Bava Kamma 57

החזירה למקום שיראנה אינו חייב לטפל בה נגנבה או אבדה חייב באחריותה

If one found a lost item and he returned it to a place where its owner will see it, he is no longer responsible to deal with it. If the item was stolen or lost, the finder bears financial responsibility to compensate for the loss.

מאי נגנבה או אבדה לאו נגנבה מביתו ואבדה מביתו

Rav Yosef states his objection: What is meant by the expression: Was stolen or lost? Does it not mean that it was stolen from the finder’s house or lost from his house before he returned it? Since he is liable for theft or loss, it appears that he has the same status as a paid bailee.

לא ממקום שהחזירה

Rabba rejects this challenge: No, it means that it was stolen or lost from the place where the finder returned it, in which case even an unpaid bailee is liable on the grounds of negligence.

והא קתני אינו חייב ליטפל בה

Rav Yosef challenges Rabba’s response: But the baraita teaches that the finder is no longer responsible to deal with it, indicating that failing to deal with it is not negligence, and the finder has no further responsibility for it.

אמר ליה הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהחזירה בצהרים

Rabba said to him: With what are we dealing here, at the end of the baraita, where it teaches that the finder is liable? We are dealing with a case where he returned it at midday, which is a time when the owner of the lost item is not typically present. Therefore, the finder has not returned the item properly, and if it is then stolen or lost, he bears responsibility even if he is an unpaid bailee.

ותרתי קתני והכי קתני החזירה שחרית למקום שיראנה ושכיח דעייל ונפיק וחזי לה אינו חייב ליטפל בה החזירה בצהרים למקום שיראנה דלא שכיח דעייל ונפיק דלא חזי לה ונגנבה או אבדה חייב באחריותה

And the baraita is teaching two separate halakhot, and this is what it is teaching: If the finder returned it in the morning, when people are typically present, to a place where the owner of the lost item will see it, and the owner typically enters and exits and it is likely that he will see it, the finder is no longer responsible to deal with it, nor does he bear responsibility if it is then stolen or lost. By contrast, if the finder returned it at midday to a place where the owner will see it, since it is a time when the owner does not typically enter and exit and will not see it, if it is then stolen or lost the finder bears financial responsibility for the loss.

איתיביה לעולם הוא חייב עד שיחזירנה לרשותו מאי לעולם לאו אפילו מביתו שמע מינה כשומר שכר דמי

Rav Yosef again raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from that which is taught in the continuation of the baraita: The finder of the lost item always bears responsibility if the item is stolen or lost until he returns it to the owner’s property. What does the word always add? Is it not teaching that even if the lost item was stolen from the finder’s house, he is liable? If so, learn from this that one who finds a lost item is considered like a paid bailee.

אמר ליה מודינא לך בבעלי חיים דכיון דנקטי להו ניגרא ברייתא בעי נטירותא יתירתא

Rabba said to Rav Yosef in reply: I concede to you in a case of one looking after lost animals that he is liable if they are stolen or lost. The reason is that since the animals have already taken to the habit of walking out of their usual path and not behaving in their typical manner, they require extra safeguarding, corresponding to that required of a paid bailee. But with regard to other items that are lost, those that do not move by themselves, the finder bears no greater responsibility to secure them than does an unpaid bailee.

איתיביה רבה לרב יוסף השב אין לי אלא בביתו לגינתו ולחורבתו מנין תלמוד לומר תשיבם מכל מקום

Rabba raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef: The verse states in the context of returning lost items: “Return them” (Deuteronomy 22:1), repeating the verb “hashev teshivem.” The Sages expounded as follows: From the word “hashev” I have derived only that one may return the item to the house of the owner of the lost article. From where do I derive that even if one returns it to his garden or to his ruin, i.e., an unused structure on his property, he has discharged his obligation and is no longer responsible for the item that he found? For this, the verse states: “Teshivem,” repeating the verb for emphasis, to teach that he fulfills the mitzva by returning the item to any place belonging to the owner.

