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Today's Daf Yomi

July 19, 2016 | 讬状讙 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Kamma 49

Study Guide Bava Kamma 49.An animal who attacks a pregnant woman and she miscarries聽does not聽pay the value of the fetus but a person who attacks a pregnant woman does pay. 聽This is because the verse in the Torah describes this situation and says that the attacker must pay the value of the fetus to the husband. 聽How is the amount evaluated? 聽If the husband is no longer alive, it goes to his inheritors, but what if he is a convert or a freed Caananite servant and has no inheritors? 聽This questions are debated and various answers are given. 聽A distinction is also made (according to one opinion) between the value of the fetus and the value of the woman who is no larger from eating more as a result of the pregnancy.


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讗诐 讻谉 诪砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讻诪讛 讛谉 讬驻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讘注诇 讜讗诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讜

If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. Rather, the court appraises how much the offspring are worth, and the one liable for the damage gives that amount to the husband. And if she does not have a husband, e.g., her husband died, he gives the money to his heirs.

讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 驻讟讜专

If the pregnant woman was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, and she was married to an emancipated Canaanite slave or to a convert who died without any heirs, the one who caused the damage is exempt from pay-ing compensation for miscarried offspring. This is because this payment is made specifically to the husband, not to the woman.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讗 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讗砖讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 砖讜讜专讬诐 砖谞转讻讜讜谞讜 诇讗砖讛 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

GEMARA: The first clause of the mishna indicates that the reason the owner is exempt from paying compensation for the offspring when an ox unintentionally gores a pregnant woman is specifically that it was intending to gore another ox. By inference, if it was intending to gore the woman, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. Shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: With regard to oxen that intended to gore a woman and then did so, the owners are exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讜谞讜 诇讗砖讛 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 砖讜专 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗讚诐 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讛讻讬 讻转讬讘 拽专讗 拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 砖讜专 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜

The Gemara answers that Rav Adda bar Ahava could have said to you: The same is true, that even if the oxen intended to gore the woman, the owners are also exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. As for that which is taught in the mishna: An ox that was intending to gore another ox, it is taught this way since it wants to teach the latter clause: A person that was intending to injure another person, as this case is written explicitly in the verse: 鈥淎nd if men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge鈥 (Exodus 21:22). In the case in the verse, the assailant intended to injure another person but injured the woman instead. Therefore, the mishna also teaches the first clause in that style: An ox that was intending to gore another ox.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 砖讜专 砖谞讙讞 讗转 讛砖驻讞讛 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞诪专转讗 诪注讘专转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讝讬拽 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖讘讜 诇讻诐 驻讛 注诐 讛讞诪讜专 注诐 讛讚讜诪讛 诇讞诪讜专

Rav Pappa says: In the case of an ox that gored a Canaanite maidservant, and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. What is the reason? The ox injured a mere pregnant donkey. With regard to the matter of compensation for offspring, who would be the property of the master were they to be born, a Canaanite slave is considered property of the master. As the verse states that Abraham addressed Eliezer, who was a Canaanite, by saying: 鈥淵ou remain here with [im] the donkey鈥 (Genesis 22:5), on which the Sages expound that he was alluding to the idea that Eliezer is of a people [am] that is similar to a donkey. Therefore, the case of an ox goring a Canaanite maidservant is not included in the Torah鈥檚 exemption from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 讬驻讛 注讚 砖诇讗 讬诇讚讛 讜讻诪讛 讛讬讗 讬驻讛 诪砖讬诇讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring? The court appraises how much the value of the woman increased due to the offspring. The Gemara asks: Would this be a correct interpretation of the term: Compensation for miscarried offspring? If this is how the sum is calculated, the mishna should have stated: How does he pay the increase in value due to the offspring? The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring and the increase in value due to the offspring? In other words, apart from evaluating the compensation for the miscarried offspring, the court also appraises the value of the woman by calculating how much she would be worth if sold as a maidservant before giving birth, and how much she would be worth after giving birth.

讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗诐 讻谉 诪砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讜讛诇讗 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇

he mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. The Gemara asks: What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel saying? Rabba said: This is what he is saying: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn鈥檛 the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth, since the concern for her dying during childbirth, which lowers her monetary value prior to giving birth, is no longer a concern? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讜讛诇讗 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇

This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 statement is also taught in a baraita: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn鈥檛 the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诇诪讬 砖讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讜讗讬谉 诇注爪诪讛 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讞讜诇拽讬谉

Rava said: This is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is teaching: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? A pregnant woman鈥檚 monetary value is increased on account of her pregnancy, beyond the monetary value of the offspring. Rather, the court appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband. And in addition, the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诇诪讬 砖讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讜讗讬谉 诇注爪诪讛 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 谞讝拽 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讜 讜爪注专 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讜 讜砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讞讜诇拽讬谉

This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 opinion is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? Rather, the court appraises damage by itself and pain by itself, and appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband, and the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.

