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Today's Daf Yomi

June 23, 2016 | 讬状讝 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Bava Kamma 23

Study Guide Bava Kamma 23. Rabbi Yochanan’s approach that fire is like a person shooting arrows is questioned and it is explained that he holds that it is both like arrows and because it’s his property. 聽When a cow eats someone’s food and brings the food into its mouth, is it considered that it is now in the property of the one who is doing the damage and therefore since it is eating and eating is exempt if it takes place not in the property of the one who is damaged, he is exempt or do we say that if the cow is standing in the property of the one who he is causing damage to, his mouth is considered in the property of the one who he is causing damage to and he would be liable.


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讘谞讝拽讬 诪诪讜谞讜 讜住讬讬诐 讘谞讝拽讬 讙讜驻讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讗砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜

with a reference to damage caused by one鈥檚 possessions, as it is written: 鈥淚f fire breaks out,鈥 indicating that his responsibility for the fire is the same as his responsibility for any of his possessions that cause damage, and it concludes with a reference to damage caused by one鈥檚 body, as the verse refers to the person by calling him 鈥渢he one who ignited the fire,鈥 telling you that his liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows.

讗诪专 专讘讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讘讬讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讟诪讜谉 讘讗砖 讚驻讟专 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

Rava said that Abaye raised a difficulty: According to the one who says that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, how can you find that the Merciful One exempted one from liability for concealed items damaged by a fire? If one caused damage by shooting an arrow, he would be equally liable for damaging both exposed and concealed items. Consequently, if one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, he should similarly be liable for concealed items damaged by a fire.

讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞驻诇讛 讚诇讬拽讛 诇讗讜转讜 讞爪专 讜谞驻诇讛 讙讚专 砖诇讗 诪讞诪转 讚诇讬拽讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讜讛讚诇讬拽讛 讜讛讝讬拽讛 讘讞爪专 讗讞专转 讚讛转诐 讻诇讜 诇讬讛 讞爪讬讜

And it was satisfactory for him, i.e., Abaye resolved the difficulty. He explained that the exemption from liability for concealed items damaged by a fire applies in a case where a fire broke out in that same courtyard, and afterward the fence separating this courtyard from the neighbor鈥檚 courtyard collapsed, but not due to the fire, and therefore the fire spread and ignited items and caused damage in another courtyard. In such a circumstance he would be exempt because there, in this case, it is as if his arrows were depleted, i.e., he bears responsibility for the fire that he had started, which initially was confined to his courtyard alone. The fire that spread to the neighboring courtyard is not similar to his arrows, and therefore he is exempt.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诇注谞讬谉 讙诇讜讬 谞诪讬 讻诇讜 诇讬讛 讞爪讬讜

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so, he should be exempt not only with regard to concealed items but also with regard to exposed items that were damaged by the fire, as his arrows are also depleted when the fire spreads and causes damage. If his exemption is due to fact that the damage was caused because the wall that had separated the two courtyards had collapsed, there should be no distinction between exposed and concealed items.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讗讬转 诇讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诪讜谞讜 讜讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 诇讙讜讚专讛 讜诇讗 讙讚专讛 讚讛转诐 砖讜专讜 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 讟驻讞 讘讗驻讬讛

Rather, it must be that the one who holds that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows also holds that his liability is due to the fire鈥檚 similarity to his property. Consequently, it remains possible for a circumstance to exist in which one will be exempt from liability for damaging concealed items and yet be held liable for exposed items. For example, if he had the ability to repair the breach and fence in the courtyard again but he did not fence it in, he will be liable, as there, it is similar to a case where his ox was in danger of escaping from his property and he did not strike it in its face to hold it back, and therefore he is liable for any ensuing damage. In this case, however, the fire is not similar to his arrows since it was not responsible for the collapse of the fence, and therefore he is exempt from damage caused to concealed items, according to the halakhot of Fire.

讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 讚诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讗讬转 诇讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诪讜谞讜 诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

The Gemara asks: But according to this conclusion, since the one who holds that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows also holds that his liability is due to its similarity to his property, what is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讞讬讬讘讜 讘讗专讘注讛 讚讘专讬诐

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to holding him liable for the additional four types of indemnity in a case where the fire injured a person. In such an instance Rabbi Yo岣nan would require, in addition to the costs of the damage itself, payments for pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, as in any case of personal injury, given that Rabbi Yo岣nan considers Fire to be no different than an arrow he had shot at the injured party.

