Bava Kamma 56

בכותל רעוע

the baraita is speaking of an unstable wall that was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner.

אמר מר הכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה היכי דמי אילימא דמטיא ליה ברוח מצויה בדיני אדם נמי נחייב אלא דמטיא ברוח שאינה מצויה

The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say that the baraita is referring to a case where the fire would reach the bent grain in a typical wind, let him also be liable for the damage according to human laws. Rather, it must be a case where the fire could reach the bent grain only in an atypical wind. Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ורב אשי אמר טמון אתמר משום דשויה טמון באש

And Rav Ashi offered an alternative explanation and said: The baraita was stated in the case of a concealed item; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item because he made it into a concealed item that was subsequently damaged by fire, and the owner cannot reclaim his loss.

אמר מר השוכר עדי שקר היכי דמי אילימא לנפשיה ממונא בעי שלומי ובדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא לחבריה

The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say that he hired them for his own benefit, in order to extract payment from another, he is required to reimburse that person with money, and he is liable according to human laws for receiving money under false circumstances. Rather, the case is one where he hired false witnesses for the benefit of another. In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit.

והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו במאי עסקינן אילימא בבי תרי פשיטא דאורייתא הוא אם לוא יגיד ונשא עונו

The baraita teaches: And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. With what circumstances are we dealing? If we say that the case involves two people who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it is obvious that each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the baraita to mention this case.

אלא בחד

Rather, the case of the baraita concerns a single witness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ותו ליכא והאיכא (סימן העושה בסם ושליח חבירו נשבר) העושה מלאכה במי חטאת ובפרת חטאת פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

The Gemara asks: And is there nothing else, i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? But there is such a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the baraita the Gemara presents a mnemonic device: One who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken. The Gemara returns to the first case: One who performs labor with water of purification, which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, or who performs labor with the red heifer of purification, invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is exempt according to human laws, since the damage he caused is not evident, but liable according to the laws of Heaven, as he caused a financial loss.

והאיכא הנותן סם המות בפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

The Gemara adds: But there is the following halakha: With regard to one who places poison before another’s animal, and the animal eats it and dies, he is exempt according to human laws, since the animal caused its own death, but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

והאיכא השולח את הבערה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who sends an exposed flame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

והאיכא המבעית את חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who frightens another without touching him, but causes him injury; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

והאיכא נשברה כדו ברשות הרבים ולא סילקה נפלה גמלו ולא העמידה רבי מאיר מחייב בהזיקן וחכמים אומרים פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one whose jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove the broken pieces, or one whose camel fell and he did not stand it up again. Rabbi Meir deems the owner of jug or of the camel liable for the damage thereby caused to others, and the Rabbis say that he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the baraita that there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven?

אין מיהא איכא טובא והני אצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: Yes, there are, in any event, many other cases, but Rabbi Yehoshua held that it was necessary for him to state the halakha of these four cases. The reason he stated them is lest you say that in these cases one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו מהו דתימא כיון דלמסתריה קאי מה עביד בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Since the fence is about to collapse even without this person’s intervention, what did he really do? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

הכופף קמתו של חבירו נמי מהו דתימא לימא מי הוה ידענא דאתיא רוח שאינה מצויה ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who bends another’s standing grain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Let the one who bent the grain say to the owner: Did I know that an atypical wind would come and cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

ולרב אשי דאמר נמי טמון איתמר מהו דתימא אנא כסויי כסיתיה ניהלך ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

And according to Rav Ashi, who said that Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling was stated with regard to the case of a concealed item, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven lest you say that the one who concealed the item could say: I covered it for you in order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

והשוכר עדי שקר נמי מהו דתימא לימא דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

And Rabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability also in the case of one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let the one who hired them say: If the witnesses hear the statement of the teacher, i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, and the statement of the student, i.e., the one who hired them, to whose statement should they listen? Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. And based on this logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו נמי מהו דתימא מי יימר דכי הוה אתינא מסהדינא ליה הוה מודה דלמא הוה משתבע לשקרא ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קא משמע לן

Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say that the witness could claim: Who says that had I come forward and testified on behalf of one litigant, the other litigant would admit liability? Perhaps he would have chosen to take a false oath and absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

נפרצה בלילה או שפרצוה לסטים כו׳ אמר רבה והוא שחתרה

§ The mishna teaches: If the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. Rabba says: And this first instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case where the animal tunneled under the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.