拽砖讬讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the first baraita, that the woman鈥檚 value decreases because of pregnancy, poses a difficulty for that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the second baraita, that it increases.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘诪讘讻专转 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谞讛 诪讘讻专转

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since each baraita is referring to a different case: Here, the first baraita, which stated that the woman鈥檚 value increases after giving birth, is referring to a woman giving birth to her firstborn. Her value decreases prior to birth out of concern that she might die in childbirth. There, the second baraita, which stated that her value increases due to pregnancy, is referring to a woman who is not giving birth to her firstborn.

讜专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讚转谞谉 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讬讗 讛专讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛专讛 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖讘讞 讛专讬讜谉 诇讘注诇

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason of the Rabbis in the second baraita, who say: The increase in her value due to the offspring is also given to the husband? The Gemara answers: They derive it from a redundancy in a verse, as we learned in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge鈥 (Exodus 21:22). From the fact that it is stated: 鈥淎nd her offspring emerge,鈥 don鈥檛 I know by inference that she was pregnant? If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淎 pregnant woman,鈥 and not just 鈥渁 woman鈥? To inform you that even the increase in her value due to the pregnancy is given to the husband.

讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讗讬 讛专讛 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讬讛 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讻谞讛 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛讛专讬讜谉 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛专讬讜谉 诪诪砖 讗诇讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚住诇讬拽 讘讬讛 砖讬讞诪讗 诇讜诇讚 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讬讚 讜专讙诇 讚诇讗

The Gemara asks: And what halakha does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel expound on this extra word 鈥減regnant鈥? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says that one who injures a woman is never liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring unless he strikes her opposite the womb, i.e., on the abdomen. Rav Pappa said: Do not say that it must be literally opposite the womb. Rather, he is liable if she was struck anywhere that the wound鈥檚 impact could reach the offspring, i.e., any part of the torso, to exclude a wound to her hand or foot, for which he is not liable, since it could be argued that it was not the wound to the hand or foot that caused the miscarriage.

讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘讛 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讝讻讛 讘讛讜 讙专 讜讻讬讜谉 讚诪转 讛讙专 讝讻讛 讘讛讜 诪谉 讛讙专 讗讘诇 讞讘诇 讘讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专 讝讻讬讗 诇讛 讗讬讛讬 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 诇砖诇讜诪讬 诇讛 诇讚讬讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: If the pregnant woman was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, he is exempt from the payment of damages for miscarried offspring. Rabba says: They taught this halakha only in a case where one injured her during the lifetime of the convert, i.e., her husband, and the convert died before the payment was given. The reason for this is that since the assailant injured her during the lifetime of the convert, the convert acquires the money, although it is still in the possession of the one liable for the damage. And once the convert dies without heirs, the money is ownerless. Therefore, the assailant acquires it from the convert. Since anyone can assume ownership of ownerless property, the assailant, who already possesses the money, becomes the owner. But if he injured her after the convert had died, she acquires the money, and he must pay the woman herself.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪专讬 讚讬讻讬 讗讟讜 讜诇讚讜转 爪专专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讗诇讗 讗讬转讬讛 诇讘注诇 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬转讬讛 诇讘注诇 诇讗

Rav 岣sda said in amazement: Master of this ruling! Is that to say that compensation for the offspring is like bundles of money, and she acquires them when her husband dies? Rabba seems to understand that the pregnant woman assumes ownership of the offspring by virtue of being in possession of them when the husband dies, and therefore has the right to compensation for them. That is not the case. Rather, if the husband is present, the Merciful One grants compensation for the offspring to him, but if the husband is not alive, the Torah does not grant compensation to anyone else.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛讻讛 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 谞讜转谉 谞讝拽 讜爪注专 诇讗砖讛 讜讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讘注诇 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讜 讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讛 讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 讝讻讛

The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rabba from the following: If the assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, the assailant acquires the money. This indicates that if the husband is no longer alive, the woman doesn鈥檛 receive anything.

讗诪专讬 讜诪讬 注讚讬驻讗 诪诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专

The Sages said in response to this: But is the baraita preferable to the mishna, which we interpreted as a referring to case where he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died? Here also, it must be explained that he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died. And if you wish, say instead that he injured her even after the death of the convert.

讜转谞讬 讝讻转讛

And as for the expression in the baraita: He acquires, referring to the one who causes the damage, teach: She acquires.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞讬砖讗转 诇讙专 讜谞转注讘专讛 诪诪谞讜 讜讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讙专 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘 讜转谞讬 讞讚讗 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 转谞讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 诇专讘讛 讜讚讗讬 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讞住讚讗 诪讬 诇讬诪讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabba and Rav 岣sda is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m: With regard to a Jewish woman who was married to a convert, and she became pregnant from him, and someone injured her, causing her to miscarry: If this was during the lifetime of the convert, the assailant gives compensation for miscarried offspring to the convert, i.e., her husband. If this was after the death of the convert, it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is liable, and it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is exempt. What, is it not a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of Rabba, it is certainly a dispute between tanna鈥檌m. His opinion does not accord with the second baraita. But according to the opinion of Rav 岣sda, shall we say that it is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m?

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘谞谉 讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

This is not necessarily so, as Rav 岣sda could say that both baraitot are in accordance with his opinion. As for the difference between them, that is not difficult. They can be explained as referring to the increase in the woman鈥檚 value due to the offspring, which is subject to dispute in the mishna, rather than referring to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring. This baraita, which taught that he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the increase in her value on account of the offspring belongs to the husband. That baraita, which taught that he is liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who maintains that the woman has a share in her increase in value due to pregnancy, and this is paid even if the incident occurred after the husband鈥檚 death.

讗讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讗讬 讗专讬讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讞讬讬诐 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 驻诇讙讗 诪讞讬讬诐 讗讬转 诇讛 驻诇讙讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讻讜诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, why state specifically that it occurs after the death of the husband? Even during the husband鈥檚 lifetime, she also has a half share, as explained earlier in the discussion. The Gemara answers: While he is alive, she has a half share, but after his death, all of it belongs to her.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛讗 讜讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻讗谉 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻讗谉 讘讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but they refer to different payments. Here, the baraita that taught that he is liable, is referring to the increase in her value due to the offspring, which belongs partly to the woman, and if the husband dies, she acquires the rights to all of it. By contrast, there, the baraita that taught that he is exempt, is referring to compensation for miscarried offspring, which belongs exclusively to her husband. Since he is a convert, the one liable for damage is exempt after his death.

讗诪专讬 诪砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 诇讬砖诪注 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜诪专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讬砖诪注 诇专讘谞谉

The Sages said, in questioning this answer: Why is there a difference between the two cases? From the halakha that after the husband鈥檚 death the woman acquires his share of the increase in her value due to the offspring, let it be derived that according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel she also acquires the rights to the compensation for miscarried offspring if she was wounded after his death. Moreover, from the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, let us derive that this is also the opinion of the Rabbis, since there is no dispute between them with regard to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讚砖讬讬讻讗 讬讚讛 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讘讻讜诇讛讜 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讗 砖讬讬讻讗 讬讚讛 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讻诇诇

In response, the Sages said: No, the first assumption is untenable, since with regard to the increase in her value due to the offspring, in which she has a share from the outset, she acquires all of it after her husband鈥檚 death. By contrast, with regard to the compensation for miscarried offspring, in which she does not have a share from the outset, she does not acquire the rights to it at all, since she has no greater claim to this than any other individual does.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讬讘讗 住讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诪讞讝讬拽 讘砖讟专讜转讬讜 砖诇 讙专 诪讛讜 诪讗谉 讚诪讞讝讬拽 讘砖讟专讗 讗讚注转讬讛 讚讗专注讗 讛讜讗 诪讞讝讬拽 讜讘讗专注讗 讛讗 诇讗 讗讞讝讬拽 讜砖讟专讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讚诇讗讜 讚注转讬讛 讗砖讟专讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讚注转讬讛 谞诪讬 讗砖讟专讗

Rav Yeiva the Elder raises a dilemma to Rav Na岣an: With regard to one who takes possession of the documents of a convert, what is the halakha after the death of the convert? On the one hand, it can be argued that one who takes possession of the document takes possession with the intention of acquiring the land that the document states is under lien, and since he did not take possession of the land itself, he also does not acquire the document. This is because he had no intention to acquire the document, but just the property specified in the document. Therefore, since the convert has died, perhaps the lien is canceled and can no longer be collected, or perhaps his intention is also to acquire the document, and the paper on which it is written belongs to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 注谞讬 诪讜专讬 讜讻讬 诇爪讜专 注诇 驻讬 爪诇讜讞讬转讜 讛讜讗 爪专讬讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇爪讜专 讜诇爪讜专