注诇 讛讞专专讛 诪砖诇诐 讻讜壮 诪讗谉 讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讻诇讘 讜诇讬讞讬讬讘 谞诪讬 讘注诇 讙讞诇转 讘砖砖讬诪专 讙讞诇转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that he must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake the dog ate but must pay for only half the cost of the damage to the burned stack of grain. The Gemara elucidates: Who is the one obligated to pay for the cake? The owner of the dog. The Gemara challenges this: But why not let the owner of the coal also be liable, as he shares some of the responsibility, being that he did not safeguard his coal and it ultimately caused damage? The Gemara answers: The case under discussion is one where the owner of the coal safeguarded his coal properly.

讗讬 讻砖砖讬诪专 讙讞诇转讜 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讻诇讘 讛转诐 讘砖讞转专 讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 住转诐 讚诇转讜转 讞转讜专讜转 讛谉 讗爪诇 讻诇讘

The Gemara asks: If the case is one where he safeguarded his coal properly, what does the dog want, i.e., what is it doing there? If the dog was able to get in there, it cannot be that the owner of the coal safeguarded it properly. The Gemara answers: The case is one where the dog burrowed under the fence, entered the property, and took the cake and the coal. Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: That is to say that ordinary doors are deemed vulnerable to being burrowed under by a dog because if it would be atypical for a dog to burrow under the door, the owner of the dog would be exempt from payment. Therefore, it must be that it is typical behavior for a dog to burrow beneath a door, and therefore it was incumbent upon the owner of the door to prevent it from causing damage.

讚讗讻诇讛 讛讬讻讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讻诇讛 讘讙讚讬砖 讚注诇诪讗 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讘注专 讘砖讚讛 讗讞专 讜诇讬讻讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讻诇讛 讘讙讚讬砖 讚讘注诇 讞专专讛

The Gemara asks: Where did it eat the cake? If we say that it ate it after placing it on a stack of grain belonging to another, i.e., someone other than the owner of the cake, then he should not be liable for the damage to the cake under the halakhot of Eating, as in order to hold someone liable we require fulfillment of scenario described in the verse: 鈥淎nd it consumed in the field of another鈥 (Exodus 22:4), meaning that an act of damage classified as Eating must be caused on the property of the injured party, and that is not the case in this instance. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary only in the case where the dog ate the cake after placing it on a stack of grain owned by the owner of the cake, and that is why the dog鈥檚 owner is liable, as it ate it while on the property of the injured party.

转驻砖讜讟 讚驻讬 驻专讛

搂 The Gemara suggests: From here it is possible to resolve a dilemma and prove that the mouth of a cow

讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 专驻转讱 讘驻讜诪讗 讚讻诇讘讗讬

is like the courtyard of the injured party, i.e., it is not a separate domain from the place in which the animal is eating. As if the mouth of the animal were to be considered like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, let the owner of the dog say to the injured party: What is your bread doing in my dog鈥檚 mouth? The dog鈥檚 mouth is my domain, and I am not liable for damage classified as Eating done to your property in my domain.

讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 驻讬 驻专讛 讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬 讗讜 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬

The Gemara notes: The need for this type of inference arises from the fact that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the mouth of a cow like the courtyard of the injured party, or is it like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, i.e., the owner of the cow?

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 砖谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara asks: But if you say that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, how can you find a case of damage classified as Eating for which the Merciful One holds the owner of the animal liable? The halakha is that one must pay for damage classified as Eating only if it occurred on the property of the injured party. If the mouth of an animal is deemed the domain of the animal鈥檚 owner, damage caused by an animal eating would always take place in the domain of the animal鈥檚 owner and he would therefore be exempt from liability in every case.

讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讞讻讻讛 讘讻讜转诇 诇讛谞讗转讛 讜讟谞驻讛 驻讬专讜转 诇讛谞讗转讛

Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: It is possible to describe a case of Eating that would render the animal鈥檚 owner liable according to the one who holds that the mouth of a cow is like the domain of its owner, for example, if the cow rubbed up against a wall for its pleasure and broke it, or if the cow soiled produce for its own pleasure. Any action in which an animal engages for its own pleasure is classified as Eating, and if the animal causes damage thereby within the domain belonging to the injured party, its owner will be held liable since nothing has entered the mouth of the animal.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞讗 讻讗砖专 讬讘注专 讛讙诇诇 注讚 转诪讜 讜诇讬讻讗 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讚砖祝 爪诇诪讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讚驻住注讬 驻住讜注讬

Mar Zutra objects to these examples of Eating: But in order to create liability under the halakhot of Eating, I require fulfillment of the verse: 鈥淎s consumes the tooth until it be all gone鈥 (I聽Kings 14:10), meaning that the damaged item must be completely destroyed or consumed, and here that is not the case, as the stones of the broken wall and the soiled produce have not been destroyed. To answer Mar Zutra鈥檚 question, Ravina said: It is possible for a cow to cause complete destruction by rubbing against a wall, e.g., a cow that completely erases any decorative images that were adorning the wall. Rav Ashi said: It is possible for cow to cause complete destruction by soiling produce, e.g., a cow that trods on the produce and crushes it, thereby totally eradicating it. Consequently, the initial question about the status of the cow鈥檚 mouth remains.

