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Daf Yomi

January 30, 2024 | 讻壮 讘砖讘讟 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

Bava Kamma 89

Today’s daf is sponsored by Gabrielle Altman in loving memory of聽 Hon. Myriam Altman. “She was a beloved wife, mother and grandmother, and an unforgettable role model and jurist. A Holocaust survivor, she would have been so proud of her family and Am Yisrael, today and every day.”

Two sources, one of them our Mishna, are brought to prove that there was a takana instituted in Usha that a woman cannot sell her usufruct (melog) property while she is still married. However, both proofs are rejected. The first source is a case where witnesses lied and said a woman was divorced and received her ketuba money. Once it was proven they were zomemim and that the woman was still married, the witnesses do not pay her the full amount of the ketuba, but the amount she could have sold it for while she was married (tovat hana’a). A woman can sell the rights to her ketuba to someone else for less than its value, as it is not clear that it has monetary value since it will only be worth money if the husband predeceases the wife. If she dies first, her husband inherits everything. If there was no takana of Usha, she can sell part of the ketuba that includes property she brought into the marriage, and therefore it does have value regardless of whether she or the husband die first. However, this is rejected as the property in the ketuba is nichsei tzon barzel, which cannot be sold in any case as the husband has right to the produce and to the principal, and the takana was regarding nichsei melog. Abaye infers from the ruling regarding the witnesses, that if a woman sells her ketuba, the money would go to her and not to her husband. Rav Shalman rejects Abaye’s proof but Rava rules like Abaye. The second proof is from our Mishna, that a woman is exempt from paying damages she inflicts on others (until her husband dies or divorces her) as she has no money of her own. If there was no takana of Usha, she could sell her usufruct property and pay damages. To reject this proof, they suggest that the Mishna is referring to a case where the woman has no usufruct property. However, the Gemara begins to raise other questions on the Mishna. Why doesn’t the woman sell her ketuba for its market value (tovat hana’a)? Three different answers are brought. What if the woman injured her husband, could she not give him the ketuba as payment? And if so, why does the Tosefta rule that she does not? A few questions are asked on the Tosefta. The Gemara suggests that whether or not the takana of Usha was instituted is a tanaitic debate. The case is one where there is a slave that is usufruct property of the woman – in one braita they rule that the slave goes freed if the woman breaks his arm; in the other, he does not get freed either by the woman or by the husband breaking his arm as neither fully owns him (the woman does not, as per the takana of Usha). However, this is rejected as the reason for the disagreement is not necessarily related to our issue.

讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讜诪砖诪砖转讜 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讝讜诪诪讬谉 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讬讝讛讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讻诪讛 讗讚诐 专讜爪讛 诇讬转谉 讘讻转讜讘讛 砖诇 讝讜 砖讗诐 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 讘注诇讛


and she is under him and serves him, i.e., she was in fact still married to him, and then these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses who were attempting to deny this woman the ability to ever collect payment of her marriage contract, then the court does not say that the witnesses shall pay the entire value of her marriage contract. Rather, the court says that they shall pay the financial advantage of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the financial advantage of her marriage contract? The court evaluates how much a person would want to give to purchase the rights of this woman鈥檚 marriage contract, taking into account the halakha that if she becomes widowed or divorced the purchaser will receive its full value, but if she dies during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, her husband will inherit her property and the purchaser will receive nothing.


讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讬转讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诪讗讬 讬讬专砖谞讛 讘注诇讛 转讝讘讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讙诪专讬


Rav Idi bar Avin continues: And if it enters your mind that there is no ordinance of Usha, why would her husband inherit from her? Let the woman sell her marriage contract entirely.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 讗诪专讜 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讬讗诪专讜 讘谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇


Abaye said: This is not a proof for the existence of the ordinance of Usha, because even if there is no ordinance, and the Sages said that the woman retains the right to sell with regard to the usufruct property, would they also say that the woman retains the right to sell with regard to guaranteed property, which is listed among the possessions she brought into the marriage but is entirely under her husband鈥檚 authority? In any event, there is property that she does not have the right to sell and that the husband would inherit if she dies, regardless of whether or not there is an ordinance of Usha, so the marriage contract could not be sold for its full value.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗 诇讬讚谉 谞讬诪讗 讘讛 诪讬诇转讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诇讗砖讛 讛讜讬讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讘注诇 讛讜讬讗 诇讬诪专讜 诇讛 注讚讬诐 诪讗讬 讗驻住讚讬谞讱 讗讬 讛讜转 诪讝讘谞转 诇讛 诇讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讘注诇 讛讜讛 砖拽讬诇 诪讬谞讱 讗诪专 专讘 砖诇诪谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 专讜讜讞 讘讬转讗


Abaye said: With regard to financial advantage, since discussion of this matter came to us, let us say something about it. The money received for selling the financial advantage is given only to the wife. For if it enters your mind to say that it is given to the husband, then let the conspiring witnesses, who have been rendered liable to pay a penalty to the wife, say to her: What loss have we caused you by testifying that you had received payment of your marriage contract? Even if you were to sell it for the financial advantage, your husband would have taken it from you. Rav Shalman said in response: She still would incur a loss, because there is a gain to the household. Even if the husband were to be the one to receive the payment from the sale, the financial situation of the household would be improved, leading to a concrete benefit for the wife as well. This offsets the wife鈥檚 potential loss.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诇讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 驻讬专讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 驻讬专讗 讚驻讬专讗 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉


Rava said: The halakha is that the money received for selling the financial advantage of the marriage contract is given only to the wife, and the husband does not even garner the profits from that money or from property the wife would purchase with that money. What is the reason? The Sages instituted that the profits of her property are for the husband, but the Sages did not institute that the profits of the profits are for him.


讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪讘讬 专讘 讗诪专讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讛注讘讚 讜讛讗砖讛 驻讙讬注转谉 专注讛 讛讞讜讘诇 讘讛谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讛诐 砖讞讘诇讜 讘讗讞专讬诐 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讬转讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 转讝讘讬谉 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讜转转谉 诇讬讛


When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of Rav they said: We learned a source for the ordinance of Usha in the mishna (87a): With regard to a slave or a married woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others they are exempt, because they do not have money with which to pay. And if it enters your mind to say that there is no ordinance of Usha, there would be a method by which a married woman can obtain money with which to pay, as the court can have her sell her usufruct property and give the money received to the one she injured. It can therefore be inferred from the mishna that a woman cannot sell her usufruct property, in accordance with the ordinance of Usha.


讜诇讟注诪讬讱 谞讛讬 谞诪讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讜诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讝讘谞讛 诇讙诪专讬 转讝讘讬谉 诇谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讬转 诇讛


The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, though indeed there is an ordinance of Usha, and she cannot fully sell her usufruct property, she should nevertheless be able to sell her usufruct property for the financial advantage, i.e., the purchaser will pay her for the future rights to the property in the event that she gets divorced or is widowed, and she will give that money to the one she injured. Rather, it must be that the mishna is discussing a case where she does not have usufruct property of which she can sell the future rights. So too, there is no source from the mishna for the ordinance of Usha, as the mishna is discussing a case where she does not have usufruct property to sell.


讜转讝讘讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 砖讬砖讛讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘诇讗 讻转讜讘讛


The Gemara questions the ruling of the mishna: Why does the mishna assert that a married woman will not have money with which to pay, but she should sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract and give the money received to the one she injured? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling of the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is prohibited for a man to remain living together with his wife for even one hour without her having a marriage contract. Therefore, the woman cannot sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讻讗 诇讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讗转讜 讛谞讱 讚讝讘谞讬 讙讘讜 诇讛 诇讻转讜讘转讛 诪讬谞讬讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir? It is so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as he would not suffer any adverse financial consequences by divorcing her. The Gemara asks: If that is the reason, then here, when she sold her marriage contract to others, the husband will not easily divorce her, as, if he would divorce her, those who purchased her marriage contract will come and collect payment of her marriage contract from the husband. It makes no difference to the husband whether he will have to pay the marriage contract to her or to the purchasers. Therefore, the reason for the ruling of the mishna cannot be based upon the statement of Rabbi Meir.


讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诪讬诇讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚讬


Rather, the reason she is not required to sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to pay the one she injured is that the financial advantage of her marriage contract is mere words, i.e., not a specific possession, but a legal entity that simply creates the possibility to collect its value at a later date. And mere words are not mortgaged for the payment of debts, in this case her debt to the injured party.


讗诇诪讛 诇讗 诪讬诇讬 讚诪讝讚讘谞讬 讘讚讬谞专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪讜讻专 砖讟专 讞讜讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讞讝专 讜诪讞诇讜 诪讞讜诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讬讜专砖 诪讜讞诇


The Gemara questions this assertion: Why not? Why is financial advantage not mortgaged? They are words that are sold for dinars. Since the financial advantage of her marriage contract has a market value, it is mortgaged to pay the debt to the injured party. Rather, she is not required to sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract because of the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: With regard to one who sells a promissory note to another, and the seller went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, and the promissory note is left valueless, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone, and even the seller鈥檚 heir can forgive the debt. Since there is a concern that the woman will forgive the debt of her marriage contract after having sold it, causing a loss to the purchaser, she is not required to sell it.


讗诪专讬 讝讘讜谞讬 讝讘讬谉 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讬讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 转诪讞诇讛


The Sages say: Let her sell the financial advantage of the marriage contract and give the money to the one she injured, and if she happens to forgive the debt of her marriage contract to her husband, she will forgive it. Just as it is generally permitted for one to sell a promissory note despite the fact that he could then forgive the debt, the same should hold true in this case as well.


讗诪专讬 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 讜讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讬讛 讜讗驻住讚讬谞讬讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讝讘讬谞讗 讘讬讚讬诐 诇讗 讗驻住讚讬谞讛讜


The Sages say: In any matter that will engender a benefit to her husband, she will certainly forgive the debt to him so that he will not have to pay the marriage contract. And with regard to causing a definite loss to that purchaser through direct action by having the woman sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract in a case where she will certainly forgive the debt, the Sages will not be willing to cause a definite loss to the purchaser.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讝讘讬谞讗 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讚讞讘诇讛 讘讬讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛


The Gemara offers another suggestion: And if you would say that she should sell her marriage contract to that one whom she injured in order to receive the money for the financial advantage,


讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 诇讗 拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 讚讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬讚讬 拽讗 讬讛讘讛 诇讬讛 住讜祝 住讜祝 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 讜讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 讜讗讟专讜讞讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讻讚讬 诇讗 诪讟专讞讬谞谉


so that even if she were to forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband, the one she injured would not lose anything, as now as well she is not giving him any payment, one could respond that ultimately, in any matter that will engender a benefit to her husband, she will certainly forgive the debt with regard to him. And we do not trouble the courts to supervise the sale of the financial advantage without cause.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖讞讘诇讛 讘讘注诇讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诪讗讬 转讝讘谞讬谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讘讛讗 讞讘诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 诇讬讻讗 驻住讬讚讗


The Gemara asks: But if the reason she does not sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to obtain money with which to pay the injured party is that she would then forgive the debt of the marriage contract, then with regard to that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:22): And similarly, in a case where she was the one who injured her husband she has not lost her marriage contract as a result, as he does not collect compensation from the properties she brought into the marriage that are enumerated in the marriage contract, why does she not lose it? Let her sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband in order to obtain the money to compensate him for that injury that she caused him, as, if she will forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband there will be no loss for the purchaser, i.e., her husband.


讛讗 讜讚讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬砖讛讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘诇讗 讻转讜讘讛


The Gemara answers: This baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is prohibited for a man to remain living together with his wife for even one hour without her having a marriage contract. Therefore, the woman cannot sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讻讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir? It is so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, and here, if she were to sell the marriage contract to him, he would then divorce her and collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. If that is so, even now, where she does not sell her marriage contract to him, he will divorce her, and once she is divorced, he will collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. Preventing her from selling the marriage contract to him will not serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.


