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Today's Daf Yomi

July 13, 2016 | 讝壮 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 43

A husband inherits his wife’s property that was owned by her but not money that will be coming to her after her death. 聽Therefore the ransom payment goes to her inheritors and not her husband. 聽There is a discussion about money that is owed to the woman – is that considered in her hands or not? 聽Does it depend on if it is money or property? 聽There is a 3 way argument about whether in a case where the animal killed without intent is there ransom payment and if one killed a slave, is there the payment of the fine of 30 shekalim? 聽Is it integrally connected to the animal being stoned (if he is not stoned, there is no ransom or fine)?


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讗讜 讙讬讜专转 讝讻讛

and subsequently married a Canaanite slave who had also been emancipated, and became pregnant from him, or if she was a convert who became pregnant from a male convert, and both the husband and wife died without heirs, the assailant gains by not having to pay, since there are no heirs. In any event, it is explicitly stated in the baraita that the beneficiary of the compensation due to her, including that which she would have received during her lifetime, is not her husband but rather her heirs.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讙专讜砖讛 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讙专讜砖讛

Rabba said: This baraita relates to a divorc茅e; since they got divorced, the husband does not inherit from her. Likewise, Rav Na岣an said: The baraita relates to a divorc茅e.

讗诪专讬 讙专讜砖讛 谞诪讬 转讬驻诇讜讙 讘讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

The Sages said in response: If she is a divorc茅e, she should also share in the compensation for the miscarried offspring. Why should her ex-husband receive the full payment?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛转讜专讛 讝讻转讛 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讘注诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讝谞讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讗砖专 讬砖讬转 注诇讬讜 讘注诇 讛讗砖讛

Rav Pappa said: The Torah awarded the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband, even if he is not actually her legal husband but rather engaged in licentious sexual intercourse with her. Although he has no rights to her property, the damages for the miscarried offspring belong to him alone, as he is the father of the offspring. What is the reason? The verse states: 鈥淎s the husband [ba鈥檃l] of the woman shall impose upon him鈥 (Exodus 21:22), indicating that damages are not collected by the woman, but by the man who engaged in intercourse [ba鈥檃l] with her, impregnating her. Therefore, if they got divorced, the ex-husband receives the payment.

讜谞讜拽诪讛 诇专讘讛 讻讙讜谉 砖讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讜诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讙讘讜 拽专拽注

The Gemara asks: Why do Rabba and Rav Na岣an explain this baraita as referring to a divorc茅e? They could have answered, in accordance with their own opinions elsewhere (Bava Batra 124b), that it is referring to payments that are not considered to have been in the woman鈥檚 possession during her lifetime, but rather are considered property due to the woman, which her husband does not inherit. Let us establish this baraita, according to Rabba, as referring to a case where they collected money for the damage and pain, and according to Rav Na岣an, where they collected land.

讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讙讘讜 拽专拽注 讬砖 诇讜 讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讗讬谉 诇讜 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讬砖 诇讜 讙讘讜 拽专拽注 讗讬谉 诇讜

As with regard to the right of a firstborn to receive a double portion of the inheritance of his father, he receives a double portion only of the property possessed by his father, not of the property due to him. In a case where money was owed to the father, Rabba says: If the heirs collected the debt from land, the firstborn has the right to a double portion, since it is considered property that was already in the father鈥檚 possession. If they collected money, he does not have a double portion, as it is considered property due to the father. And Rav Na岣an says: If they collected money, he has a double portion, and if they collected land, he does not have a double portion.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讘谞讬 诪注专讘讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: That statement applies according to the residents of the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who limit the rights of a firstborn to his father鈥檚 property to the extent that they hold he does not receive a double portion of any appreciation in the property occurring after his father鈥檚 death.

讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讻专讘讬

By contrast, when they state that this baraita here relates to a divorc茅e, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that the firstborn receives a double portion even in the appreciation of the property occurring after the father鈥檚 death. According to this opinion, clearly everything due to the father is considered to be in his possession, whether he receives his compensation in money or in land. The same applies to a husband, who inherits the rights to inherit compensation for damage and pain inflicted on his wife. That is why Rabba and Rav Na岣an had to interpret this baraita as relating to a divorc茅e.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 砖谞讗诪专 讻住祝 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 讬转谉 诇讗讚谞讬讜 讜讛砖讜专 讬住拽诇 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 讗讬谉 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: With regard to an ox that killed a Canaanite slave unintentionally, the owner is exempt from paying the fine of thirty shekels, as it is stated: 鈥淗e shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned鈥 (Exodus 21:32). It is derived from the verse that the liability to pay thirty shekels is dependent on the stoning of the ox; whenever the ox is liable to be killed by stoning, the owner pays thirty shekels as compensation for the damage. If the ox is not liable to be killed by stoning, e.g., if it killed unintentionally, the owner does not pay thirty shekels.