转讗 砖诪注 砖讬住讛 讘讜 讗转 讛讻诇讘 砖讬住讛 讘讜 讗转 讛谞讞砖 驻讟讜专 诪讗谉 驻讟讜专 诪砖住讛 驻讟讜专 讜讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讻诇讘 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讬讚讱 讘驻讜诪讬讛 讚讻诇讘讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita: If he incited a dog against another person, or if he incited a snake against another person, he is exempt (Sanhedrin 66b). The Gemara clarifies: Who is exempt? The one who incited the dog is exempt, but the owner of the dog is liable. And if you say that the mouth of the animal is like the courtyard of the one liable for the damage, let the owner of the dog say to the injured party: What does your hand want, i.e., what is it doing, in my dog鈥檚 mouth, which is my domain?

讗讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 讗祝 诪砖住讛 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讗驻拽讬讛 诇谞讬讘讬讛 讜住专讟讬讛

The Gemara answers: The mishna could be understood a different way. Say that even the one who incited the dog is exempt, as the dog is not his property, but the dog owner is also exempt because his dog鈥檚 mouth has a legal status similar to that of the dog owner鈥檚 courtyard. And if you wish, say instead that the case under discussion is one where the dog extended his canine teeth and scratched the victim, but the victim鈥檚 hand was not inside his mouth, and therefore this incident cannot be treated as if it took place in the domain of the owner of the dog.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讬讱 讘讜 讗转 讛谞讞砖 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution based on the continuation of the above mishna: If one caused the snake to bite a person by bringing the fangs of the snake to the victim鈥檚 body, and the snake killed him, Rabbi Yehuda deems the one who instigated the attack liable to receive the death penalty and the Rabbis exempt him.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讻砖转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗专住 谞讞砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讜 讛讜讗 注讜诪讚 诇驻讬讻讱 诪讻讬砖 讘住讬讬祝 讜谞讞砖 驻讟讜专 诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讗专住 谞讞砖 诪注爪诪讜 诪拽讬讗 诇驻讬讻讱 谞讞砖 讘住拽讬诇讛 讜诪讻讬砖 驻讟讜专

And Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov says in explanation of the dispute: When you analyze the matter you will find that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, the venom of a snake is deemed to be constantly present between its fangs, and therefore when the snake is made to strike the victim it is not actively engaged in any action. Consequently, the person handling the snake is liable, similar to one who strikes a victim with a sword, while the snake itself is exempt as it has not done anything. And according to according to the statement of the Rabbis, the venom of a snake is not present between its fangs but rather the snake must secrete it of its own volition. Consequently, the snake receives the penalty of stoning like any animal that kills a person, while the one who instigated the attack and striking with it is exempt.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 驻讬 驻专讛 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讬讚讱 讘驻讜诪讗 讚讞讬讜讜讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 拽讟诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

And if you say that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, let the owner of the snake metaphorically say to the injured party: What is your hand doing in my snake鈥檚 mouth? The Gemara answers: We do not say this principle with regard to matters relating to the death penalty; therefore, one who kills another is always liable, regardless of whether it occurred within the domain of the killer or within the domain of the victim.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛谞讻谞住 诇讞爪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讜谞讙讞讜 砖讜专讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜诪转 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讜讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪谉 讛讻讜驻专

And from where do you say this? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:13): With regard to one who enters the courtyard of a property owner without his permission, and the property owner鈥檚 ox gores the intruder and he dies, the ox receives the penalty of stoning while the owner is exempt from having to pay ransom.

讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪谉 讛讻讜驻专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘专砖讜转讬 诪讗讬 讘注讬转 砖讜专讜 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬转 讘专砖讜转讬 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 拽讟诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that the owner is exempt from paying ransom? He is exempt because he can metaphorically say to the victim: What do you want in my domain, i.e., why were you there without permission? Since he entered the premises without authorization, he bears responsibility for his own fate. But if that is so, the same applies to his ox as well, and let the owner of the ox say to the victim: What do you want in my domain? Rather, it must be that we do not say that this principle applies with regard to matters relating to the death penalty. Consequently, these cases do not prove that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the victim within the scope of the halakhot of damages.