Rav Na岣an said to him: Answer this, my Master: Does he need to acquire the document to use as paper to cover the opening of his flask? Why would he want the document if it does not grant him ownership of the land described therein? Rav Yeiva the Elder said to him: Indeed, his intention is even to cover the flask and to cover it with the paper, albeit a mundane purpose.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪砖讻讜谞讜 砖诇 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬讚 讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讜 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬转 诇讬讛 讙专 驻拽注 诇讬讛 砖注讘讜讚讬讛

Rabba says: In a case where the collateral of a Jew was in the possession of a convert who lent him money, and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, then, since the convert has no heirs, the court appropriates it from his possession and returns it to its owner. What is the reason? Since the convert died, his lien on the property is abrogated. Therefore, the deposit automatically returns to its owner, and no one else has the right to take it.

诪砖讻讜谞讜 砖诇 讙专 讘讬讚 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讜 讝讛 拽谞讛 讻谞讙讚 诪注讜转讬讜 讜讝讛 拽谞讛 讗转 讛砖讗专

By contrast, if the collateral of a convert is in the possession of a Jew who lent him money and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, this one, i.e., the one owed money, acquires a share of the collateral corresponding to the money owed to him by the convert, and that one, i.e., the one who took possession of it, acquires the rest.

讜讗诪讗讬 转拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讞爪讬专讜 讚讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪讬专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara asks: But why doesn鈥檛 the creditor acquire the entire collateral? If it is in his possession, let his courtyard effect acquisition for him, as doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina say: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even without his knowledge?

讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬转讬讛 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讗 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诪拽谞讬 [诪爪讬] 拽谞讬 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 [谞诪讬] 讞爪讬专讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讚讗讬 讘注讬 讛讜讗 诇诪讬拽谞讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 拽谞讬 讞爪讬专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讬讗

The Sages said in response: Here we are dealing with a case where the creditor is not standing next to the courtyard. Anywhere that he is present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could pick it up and acquire it himself, his courtyard also effects acquisition for him. But anywhere that he is not present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could not acquire it, his courtyard also does not effect acquisition for him.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘讞爪讬专讜 讚诇讗 拽谞讛

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that where the creditor is not present in his courtyard, he does not acquire the rest of the collateral.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讜 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讗讞专 讞讬讬讘

MISHNA: One who digs part of a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property, or digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance on another person鈥檚 private property, is liable for damage caused by the pit in each case.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讞讬讬讘 讜讝讛讜 讘讜专 讛讗诪讜专 讘转讜专讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛驻拽讬专 专砖讜转讜 讜诇讗 讛驻拽讬专 讘讜专讜 讝讛讜 讘讜专 讛讗诪讜专 讘转讜专讛

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One who digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or who digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property is liable, and this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: With regard to one who renounced ownership of his property but did not renounce ownership of his pit located in the property, this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讬 讬驻转讞 讜讻讬 讬讻专讛 讗诐 注诇 驻转讬讞讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻专讬讬讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 砖注诇 注住拽讬 驻转讬讞讛 讜注诇 注住拽讬 讻专讬讬讛 讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗

In explanation of this dispute, Rabba says: With regard to a pit that a person digs or opens into the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable for damage that occurs as a result. What is the reason? The verse states: 鈥淎nd if a man shall open a pit,鈥 and it also states: 鈥淚f a man shall dig a pit鈥 (Exodus 21:33), which raises the question: If one is liable for opening a pit by removing the cover of a pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so obvious that he should be liable for digging a new pit? What, then, does the latter phrase add? Rather, the interpretation of the verse must be that the responsibility for the pit comes to him by engaging in opening the pit and by engaging in digging the pit. Although he does not own the area itself, he is liable for creating a public hazard. They disagree only

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Kamma 49

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Kamma 49

讗诐 讻谉 诪砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讻诪讛 讛谉 讬驻讬谉 讜谞讜转谉 诇讘注诇 讜讗诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讜

If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. Rather, the court appraises how much the offspring are worth, and the one liable for the damage gives that amount to the husband. And if she does not have a husband, e.g., her husband died, he gives the money to his heirs.

讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 驻讟讜专

If the pregnant woman was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, and she was married to an emancipated Canaanite slave or to a convert who died without any heirs, the one who caused the damage is exempt from pay-ing compensation for miscarried offspring. This is because this payment is made specifically to the husband, not to the woman.

讙诪壮 讟注诪讗 讚诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讛讗 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讗砖讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讬诪讗 转讬讛讜讬 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 砖讜讜专讬诐 砖谞转讻讜讜谞讜 诇讗砖讛 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

GEMARA: The first clause of the mishna indicates that the reason the owner is exempt from paying compensation for the offspring when an ox unintentionally gores a pregnant woman is specifically that it was intending to gore another ox. By inference, if it was intending to gore the woman, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. Shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: With regard to oxen that intended to gore a woman and then did so, the owners are exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring?

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讜谞讜 诇讗砖讛 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专讬诐 诪讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 砖讜专 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诇诪讬转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗讚诐 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜 讚讛讻讬 讻转讬讘 拽专讗 拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 砖讜专 砖讛讬讛 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讞讘讬专讜

The Gemara answers that Rav Adda bar Ahava could have said to you: The same is true, that even if the oxen intended to gore the woman, the owners are also exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. As for that which is taught in the mishna: An ox that was intending to gore another ox, it is taught this way since it wants to teach the latter clause: A person that was intending to injure another person, as this case is written explicitly in the verse: 鈥淎nd if men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge鈥 (Exodus 21:22). In the case in the verse, the assailant intended to injure another person but injured the woman instead. Therefore, the mishna also teaches the first clause in that style: An ox that was intending to gore another ox.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 砖讜专 砖谞讙讞 讗转 讛砖驻讞讛 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞诪专转讗 诪注讘专转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讝讬拽 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖讘讜 诇讻诐 驻讛 注诐 讛讞诪讜专 注诐 讛讚讜诪讛 诇讞诪讜专

Rav Pappa says: In the case of an ox that gored a Canaanite maidservant, and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, the owner pays compensation for miscarried offspring. What is the reason? The ox injured a mere pregnant donkey. With regard to the matter of compensation for offspring, who would be the property of the master were they to be born, a Canaanite slave is considered property of the master. As the verse states that Abraham addressed Eliezer, who was a Canaanite, by saying: 鈥淵ou remain here with [im] the donkey鈥 (Genesis 22:5), on which the Sages expound that he was alluding to the idea that Eliezer is of a people [am] that is similar to a donkey. Therefore, the case of an ox goring a Canaanite maidservant is not included in the Torah鈥檚 exemption from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讻诪讛 讛讬讗 讬驻讛 注讚 砖诇讗 讬诇讚讛 讜讻诪讛 讛讬讗 讬驻讛 诪砖讬诇讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring? The court appraises how much the value of the woman increased due to the offspring. The Gemara asks: Would this be a correct interpretation of the term: Compensation for miscarried offspring? If this is how the sum is calculated, the mishna should have stated: How does he pay the increase in value due to the offspring? The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying: How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring and the increase in value due to the offspring? In other words, apart from evaluating the compensation for the miscarried offspring, the court also appraises the value of the woman by calculating how much she would be worth if sold as a maidservant before giving birth, and how much she would be worth after giving birth.

讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗诐 讻谉 诪砖讛讗砖讛 讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 诪讗讬 拽讗诪专 讗诪专 专讘讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讜讛诇讗 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇

he mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. The Gemara asks: What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel saying? Rabba said: This is what he is saying: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn鈥檛 the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth, since the concern for her dying during childbirth, which lowers her monetary value prior to giving birth, is no longer a concern? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讜讛诇讗 讗砖讛 诪砖讘讞转 诇讗讞专 砖转诇讚 讬讜转专 诪拽讜讚诐 砖转诇讚 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇

This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 statement is also taught in a baraita: But is the monetary value of a woman higher before she gives birth than after she gives birth? But isn鈥檛 the opposite true, that the monetary value of a woman is higher after giving birth than before giving birth? Rather, the court appraises the value of the fetuses and gives that amount to the husband.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诇诪讬 砖讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讜讗讬谉 诇注爪诪讛 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讞讜诇拽讬谉

Rava said: This is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is teaching: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? A pregnant woman鈥檚 monetary value is increased on account of her pregnancy, beyond the monetary value of the offspring. Rather, the court appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband. And in addition, the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜讻讬 讗砖讛 诇诪讬 砖讬讜诇讚转 诪砖讘讞转 讜讗讬谉 诇注爪诪讛 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 砖诪讬谉 谞讝拽 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讜 讜爪注专 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讜 讜砖诪讬谉 讗转 讛讜诇讚讜转 讜谞讜转谞讬谉 诇讘注诇 讜砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讞讜诇拽讬谉

This explanation of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel鈥檚 opinion is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: But is the value of the woman higher only for the one for whom she gives birth, i.e., her husband, and she herself does not have any increase in value at all due to the offspring? Rather, the court appraises damage by itself and pain by itself, and appraises the value of the offspring and gives it to the husband, and the husband and wife divide the increase in her value due to the offspring.

