing for the animal to do and therefore eating garments or vessels should be classified as a case of Goring, which would normally result in liability when it occurs in the public domain. What is the reason for this? Rav answers his own question by stating a principle: With regard to anyone who deviates from normative behavior in his actions, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt from liability. In this case, the injured party left his garments or vessels in the public domain and thereby deviated from normative behavior, and therefore the owner of the animal that acted atypically and ate them is exempt from liability.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜讬专拽讜转 讗讘诇 讻住讜转 讜讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘转

And Shmuel said: They taught in the mishna that one is exempt from liability for damage caused in the public domain only in a case where his animal ate fruit or vegetables, in accordance with the halakhot of Eating in the public domain, but if the animal ate garments or vessels in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay for half the cost of the damage. Since this is atypical animal behavior, it is classified as a case of Goring, for which the owner of the animal is liable even if it occurs in the public domain.

讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讻讜诇讛讜 讜讗讝讚讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖转讬 驻专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讞转 专讘讜爪讛 讜讗讞转 诪讛诇讻转 讘注讟讛 诪讛诇讻转 讘专讘讜爪讛 驻讟讜专讛 专讘讜爪讛 讘诪讛诇讻转 讞讬讬讘转

And similarly, Reish Lakish said, in accordance with the opinion of Rav: The exemption discussed in the mishna was said in reference to all of the cases. And Reish Lakish follows his own line of reasoning, as Reish Lakish says: If there were two cows in the public domain, one prone and one walking, and the walking cow kicked the prone cow, its owner is exempt from liability; but if the prone cow kicked the walking cow, its owner is liable. This indicates that Reish Lakish accepts the principle: Anyone who deviates from normative behavior, if another came along afterward and deviates from the norm with regard to the action the first has done and thereby causes damage to him, the one who causes the damage is exempt. Since it is atypical behavior for a cow to lie down in the public domain, even if the walking cow also behaved atypically and kicked the prone cow, its owner is exempt from liability.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 驻讬专讜转 讜讬专拽讜转 讗讘诇 讻住讜转 讜讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘转

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: They taught in the mishna that one is exempt from liability in the public domain only if his animal ate fruit or vegetables, but if the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner is liable to pay for half the cost of the damage.

诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖转讬 驻专讜转 诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讻住讜转 注讘讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪谞讞讬 讙诇讬诪讬 讜诪转驻讞讬 讗讘诇 讘讛诪讛 诇讗讜 讗讜专讞讛

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Yo岣nan does not accept Reish Lakish鈥檚 opinion even in the case of the two cows? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually it is possible that Rabbi Yo岣nan accepts the opinion of Reish Lakish, but he distinguishes between the cases. In the case of garments, it is common for people to put their cloaks down in the public domain in order to rest [umitpe岣], and this is not considered atypical behavior. But it is not common for an animal to lie down in the public domain, and since this animal behaved in an atypical manner, no liability is borne by the owner of the walking cow for engaging in atypical behavior and kicking the prone cow.

讜讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 讜讻讜壮 讜讻诪讛 专讘讛 讗诪专 讚诪讬 注诪讬专 专讘讗 讗诪专 讚诪讬 砖注讜专讬诐 讘讝讜诇

搂 The mishna teaches: And if the animal derives benefit from eating another鈥檚 produce in the public domain, although the owner is exempt from paying for the damage it caused, nevertheless the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derives. The Gemara asks: And how much is this payment, i.e., how is it calculated? Rabba says: It is the value of, i.e., the amount one would pay, for an equal quantity of stalks of hay or straw. This is because the owner can claim that had his animal not eaten the produce, he would have fed it inexpensive straw, so the animal鈥檚 benefit is limited to the cost of the straw that it would have eaten. Rava says: If the animal ate barley, his owner must pay the value of the barley, i.e., as that is typical animal food, but based on the cheapest price available in the market.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讬 讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪砖诇诪转 讗诇讗 讚诪讬 注诪讬专 讘诇讘讚

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba and it is taught in a different baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava. It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba: Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i said: The animal鈥檚 owner pays only the value of stalks of straw.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 诪讛 砖谞讛谞讬转 讻讬爪讚 讗讻诇讛 拽讘 讗讜 拽讘讬讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 转砖诇诐 讚诪讬讛谉 讗诇讗 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讻诪讛 讗讚诐 专讜爪讛 诇讛讗讻讬诇 诇讘讛诪转讜 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 专讙讬诇 诇驻讬讻讱 讗讻诇讛 讞讟讬谉 讗讜 讚讘专 讛专注 诇讛 驻讟讜专讛