讻讙讜谉 讚谞驻讬砖 讻转讜讘转讛 讚诪砖讜诐 讛讛讜讗 驻讜专转讗 诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 讟讜讘讗


The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where there is a large sum recorded in her marriage contract, so that because of that slight sum due him as compensation for his injuries, he would not be willing to lose the large sum that he would have to pay were he to divorce her. Therefore, the marriage contract does serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.


讜讗讬 讚谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 谞讜拽诪讗 讗讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗讬讚讱 转讝讘谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛


The Gemara suggests: But if in fact the baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, let them establish her marriage contract at the sum of a marriage contract required by Torah law, and with regard to the other, additional, sum, let her sell it to her husband as payment for his injuries. Since she will be left with a marriage contract of standard value, they would be allowed to remain living together.


讻讙讜谉 讚诇讗 谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚讛讜讬 讞讘诇讬讛 讗专讘注讛 讝讜讝讬 讚诪砖讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讝讜讝讬 诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 注砖专讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛


The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is not larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, that payment for his injury was assessed to be four dinars, and because of a gain of four dinars, the husband would not be willing to lose twenty-five dinars, which is the value of a marriage contract required by Torah law.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻砖诐 砖诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讻讱 诇讗 转驻住讬讚 讜讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讜讛讗 讝讬诪谞讬谉 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 讚诪驻住讚讗 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which is taught in the latter case of the baraita: Just as she does not sell her marriage contract to obtain money to pay damages while she is under him, i.e., married to her husband, so too, she does not lose the value of her marriage contract to pay damages while she is under him. But there are times when she will be found to have lost the value of her marriage contract, and what are the circumstances? It would be a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law. In that case she would be obligated to sell the portion of the marriage contract representing the additional amount in order to obtain money with which to compensate the one she injured.


讗诪专 专讘讗 住讬驻讗 讗转讗谉 诇讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉


Rava said in response: In the latter clause of that baraita, we arrive at the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and it is not discussing the sale of a marriage contract in general.


讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讻砖诐 砖讛诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讗讞专讬诐 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讗谞住讜讛 讻讱 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讗谞住讜讛


And this is what the baraita is teaching: Just as the halakha stipulates that a woman who sells her marriage contract to others does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress, and she did not intend to abrogate her sons鈥 rights to inherit the property in the future. Rava continues his explanation of the baraita: So too, a woman who sells her marriage contract to her husband does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress.


诇讬诪讗 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬 讞讚讗 注讘讚讬 诪诇讜讙 讬讜爪讗讬谉 讘砖谉 讜注讬谉 诇讗砖讛 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜诇讗 诇讗砖讛


搂 The Gemara returns to the earlier discussion and suggests: Shall we say that the issue whether or not there was an ordinance of Usha instituting that the wife cannot sell her usufruct property is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? As it is taught in one baraita: Canaanite slaves that the woman brought into the marriage as usufruct property are emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the woman, i.e., the wife, as is the halakha when the owner of a slave knocks out the slave鈥檚 tooth or blinds his eye, but they are not emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the man, i.e., the husband, as he is not their owner. And it is taught in another baraita: The slave is not emancipated if his tooth was knocked out or his eye was blinded, nor by the man nor by the woman.


住讘专讜讛 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗砖讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜诇讗 诇讗砖讛 讗讬转 诇讬讛 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗


The Gemara continues its analysis: They assumed that everyone holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce, which the husband has with regard to usufruct property, is not like ownership of the item itself, which is why the husband is not considered the owner of the slaves. What, is it not so that the two baraitot disagree with regard to this: That the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he was struck by the woman holds that there is no ordinance of Usha? Since she retains the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated. And the one who says that the slave is not emancipated if he was struck by the man and not if he was struck by the woman holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Since she cannot sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.


诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诇讗 讻讗谉 拽讜讚诐 转拽谞讛 讻讗谉 诇讗讞专 转拽谞讛


The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: No; perhaps it is the case that everyone holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. But here, in the first baraita, it is referring to the time before the ordinance was instituted, and since the wife had the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated, while there, in the second baraita, it is referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and since she could no longer sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.


讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇讗讞专 转拽谞讛 讜讗讬转 诇讛讜 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗砖讛 讜诇讗 诇讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗


The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and the tanna in each baraita holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Rather, according to the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he is struck by the woman but not if he is struck by the man, what is the reason? It is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava said:


  • Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.

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Bava Kamma 89

讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讜诪砖诪砖转讜 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讝讜诪诪讬谉 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讬讝讛讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗转 讻转讜讘转讛 讗讜诪讚讬谉 讻诪讛 讗讚诐 专讜爪讛 诇讬转谉 讘讻转讜讘讛 砖诇 讝讜 砖讗诐 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讜讗诐 诪转讛 讬讬专砖谞讛 讘注诇讛


and she is under him and serves him, i.e., she was in fact still married to him, and then these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses who were attempting to deny this woman the ability to ever collect payment of her marriage contract, then the court does not say that the witnesses shall pay the entire value of her marriage contract. Rather, the court says that they shall pay the financial advantage of her marriage contract. The Gemara explains: What is the financial advantage of her marriage contract? The court evaluates how much a person would want to give to purchase the rights of this woman鈥檚 marriage contract, taking into account the halakha that if she becomes widowed or divorced the purchaser will receive its full value, but if she dies during her husband鈥檚 lifetime, her husband will inherit her property and the purchaser will receive nothing.


讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讬转讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诪讗讬 讬讬专砖谞讛 讘注诇讛 转讝讘讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讙诪专讬


Rav Idi bar Avin continues: And if it enters your mind that there is no ordinance of Usha, why would her husband inherit from her? Let the woman sell her marriage contract entirely.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗诐 讗诪专讜 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讬讗诪专讜 讘谞讻住讬 爪讗谉 讘专讝诇


Abaye said: This is not a proof for the existence of the ordinance of Usha, because even if there is no ordinance, and the Sages said that the woman retains the right to sell with regard to the usufruct property, would they also say that the woman retains the right to sell with regard to guaranteed property, which is listed among the possessions she brought into the marriage but is entirely under her husband鈥檚 authority? In any event, there is property that she does not have the right to sell and that the husband would inherit if she dies, regardless of whether or not there is an ordinance of Usha, so the marriage contract could not be sold for its full value.


讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗 诇讬讚谉 谞讬诪讗 讘讛 诪讬诇转讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诇讗砖讛 讛讜讬讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讘注诇 讛讜讬讗 诇讬诪专讜 诇讛 注讚讬诐 诪讗讬 讗驻住讚讬谞讱 讗讬 讛讜转 诪讝讘谞转 诇讛 诇讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讘注诇 讛讜讛 砖拽讬诇 诪讬谞讱 讗诪专 专讘 砖诇诪谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 专讜讜讞 讘讬转讗


Abaye said: With regard to financial advantage, since discussion of this matter came to us, let us say something about it. The money received for selling the financial advantage is given only to the wife. For if it enters your mind to say that it is given to the husband, then let the conspiring witnesses, who have been rendered liable to pay a penalty to the wife, say to her: What loss have we caused you by testifying that you had received payment of your marriage contract? Even if you were to sell it for the financial advantage, your husband would have taken it from you. Rav Shalman said in response: She still would incur a loss, because there is a gain to the household. Even if the husband were to be the one to receive the payment from the sale, the financial situation of the household would be improved, leading to a concrete benefit for the wife as well. This offsets the wife鈥檚 potential loss.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诇讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讜转 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 驻讬专讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 驻讬专讗 讚驻讬专讗 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉


Rava said: The halakha is that the money received for selling the financial advantage of the marriage contract is given only to the wife, and the husband does not even garner the profits from that money or from property the wife would purchase with that money. What is the reason? The Sages instituted that the profits of her property are for the husband, but the Sages did not institute that the profits of the profits are for him.


讻讬 讗转讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讜专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 诪讘讬 专讘 讗诪专讬 转谞讬谞讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讛注讘讚 讜讛讗砖讛 驻讙讬注转谉 专注讛 讛讞讜讘诇 讘讛谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讛诐 砖讞讘诇讜 讘讗讞专讬诐 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讬转讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 转讝讘讬谉 谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讜转转谉 诇讬讛


When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of Rav they said: We learned a source for the ordinance of Usha in the mishna (87a): With regard to a slave or a married woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others they are exempt, because they do not have money with which to pay. And if it enters your mind to say that there is no ordinance of Usha, there would be a method by which a married woman can obtain money with which to pay, as the court can have her sell her usufruct property and give the money received to the one she injured. It can therefore be inferred from the mishna that a woman cannot sell her usufruct property, in accordance with the ordinance of Usha.


讜诇讟注诪讬讱 谞讛讬 谞诪讬 讚讗讬转讬讛 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讜诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讝讘谞讛 诇讙诪专讬 转讝讘讬谉 诇谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 讚诇讬转 诇讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讬转 诇讛


The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, though indeed there is an ordinance of Usha, and she cannot fully sell her usufruct property, she should nevertheless be able to sell her usufruct property for the financial advantage, i.e., the purchaser will pay her for the future rights to the property in the event that she gets divorced or is widowed, and she will give that money to the one she injured. Rather, it must be that the mishna is discussing a case where she does not have usufruct property of which she can sell the future rights. So too, there is no source from the mishna for the ordinance of Usha, as the mishna is discussing a case where she does not have usufruct property to sell.


讜转讝讘讬谉 讻转讜讘转讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 砖讬砖讛讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘诇讗 讻转讜讘讛


The Gemara questions the ruling of the mishna: Why does the mishna assert that a married woman will not have money with which to pay, but she should sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract and give the money received to the one she injured? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling of the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is prohibited for a man to remain living together with his wife for even one hour without her having a marriage contract. Therefore, the woman cannot sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讻讗 诇讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讗转讜 讛谞讱 讚讝讘谞讬 讙讘讜 诇讛 诇讻转讜讘转讛 诪讬谞讬讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir? It is so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, as he would not suffer any adverse financial consequences by divorcing her. The Gemara asks: If that is the reason, then here, when she sold her marriage contract to others, the husband will not easily divorce her, as, if he would divorce her, those who purchased her marriage contract will come and collect payment of her marriage contract from the husband. It makes no difference to the husband whether he will have to pay the marriage contract to her or to the purchasers. Therefore, the reason for the ruling of the mishna cannot be based upon the statement of Rabbi Meir.


讗诇讗 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 诪讬诇讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜诪讬诇讬 诇讗 诪砖转注讘讚讬


Rather, the reason she is not required to sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to pay the one she injured is that the financial advantage of her marriage contract is mere words, i.e., not a specific possession, but a legal entity that simply creates the possibility to collect its value at a later date. And mere words are not mortgaged for the payment of debts, in this case her debt to the injured party.


讗诇诪讛 诇讗 诪讬诇讬 讚诪讝讚讘谞讬 讘讚讬谞专讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪讜讻专 砖讟专 讞讜讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 讜讞讝专 讜诪讞诇讜 诪讞讜诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讬讜专砖 诪讜讞诇


The Gemara questions this assertion: Why not? Why is financial advantage not mortgaged? They are words that are sold for dinars. Since the financial advantage of her marriage contract has a market value, it is mortgaged to pay the debt to the injured party. Rather, she is not required to sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract because of the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: With regard to one who sells a promissory note to another, and the seller went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, and the promissory note is left valueless, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone, and even the seller鈥檚 heir can forgive the debt. Since there is a concern that the woman will forgive the debt of her marriage contract after having sold it, causing a loss to the purchaser, she is not required to sell it.