讛谞讛讜 注讬讝讬 讚讘讬 转专讘讜 讚讛讜讜 诪驻住讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗讘讬讬 讝讬诇 讗讬诪讗 诇讛讜 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讚诇讬爪谞注讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪讗讬 讗讬讝讬诇 讚讗讬 讗讝讬诇谞讗 讗诪专讬 诇讬 诇讙讚讜专 诪专 讙讚讬专讗 讘讗专注讬讛

搂 The Gemara relates: There were these goats, belonging to the Tarbu family, that would frequently damage Rav Yosef鈥檚 property. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Go and tell their owners that they must keep their goats enclosed within their own property. Abaye said to Rav Yosef in response: Why should I go? If I go and deliver this message, they will say to me: Let the Master put a fence up around his property so that the goats will not be able to get in there.

讜讗讬 讙讚专 砖谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻砖讞转专讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讚谞驻讬诇 讙讜讚讗 讘诇讬诇讬讗

The Gemara questions this claim: And if an individual did put up a fence to safeguard his property from the Eating of other animals because he was required to do so, and had he not done so the owners of those animals would not be liable to pay for the damage caused by their animals, how can you find damage classified as Eating for which the Merciful One holds the owner of the animal liable? As, if it is the responsibility of the injured party to fence in his property, animals will not be able to get inside. The Gemara answers: A case in which the Torah holds the owner of the animal liable can be explained as one where the animal burrowed under the fence. Alternatively, it could be explained as a case where the separating fence collapsed in middle of the night and the owner of the fence did not have the opportunity to repair it before the animals caused damage.

诪讻专讬讝 专讘 讬讜住祝 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讛 讚住诇拽讬谉 诇注讬诇讗 讜讚谞讞转讬谉 诇转讞转讗讛 讛谞讬 注讬讝讬 讚砖讜拽讗 讚诪驻住讚讬 诪转专讬谞谉 讘诪专讬讬讛讜 转专讬 讜转诇转讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讗讬 爪讬讬转 爪讬讬转 讜讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谉 诇讬讛 转讬讘 讗诪住讞转讗 讜拽讘诇 讝讜讝讱

The Gemara comments: Rav Yosef, and some say it was Rabba, would announce: Those that ascend to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, bringing with them the rulings of the Babylonian Sages, as well as those that descend to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, bringing the rulings of the sages of Eretz Yisrael with them, all agree to the following halakha: With regard to these goats that loiter in the market until they are slaughtered and in the meantime cause damage to others, we warn their owner two or three times. If the owner of the goats heeds the warning and safeguards his animals from damaging others, then he heeds it and no further action is necessary. But if not, we say to him: Go, sit next to the butcher shop and take your money, meaning we instruct him to slaughter his goats immediately. Since he in any event intends to slaughter them, the court can force him to do so immediately. Otherwise, he cannot be forced to slaughter them as preventive measure.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬讝讛讜 转诐 讜讗讬讝讜 诪讜注讚 诪讜注讚 讻诇 砖讛注讬讚讜 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讜转诐 诪砖讬讞讝讜专 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注讚 砖讛注讬讚讜 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讜转诐 讻诇 砖讬讛讜 讛转讬谞讜拽讜转 诪诪砖诪砖讬谉 讘讜 讜讗讬谞讜 谞讜讙讞

MISHNA: Which type of ox is deemed innocuous and which is deemed forewarned? An ox is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified about it that it gored on three different days. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status from when it reverses its behavior and refrains from goring for three consecutive days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified that it gored three times, regardless of the number of days on which this behavior occurred. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status in any case where children pet it and play with it and it does not gore them.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转诪诇 讞讚 诪转诪诇 转专讬 砖诇砖诐 转诇转讗 讜诇讗 讬砖诪专谞讜 讘注诇讬讜 讗转讗谉 诇谞讙讬讞讛 专讘讬注讬转

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that an ox is deemed forewarned only if it gored on three separate days? Abaye said: It states in the verse: 鈥淥r if it is known that the ox was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner has not secured it鈥 (Exodus 21:36). This leads to the following inference: 鈥淵esterday鈥 indicates one day, 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 indicates two days, 鈥渢he day before yesterday鈥 indicates three days, 鈥渁nd its owner has not secured it鈥; here we arrive at a fourth incident of goring, for which the owner pays the full amount of damages.

专讘讗 讗诪专 转诪诇 诪转诪诇 讞讚 砖诇砖诐 转专讬 讜诇讗 讬砖诪专谞讜 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讞讬讬讘

Rava said: 鈥淵esterday鈥 and 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 are not to be expounded separately. Rather, the inference from this phrase is that 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 indicates one day, 鈥渢he day before yesterday鈥 indicates two days, 鈥渁nd its owner has not secured it鈥 indicates now, the third incident of goring, as it is liable as a forewarned animal for the third goring.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not determine the forewarned status of an ox by the number of days on which the animal gored but simply by the number of times? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir said:

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

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Bava Kamma 23

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 23

讘谞讝拽讬 诪诪讜谞讜 讜住讬讬诐 讘谞讝拽讬 讙讜驻讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讗砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜

with a reference to damage caused by one鈥檚 possessions, as it is written: 鈥淚f fire breaks out,鈥 indicating that his responsibility for the fire is the same as his responsibility for any of his possessions that cause damage, and it concludes with a reference to damage caused by one鈥檚 body, as the verse refers to the person by calling him 鈥渢he one who ignited the fire,鈥 telling you that his liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows.