拽砖讬讗 讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讚专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the first baraita, that the woman鈥檚 value decreases because of pregnancy, poses a difficulty for that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the second baraita, that it increases.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘诪讘讻专转 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谞讛 诪讘讻专转

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since each baraita is referring to a different case: Here, the first baraita, which stated that the woman鈥檚 value increases after giving birth, is referring to a woman giving birth to her firstborn. Her value decreases prior to birth out of concern that she might die in childbirth. There, the second baraita, which stated that her value increases due to pregnancy, is referring to a woman who is not giving birth to her firstborn.

讜专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讚转谞谉 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讛讬讗 讛专讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛专讛 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖讘讞 讛专讬讜谉 诇讘注诇

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason of the Rabbis in the second baraita, who say: The increase in her value due to the offspring is also given to the husband? The Gemara answers: They derive it from a redundancy in a verse, as we learned in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge鈥 (Exodus 21:22). From the fact that it is stated: 鈥淎nd her offspring emerge,鈥 don鈥檛 I know by inference that she was pregnant? If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淎 pregnant woman,鈥 and not just 鈥渁 woman鈥? To inform you that even the increase in her value due to the pregnancy is given to the husband.

讜专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讗讬 讛专讛 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讬讛 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讻谞讛 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛讛专讬讜谉 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讻谞讙讚 讘讬转 讛专讬讜谉 诪诪砖 讗诇讗 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚住诇讬拽 讘讬讛 砖讬讞诪讗 诇讜诇讚 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讬讚 讜专讙诇 讚诇讗

The Gemara asks: And what halakha does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel expound on this extra word 鈥減regnant鈥? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya鈥檃kov says that one who injures a woman is never liable to pay compensation for miscarried offspring unless he strikes her opposite the womb, i.e., on the abdomen. Rav Pappa said: Do not say that it must be literally opposite the womb. Rather, he is liable if she was struck anywhere that the wound鈥檚 impact could reach the offspring, i.e., any part of the torso, to exclude a wound to her hand or foot, for which he is not liable, since it could be argued that it was not the wound to the hand or foot that caused the miscarriage.

讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 驻讟讜专 讗诪专 专讘讛 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讝讻讛 讘讛讜 讙专 讜讻讬讜谉 讚诪转 讛讙专 讝讻讛 讘讛讜 诪谉 讛讙专 讗讘诇 讞讘诇 讘讛 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专 讝讻讬讗 诇讛 讗讬讛讬 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讜诪讬讞讬讬讘 诇砖诇讜诪讬 诇讛 诇讚讬讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: If the pregnant woman was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, he is exempt from the payment of damages for miscarried offspring. Rabba says: They taught this halakha only in a case where one injured her during the lifetime of the convert, i.e., her husband, and the convert died before the payment was given. The reason for this is that since the assailant injured her during the lifetime of the convert, the convert acquires the money, although it is still in the possession of the one liable for the damage. And once the convert dies without heirs, the money is ownerless. Therefore, the assailant acquires it from the convert. Since anyone can assume ownership of ownerless property, the assailant, who already possesses the money, becomes the owner. But if he injured her after the convert had died, she acquires the money, and he must pay the woman herself.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪专讬 讚讬讻讬 讗讟讜 讜诇讚讜转 爪专专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讗诇讗 讗讬转讬讛 诇讘注诇 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬转讬讛 诇讘注诇 诇讗

Rav 岣sda said in amazement: Master of this ruling! Is that to say that compensation for the offspring is like bundles of money, and she acquires them when her husband dies? Rabba seems to understand that the pregnant woman assumes ownership of the offspring by virtue of being in possession of them when the husband dies, and therefore has the right to compensation for them. That is not the case. Rather, if the husband is present, the Merciful One grants compensation for the offspring to him, but if the husband is not alive, the Torah does not grant compensation to anyone else.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讛讻讛 讗转 讛讗砖讛 讜讬爪讗讜 讬诇讚讬讛 谞讜转谉 谞讝拽 讜爪注专 诇讗砖讛 讜讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讘注诇 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讜 讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 谞讜转谉 诇讬讜专砖讬讛 讛讬转讛 砖驻讞讛 讜谞砖转讞专专讛 讗讜 讙讬讜专转 讝讻讛

The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rabba from the following: If the assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, the assailant acquires the money. This indicates that if the husband is no longer alive, the woman doesn鈥檛 receive anything.

讗诪专讬 讜诪讬 注讚讬驻讗 诪诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 砖讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专

The Sages said in response to this: But is the baraita preferable to the mishna, which we interpreted as a referring to case where he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died? Here also, it must be explained that he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the convert then died. And if you wish, say instead that he injured her even after the death of the convert.