讗诪专 专讘讛 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪讻讜驻专 砖谞讗诪专 讛砖讜专 讬住拽诇 讜讙诐 讘注诇讬讜 讬讜诪转 讗诐 讻驻专 讬讜砖转 注诇讬讜 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讻讜驻专 讗讬谉 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讗讬谉 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讻讜驻专

Similarly, Rabba says: With regard to an ox that killed a freeman unintentionally, its owner is exempt from paying ransom; as it is stated: 鈥淭he ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is laid on him鈥 (Exodus 21:29鈥30). This indicates that whenever the ox is liable to be killed by stoning the owner pays ransom; and if the ox is not liable to be killed by stoning the owner does not pay ransom.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讛诪讬转 砖讜专讬 讗转 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讜 砖讜专讜 砖诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讻讜驻专

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a mishna: If a person admits: My ox killed so-and-so, or: My ox killed the ox of so-and-so, this owner pays based on his own admission (Ketubot 41a). This cannot be referring to the payment of a fine, as a person who admits his responsibility for an act incurring a fine is exempt from paying the fine. Clearly, it must be referring to a payment for which one can render himself liable through admission. What, is it not referring to the payment of ransom? If so, this proves that payment of ransom is not dependent on whether the ox is liable to be killed by stoning, as the ox cannot be killed based on its owner鈥檚 admission alone.

诇讗 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to payment of the monetary value of the victim. Although he is not liable to pay ransom, as the ox is not killed, nevertheless, since by his own admission his ox caused damage, he is liable to pay damages.

讗讬 讚诪讬诐 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛诪讬转 砖讜专讬 讗转 注讘讚讜 砖诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讗讬 讚诪讬诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讗

Abaye challenged this answer: If it is referring to the value of the victim, say the latter clause of that mishna: If a person admits: My ox killed the Canaanite slave of so-and-so, he does not pay based on his own admission. And if, as you claim, the mishna is referring to the value of the victim, not to the thirty-shekel fine, why should he not pay?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬讻讬诇谞讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 诇讱 专讬砖讗 讚诪讬诐 讜住讬驻讗 拽谞住 诪讬讛讜 砖谞讜讬讬讗 讚讞讬拽讗 诇讗 诪砖谞讬谞讗 诇讱 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚诪讬诐

Rabba said to Abaye: I could have answered you by saying that the former clause, which discusses an ox killing a freeman, is referring to the value of the victim, and the latter clause, which relates to an ox that gored a slave, is referring to payment of the thirty-shekel fine. But I will not answer you with a forced answer. Instead, I will answer as follows: Both this clause and that clause refer to the value of the victim;

诪讬讛讜 讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讚诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讗转讜 住讛讚讬 讜讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚拽讟诇 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬 讗讬 转诐 讛讜讛 讗讬 诪讜注讚 讛讜讛 讜讗诪专 诪专讬讛 讚诪讜注讚 讛讜讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

but there is a distinction between the two cases. With regard to an ox killing a freeman, there is a scenario where the owner pays ransom based on his own admission. And what are the circumstances? If witnesses came and testified that the ox killed a freeman and is therefore liable to be killed by stoning, but they did not know whether it was innocuous or if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned. In this case, the owner pays ransom based on his own admission, since the ox is liable to be killed, and the ransom is for atonement and does not constitute a fine. Therefore, even where there are no witnesses, and the ox is therefore not liable to be killed by stoning for killing a person, nevertheless, the owner at least pays the monetary value of the victim based on his admission.

讙讘讬 注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 拽谞住 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚拽讟诇 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬 讗讬 转诐 讛讜讛 讗讬 诪讜注讚 讛讜讛 讜讗诪专 诪专讬讛 诪讜注讚 讛讜讗 诇讗 诪砖转诇诐 拽谞住 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

By contrast, with regard to an ox killing a slave, there is a scenario where one does not pay the fine of thirty shekels based on his own admission. And what are the circumstances where one would be liable to pay this fine due to his own admission? If witnesses came and testified that the ox killed a slave, but they did not know whether it was innocuous or if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned. In this case, even though the ox is liable to be killed, the owner does not pay the fine based on his own admission, due to the principle that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Therefore, in a case where there are no witnesses, he does not even pay the value of the victim based on his own admission.

诪转讬讘 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 讘讬谉 讘讻讜驻专 讘讬谉 讘诪讬转讛

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitz岣k raises an objection from a baraita that states a principle: In any scenario where a person is liable for his ox killing a freeman, he is liable for his ox killing a Canaanite slave, whether with regard to liability to pay ransom or with regard to the ox being put to death.