מאי לגינתו ולחורבתו אילימא לגינתו המשתמרת ולחורבתו המשתמרת היינו ביתו אלא פשיטא לגינתו שאינה משתמרת ולחורבתו שאינה משתמרת שמע מינה כשומר חנם דמי

What is the meaning of the phrase in the baraita: To his garden or to his ruin? If we say that the finder returned the lost item to the garden of the owner that is secured, i.e., properly enclosed, or to his ruin that is secured, it would be unnecessary to state this, as it is the same as his house, since these spaces are secured in the same way as his house. Rather, it is obvious that it means that he returned them to his garden that is not secured, or to his ruin that is not secured, and nevertheless, the finder is no longer liable for subsequent damage or theft of the found item. Conclude from it that a finder is like an unpaid bailee in terms of his liabilities, and this reduced level of safeguarding when returning the item is sufficient.

אמר ליה לעולם לגינתו המשתמרת ולחורבתו המשתמרת ודקא קשיא לך היינו ביתו הא קא משמע לן דלא בעינן דעת בעלים כדרבי אלעזר

Rav Yosef said to him: Actually, one can explain that the baraita is referring to a case where the finder placed it in the owner’s garden that is secured, or his ruin that is secured; and with regard to that which poses a difficulty to you, that this is the same as his house, there is nevertheless a novelty in this ruling: This teaches us that in this case we do not require the owner’s knowledge that the article has been returned, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

דאמר רבי אלעזר הכל צריכין דעת בעלים חוץ מהשבת אבידה שהרי ריבתה בו תורה השבות הרבה

As Rabbi Elazar says: All those who are obligated to return items to their owners, e.g., a bailee or a thief, require the owner’s knowledge that they are returning it except for one fulfilling the mitzva of returning a lost item. This is because the Torah included many permitted ways of returning lost items by employing the double expression “hashev teshivem,” which serves to permit the return of the lost item without the knowledge of the owner.

אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף ואת לא תסברא דשומר אבידה כשומר חנם דמי והא אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן הטוען טענת גנב באבידה משלם תשלומי כפל ואי סלקא דעתך שומר שכר הוי אמאי משלם תשלומי כפל קרנא בעי שלומי

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And you, do you not hold that one safeguarding a lost item is like an unpaid bailee? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who finds a lost item but falsely states the claim that a thief stole the item from him and takes an oath to that effect, he must pay a double payment, i.e., twice the value of the item. And if it enters your mind that the finder of a lost item is considered to have the same status as a paid bailee, why in such a case must he pay a double payment? He should be required to pay only the principal, since a paid bailee is liable in any event if the article is stolen or lost, and he did not stand to benefit from the claim that the item was stolen.

אמר ליה הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שטוען טענת לסטים מזויין

Rav Yosef said to him: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the finder took a false oath stating the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, and in such a case even a paid bailee is exempt. Consequently, his claim would have absolved him from liability, and if the item is subsequently found in his possession, he is liable to pay double for his false claim that it was stolen.

אמר ליה ליסטים מזויין גזלן הוא

Abaye said to him: But an armed bandit has the status of a robber and not of a thief, so according to this explanation, why did Rabbi Yoḥanan state that it was stolen by a thief?

אמר ליה שאני אומר לסטים מזויין כיון דמיטמר מאינשי גנב הוא

Rav Yosef said to him: The reason that only a thief pays the double payment and not a robber is that a thief denigrates God by exhibiting fear of people by stealing surreptitiously while not exhibiting fear of Heaven. This is in contrast to a robber, who robs openly. Accordingly, the reason that I say that an armed bandit is considered as a thief, is since he hides from people rather than stealing openly. Although he in fact does steal openly, since he does so by employing a weapon he also exhibits fear of people, and is akin to a thief. Therefore, armed bandits are liable to pay a double payment as is a thief, and a claim that the deposit was seized by armed bandits is considered to be the same as a claim that it was stolen by thieves. Consequently, since a paid bailee is absolved by means of such a claim, if it is determined that his claim was false he must pay double.