讗诪专 专讘讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讘讬讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖讜 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讟诪讜谉 讘讗砖 讚驻讟专 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

Rava said that Abaye raised a difficulty: According to the one who says that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, how can you find that the Merciful One exempted one from liability for concealed items damaged by a fire? If one caused damage by shooting an arrow, he would be equally liable for damaging both exposed and concealed items. Consequently, if one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, he should similarly be liable for concealed items damaged by a fire.

讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讻讙讜谉 砖谞驻诇讛 讚诇讬拽讛 诇讗讜转讜 讞爪专 讜谞驻诇讛 讙讚专 砖诇讗 诪讞诪转 讚诇讬拽讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讜讛讚诇讬拽讛 讜讛讝讬拽讛 讘讞爪专 讗讞专转 讚讛转诐 讻诇讜 诇讬讛 讞爪讬讜

And it was satisfactory for him, i.e., Abaye resolved the difficulty. He explained that the exemption from liability for concealed items damaged by a fire applies in a case where a fire broke out in that same courtyard, and afterward the fence separating this courtyard from the neighbor鈥檚 courtyard collapsed, but not due to the fire, and therefore the fire spread and ignited items and caused damage in another courtyard. In such a circumstance he would be exempt because there, in this case, it is as if his arrows were depleted, i.e., he bears responsibility for the fire that he had started, which initially was confined to his courtyard alone. The fire that spread to the neighboring courtyard is not similar to his arrows, and therefore he is exempt.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诇注谞讬谉 讙诇讜讬 谞诪讬 讻诇讜 诇讬讛 讞爪讬讜

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so, he should be exempt not only with regard to concealed items but also with regard to exposed items that were damaged by the fire, as his arrows are also depleted when the fire spreads and causes damage. If his exemption is due to fact that the damage was caused because the wall that had separated the two courtyards had collapsed, there should be no distinction between exposed and concealed items.

讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讗讬转 诇讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诪讜谞讜 讜讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 诇讙讜讚专讛 讜诇讗 讙讚专讛 讚讛转诐 砖讜专讜 讛讜讗 讜诇讗 讟驻讞 讘讗驻讬讛

Rather, it must be that the one who holds that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows also holds that his liability is due to the fire鈥檚 similarity to his property. Consequently, it remains possible for a circumstance to exist in which one will be exempt from liability for damaging concealed items and yet be held liable for exposed items. For example, if he had the ability to repair the breach and fence in the courtyard again but he did not fence it in, he will be liable, as there, it is similar to a case where his ox was in danger of escaping from his property and he did not strike it in its face to hold it back, and therefore he is liable for any ensuing damage. In this case, however, the fire is not similar to his arrows since it was not responsible for the collapse of the fence, and therefore he is exempt from damage caused to concealed items, according to the halakhot of Fire.

讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 讚诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讞爪讬讜 讗讬转 诇讬讛 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 诪诪讜谞讜 诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜

The Gemara asks: But according to this conclusion, since the one who holds that one鈥檚 liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows also holds that his liability is due to its similarity to his property, what is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish?

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讞讬讬讘讜 讘讗专讘注讛 讚讘专讬诐

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to holding him liable for the additional four types of indemnity in a case where the fire injured a person. In such an instance Rabbi Yo岣nan would require, in addition to the costs of the damage itself, payments for pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, as in any case of personal injury, given that Rabbi Yo岣nan considers Fire to be no different than an arrow he had shot at the injured party.

注诇 讛讞专专讛 诪砖诇诐 讻讜壮 诪讗谉 讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讻诇讘 讜诇讬讞讬讬讘 谞诪讬 讘注诇 讙讞诇转 讘砖砖讬诪专 讙讞诇转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that he must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake the dog ate but must pay for only half the cost of the damage to the burned stack of grain. The Gemara elucidates: Who is the one obligated to pay for the cake? The owner of the dog. The Gemara challenges this: But why not let the owner of the coal also be liable, as he shares some of the responsibility, being that he did not safeguard his coal and it ultimately caused damage? The Gemara answers: The case under discussion is one where the owner of the coal safeguarded his coal properly.

讗讬 讻砖砖讬诪专 讙讞诇转讜 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讻诇讘 讛转诐 讘砖讞转专 讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 住转诐 讚诇转讜转 讞转讜专讜转 讛谉 讗爪诇 讻诇讘

The Gemara asks: If the case is one where he safeguarded his coal properly, what does the dog want, i.e., what is it doing there? If the dog was able to get in there, it cannot be that the owner of the coal safeguarded it properly. The Gemara answers: The case is one where the dog burrowed under the fence, entered the property, and took the cake and the coal. Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: That is to say that ordinary doors are deemed vulnerable to being burrowed under by a dog because if it would be atypical for a dog to burrow under the door, the owner of the dog would be exempt from payment. Therefore, it must be that it is typical behavior for a dog to burrow beneath a door, and therefore it was incumbent upon the owner of the door to prevent it from causing damage.

讚讗讻诇讛 讛讬讻讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讻诇讛 讘讙讚讬砖 讚注诇诪讗 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讘注专 讘砖讚讛 讗讞专 讜诇讬讻讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讻诇讛 讘讙讚讬砖 讚讘注诇 讞专专讛

The Gemara asks: Where did it eat the cake? If we say that it ate it after placing it on a stack of grain belonging to another, i.e., someone other than the owner of the cake, then he should not be liable for the damage to the cake under the halakhot of Eating, as in order to hold someone liable we require fulfillment of scenario described in the verse: 鈥淎nd it consumed in the field of another鈥 (Exodus 22:4), meaning that an act of damage classified as Eating must be caused on the property of the injured party, and that is not the case in this instance. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary only in the case where the dog ate the cake after placing it on a stack of grain owned by the owner of the cake, and that is why the dog鈥檚 owner is liable, as it ate it while on the property of the injured party.

转驻砖讜讟 讚驻讬 驻专讛

搂 The Gemara suggests: From here it is possible to resolve a dilemma and prove that the mouth of a cow

讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 专驻转讱 讘驻讜诪讗 讚讻诇讘讗讬

is like the courtyard of the injured party, i.e., it is not a separate domain from the place in which the animal is eating. As if the mouth of the animal were to be considered like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, let the owner of the dog say to the injured party: What is your bread doing in my dog鈥檚 mouth? The dog鈥檚 mouth is my domain, and I am not liable for damage classified as Eating done to your property in my domain.

讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 驻讬 驻专讛 讻讞爪专 讛谞讬讝拽 讚诪讬 讗讜 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬

The Gemara notes: The need for this type of inference arises from the fact that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the mouth of a cow like the courtyard of the injured party, or is it like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, i.e., the owner of the cow?

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 砖谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛

The Gemara asks: But if you say that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, how can you find a case of damage classified as Eating for which the Merciful One holds the owner of the animal liable? The halakha is that one must pay for damage classified as Eating only if it occurred on the property of the injured party. If the mouth of an animal is deemed the domain of the animal鈥檚 owner, damage caused by an animal eating would always take place in the domain of the animal鈥檚 owner and he would therefore be exempt from liability in every case.

讗诪专 专讘 诪专讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讻讙讜谉 砖谞转讞讻讻讛 讘讻讜转诇 诇讛谞讗转讛 讜讟谞驻讛 驻讬专讜转 诇讛谞讗转讛

Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: It is possible to describe a case of Eating that would render the animal鈥檚 owner liable according to the one who holds that the mouth of a cow is like the domain of its owner, for example, if the cow rubbed up against a wall for its pleasure and broke it, or if the cow soiled produce for its own pleasure. Any action in which an animal engages for its own pleasure is classified as Eating, and if the animal causes damage thereby within the domain belonging to the injured party, its owner will be held liable since nothing has entered the mouth of the animal.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讜讛讗 讘注讬谞讗 讻讗砖专 讬讘注专 讛讙诇诇 注讚 转诪讜 讜诇讬讻讗 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讚砖祝 爪诇诪讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讚驻住注讬 驻住讜注讬

Mar Zutra objects to these examples of Eating: But in order to create liability under the halakhot of Eating, I require fulfillment of the verse: 鈥淎s consumes the tooth until it be all gone鈥 (I聽Kings 14:10), meaning that the damaged item must be completely destroyed or consumed, and here that is not the case, as the stones of the broken wall and the soiled produce have not been destroyed. To answer Mar Zutra鈥檚 question, Ravina said: It is possible for a cow to cause complete destruction by rubbing against a wall, e.g., a cow that completely erases any decorative images that were adorning the wall. Rav Ashi said: It is possible for cow to cause complete destruction by soiling produce, e.g., a cow that trods on the produce and crushes it, thereby totally eradicating it. Consequently, the initial question about the status of the cow鈥檚 mouth remains.

转讗 砖诪注 砖讬住讛 讘讜 讗转 讛讻诇讘 砖讬住讛 讘讜 讗转 讛谞讞砖 驻讟讜专 诪讗谉 驻讟讜专 诪砖住讛 驻讟讜专 讜讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讻诇讘 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讬讚讱 讘驻讜诪讬讛 讚讻诇讘讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita: If he incited a dog against another person, or if he incited a snake against another person, he is exempt (Sanhedrin 66b). The Gemara clarifies: Who is exempt? The one who incited the dog is exempt, but the owner of the dog is liable. And if you say that the mouth of the animal is like the courtyard of the one liable for the damage, let the owner of the dog say to the injured party: What does your hand want, i.e., what is it doing, in my dog鈥檚 mouth, which is my domain?

讗讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 讗祝 诪砖住讛 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讗驻拽讬讛 诇谞讬讘讬讛 讜住专讟讬讛

The Gemara answers: The mishna could be understood a different way. Say that even the one who incited the dog is exempt, as the dog is not his property, but the dog owner is also exempt because his dog鈥檚 mouth has a legal status similar to that of the dog owner鈥檚 courtyard. And if you wish, say instead that the case under discussion is one where the dog extended his canine teeth and scratched the victim, but the victim鈥檚 hand was not inside his mouth, and therefore this incident cannot be treated as if it took place in the domain of the owner of the dog.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讬讱 讘讜 讗转 讛谞讞砖 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution based on the continuation of the above mishna: If one caused the snake to bite a person by bringing the fangs of the snake to the victim鈥檚 body, and the snake killed him, Rabbi Yehuda deems the one who instigated the attack liable to receive the death penalty and the Rabbis exempt him.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 讻砖转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗专住 谞讞砖 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讜 讛讜讗 注讜诪讚 诇驻讬讻讱 诪讻讬砖 讘住讬讬祝 讜谞讞砖 驻讟讜专 诇讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讗专住 谞讞砖 诪注爪诪讜 诪拽讬讗 诇驻讬讻讱 谞讞砖 讘住拽讬诇讛 讜诪讻讬砖 驻讟讜专

And Rav A岣 bar Ya鈥檃kov says in explanation of the dispute: When you analyze the matter you will find that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, the venom of a snake is deemed to be constantly present between its fangs, and therefore when the snake is made to strike the victim it is not actively engaged in any action. Consequently, the person handling the snake is liable, similar to one who strikes a victim with a sword, while the snake itself is exempt as it has not done anything. And according to according to the statement of the Rabbis, the venom of a snake is not present between its fangs but rather the snake must secrete it of its own volition. Consequently, the snake receives the penalty of stoning like any animal that kills a person, while the one who instigated the attack and striking with it is exempt.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 驻讬 驻专讛 讻讞爪专 讛诪讝讬拽 讚诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬 讬讚讱 讘驻讜诪讗 讚讞讬讜讜讗讬 诇注谞讬谉 拽讟诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

And if you say that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the one responsible for the damage, let the owner of the snake metaphorically say to the injured party: What is your hand doing in my snake鈥檚 mouth? The Gemara answers: We do not say this principle with regard to matters relating to the death penalty; therefore, one who kills another is always liable, regardless of whether it occurred within the domain of the killer or within the domain of the victim.

讜诪谞讗 转讬诪专讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛谞讻谞住 诇讞爪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讜谞讙讞讜 砖讜专讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜诪转 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讜讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪谉 讛讻讜驻专

And from where do you say this? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 5:13): With regard to one who enters the courtyard of a property owner without his permission, and the property owner鈥檚 ox gores the intruder and he dies, the ox receives the penalty of stoning while the owner is exempt from having to pay ransom.

讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪谉 讛讻讜驻专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘专砖讜转讬 诪讗讬 讘注讬转 砖讜专讜 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讘注讬转 讘专砖讜转讬 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 拽讟诇讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that the owner is exempt from paying ransom? He is exempt because he can metaphorically say to the victim: What do you want in my domain, i.e., why were you there without permission? Since he entered the premises without authorization, he bears responsibility for his own fate. But if that is so, the same applies to his ox as well, and let the owner of the ox say to the victim: What do you want in my domain? Rather, it must be that we do not say that this principle applies with regard to matters relating to the death penalty. Consequently, these cases do not prove that the mouth of the cow is like the courtyard of the victim within the scope of the halakhot of damages.

讛谞讛讜 注讬讝讬 讚讘讬 转专讘讜 讚讛讜讜 诪驻住讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗讘讬讬 讝讬诇 讗讬诪讗 诇讛讜 诇诪专讬讬讛讜 讚诇讬爪谞注讬谞讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪讗讬 讗讬讝讬诇 讚讗讬 讗讝讬诇谞讗 讗诪专讬 诇讬 诇讙讚讜专 诪专 讙讚讬专讗 讘讗专注讬讛

搂 The Gemara relates: There were these goats, belonging to the Tarbu family, that would frequently damage Rav Yosef鈥檚 property. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Go and tell their owners that they must keep their goats enclosed within their own property. Abaye said to Rav Yosef in response: Why should I go? If I go and deliver this message, they will say to me: Let the Master put a fence up around his property so that the goats will not be able to get in there.