讻讜驻专 讘注讘讚 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诪讬诐

The wording of the baraita is unclear: Is there a ransom to be paid in the case of a slave? Ransom is paid only for the killing of a freeman. Rather, is it not referring to payment of the value of the victim? This poses a difficulty for Rabba鈥檚 opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of the victim for admitting to his ox鈥檚 killing of a slave.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讻讜驻专 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 拽谞住 讜讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬诐

There are those who say that he, Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitz岣k, raised the objection and he resolved it, and there are those who say it was Rabba who said to him in response, that this is what the baraita is teaching: In any scenario where a person is liable to pay ransom for his ox killing a freeman, e.g., where it gored intentionally based on the testimony of witnesses, he is liable to pay a fine for his ox killing a slave. And in any scenario where one is liable to pay the value of the victim for his ox killing a freeman, e.g., where it gored unintentionally based on the testimony of witnesses, for a slave too, one is liable to pay the value, namely, where it gored unintentionally based on the testimony of witnesses. Accordingly, one does not pay the value of a slave based on his own admission, although he does pay the value of a freeman if he admits that his ox killed him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗砖讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 谞砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

Rava said to Rabba: If that is so, that one is liable to pay the value of the victim in cases where he is exempt from paying ransom, then if a person burns another to death unintentionally with his fire, and the proof is based on the testimony of witnesses, he should, likewise, at least pay the value of the victim.

讜诪谞讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讚诇讗 诪砖诇诐

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rava know that he does not pay the value of the victim if he started the fire unintentionally?

讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪讚转谞谉 讛讬讛 讙讚讬 讻驻讜转 诇讜 讜注讘讚 住诪讜讱 诇讜 讜谞砖专祝 注诪讜 讞讬讬讘 注讘讚 讻驻讜转 诇讜 讜讙讚讬 住诪讜讱 诇讜 讜谞砖专祝 注诪讜 驻讟讜专

If we say that it is from what we learned in a mishna (61b): If one ignites a heap of grain and there was a goat bound to an item adjacent to it, and there was also a slave adjacent to it but not bound, and they were burned together with the heap of grain, he is liable to pay for the heap of grain and for the goat. If the slave was bound to it in such a way that he was unable to flee from the fire, and the goat was adjacent to it, and they were burned with it, he is exempt from liability. Apparently, there is no liability even if he unintentionally burned the slave to death.

讛讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻讙讜谉 砖讛爪讬转 讘讙讜驻讜 砖诇 注讘讚 讚拽诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara comments: If this is Rava鈥檚 source, there is no proof from here. Didn鈥檛 Reish Lakish say that the mishna is referring to a case where he ignited the body of the slave directly, in which case he is exempt from paying damages because he receives the greater punishment of them? Since he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment for killing the slave, he is not liable to pay damages. Therefore, this does not serve as proof that one is not liable to pay the value of a fire victim.

讜讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 诪讜注讚转 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讛讗砖 诪砖诇诪转 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讚诪讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 诇讗 拽转谞讬

And if Rava鈥檚 proof is rather from that which is taught in a baraita (10a): The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the one responsible for Fire is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to Pit, as damages are not paid for everything that can be damaged by a pit. But the baraita does not teach: That with regard to Fire, one is liable to pay the value of the victim even if the fire was ignited unintentionally. This is not so with regard to Pit. This would seem to support Rava鈥檚 opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of an unintentional victim of fire.

讚诇诪讗 转谞讗 讜砖讬讬专

The Gemara comments: If this is Rava鈥檚 source, there is no proof from here. Perhaps the baraita taught one distinction and omitted another; it simply did not enumerate all the differences.

讗诇讗 专讘讗 讙讜驻讬讛 讗讘注讜讬讬 诪讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗砖讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪讬 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讜 诇讗

Rather, Rava鈥檚 statement should not be understood as an objection to Rabba鈥檚 opinion, as Rava himself had a dilemma with regard to the matter: If a person burns another to death unintentionally with his fire, does he pay the value of the victim or not?

诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讙讘讬 砖讜专 讛讜讗 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讘诇 讗砖讜 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讙讘讬 砖讜专讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬讻讗 讻讜驻专 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讙讘讬 讗砖讜 谞诪讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪讬讛转 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara elaborates on the question: Do we say that it is specifically with regard to death caused by one鈥檚 ox, where if it was done intentionally he pays ransom and where it was done unintentionally he pays the victim鈥檚 monetary value instead; but with regard to death caused by his fire, where even if it was done intentionally he does not pay ransom, if it was done unintentionally he does not pay the value either? Or perhaps, since with regard to the case where his ox gored unintentionally, although there is no liability to pay ransom, nevertheless, he at least pays the value of the victim. One should say that with regard to his fire too, even though in a case where it was done intentionally he does not pay ransom, when it was done unintentionally, he should pay the value in any event.

讜诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 转讬拽讜

The Gemara concludes: And we do not know the solution to this dilemma, which shall stand unresolved.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻驻专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 讻驻专 诇专讘讜转 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻讻讜驻专 讘讻讜讜谞讛

搂 With regard to Rabba鈥檚 statement that for an ox that killed a person unintentionally one is exempt from paying ransom, the Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: It would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淎 ransom is laid on him.鈥 What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f a ransom is laid on him鈥 (Exodus 21:30)? It is to include liability to pay ransom in a case where the ox killed unintentionally, just as one is liable to pay ransom when it killed intentionally, in contrast to Rabba鈥檚 opinion.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 注讘讚 谞诪讬 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 注讘讚 诇专讘讜转 注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻注讘讚 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: If Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 interpretation is so, it should be implemented with regard to the fine for a Canaanite slave as well, and it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: The ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver. What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave鈥 (Exodus 21:32)? It is to include liability in a case where the ox killed a Canaanite slave unintentionally, just as when it killed a slave intentionally. And if you would say that indeed this is the halakha, but doesn鈥檛 Reish Lakish say that for an ox that killed a slave unintentionally its owner is exempt from paying the thirty shekels?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讙讘专讗 讗讙讘专讗 拽讗 专诪讬转

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? It could be that although Reish Lakish maintains that he is exempt, Rabbi Yo岣nan holds that he is liable.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讘讚 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 注讘讚 诇专讘讜转 注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻注讘讚 讘讻讜讜谞讛

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he confirmed that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as he says that it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淭he ox gores a slave.鈥 What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave鈥? It is to include liability in a case where the ox killed a slave unintentionally, just as when it killed a slave intentionally.

讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 诪讚注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 谞诪讬 诇讗 讚专讬砖

The Gemara suggests: And according to Reish Lakish, let us say similarly that from the fact that he does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave鈥 to derive an additional halakha, it may be inferred that he does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom鈥 either, and holds that ransom is not paid if the incident was unintentional.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 讚专讬砖

The Sages said: No, that is not a valid comparison. Although Reish Lakish does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave,鈥 he does interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom.鈥

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘诪拽讜诐 转砖诇讜诪讬谉 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 讻转讬讘 讘诪拽讜诐 转砖诇讜诪讬谉

And what is different between the two verses? The terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave鈥 are not written where the liability for payment is stated, but rather in the presentation of the case: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave.鈥 Therefore, the use of the word 鈥渋f鈥 is warranted. By contrast, the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom鈥 are written where the liability for payment is stated, where it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淎 ransom is laid on him.鈥 Therefore, the superfluous word 鈥渋f鈥 lends itself to interpretation to include liability to pay ransom even in a case where the killing was unintentional.

讜讻谉 讘讘谉 讗讜 讘讘转 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗讜 讘谉 讬讙讞 讗讜 讘转 讬讙讞 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐

搂 The mishna teaches: And the same halakha applies in a case where the ox killed a boy or in a case where it killed a girl. The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淲hether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter鈥 (Exodus 21:31), to deem the owner liable for the death of minors just as for adults.

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 讜讞讬讬讘 砖讜专 讘讗讚诐 诪讛 讻砖讞讬讬讘 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐 讗祝 讻砖讞讬讬讘 砖讜专 讘讗讚诐 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐

The baraita asks: And could this not be derived through logical inference? Since the Torah renders a person liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment for killing another person, and, similarly, renders an ox liable to be killed for killing a person, it should be derived that just as when the Torah renders a person liable for killing a person the Torah makes no distinction between killing minors and killing adults, so too, when it renders an ox liable to be killed for killing a person, do not differentiate with regard to it between minors and adults.

讜注讜讚 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐

And furthermore, it could be inferred a fortiori: If in the case of a person killing a person the Torah does not render minors entirely like adults with regard to this act, inasmuch as minors are exempt from liability for killing, but nevertheless it renders a person liable for killing minors as well as adults,

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 43

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 43

讗讜 讙讬讜专转 讝讻讛

and subsequently married a Canaanite slave who had also been emancipated, and became pregnant from him, or if she was a convert who became pregnant from a male convert, and both the husband and wife died without heirs, the assailant gains by not having to pay, since there are no heirs. In any event, it is explicitly stated in the baraita that the beneficiary of the compensation due to her, including that which she would have received during her lifetime, is not her husband but rather her heirs.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讙专讜砖讛 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘讙专讜砖讛

Rabba said: This baraita relates to a divorc茅e; since they got divorced, the husband does not inherit from her. Likewise, Rav Na岣an said: The baraita relates to a divorc茅e.

讗诪专讬 讙专讜砖讛 谞诪讬 转讬驻诇讜讙 讘讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

The Sages said in response: If she is a divorc茅e, she should also share in the compensation for the miscarried offspring. Why should her ex-husband receive the full payment?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛转讜专讛 讝讻转讛 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讘注诇 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讗 注诇讬讛 讘讝谞讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讗砖专 讬砖讬转 注诇讬讜 讘注诇 讛讗砖讛

Rav Pappa said: The Torah awarded the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband, even if he is not actually her legal husband but rather engaged in licentious sexual intercourse with her. Although he has no rights to her property, the damages for the miscarried offspring belong to him alone, as he is the father of the offspring. What is the reason? The verse states: 鈥淎s the husband [ba鈥檃l] of the woman shall impose upon him鈥 (Exodus 21:22), indicating that damages are not collected by the woman, but by the man who engaged in intercourse [ba鈥檃l] with her, impregnating her. Therefore, if they got divorced, the ex-husband receives the payment.

讜谞讜拽诪讛 诇专讘讛 讻讙讜谉 砖讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讜诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讙讘讜 拽专拽注

The Gemara asks: Why do Rabba and Rav Na岣an explain this baraita as referring to a divorc茅e? They could have answered, in accordance with their own opinions elsewhere (Bava Batra 124b), that it is referring to payments that are not considered to have been in the woman鈥檚 possession during her lifetime, but rather are considered property due to the woman, which her husband does not inherit. Let us establish this baraita, according to Rabba, as referring to a case where they collected money for the damage and pain, and according to Rav Na岣an, where they collected land.

讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讙讘讜 拽专拽注 讬砖 诇讜 讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讗讬谉 诇讜 讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 讙讘讜 诪注讜转 讬砖 诇讜 讙讘讜 拽专拽注 讗讬谉 诇讜

As with regard to the right of a firstborn to receive a double portion of the inheritance of his father, he receives a double portion only of the property possessed by his father, not of the property due to him. In a case where money was owed to the father, Rabba says: If the heirs collected the debt from land, the firstborn has the right to a double portion, since it is considered property that was already in the father鈥檚 possession. If they collected money, he does not have a double portion, as it is considered property due to the father. And Rav Na岣an says: If they collected money, he has a double portion, and if they collected land, he does not have a double portion.

讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 诇讘谞讬 诪注专讘讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉

The Gemara answers: That statement applies according to the residents of the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who limit the rights of a firstborn to his father鈥檚 property to the extent that they hold he does not receive a double portion of any appreciation in the property occurring after his father鈥檚 death.

讻讬 拽讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讻专讘讬

By contrast, when they state that this baraita here relates to a divorc茅e, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that the firstborn receives a double portion even in the appreciation of the property occurring after the father鈥檚 death. According to this opinion, clearly everything due to the father is considered to be in his possession, whether he receives his compensation in money or in land. The same applies to a husband, who inherits the rights to inherit compensation for damage and pain inflicted on his wife. That is why Rabba and Rav Na岣an had to interpret this baraita as relating to a divorc茅e.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 诇拽讬砖 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 砖谞讗诪专 讻住祝 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 讬转谉 诇讗讚谞讬讜 讜讛砖讜专 讬住拽诇 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐 讗讬谉 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: With regard to an ox that killed a Canaanite slave unintentionally, the owner is exempt from paying the fine of thirty shekels, as it is stated: 鈥淗e shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned鈥 (Exodus 21:32). It is derived from the verse that the liability to pay thirty shekels is dependent on the stoning of the ox; whenever the ox is liable to be killed by stoning, the owner pays thirty shekels as compensation for the damage. If the ox is not liable to be killed by stoning, e.g., if it killed unintentionally, the owner does not pay thirty shekels.

讗诪专 专讘讛 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪讻讜驻专 砖谞讗诪专 讛砖讜专 讬住拽诇 讜讙诐 讘注诇讬讜 讬讜诪转 讗诐 讻驻专 讬讜砖转 注诇讬讜 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讻讜驻专 讗讬谉 讛砖讜专 讘住拽讬诇讛 讗讬谉 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讻讜驻专

Similarly, Rabba says: With regard to an ox that killed a freeman unintentionally, its owner is exempt from paying ransom; as it is stated: 鈥淭he ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is laid on him鈥 (Exodus 21:29鈥30). This indicates that whenever the ox is liable to be killed by stoning the owner pays ransom; and if the ox is not liable to be killed by stoning the owner does not pay ransom.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讛诪讬转 砖讜专讬 讗转 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讜 砖讜专讜 砖诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讻讜驻专

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a mishna: If a person admits: My ox killed so-and-so, or: My ox killed the ox of so-and-so, this owner pays based on his own admission (Ketubot 41a). This cannot be referring to the payment of a fine, as a person who admits his responsibility for an act incurring a fine is exempt from paying the fine. Clearly, it must be referring to a payment for which one can render himself liable through admission. What, is it not referring to the payment of ransom? If so, this proves that payment of ransom is not dependent on whether the ox is liable to be killed by stoning, as the ox cannot be killed based on its owner鈥檚 admission alone.

诇讗 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to payment of the monetary value of the victim. Although he is not liable to pay ransom, as the ox is not killed, nevertheless, since by his own admission his ox caused damage, he is liable to pay damages.

讗讬 讚诪讬诐 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛诪讬转 砖讜专讬 讗转 注讘讚讜 砖诇 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讗讬 讚诪讬诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讗

Abaye challenged this answer: If it is referring to the value of the victim, say the latter clause of that mishna: If a person admits: My ox killed the Canaanite slave of so-and-so, he does not pay based on his own admission. And if, as you claim, the mishna is referring to the value of the victim, not to the thirty-shekel fine, why should he not pay?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬讻讬诇谞讗 诇砖谞讜讬讬 诇讱 专讬砖讗 讚诪讬诐 讜住讬驻讗 拽谞住 诪讬讛讜 砖谞讜讬讬讗 讚讞讬拽讗 诇讗 诪砖谞讬谞讗 诇讱 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讚诪讬诐

Rabba said to Abaye: I could have answered you by saying that the former clause, which discusses an ox killing a freeman, is referring to the value of the victim, and the latter clause, which relates to an ox that gored a slave, is referring to payment of the thirty-shekel fine. But I will not answer you with a forced answer. Instead, I will answer as follows: Both this clause and that clause refer to the value of the victim;

诪讬讛讜 讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讚诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讗转讜 住讛讚讬 讜讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚拽讟诇 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬 讗讬 转诐 讛讜讛 讗讬 诪讜注讚 讛讜讛 讜讗诪专 诪专讬讛 讚诪讜注讚 讛讜讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

but there is a distinction between the two cases. With regard to an ox killing a freeman, there is a scenario where the owner pays ransom based on his own admission. And what are the circumstances? If witnesses came and testified that the ox killed a freeman and is therefore liable to be killed by stoning, but they did not know whether it was innocuous or if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned. In this case, the owner pays ransom based on his own admission, since the ox is liable to be killed, and the ransom is for atonement and does not constitute a fine. Therefore, even where there are no witnesses, and the ox is therefore not liable to be killed by stoning for killing a person, nevertheless, the owner at least pays the monetary value of the victim based on his admission.

讙讘讬 注讘讚 砖讗讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 拽谞住 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讗讬 讗转讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚拽讟诇 讜诇讗 讬讚注讬 讗讬 转诐 讛讜讛 讗讬 诪讜注讚 讛讜讛 讜讗诪专 诪专讬讛 诪讜注讚 讛讜讗 诇讗 诪砖转诇诐 拽谞住 注诇 驻讬 注爪诪讜 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 注讚讬诐 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

By contrast, with regard to an ox killing a slave, there is a scenario where one does not pay the fine of thirty shekels based on his own admission. And what are the circumstances where one would be liable to pay this fine due to his own admission? If witnesses came and testified that the ox killed a slave, but they did not know whether it was innocuous or if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned. In this case, even though the ox is liable to be killed, the owner does not pay the fine based on his own admission, due to the principle that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Therefore, in a case where there are no witnesses, he does not even pay the value of the victim based on his own admission.

诪转讬讘 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 讘讬谉 讘讻讜驻专 讘讬谉 讘诪讬转讛

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitz岣k raises an objection from a baraita that states a principle: In any scenario where a person is liable for his ox killing a freeman, he is liable for his ox killing a Canaanite slave, whether with regard to liability to pay ransom or with regard to the ox being put to death.

讻讜驻专 讘注讘讚 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讚诪讬诐

The wording of the baraita is unclear: Is there a ransom to be paid in the case of a slave? Ransom is paid only for the killing of a freeman. Rather, is it not referring to payment of the value of the victim? This poses a difficulty for Rabba鈥檚 opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of the victim for admitting to his ox鈥檚 killing of a slave.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讻讜驻专 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 拽谞住 讜讻诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讘谉 讞讜专讬谉 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬诐

There are those who say that he, Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitz岣k, raised the objection and he resolved it, and there are those who say it was Rabba who said to him in response, that this is what the baraita is teaching: In any scenario where a person is liable to pay ransom for his ox killing a freeman, e.g., where it gored intentionally based on the testimony of witnesses, he is liable to pay a fine for his ox killing a slave. And in any scenario where one is liable to pay the value of the victim for his ox killing a freeman, e.g., where it gored unintentionally based on the testimony of witnesses, for a slave too, one is liable to pay the value, namely, where it gored unintentionally based on the testimony of witnesses. Accordingly, one does not pay the value of a slave based on his own admission, although he does pay the value of a freeman if he admits that his ox killed him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讛讻讬 讗砖讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 注诇 驻讬 注讚讬诐 谞砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

Rava said to Rabba: If that is so, that one is liable to pay the value of the victim in cases where he is exempt from paying ransom, then if a person burns another to death unintentionally with his fire, and the proof is based on the testimony of witnesses, he should, likewise, at least pay the value of the victim.

讜诪谞讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讚诇讗 诪砖诇诐

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rava know that he does not pay the value of the victim if he started the fire unintentionally?

讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪讚转谞谉 讛讬讛 讙讚讬 讻驻讜转 诇讜 讜注讘讚 住诪讜讱 诇讜 讜谞砖专祝 注诪讜 讞讬讬讘 注讘讚 讻驻讜转 诇讜 讜讙讚讬 住诪讜讱 诇讜 讜谞砖专祝 注诪讜 驻讟讜专

If we say that it is from what we learned in a mishna (61b): If one ignites a heap of grain and there was a goat bound to an item adjacent to it, and there was also a slave adjacent to it but not bound, and they were burned together with the heap of grain, he is liable to pay for the heap of grain and for the goat. If the slave was bound to it in such a way that he was unable to flee from the fire, and the goat was adjacent to it, and they were burned with it, he is exempt from liability. Apparently, there is no liability even if he unintentionally burned the slave to death.

讛讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讻讙讜谉 砖讛爪讬转 讘讙讜驻讜 砖诇 注讘讚 讚拽诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara comments: If this is Rava鈥檚 source, there is no proof from here. Didn鈥檛 Reish Lakish say that the mishna is referring to a case where he ignited the body of the slave directly, in which case he is exempt from paying damages because he receives the greater punishment of them? Since he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment for killing the slave, he is not liable to pay damages. Therefore, this does not serve as proof that one is not liable to pay the value of a fire victim.

讜讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讞讜诪专 讘讗砖 诪讘讘讜专 砖讛讗砖 诪讜注讚转 诇讗讻讜诇 讘讬谉 讚讘专 讛专讗讜讬 诇讛 讘讬谉 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讛 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讛讗砖 诪砖诇诪转 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讚诪讬诐 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘讘讜专 诇讗 拽转谞讬

And if Rava鈥檚 proof is rather from that which is taught in a baraita (10a): The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the one responsible for Fire is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to Pit, as damages are not paid for everything that can be damaged by a pit. But the baraita does not teach: That with regard to Fire, one is liable to pay the value of the victim even if the fire was ignited unintentionally. This is not so with regard to Pit. This would seem to support Rava鈥檚 opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of an unintentional victim of fire.

讚诇诪讗 转谞讗 讜砖讬讬专

The Gemara comments: If this is Rava鈥檚 source, there is no proof from here. Perhaps the baraita taught one distinction and omitted another; it simply did not enumerate all the differences.

讗诇讗 专讘讗 讙讜驻讬讛 讗讘注讜讬讬 诪讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 讗砖讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪讬 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讜 诇讗

Rather, Rava鈥檚 statement should not be understood as an objection to Rabba鈥檚 opinion, as Rava himself had a dilemma with regard to the matter: If a person burns another to death unintentionally with his fire, does he pay the value of the victim or not?

诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讙讘讬 砖讜专 讛讜讗 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讘诇 讗砖讜 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讙讘讬 砖讜专讜 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讬讻讗 讻讜驻专 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐 讙讘讬 讗砖讜 谞诪讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘讻讜讜谞讛 诇讗 诪砖诇诐 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 诪讬讛转 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara elaborates on the question: Do we say that it is specifically with regard to death caused by one鈥檚 ox, where if it was done intentionally he pays ransom and where it was done unintentionally he pays the victim鈥檚 monetary value instead; but with regard to death caused by his fire, where even if it was done intentionally he does not pay ransom, if it was done unintentionally he does not pay the value either? Or perhaps, since with regard to the case where his ox gored unintentionally, although there is no liability to pay ransom, nevertheless, he at least pays the value of the victim. One should say that with regard to his fire too, even though in a case where it was done intentionally he does not pay ransom, when it was done unintentionally, he should pay the value in any event.

讜诇讗 讬讚注讬谞谉 转讬拽讜

The Gemara concludes: And we do not know the solution to this dilemma, which shall stand unresolved.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻驻专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 讻驻专 诇专讘讜转 讻讜驻专 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻讻讜驻专 讘讻讜讜谞讛

搂 With regard to Rabba鈥檚 statement that for an ox that killed a person unintentionally one is exempt from paying ransom, the Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: It would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淎 ransom is laid on him.鈥 What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f a ransom is laid on him鈥 (Exodus 21:30)? It is to include liability to pay ransom in a case where the ox killed unintentionally, just as one is liable to pay ransom when it killed intentionally, in contrast to Rabba鈥檚 opinion.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 注讘讚 谞诪讬 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 注讘讚 诇专讘讜转 注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻注讘讚 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖讜专 砖讛诪讬转 讗转 讛注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 驻讟讜专 诪砖诇砖讬诐 砖拽诇讬诐

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: If Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 interpretation is so, it should be implemented with regard to the fine for a Canaanite slave as well, and it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: The ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver. What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave鈥 (Exodus 21:32)? It is to include liability in a case where the ox killed a Canaanite slave unintentionally, just as when it killed a slave intentionally. And if you would say that indeed this is the halakha, but doesn鈥檛 Reish Lakish say that for an ox that killed a slave unintentionally its owner is exempt from paying the thirty shekels?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讙讘专讗 讗讙讘专讗 拽讗 专诪讬转

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? It could be that although Reish Lakish maintains that he is exempt, Rabbi Yo岣nan holds that he is liable.

讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 注讘讚 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 注讘讚 诇专讘讜转 注讘讚 砖诇讗 讘讻讜讜谞讛 讻注讘讚 讘讻讜讜谞讛

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he confirmed that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, as he says that it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淭he ox gores a slave.鈥 What is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave鈥? It is to include liability in a case where the ox killed a slave unintentionally, just as when it killed a slave intentionally.

讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 谞诪讬 谞讬诪讗 诪讚注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 谞诪讬 诇讗 讚专讬砖

The Gemara suggests: And according to Reish Lakish, let us say similarly that from the fact that he does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave鈥 to derive an additional halakha, it may be inferred that he does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom鈥 either, and holds that ransom is not paid if the incident was unintentional.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讚专讬砖 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 讚专讬砖

The Sages said: No, that is not a valid comparison. Although Reish Lakish does not interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave,鈥 he does interpret the difference between the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom.鈥

讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 注讘讚 讗诐 注讘讚 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讘诪拽讜诐 转砖诇讜诪讬谉 讻驻专 讗诐 讻驻专 讻转讬讘 讘诪拽讜诐 转砖诇讜诪讬谉

And what is different between the two verses? The terms 鈥渁 slave鈥 and 鈥渋f a slave鈥 are not written where the liability for payment is stated, but rather in the presentation of the case: 鈥淚f the ox gores a slave.鈥 Therefore, the use of the word 鈥渋f鈥 is warranted. By contrast, the terms 鈥渁 ransom鈥 and 鈥渋f a ransom鈥 are written where the liability for payment is stated, where it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: 鈥淎 ransom is laid on him.鈥 Therefore, the superfluous word 鈥渋f鈥 lends itself to interpretation to include liability to pay ransom even in a case where the killing was unintentional.

讜讻谉 讘讘谉 讗讜 讘讘转 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗讜 讘谉 讬讙讞 讗讜 讘转 讬讙讞 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐

搂 The mishna teaches: And the same halakha applies in a case where the ox killed a boy or in a case where it killed a girl. The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淲hether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter鈥 (Exodus 21:31), to deem the owner liable for the death of minors just as for adults.

讜讛诇讗 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 讜讞讬讬讘 砖讜专 讘讗讚诐 诪讛 讻砖讞讬讬讘 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 诇讗 砖谞讗 讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐 讗祝 讻砖讞讬讬讘 砖讜专 讘讗讚诐 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐 诇讙讚讜诇讬诐

The baraita asks: And could this not be derived through logical inference? Since the Torah renders a person liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment for killing another person, and, similarly, renders an ox liable to be killed for killing a person, it should be derived that just as when the Torah renders a person liable for killing a person the Torah makes no distinction between killing minors and killing adults, so too, when it renders an ox liable to be killed for killing a person, do not differentiate with regard to it between minors and adults.

讜注讜讚 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 讘讗讚诐 砖诇讗 注砖讛 讘讜 拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讜 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讻讙讚讜诇讬诐

And furthermore, it could be inferred a fortiori: If in the case of a person killing a person the Torah does not render minors entirely like adults with regard to this act, inasmuch as minors are exempt from liability for killing, but nevertheless it renders a person liable for killing minors as well as adults,

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