讗诪专讬 讝讘讜谞讬 讝讘讬谉 讜转转谉 诇讬讛 讜讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讬讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 转诪讞诇讛


The Sages say: Let her sell the financial advantage of the marriage contract and give the money to the one she injured, and if she happens to forgive the debt of her marriage contract to her husband, she will forgive it. Just as it is generally permitted for one to sell a promissory note despite the fact that he could then forgive the debt, the same should hold true in this case as well.


讗诪专讬 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 讜讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讬讛 讜讗驻住讚讬谞讬讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讝讘讬谞讗 讘讬讚讬诐 诇讗 讗驻住讚讬谞讛讜


The Sages say: In any matter that will engender a benefit to her husband, she will certainly forgive the debt to him so that he will not have to pay the marriage contract. And with regard to causing a definite loss to that purchaser through direct action by having the woman sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract in a case where she will certainly forgive the debt, the Sages will not be willing to cause a definite loss to the purchaser.


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讝讘讬谞讗 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讛讛讜讗 讚讞讘诇讛 讘讬讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛


The Gemara offers another suggestion: And if you would say that she should sell her marriage contract to that one whom she injured in order to receive the money for the financial advantage,


讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 诇讗 拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 讚讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讬讚讬 拽讗 讬讛讘讛 诇讬讛 住讜祝 住讜祝 讻诇 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 讜讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 讜讗讟专讜讞讬 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讘讻讚讬 诇讗 诪讟专讞讬谞谉


so that even if she were to forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband, the one she injured would not lose anything, as now as well she is not giving him any payment, one could respond that ultimately, in any matter that will engender a benefit to her husband, she will certainly forgive the debt with regard to him. And we do not trouble the courts to supervise the sale of the financial advantage without cause.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜讻谉 讛讬讗 砖讞讘诇讛 讘讘注诇讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转讛 讗诪讗讬 转讝讘谞讬谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 诇讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 讘讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讘讛讗 讞讘诇讛 讚讗讬 诪讞诇讛 诇讙讘讬 讘注诇 诇讬讻讗 驻住讬讚讗


The Gemara asks: But if the reason she does not sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to obtain money with which to pay the injured party is that she would then forgive the debt of the marriage contract, then with regard to that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:22): And similarly, in a case where she was the one who injured her husband she has not lost her marriage contract as a result, as he does not collect compensation from the properties she brought into the marriage that are enumerated in the marriage contract, why does she not lose it? Let her sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband in order to obtain the money to compensate him for that injury that she caused him, as, if she will forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband there will be no loss for the purchaser, i.e., her husband.


讛讗 讜讚讗讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讗讚诐 砖讬砖讛讗 讗转 讗砖转讜 讗驻讬诇讜 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘诇讗 讻转讜讘讛


The Gemara answers: This baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is prohibited for a man to remain living together with his wife for even one hour without her having a marriage contract. Therefore, the woman cannot sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband.


讜讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 拽诇讛 讘注讬谞讬讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讛讻讗 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛 讗讬 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诪讙专砖 诇讛 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛 诪讬谞讛


The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir? It is so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, and here, if she were to sell the marriage contract to him, he would then divorce her and collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. If that is so, even now, where she does not sell her marriage contract to him, he will divorce her, and once she is divorced, he will collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. Preventing her from selling the marriage contract to him will not serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.


讻讙讜谉 讚谞驻讬砖 讻转讜讘转讛 讚诪砖讜诐 讛讛讜讗 驻讜专转讗 诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 讟讜讘讗


The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where there is a large sum recorded in her marriage contract, so that because of that slight sum due him as compensation for his injuries, he would not be willing to lose the large sum that he would have to pay were he to divorce her. Therefore, the marriage contract does serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.


讜讗讬 讚谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 谞讜拽诪讗 讗讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗讬讚讱 转讝讘谞讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讘讞讘诇讬讛


The Gemara suggests: But if in fact the baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, let them establish her marriage contract at the sum of a marriage contract required by Torah law, and with regard to the other, additional, sum, let her sell it to her husband as payment for his injuries. Since she will be left with a marriage contract of standard value, they would be allowed to remain living together.


讻讙讜谉 讚诇讗 谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚讛讜讬 讞讘诇讬讛 讗专讘注讛 讝讜讝讬 讚诪砖讜诐 讗专讘注讛 讝讜讝讬 诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 注砖专讬诐 讜讞诪砖讛


The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is not larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, that payment for his injury was assessed to be four dinars, and because of a gain of four dinars, the husband would not be willing to lose twenty-five dinars, which is the value of a marriage contract required by Torah law.


讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讻砖诐 砖诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讻讱 诇讗 转驻住讬讚 讜讛讬讗 转讞转讬讜 讜讛讗 讝讬诪谞讬谉 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 讚诪驻住讚讗 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讻讙讜谉 讚谞驻讬砖讗 讻转讜讘转讛 诪讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which is taught in the latter case of the baraita: Just as she does not sell her marriage contract to obtain money to pay damages while she is under him, i.e., married to her husband, so too, she does not lose the value of her marriage contract to pay damages while she is under him. But there are times when she will be found to have lost the value of her marriage contract, and what are the circumstances? It would be a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law. In that case she would be obligated to sell the portion of the marriage contract representing the additional amount in order to obtain money with which to compensate the one she injured.


讗诪专 专讘讗 住讬驻讗 讗转讗谉 诇讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉


Rava said in response: In the latter clause of that baraita, we arrive at the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and it is not discussing the sale of a marriage contract in general.


讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讻砖诐 砖讛诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讗讞专讬诐 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讗谞住讜讛 讻讱 诪讜讻专转 讻转讜讘转讛 诇讘注诇讛 诇讗 讛驻住讬讚讛 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讗谞住讜讛


And this is what the baraita is teaching: Just as the halakha stipulates that a woman who sells her marriage contract to others does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress, and she did not intend to abrogate her sons鈥 rights to inherit the property in the future. Rava continues his explanation of the baraita: So too, a woman who sells her marriage contract to her husband does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother鈥檚 marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress.


诇讬诪讗 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬 讞讚讗 注讘讚讬 诪诇讜讙 讬讜爪讗讬谉 讘砖谉 讜注讬谉 诇讗砖讛 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜诇讗 诇讗砖讛


搂 The Gemara returns to the earlier discussion and suggests: Shall we say that the issue whether or not there was an ordinance of Usha instituting that the wife cannot sell her usufruct property is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m? As it is taught in one baraita: Canaanite slaves that the woman brought into the marriage as usufruct property are emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the woman, i.e., the wife, as is the halakha when the owner of a slave knocks out the slave鈥檚 tooth or blinds his eye, but they are not emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the man, i.e., the husband, as he is not their owner. And it is taught in another baraita: The slave is not emancipated if his tooth was knocked out or his eye was blinded, nor by the man nor by the woman.


住讘专讜讛 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗砖讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗 诇讗讬砖 讜诇讗 诇讗砖讛 讗讬转 诇讬讛 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗


The Gemara continues its analysis: They assumed that everyone holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce, which the husband has with regard to usufruct property, is not like ownership of the item itself, which is why the husband is not considered the owner of the slaves. What, is it not so that the two baraitot disagree with regard to this: That the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he was struck by the woman holds that there is no ordinance of Usha? Since she retains the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated. And the one who says that the slave is not emancipated if he was struck by the man and not if he was struck by the woman holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Since she cannot sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.


诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗讬转 诇讛讜 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诇讗 讻讗谉 拽讜讚诐 转拽谞讛 讻讗谉 诇讗讞专 转拽谞讛


The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: No; perhaps it is the case that everyone holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. But here, in the first baraita, it is referring to the time before the ordinance was instituted, and since the wife had the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated, while there, in the second baraita, it is referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and since she could no longer sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.


讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 诇讗讞专 转拽谞讛 讜讗讬转 诇讛讜 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讗砖讛 讜诇讗 诇讗讬砖 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗


The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and the tanna in each baraita holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Rather, according to the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he is struck by the woman but not if he is struck by the man, what is the reason? It is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava said:


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