איתיביה

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef from that which is taught in a baraita:

לא אם אמרת בשומר חנם שכן משלם תשלומי כפל תאמר בשומר שכר שאינו משלם תשלומי כפל

No, if you say that this is the halakha with regard to an unpaid bailee, who pays a double payment, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a paid bailee, who does not pay a double payment?

ואי סלקא דעתך לסטים מזויין גנב הוא נמצא בשומר שכר משלם תשלומי כפל בטוען טענת לסטים מזויין

Abaye states his objection: And if it enters your mind to say that an armed bandit is considered like a thief, it turns out that there is a case where a paid bailee pays a double payment, and it is when he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit.

אמר ליה הכי קאמר לא אם אמרת בשומר חנם שכן משלם תשלומי כפל בכל טענותיו תאמר בשומר שכר שאינו משלם תשלומי כפל אלא בטוען טענת לסטים מזויין

Rav Yosef said to him: This is what the baraita is saying: No, if you say that this is the halakha with regard to an unpaid bailee, who pays a double payment for any claim that he makes concerning the theft of the item if he is subsequently found to be lying, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a paid bailee, who pays a double payment for a false claim only when he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit.

איתיביה ונשבר או מת אין לי אלא שבורה ומתה גניבה ואבידה מנין אמרת קל וחומר ומה שומר שכר שפטר בו שבורה ומתה חייב בגניבה ואבידה שואל שחייב בשבורה ומתה אינו דין שחייב בגניבה ואבידה וזהו קל וחומר שאין עליו תשובה

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef from that which is taught in another baraita: The Torah states with regard to a case where one borrows an object or an animal from another: “And it breaks or dies, he shall pay restitution [shalem yeshalem]” (Exodus 22:13). I have derived only that the borrower is liable in a case where the object or animal breaks or dies; but from where do I derive that he is also liable if it was stolen or lost? You can state the following a fortiori inference: And just as a paid bailee, whom the Torah rendered exempt in a case where the item breaks or dies, is nevertheless liable for a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable even if the item breaks or dies, is not it logical that he is liable for theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.

ואי סלקא דעתך לסטים מזויין גנב הוא אמאי אין עליו תשובה איכא למפרך מה לשומר שכר שכן משלם תשלומי כפל בטוען טענת לסטים מזויין

And if it enters your mind to say that an armed bandit is considered like a thief, why is this an argument that has no refutation? It can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a paid bailee? He is notable in that he pays double payment if he states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, whereas a borrower does not pay double in such a case, but only the principal amount.

אמר ליה קסבר האי תנא קרנא בלא שבועה עדיפא מכפילא בשבועה

Rav Yosef said to him: This tanna holds that the requirement of a borrower to pay the principal without having the option to exempt himself by taking an oath is stricter than the requirement of a paid bailee to pay the double payment when claiming that it was stolen by an armed bandit, as this obligation is in effect only where he took an oath. Therefore, this doubled payment pertaining to a paid bailee cannot be used as a refutation of the a fortiori inference.

לימא מסייע ליה השוכר פרה מחבירו ונגנבה ואמר הלה הריני משלם ואיני נשבע ואחר כך נמצא הגנב משלם תשלומי כפל לשוכר

The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Yosef’s opinion: In the case of one who rents a cow from another and it is stolen, and this renter says: I will pay for it and I am not taking an oath that the cow was stolen, since I do not wish to take an oath, and afterward the thief is found, the thief pays the double payment to the renter and not to the owner.

סברוה כרבי יהודה דאמר שוכר כנושא שכר דמי ומדקתני ואמר הריני משלם ואיני נשבע מכלל דאי בעי פטר ליה נפשיה בשבועה

The Gemara notes: The Sages who sought to use that baraita to support Rav Yosef’s opinion assumed that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A renter is like a paid bailee and is liable for theft or loss, but from the fact that it teaches: And he said: I will pay for it and I am not taking an oath that the cow was stolen, one can learn by inference that if the renter wants, he can exempt himself from payment by taking an oath.

היכי דמי כגון דקא טעין טענת לסטים מזויין וקתני ואחר כך נמצא הגנב משלם תשלומי כפל לשוכר שמע מינה לסטים מזויין גנב הוא

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? Is it not a case where the renter states a claim that the item was taken by an armed bandit, in which case, as a paid bailee, he does not bear liability? And despite this, the baraita teaches: And if afterward the thief was found, the thief pays the double payment to the renter. Conclude from it that an armed bandit is considered like a thief.

אמרי מי סברת כרבי יהודה דאמר שוכר כנושא שכר דמי דלמא כרבי מאיר סבירא ליה דאמר שוכר כשומר חנם דמי

The Gemara says in rejection of this proof: Do you maintain that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a renter is considered like a paid bailee? Perhaps this tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a renter is considered like an unpaid bailee, and on account of that he is absolved of responsibility even if he claimed it was a regular theft.

איבעית אימא כדמחליף רבה בר אבוה ותני שוכר כיצד משלם רבי מאיר אומר כשומר שכר רבי יהודה אומר כשומר חנם

Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita is referring to an unarmed bandit and is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Avuh, who reversed the opinions and teaches as follows: How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says he has the same liability as a paid bailee, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says he has the same liability as an unpaid bailee. Therefore, even if this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it does not provide support for Rav Yosef’s opinion.

רבי זירא אמר הכא במאי עסקינן בטוען טענת לסטים מזויין ונמצא לסטים שאינו מזויין

Rabbi Zeira said: Even without reversing the opinions, it is possible to explain that the baraita does not provide support for Rav Yosef’s opinion by saying as follows: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the renter states the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, and so he could have absolved himself by taking an oath, but afterward it is found that it was stolen by an unarmed bandit. On account of this, the bandit pays the double payment to the renter. No conclusive proof is brought as to whether one who found a lost item has the status of a paid or unpaid bailee.

נפלה לגינה ונהנית משלמת מה שנהנית אמר רב בנחבטה

§ The mishna teaches: If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit, the owner pays for the benefit that it derives. Rav says: This is referring to a case where the vegetables softened the impact of striking the ground, and the owner pays for this benefit of the animal being saved from injury.

אבל אכלה אפילו מה שנהנית אינה משלמת לימא רב לטעמיה דאמר רב היה לה שלא תאכל

The Gemara comments: This statement of Rav indicates that the owner pays only for what occurred while the animal landed, but if the animal then ate from the garden, the owner is not required to pay even for the benefit that the animal derives. Shall we say that Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning? As Rav says that in a case where one placed his produce in the courtyard of another without permission, and an animal belonging to the owner of the courtyard ate the produce and was sickened thereby, the owner of the produce is not liable, as he can claim: The animal should not have eaten it. Similarly, here the owner of the animal can say: This animal fell through no fault of mine, and so it is not my fault that it ate.

אמרי הכי השתא אימור דאמר רב התם היה לה שלא תאכל היכא דאיתזקא היא דמצי אמר ליה מריה דפירי לא משלמנא היה לה שלא תאכל לאזוקי היא אחריני דפטירה לשלומי מי אמר

The Sages of the Gemara say: How can these cases be compared? One could say that Rav said there that the animal should not have eaten the produce. This claim is relevant where the animal itself was injured by eating another’s produce, because the owner of the produce can say: I will not pay, because the animal should not have eaten. This is a claim to exempt the owner of the produce from paying the owner of the animal. Did Rav say that when the animal causes damage to another’s produce, the owner can exempt himself from paying the owner of the produce by stating this claim?

אלא

Rather,