讜讗讬 讙讚专 砖谉 讚讞讬讬讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻砖讞转专讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讚谞驻讬诇 讙讜讚讗 讘诇讬诇讬讗

The Gemara questions this claim: And if an individual did put up a fence to safeguard his property from the Eating of other animals because he was required to do so, and had he not done so the owners of those animals would not be liable to pay for the damage caused by their animals, how can you find damage classified as Eating for which the Merciful One holds the owner of the animal liable? As, if it is the responsibility of the injured party to fence in his property, animals will not be able to get inside. The Gemara answers: A case in which the Torah holds the owner of the animal liable can be explained as one where the animal burrowed under the fence. Alternatively, it could be explained as a case where the separating fence collapsed in middle of the night and the owner of the fence did not have the opportunity to repair it before the animals caused damage.

诪讻专讬讝 专讘 讬讜住祝 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘讛 讚住诇拽讬谉 诇注讬诇讗 讜讚谞讞转讬谉 诇转讞转讗讛 讛谞讬 注讬讝讬 讚砖讜拽讗 讚诪驻住讚讬 诪转专讬谞谉 讘诪专讬讬讛讜 转专讬 讜转诇转讗 讝诪谞讬谉 讗讬 爪讬讬转 爪讬讬转 讜讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专讬谉 诇讬讛 转讬讘 讗诪住讞转讗 讜拽讘诇 讝讜讝讱

The Gemara comments: Rav Yosef, and some say it was Rabba, would announce: Those that ascend to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, bringing with them the rulings of the Babylonian Sages, as well as those that descend to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, bringing the rulings of the sages of Eretz Yisrael with them, all agree to the following halakha: With regard to these goats that loiter in the market until they are slaughtered and in the meantime cause damage to others, we warn their owner two or three times. If the owner of the goats heeds the warning and safeguards his animals from damaging others, then he heeds it and no further action is necessary. But if not, we say to him: Go, sit next to the butcher shop and take your money, meaning we instruct him to slaughter his goats immediately. Since he in any event intends to slaughter them, the court can force him to do so immediately. Otherwise, he cannot be forced to slaughter them as preventive measure.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讬讝讛讜 转诐 讜讗讬讝讜 诪讜注讚 诪讜注讚 讻诇 砖讛注讬讚讜 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讜转诐 诪砖讬讞讝讜专 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注讚 砖讛注讬讚讜 讘讜 砖诇砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讜转诐 讻诇 砖讬讛讜 讛转讬谞讜拽讜转 诪诪砖诪砖讬谉 讘讜 讜讗讬谞讜 谞讜讙讞

MISHNA: Which type of ox is deemed innocuous and which is deemed forewarned? An ox is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified about it that it gored on three different days. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status from when it reverses its behavior and refrains from goring for three consecutive days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified that it gored three times, regardless of the number of days on which this behavior occurred. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status in any case where children pet it and play with it and it does not gore them.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 转诪诇 讞讚 诪转诪诇 转专讬 砖诇砖诐 转诇转讗 讜诇讗 讬砖诪专谞讜 讘注诇讬讜 讗转讗谉 诇谞讙讬讞讛 专讘讬注讬转

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that an ox is deemed forewarned only if it gored on three separate days? Abaye said: It states in the verse: 鈥淥r if it is known that the ox was a goring ox from yesterday and the day before yesterday, and its owner has not secured it鈥 (Exodus 21:36). This leads to the following inference: 鈥淵esterday鈥 indicates one day, 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 indicates two days, 鈥渢he day before yesterday鈥 indicates three days, 鈥渁nd its owner has not secured it鈥; here we arrive at a fourth incident of goring, for which the owner pays the full amount of damages.

专讘讗 讗诪专 转诪诇 诪转诪诇 讞讚 砖诇砖诐 转专讬 讜诇讗 讬砖诪专谞讜 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讞讬讬讘

Rava said: 鈥淵esterday鈥 and 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 are not to be expounded separately. Rather, the inference from this phrase is that 鈥渇rom yesterday鈥 indicates one day, 鈥渢he day before yesterday鈥 indicates two days, 鈥渁nd its owner has not secured it鈥 indicates now, the third incident of goring, as it is liable as a forewarned animal for the third goring.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not determine the forewarned status of an ox by the number of days on which the animal gored but simply by the number of times? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir said:

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