讜转谞讬 讝讻转讛

And as for the expression in the baraita: He acquires, referring to the one who causes the damage, teach: She acquires.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讘转 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞讬砖讗转 诇讙专 讜谞转注讘专讛 诪诪谞讜 讜讞讘诇 讘讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讙专 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讙专 诇讗讞专 诪讬转转 讛讙专 转谞讬 讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘 讜转谞讬 讞讚讗 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 转谞讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 诇专讘讛 讜讚讗讬 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘 讞住讚讗 诪讬 诇讬诪讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabba and Rav 岣sda is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m: With regard to a Jewish woman who was married to a convert, and she became pregnant from him, and someone injured her, causing her to miscarry: If this was during the lifetime of the convert, the assailant gives compensation for miscarried offspring to the convert, i.e., her husband. If this was after the death of the convert, it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is liable, and it is taught in one baraita that the assailant is exempt. What, is it not a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of Rabba, it is certainly a dispute between tanna鈥檌m. His opinion does not accord with the second baraita. But according to the opinion of Rav 岣sda, shall we say that it is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m?

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘谞谉 讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇

This is not necessarily so, as Rav 岣sda could say that both baraitot are in accordance with his opinion. As for the difference between them, that is not difficult. They can be explained as referring to the increase in the woman鈥檚 value due to the offspring, which is subject to dispute in the mishna, rather than referring to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring. This baraita, which taught that he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the increase in her value on account of the offspring belongs to the husband. That baraita, which taught that he is liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who maintains that the woman has a share in her increase in value due to pregnancy, and this is paid even if the incident occurred after the husband鈥檚 death.

讗讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讗讬 讗专讬讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讞讬讬诐 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 驻诇讙讗 诪讞讬讬诐 讗讬转 诇讛 驻诇讙讗 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讻讜诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, why state specifically that it occurs after the death of the husband? Even during the husband鈥檚 lifetime, she also has a half share, as explained earlier in the discussion. The Gemara answers: While he is alive, she has a half share, but after his death, all of it belongs to her.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讛讗 讜讛讗 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻讗谉 讘砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讻讗谉 讘讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转

And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but they refer to different payments. Here, the baraita that taught that he is liable, is referring to the increase in her value due to the offspring, which belongs partly to the woman, and if the husband dies, she acquires the rights to all of it. By contrast, there, the baraita that taught that he is exempt, is referring to compensation for miscarried offspring, which belongs exclusively to her husband. Since he is a convert, the one liable for damage is exempt after his death.

讗诪专讬 诪砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 诇讬砖诪注 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 讜诪专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讬砖诪注 诇专讘谞谉

The Sages said, in questioning this answer: Why is there a difference between the two cases? From the halakha that after the husband鈥檚 death the woman acquires his share of the increase in her value due to the offspring, let it be derived that according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel she also acquires the rights to the compensation for miscarried offspring if she was wounded after his death. Moreover, from the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, let us derive that this is also the opinion of the Rabbis, since there is no dispute between them with regard to the payment of compensation for miscarried offspring.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 砖讘讞 讜诇讚讜转 讚砖讬讬讻讗 讬讚讛 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讘讻讜诇讛讜 讚诪讬 讜诇讚讜转 诇讗 砖讬讬讻讗 讬讚讛 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 讝讻讬讗 讘讛讜 讻诇诇

In response, the Sages said: No, the first assumption is untenable, since with regard to the increase in her value due to the offspring, in which she has a share from the outset, she acquires all of it after her husband鈥檚 death. By contrast, with regard to the compensation for miscarried offspring, in which she does not have a share from the outset, she does not acquire the rights to it at all, since she has no greater claim to this than any other individual does.

讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘 讬讬讘讗 住讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛诪讞讝讬拽 讘砖讟专讜转讬讜 砖诇 讙专 诪讛讜 诪讗谉 讚诪讞讝讬拽 讘砖讟专讗 讗讚注转讬讛 讚讗专注讗 讛讜讗 诪讞讝讬拽 讜讘讗专注讗 讛讗 诇讗 讗讞讝讬拽 讜砖讟专讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讛 讚诇讗讜 讚注转讬讛 讗砖讟专讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讚注转讬讛 谞诪讬 讗砖讟专讗

Rav Yeiva the Elder raises a dilemma to Rav Na岣an: With regard to one who takes possession of the documents of a convert, what is the halakha after the death of the convert? On the one hand, it can be argued that one who takes possession of the document takes possession with the intention of acquiring the land that the document states is under lien, and since he did not take possession of the land itself, he also does not acquire the document. This is because he had no intention to acquire the document, but just the property specified in the document. Therefore, since the convert has died, perhaps the lien is canceled and can no longer be collected, or perhaps his intention is also to acquire the document, and the paper on which it is written belongs to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 注谞讬 诪讜专讬 讜讻讬 诇爪讜专 注诇 驻讬 爪诇讜讞讬转讜 讛讜讗 爪专讬讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇爪讜专 讜诇爪讜专

Rav Na岣an said to him: Answer this, my Master: Does he need to acquire the document to use as paper to cover the opening of his flask? Why would he want the document if it does not grant him ownership of the land described therein? Rav Yeiva the Elder said to him: Indeed, his intention is even to cover the flask and to cover it with the paper, albeit a mundane purpose.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪砖讻讜谞讜 砖诇 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬讚 讙专 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讜 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚诪讬转 诇讬讛 讙专 驻拽注 诇讬讛 砖注讘讜讚讬讛

Rabba says: In a case where the collateral of a Jew was in the possession of a convert who lent him money, and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, then, since the convert has no heirs, the court appropriates it from his possession and returns it to its owner. What is the reason? Since the convert died, his lien on the property is abrogated. Therefore, the deposit automatically returns to its owner, and no one else has the right to take it.

诪砖讻讜谞讜 砖诇 讙专 讘讬讚 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪转 讛讙专 讜讘讗 讬砖专讗诇 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讜 讝讛 拽谞讛 讻谞讙讚 诪注讜转讬讜 讜讝讛 拽谞讛 讗转 讛砖讗专

By contrast, if the collateral of a convert is in the possession of a Jew who lent him money and the convert died, and another Jew came and took possession of it, this one, i.e., the one owed money, acquires a share of the collateral corresponding to the money owed to him by the convert, and that one, i.e., the one who took possession of it, acquires the rest.

讜讗诪讗讬 转拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讞爪讬专讜 讚讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪讬专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara asks: But why doesn鈥檛 the creditor acquire the entire collateral? If it is in his possession, let his courtyard effect acquisition for him, as doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina say: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him even without his knowledge?

讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讬转讬讛 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬转讗 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讚讗讬 讘注讬 诪拽谞讬 [诪爪讬] 拽谞讬 拽谞讬讗 诇讬讛 [谞诪讬] 讞爪讬专讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讚讗讬 讘注讬 讛讜讗 诇诪讬拽谞讬 诇讗 诪爪讬 拽谞讬 讞爪讬专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽谞讬讗

The Sages said in response: Here we are dealing with a case where the creditor is not standing next to the courtyard. Anywhere that he is present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could pick it up and acquire it himself, his courtyard also effects acquisition for him. But anywhere that he is not present, next to the collateral, so that if he wants to acquire it he could not acquire it, his courtyard also does not effect acquisition for him.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘讞爪讬专讜 讚诇讗 拽谞讛

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that where the creditor is not present in his courtyard, he does not acquire the rest of the collateral.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讗讜 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讗讞专 讞讬讬讘

MISHNA: One who digs part of a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property, or digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance on another person鈥檚 private property, is liable for damage caused by the pit in each case.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讞讜驻专 讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜驻转讞讜 诇专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讞讬讬讘 讜讝讛讜 讘讜专 讛讗诪讜专 讘转讜专讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛驻拽讬专 专砖讜转讜 讜诇讗 讛驻拽讬专 讘讜专讜 讝讛讜 讘讜专 讛讗诪讜专 讘转讜专讛

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One who digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or who digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property is liable, and this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: With regard to one who renounced ownership of his property but did not renounce ownership of his pit located in the property, this is the case of Pit that is stated in the Torah.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘讘讜专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讻讬 讬驻转讞 讜讻讬 讬讻专讛 讗诐 注诇 驻转讬讞讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻专讬讬讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 砖注诇 注住拽讬 驻转讬讞讛 讜注诇 注住拽讬 讻专讬讬讛 讘讗讛 诇讜 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗

In explanation of this dispute, Rabba says: With regard to a pit that a person digs or opens into the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable for damage that occurs as a result. What is the reason? The verse states: 鈥淎nd if a man shall open a pit,鈥 and it also states: 鈥淚f a man shall dig a pit鈥 (Exodus 21:33), which raises the question: If one is liable for opening a pit by removing the cover of a pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so obvious that he should be liable for digging a new pit? What, then, does the latter phrase add? Rather, the interpretation of the verse must be that the responsibility for the pit comes to him by engaging in opening the pit and by engaging in digging the pit. Although he does not own the area itself, he is liable for creating a public hazard. They disagree only

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