אבל לא חתרה מאי חייב היכי דמי אילימא בכותל בריא כי לא חתרה אמאי חייב מאי הוה ליה למעבד אלא בכותל רעוע כי חתרה אמאי פטור תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס הוא

The Gemara asks: But if the animal did not tunnel under the wall, what is the halakha? Would the owner be liable? What are the circumstances? If we say that the pen had a stable wall, then even if the animal did not tunnel, why is the owner liable? What should he have done? Clearly, he cannot be held liable for the damage. Rather, the pen had an unstable wall. The Gemara asks: Even if the animal tunneled under the wall and knocked it down, why is he exempt? The damage in this case is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident.

הניחא למאן דאמר תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור אלא למאן דאמר תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב מאי איכא למימר

This works out well according to the one who said that in any case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, he is exempt from liability, since the ultimate cause of the damage was not his fault. But according to the one who says that in any case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident he is liable, as even without the accident his negligence could have caused damage, what is there to say?

אלא מתניתין בכותל בריא ואפילו לא חתרה וכי איתמר דרבה אסיפא איתמר הניחה בחמה או שמסרה לחרש שוטה וקטן ויצתה והזיקה חייב אמר רבה ואפילו חתרה

Rather, the case of the mishna concerns a stable wall, and even if the animal did not tunnel under the wall the owner is exempt. And when the statement of Rabba was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna that says: If the owner left the animal in the sun or conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the animal went out and caused damage, the owner is liable. Concerning this Rabba stated: And the owner is liable even if the animal tunneled its way out under the wall of the pen.

לא מבעיא היכא דלא חתרה דכולה בפשיעה הוא אלא אפילו חתרה נמי מהו דתימא הויא לה תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס קא משמע לן דכולה פשיעה היא

The Gemara explains: It is not necessary for the mishna to mention the case where the animal did not tunnel its way out. In that case the owner is clearly liable, since the entire incident occurred due to his negligence of leaving the animal in the sun, thereby causing it distress and leading it to attempt escape by any possible means. But even if the animal tunneled its way out, the owner is liable, and this is the novelty in this ruling: Lest you say that this is a case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, because animals do not typically tunnel their way out of a pen, the mishna teaches us that it is considered as though the entire damage resulted from the owner’s negligence.

מאי טעמא דאמר ליה מידע ידעת דכיון דשבקתה בחמה כל טצדקא דאית לה למיעבד עבדא ונפקא

What is the reason that the owner is liable? It is that the one who suffered the damage can say to the owner of the sheep: You should have known that since you left it in the sun, it would utilize any means [tatzdeka] available for it to use and it would escape, so you are ultimately responsible for the damage.

הוציאוה לסטים לסטים חייבין

§ The mishna teaches: If the bandits themselves took the sheep out, the bandits are liable.

פשיטא כיון דאפקוה קיימא לה ברשותייהו לכל מילי

The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that this is the halakha, as once they removed the animal, it is now in their custody for all purposes, including responsibility for any ensuing damage.

לא צריכא דקמו לה באפה כי הא דאמר רבה אמר רב מתנה אמר רב המעמיד בהמת חברו על קמת חבירו חייב מעמיד פשיטא לא צריכא דקם לה באפה

The Gemara answers: No, this statement is necessary in a case where they stood before the animal and encouraged it to leave the enclosure but did not lead it out directly. This case is like the case in this statement that Rabba says that Rav Mattana says that Rav says: With regard to one who stands another’s animal near a third person’s standing grain, and the animal eats the grain, he is liable. The Gemara asks: If he stands the animal there, isn’t it obvious that he is liable? The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary in a case where one stood before the animal and encouraged it to go toward the grain without leading it, and he is nevertheless liable.

אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף הכישה אמרת לן ולסטים נמי דהכישוה

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: You told us when explaining the statement of Rav Mattana in the name of Rav that it is referring to a case where he hit the animal with a stick, and similarly, the mishna can also be explained as referring to a case where the bandits hit it with a stick and did not lead it.

מסרה לרועה נכנס הרועה כו׳ אמרי תחתיו דמאן אילימא תחתיו דבעל בהמה תנינא חדא זמנא מסרו לשומר חנם ולשואל לנושא שכר ולשוכר כולן נכנסו תחת הבעלים אלא תחתיו דשומר

§ The mishna teaches that if the owner conveyed the animal to a shepherd to care for it, the shepherd enters in his place and is responsible for all damage. The Sages say in clarification: The shepherd enters in place of whom? If we say that the shepherd is in place of the owner of the animal, didn’t we already learn on one occasion in a mishna (44b): If the owner conveyed his animal to an unpaid bailee, or to a borrower, to a paid bailee, or to a renter, they all enter into the responsibilities and liabilities in place of the owner. What novelty is there in stating that the responsibility now lies with the shepherd to whom the owner conveyed the animal? Rather, it means that the shepherd enters in place of a bailee to whom the owner conveyed the animal, who is no longer liable once he conveys the animal to a shepherd.