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava (Tosefta 1:7): If the animal derived benefit from eating another鈥檚 produce, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived. How so? If the animal ate one kav or two kav of grain, we do not say that he should pay their value. Rather, the court estimates how much a person would pay in order to feed his animal typical food fit for it to eat, even if this particular animal does not usually eat that food, as its owner gives it cheaper food. Therefore, if the animal ate barley, which is typical animal fare, even though it does not usually do so, its owner must pay compensation for the barley that was eaten, at its cheapest market price. Therefore, if the animal ate wheat or another item that is detrimental to it, so that it did not derive any benefit, if this occurred in the public domain the owner is exempt from all liability.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诇讗 讛讜讬转 讙讘谉 讘讗讜专转讗 讘转讞讜诪讗 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 诪讬诇讬 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 诪讬诇讬 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 讗讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱

搂 In connection to the principle stated in the mishna, that if the animal derives benefit the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derived, the Gemara relates: Rav 岣sda said to Rami bar 岣ma: You were not with us at night within our boundary when we raised dilemmas concerning exceptional matters. Rami bar 岣ma said to him: What are the exceptional matters you discussed? Rav 岣sda said to him: With regard to one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge or permission, must he pay him rent for living there or does he not need to pay him rent?

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 讝讛 诇讗 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 讞住专

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this question? If we say that the case concerns a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, i.e., if the squatter would not have lived there the owner would have kept it vacant, and the man squatting there is someone who would not have rented other living quarters because he has other lodgings available to him for free, then it is a case where this one, the squatter, does not derive benefit, and that one, the owner, does not suffer a loss; in that case certainly no payment is necessary. Rather, say that the discussion concerns a case of a courtyard that stands to be rented out, and the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters. If so, then this is a case where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and in that case he certainly must make payment. The dilemma was not with regard to either of these circumstances.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 拽讬讬诪讗 诇讗讙专讗 讜讙讘专讗 讚注讘讬讚 诇诪讬讙专 诪讗讬 诪爪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞住专转讬讱 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in the case of a courtyard that does not stand to be rented out, but the man squatting there would have rented other living quarters had he not squatted in this property. What is the halakha in this case? Is the squatter legally able to say to the owner of the courtyard: What loss have I caused you, as you would not have rented it out anyway? Or perhaps the owner of the courtyard is legally able to say to the squatter:

讛讗 讗讬转讛谞讬转

You have derived benefit from my property, as by living there you saved the money you otherwise would have had to pay in order to rent out a different courtyard, and therefore you must pay me for the benefit you derived.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讛讬讗 讛讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讻讬 转砖诪砖 诇讬 砖拽诇 住讜讚专讬讛 讻专讱 诇讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诐 谞讛谞讬转 诪砖诇诪转 诪讛 砖谞讛谞讬转

Rami bar 岣ma said to him: This dilemma is not new; rather, it is discussed in the mishna, and the mishna already provided a solution. Rav 岣sda asked him: To which mishna are you referring? Rami bar 岣ma said to him: After you serve me, I will tell you. Rav 岣sda took hold of Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 scarf [suderei] and folded it, as an act of service. Rami bar 岣ma then said to him: This is the mishna: If the animal derives benefit, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that the animal derived. This demonstrates that one who derives benefit must pay for the benefit he derives, even if the injured party is not entitled to payment for his loss.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讻诪讛 诇讗 讞诇讬 讜诇讗 诪专讙讬砖 讙讘专讗 讚诪专讬讛 住讬讬注讬讛 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讚诪讬 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 拽讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讛讗讬 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 讞住专 讜讛讗讬 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讛讜讗

Rava said: How little does a man who has the assistance of his Lord have to worry or be concerned about the possibility that his opinion may not be accepted, as even though the dilemma that was raised is in fact not similar to the case in the mishna quoted by Rami bar 岣ma, Rav 岣sda nevertheless accepted it from him. This case in the mishna, about the animal eating produce in the public domain, is where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss, and that case of the squatter living in the courtyard, is where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss.

讜专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 住转诐 驻讬专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗驻拽讜专讬 诪驻拽专 诇讛讜

The Gemara asks: And what does Rami bar 岣ma think? Why does he equate the two cases? The Gemara explains: He holds that if produce is left in the public domain without specification with regard to its ownership, it is assumed that the owner has rendered it ownerless. The owner does not expect to derive benefit from the produce, and therefore when the animal ate it he suffered no loss. Consequently, it is a case where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, and it is comparable to the case of the squatter in the courtyard.

转谞谉 讛诪拽讬祝 讞讘讬专讜 诪砖诇砖 专讜讞讜转讬讜 讜讙讚专 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谞讛 讜讗转 讛砖谞讬讛 讜讗转 讛砖诇讬砖讬转 讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 讛讗 专讘讬注讬转 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜

The Gemara attempts to cite conclusive evidence from another case: We learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 4b): If one鈥檚 fields surround the fields of another on three sides, and he fenced in the first, the second, and the third field, thereby providing protection also to the other man鈥檚 field, the court does not obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the costs of the fence, as he can claim that he does not derive benefit from it, since his field remains exposed on the fourth side. The Gemara infers: But this indicates that if his fields surrounded the inner field on all four sides, and the owner of the outer fields fenced the field on the fourth side as well, the court does obligate the owner of the inner field to share in the expenses.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讞讬讬讘 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗转 讙专诪转 诇讬 讛拽讬驻讗 讬转讬专讗

The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay for that benefit. In this case, the owner of the inner field benefits from the fence while the owner of the outer field does not suffer a loss, because in any event he would have needed to build those fences, and the owner of the inner field is obligated to share in the expense. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the outer field can say to the owner of the inner field: Your field caused me to have to build the fence with a larger circumference than I would have otherwise needed to had your field not been there, and therefore your field caused me an additional expense. This case is therefore similar to those where this one derives benefit and that one suffers a loss.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗诐 注诪讚 谞讬拽祝 讜讙讚专 讗转 讛专讘讬注讬转 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬讜 讗转 讛讻诇 讟注诪讗 讚讙讚专 谞讬拽祝 讛讗 诪拽讬祝 驻讟讜专

The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna. Rabbi Yosei said: If the owner of the surrounded, i.e., inner, field arose and enclosed the fourth side on his own, the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it, as through his actions he demonstrated that he was interested in having the fence installed. The Gemara infers from this: The reason the court imposes upon him the obligation to pay his share of all of it is because the owner of the surrounded field arose and enclosed the fourth side himself. By inference, had the owner of the surrounding field built the fourth fence, the owner of the inner field would be exempt.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 驻讟讜专 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬 住讙讬 诇讬 讘谞讟讬专讗 讘专 讝讜讝讗

The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there because the owner of the inner field can say to the owner of the surrounding fields: For me, the protection of a fence worth a dinar would have been sufficient; I did not wish to pay for such an expensive fence.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讘讬转 讜讛注诇讬讬讛 砖诇 砖谞讬诐 砖谞驻诇讜 讗诪专 讘注诇 讛注诇讬讬讛 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讘谞讜转 讜讛讜讗 讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 讛专讬 讘注诇 讛注诇讬讬讛 讘讜谞讛 讘讬转 讜讬讜砖讘 讘讛 注讚 砖讬转谉 诇讜 讬爪讬讗讜转讬讜

The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Bava Metzia 117a): If a house and its upper story, which belonged to two separate people, collapsed, necessitating that the entire structure be rebuilt, and the owner of the upper story told the owner of the lower story of the house to build the lower story again so that he could rebuild the upper story, but the owner of the lower story does not want to do so, the owner of the upper story may build the lower story of the house and live in it until the owner of the lower story will pay him for his expenses, and only then will he be required to vacate the lower story of the house and build the upper story.

讬爪讬讗讜转讬讜 讛讜讗 讚诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讗 砖讻专讜 诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 驻讟讜专 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讘讬转讗 诇注诇讬讬讛 诪砖转注讘讚

The Gemara infers: It is all of his expenses that the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to pay him, and he does not subtract from the amount compensation for rent for the time that the owner of the upper story lived in the lower story of the house. Conclude from the mishna that where this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is exempt, as the owner of the upper story derived benefit from living in the lower story, while the owner of the lower story did not suffer a loss, since he said he did not need it. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there because the lower story of the house is subjugated to the upper story, because it also serves as the foundation of the upper story, and therefore the owner of the lower story of the house is obligated to provide lodging to the owner of the upper story in the interim.

转讗 砖诪注 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讝讛 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讝讛 谞讛谞讛 讜讝讛 诇讗 讞住专 讞讬讬讘 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 砖讞专讜专讬转讗 讚讗砖讬讬转讗

The Gemara attempts another resolution. Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna, in which Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the first tanna and holds that the owner of the upper story may not reside in the lower story of the house without payment. Rabbi Yehuda says: A proof that the owner of the upper story must pay rent is from the halakha that even this one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge must pay him rent. Conclude from the mishna that when this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, the one who derives benefit is obligated to pay. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there, as there it is possible to claim that the owner of the lower story suffers a loss due to the blackening of the walls, as when a person lives in a home, the value of the house depreciates due to the use.

砖诇讞讜讛 讘讬 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讜讻讬 诪讛 注砖讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 讞住专讜 讜诪讛 讛讝讬拽讜 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 谞转讬讬砖讘 讘讚讘专 讛讚专 砖诇讞讜讛 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 讻讜诇讬讛 讛讗讬 砖诇讞讜 诇讬 讜讗讝诇讬 讗讬诇讜 讗砖讻讞讬 讘讛 讟注诪讗 诇讗 砖诇讞谞讗 诇讛讜

This dilemma was not successfully resolved so they sent it to the academy of Rabbi Ami to ask his opinion. Rabbi Ami said: And what did this squatter do to the owner? What loss did he cause him? How did he damage him? Rav Ami holds that if this one derives benefit and that one does not suffer a loss, no payment is necessary. When asked about this dilemma, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said: Let us consider the matter. After waiting and not receiving a response they sent the question to Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba again. He said: They keep sending me this dilemma; had I found a response to their question, would I not have sent them a reply? They should have realized that Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba did not have an answer for them.

讗转诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专

It was stated that the amora鈥檌m discussed this matter: Rav Kahana says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He need not pay him rent, and Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: He must pay him rent.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讗 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 诇讗讜 讘驻讬专讜砖 讗转诪专 讗诇讗 诪讻诇诇讗 讗转诪专 讚转谞谉 谞讟诇 讗讘谉 讗讜 拽讜专讛 砖诇 讛拽讚砖 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 诪注诇

Rav Pappa said: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu, citing Rabbi Yo岣nan, was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated from an inference that Rabbi Abbahu drew from something that Rabbi Yo岣nan said in a different context. As we learned in a mishna (Me鈥檌la 5:4): If the treasurer of consecrated property took for himself a stone or a cross beam that had been consecrated, he has not violated the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. This is because his act of taking the stone or the beam has not effectively removed it from within the jurisdiction of Temple property, as any item under his control is in the possession of the Temple treasury.

谞转谞讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讜讗 诪注诇 讜讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 诪注诇 讘谞讗讛 诇转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 诪注诇 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 转讞转讬讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

If the treasurer gave it to another as a gift, he has then misused consecrated property, as he removed it from the possession of the Temple and conveyed it into the possession of another. But the other man, who received the item, has not misused a consecrated item until he actually uses the item. If the treasurer himself built it into his house, he has not violated the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property until he has lived beneath it for an amount of time worth one peruta.

讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讛讜讗 砖讛谞讬讞讛 注诇 驻讬 讗专讜讘讛

And Shmuel said: And this is the halakha provided that he placed it over the skylight, as were he to have built it into the actual structure of the house, he would have violated the prohibition of misuse with the very act of construction, as by doing so he effects a change in the stone itself. By contrast, when he places the stone in a place from which it is easy to remove it and give it back, then as long as he has not lived beneath it, he has not, as yet, misused consecrated property.

讜讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜拽讗诪专 诪砖诪讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讛讚专 讘讞爪专 讞讘讬专讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛注诇讜转 诇讜 砖讻专 讜砖转拽 诇讬讛

And Rabbi Abbahu sat before Rabbi Yo岣nan and was saying in the name of Shmuel: That is to say, one who resides in another鈥檚 courtyard without his knowledge must pay him rent, similar to the treasurer who resides beneath the consecrated beam without detracting from the value of the beam in any way but has nevertheless violated the prohibition of misuse since he has derived personal benefit from it. And Rabbi Yo岣nan remained silent and offered him no reply.

讗讬讛讜 住讘专 诪讚砖转讬拽 诪讜讚讛 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 讛讬讗 讗砖讙讜讞讬 诇讗 讗砖讙讞 讘讬讛

Rabbi Abbahu thought that since he was silent, this must mean he concedes to his conclusion, and therefore, from then on he would cite this opinion in the name of Rabbi Yo岣nan. But that is not so. The reason Rabbi Yo岣nan was silent was because he did not pay attention to Rabbi Abbahu and did not bother to contradict his opinion on the issue. In truth Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion is as was reported in his name by Rav Kahana, that a squatter living on someone else鈥檚 premises without his permission and without causing him any loss does not need to pay the owner any rent.

讻讚专讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讛拽讚砖 砖诇讗 诪讚注转

The Gemara explains the distinction between that case and the case of the consecrated stone or beam. The reason the treasurer of consecrated property is considered to have misused consecrated property by deriving benefit from it is in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: Consecrated property from which one derived benefit without the Temple treasury鈥檚 knowledge

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