ושומר קמא אפטר ליה לגמרי לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרבא דאמר רבא שומר שמסר לשומר חייב

The Gemara asks: If so, this mishna indicates that the first bailee exempts himself completely by conveying the sheep to a shepherd, the second bailee, and he bears no further responsibility. Shall we say that mishna is a conclusive refutation of the ruling of Rava, as Rava says: A bailee who conveyed the deposit to another bailee nevertheless remains liable?

אמר לך רבא מאי מסרו לרועה לברזיליה דאורחיה דרועה למימסר לברזיליה

The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you in response: What does the mishna mean when it states: He conveyed it to a shepherd? It is referring to a shepherd who conveyed the animal to the shepherd’s assistant, as it is the typical manner of a shepherd to convey animals in his charge to his assistant. Therefore, anyone who gives his animal to a shepherd understands that the shepherd’s assistant may also care for the animal, and it is not a violation of the terms of his assignment for the shepherd to convey it to his assistant. Consequently, this mishna does not refute Rava’s opinion.

איכא דאמרי מדקתני מסרה לרועה ולא קתני מסרה לאחר שמע מינה מאי מסרה לרועה מסר רועה לברזיליה דאורחיה דרועה למימסר לברזיליה אבל לאחר לא

There are those who say the same answer in a similar manner: From the fact that the mishna teaches the case using the expression: He conveyed it to a shepherd, and does not teach it using the less specific expression: He conveyed it to another, conclude from it that what it means by: He conveyed it to a shepherd, is that the shepherd conveyed it to his assistant, as it is the typical manner of a shepherd to convey an animal to his assistant. But if the shepherd conveyed it to another to care for it in his place, the mishna does not rule that the other person enters in his place.

לימא מסייע ליה לרבא דאמר רבא שומר שמסר לשומר חייב אמרי לא דלמא אורחא דמילתא קתני והוא הדין לאחר

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the wording of the mishna therefore supports Rava’s opinion, as Rava says: A bailee who conveyed the deposit to another bailee remains liable. The Sages say in rejection of that suggestion: No, one cannot infer from the wording of the mishna that it is referring specifically to a shepherd conveying the animal to his assistant, since perhaps it teaches the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, but the same is true even if the shepherd conveyed the animal to another. Therefore, no support can be brought from here for Rava’s opinion.

איתמר שומר אבידה רבה אמר כשומר חנם דמי רב יוסף אמר כשומר שכר דמי

§ It was stated that there is a dispute between amora’im concerning the following issue: With regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item that he has not yet returned, what level of responsibility does he bear? Rabba said: He is considered to be like an unpaid bailee, whereas Rav Yosef said: He is considered to be like a paid bailee.

רבה אמר כשומר חנם דמי מאי הנאה קא מטי ליה רב יוסף אמר כשומר שכר דמי בההיא הנאה דלא בעיא למיתבי ליה ריפתא לעניא הוי כשומר שכר

Their respective opinions are explained: Rabba said that he is considered to be like an unpaid bailee because what benefit comes to him through safeguarding it? Therefore, he is just like any unpaid bailee. Rav Yosef said that he is considered to be like a paid bailee on account of the benefit that he is not required to give bread to a poor person while looking after the lost item, since one who is engaged in one mitzva is exempt from performing another. Consequently, since there is some benefit involved in looking after the lost item, he is considered to be like a paid bailee.

איכא דמפרשי הכי רב יוסף אמר כשומר שכר דמי כיון דרחמנא שעבדיה בעל כורחיה הלכך כשומר שכר דמי

This is one interpretation, whereas there are those who explain like this: Rav Yosef said that he is considered to be like a paid bailee. Once the Merciful One obligates him against his will to look after lost items, the Torah presumably imposes the high standard of safeguarding on him. Therefore, he is considered to be like a paid bailee.

(סימן החזירה לעולם השב חייא אמרת נשבר שכר)

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the halakhot and difficulties to be discussed: He returned it, always, returned, Ḥiyya, you say, breaks, payment.

איתיביה רב יוסף לרבה

Rav Yosef raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from that which is taught in a baraita: