Bava Kamma 99

והקדיחו יורה נותן לו דמי צמרו דמי צמרו אין דמי צמרו ושבחו לא לאו שהקדיחו לאחר נפילה דאיכא שבחא ושמע מינה אומן קונה בשבח כלי

and it was burned in the cauldron in which it was dyed, the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. The Gemara infers: The value of his wool, yes, the dyer must pay that amount, but the value of the wool and its enhanced value, no, he need not pay. The Gemara suggests: Is this not referring to a case where the wool was burned after falling into the cauldron and the dye had taken hold, so that there is enhanced value, and one can learn from the mishna that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and therefore the dyer need not pay the enhanced value?

אמר שמואל הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהקדיחו בשעת נפילה דליכא שבחא אבל הקדיחו לאחר נפילה מאי נותן לו דמי צמרו ושבחו לימא שמואל לית ליה דרב אסי

Shmuel said: This is not a proof. With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the wool was burned at the moment of falling into the cauldron, before the dye had taken hold, so that there is no enhancement. The Gemara asks: But according to this opinion, what would the halakha be if it was burned after falling into the cauldron, when the dye had taken hold? Would the dyer give the owner the value of his wool and its enhancement? Shall we say that Shmuel does not accept the statement of Rav Asi, and holds that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel?

אמר לך שמואל הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דצמר וסמנין דבעל הבית וצבע אגר ידיה הוא דשקיל

The Gemara rejects this statement. Shmuel could have said to you: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with a case where the wool and herbs used in the dye both belong to the homeowner, and the dyer is taking only the payment of his hand, i.e., the wages for his labor, and nothing else. In this case, the craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but in a case where the craftsman provides the materials, he does acquire such rights.

אי הכי נותן לו דמי צמרו וסמנין מיבעי ליה אלא שמואל דחויי קא מדחי ליה

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the homeowner’s herbs were also ruined by the dyer, the mishna should have said that the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool and herbs, not just the value of his wool. Rather, Shmuel is merely dismissing the Gemara’s proof with regard to the statement of Rav Asi that a craftsman acquires a vessel through its enhancement, by saying that the mishna could be understood otherwise. He does not, however, state his own opinion on this matter.

תא שמע הנותן טליתו לאומן גמרו והודיעו אפילו מכאן ועד עשרה ימים אינו עובר עליו משום לא תלין נתנה לו בחצי היום כיון ששקעה עליו החמה עובר עליו משום בל תלין

The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who gave his garment to a craftsman, and the craftsman concluded the work and notified the owner that the work was complete, even if the owner delays paying the craftsman from now until ten days henceforth, he does not violate, for this delay, the prohibition of: “You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him; the wages of a hired worker shall not abide with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13). If the craftsman gave the garment to him at midday, then once the sun has set and the owner has not paid him, the owner does violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages.

ואי סלקא דעתך אומן קונה בשבח כלי אמאי עובר משום בל תלין

The Gemara concludes: And if it enters your mind to say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, why does the owner violate the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages? It is as if the craftsman acquired the garment, and the payment is considered to be a purchase of the garment by the owner, rather than a wage.

אמר רב מרי בריה דרב כהנא בגרדא דסרבלא דליכא שבחא

The Gemara responds: Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: The baraita is stating the halakha with regard to the laundering of a thick garment, where there is no enhancement of the garment. Therefore, the craftsman does not acquire it.

סוף סוף למאי יהבה נהליה לרכוכי כיון דרככיה היינו שבחא לא צריכא דאגריה לביטשי ביטשא ביטשא במעתא דהיינו שכירות

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, to what end did the owner of the garment give it to the craftsman? He gave it to him in order to soften it. Once he has softened it, that is its enhancement, and the craftsman has therefore acquired it. The Gemara responds: No; it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the owner hired the craftsman for treading, i.e., to forcefully tread on the garment in water until it softens, with the owner paying the craftsman a ma’a coin for each tread. The difference is that this is considered hired labor, where the craftsman is paid based on the amount of times he performed an action, and not contractual labor, where he is paid based on the outcome, in this case, a softened garment.

ולמאי דסליק אדעתין מעיקרא דלא אגריה לביטשי מסייע ליה לרב ששת דבעו מיניה מרב ששת קבלנות עובר עליו משום בל תלין או אינו עובר ואמר להו רב ששת עובר

The Gemara comments: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that the owner did not hire the worker for treading but rather he hired him like a craftsman based on the assumption that the garment would be returned laundered, this supports the opinion of Rav Sheshet. As they asked Rav Sheshet: If one hires a contractor, who is not paid an hourly wage but is paid upon the completion of his task, and the one who hired him does not pay him on the day that he completes the work, does he violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages, or does he not violate the prohibition? And Rav Sheshet said to them: He does violate the prohibition.

לימא דרב ששת פליגא אדרב אסי אמר שמואל בר אחא בשליחא דאיגרתא

The Gemara asks: Shall we say based on this statement that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the statement of Rav Asi, who holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and his payment is not considered to be a wage? Shmuel bar Aḥa said: Rav Sheshet is discussing a specific type of contractor, and he stated his ruling with regard to an agent tasked with the delivery of a letter, in which case, since the contractor’s only task is to deliver the letter, there is no enhancement through which he might acquire ownership rights. Consequently the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages applies.

לימא כתנאי עשה לי שירים נזמין וטבעות ואקדש לך כיון שעשאן מקודשת דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים אינה מקודשת עד שיגיע ממון לידה

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rav Asi, that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: Fashion bracelets, earrings, or rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you as payment for your work, then once he has fashioned them she is betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.

מאי ממון אילימא אותו ממון מכלל דרבי מאיר סבר אותו ממון לא אלא במאי מקדשא אלא פשיטא מאי ממון ממון אחר

The Gemara asks: What is this money mentioned by the Rabbis? If we say it means that very money, i.e., the rings she ordered, then by inference Rabbi Meir holds that even that very money is not required in order for the betrothal to take effect. But with what does he betroth her? He has given her nothing but the jewelry. Rather, it is obvious. To what money are the Rabbis referring? They must be referring to when he betroths her via other money, i.e., the payment she owes him for his service. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, in order for the betrothal to take effect he must give her additional money, while according to Rabbi Meir the betrothal takes effect when he gives her the jewelry.

וסברוה דכולי עלמא ישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף ודכולי עלמא המקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת

The Gemara prefaces its explanation of the connection to the issue at hand by delineating two assumptions: And those who say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis are engaging in a dispute with regard to the issue of a craftsman acquiring ownership rights through the enhancement of a vessel assumed that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, i.e., the obligation to pay for a service begins when the hired party commences work, and the sum owed increases as he proceeds. The fact that he is not paid from the time he commences work establishes the wages as a debt. Consequently, the wages now have the status of a loan. And they also assumed that everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan that she is not betrothed. She therefore cannot be betrothed to him by not having to pay the wages for his work.

מאי לאו באומן קונה בשבח כלי קמיפלגי דרבי מאיר סבר אומן קונה בשבח כלי ורבנן סברי אין אומן קונה בשבח כלי

Based on these assumptions, the Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to whether a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel? As Rabbi Meir holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since he owns the enhanced value of the vessel, when he gives the jewelry to her he is giving her something valuable of his own, and she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since a craftsman, in this case, the goldsmith, does not own the jewelry, he cannot betroth a woman with it.

לא דכולי עלמא אין אומן קונה בשבח כלי אלא הכא בישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף קא מיפלגי

The Gemara rejects this explanation of the dispute: No, it is possible that everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but here they disagree with regard to the issue of whether the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end.

רבי מאיר סבר אין לשכירות אלא לבסוף ורבנן סברי יש לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף

Rabbi Meir holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired, i.e., the owner is obligated to pay only when the work is complete, and therefore the goldsmith’s wages do not have the status of a loan, but of a sum of money that she becomes obligated to give him at that time. If he gives her the jewelry without asking for that money, it is as though he gave the money from his wages to her, and she may be betrothed with it. And the Rabbis hold that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and therefore his wages have the status of a loan, and she cannot be betrothed with them and must be given additional money.

ואי בעית אימא דכולי עלמא ישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף והכא במקדש במלוה קמיפלגי דרבי מאיר סבר המקדש במלוה מקודשת ורבנן סברי המקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and here they disagree with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan. As Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.

רבא אמר דכולי עלמא ישנה לשכירות מתחילה ועד סוף ודכולי עלמא המקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת ודכולי עלמא אין אומן קונה בשבח כלי

Rava said another interpretation: Everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period a craftsman is hired to its end; and everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed; and everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel.

אלא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהוסיף לה נופך משלו רבי מאיר סבר מלוה ופרוטה דעתה אפרוטה ורבנן סברי מלוה ופרוטה דעתה אמלוה

But with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he added a jewel [nofekh] of his own for her. Rabbi Meir holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta, her mind is focused on the peruta. Therefore, in this case the jewel serves as the betrothal money. And the Rabbis hold that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, so the loan serves as the betrothal money, and if one betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.

ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא בשכר שעשיתי עמך אינה מקודשת בשכר שאעשה עמך מקודשת רבי נתן אומר בשכר שאעשה עמך אינה מקודשת וכל שכן בשכר שעשיתי עמך

And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the dispute between these tanna’im. As it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:4): If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you, she is not betrothed, as the payment is a loan, since she already owes him this money. But if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is betrothed, as from the moment he is entitled to the money, he gives it to her for her betrothal. Rabbi Natan says: If he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed, as Rabbi Natan holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, which means that upon the completion of the labor it is a loan, and all the more so if he says: Be betrothed to me with the payment for which I have worked for you.

ורבי יהודה הנשיא אומר באמת אמרו בין בשכר שעשיתי עמך ובין בשכר שאעשה עמך אינה מקודשת ואם הוסיף לה נופך משלו מקודשת

The baraita cites a third opinion: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Actually they said that the halakha is that regardless of whether he said: With the payment for which I have worked for you, or whether he said: With the payment for which I will work for you, she is not betrothed. But if he added a jewel of his own for her, she is betrothed.

מאי איכא בין תנא קמא לרבי נתן איכא בינייהו שכירות בין רבי נתן לרבי יהודה הנשיא איכא בינייהו מלוה ופרוטה

The Gemara clarifies the dispute: What difference is there between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan? The difference between them is with regard to a wage: Is the obligation incurred continuously or only upon the completion of the work? The difference between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the issue of a loan and one peruta. Rabbi Natan holds that if a man betroths a woman with a loan and one peruta her mind is focused on the loan, and in this case his jewel is disregarded; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that her mind is focused on the peruta, in this case the jewel, and she is betrothed with the jewel.

אמר שמואל טבח אומן שקלקל חייב לשלם מזיק הוא פושע הוא נעשה כאומר לו שחוט לי מכאן ושחט לו מכאן

§ The Gemara now returns to the topic of a craftsman who damages the item with which he is working. Shmuel says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal for the damage. Why? He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, i.e., the area of the throat where ritual slaughter is performed, and he slaughtered it from there, i.e., a different area of the throat, in violation of the owner’s wishes.

למה ליה למימר מזיק הוא פושע הוא אי אמר מזיק הוא הוה אמינא הני מילי היכא דקא עביד בשכר אבל היכא דקא עביד בחנם לא קא משמע לן פושע הוא

The Gemara asks: Why must he say both that the butcher is one who causes damage and that he is negligent? The Gemara explains: If Shmuel had said only that he is one who causes damage, I would say that this statement applies only in a case where the butcher slaughtered the animal for pay, in which case, due to the extra responsibility that he bears, he is considered to be one who caused damage and is liable to pay even in a case where the damage was unintentional; but in a case where he does the work for free, I would say no, he is exempt from liability in a case where the damage was unintentional. Shmuel therefore teaches us that the butcher is negligent, and one who works without pay is analogous to an unpaid bailee, who is liable to pay for damage caused by negligence.

איתיביה רב חמא בר גוריא לשמואל הנותן בהמה לטבח וניבלה אומן פטור הדיוט חייב ואם נותן שכר בין הדיוט בין אומן חייב אמר ליה לעכר מוחך

Rav Ḥama bar Gurya raised an objection to Shmuel from the Tosefta (10:10): With regard to one who gives an animal to a butcher, and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an animal carcass, if the butcher is an expert, then he is exempt from liability; if he is an ordinary person, without particular expertise in the act of ritual slaughter, he is liable. And if the owner of the animal paid the butcher, then regardless of whether he is an ordinary person or whether he is an expert, the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. This indicates that an expert butcher who slaughtered the animal improperly is exempt if he slaughtered it without pay. Shmuel said to him: May your mind be muddled for raising a ridiculous objection.

אתא ההוא מרבנן קא מותיב ליה אמר ליה השתא שקלת מאי דשקל חברך קאמינא לכו אנא רבי מאיר וקאמריתו לי רבנן אמאי לא דייקת מילי שאני אומר מזיק הוא פושע הוא נעשה כאומר לו שחוט לי מכאן ושחט לו מכאן מאן אית ליה האי סברא רבי מאיר דאמר מבעי ליה למירמי אנפשיה

One of the Sages came and raised the same objection to Shmuel. Shmuel said to him: Now you shall receive what your friend received from me, since I say to you my statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and you say to me, i.e., you raise an objection, based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. Why were you not precise in your consideration of my choice of words? As I say: He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; he is like one who is told by the animal’s owner to slaughter it from here, and he slaughtered it from there. Who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, who says: He should have taken upon himself the responsibility to perform his task properly, and if he did not, he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. The other baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt him from liability.

הי רבי מאיר אילימא [הא] רבי מאיר (קלן סימן)

The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Meir is Shmuel referring to? If we say it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, that is difficult. Parenthetically, the Gemara states that the letters kuf, lamed, nun serve as a mnemonic device for the three statements of Rabbi Meir that will be cited. It stands for: He tied it [kesharo], to dye [litzboa], and broke [nishbera].

דתנן קשרו בעליו במוסירה ונעל בפניו כראוי ויצא והזיק בין תם בין מועד חייב דברי רבי מאיר

The Gemara returns to the matter at hand: As we learned in a mishna (45b): If the ox’s owner tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in an appropriate manner, but nevertheless the ox emerged and caused damage, whether the ox is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable, since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. As the Gemara explains on 45b, Rabbi Meir holds that a forewarned ox requires a heightened level of safeguarding, and since the owner did not safeguard it, he is liable. The same would apply here, that one who agrees to perform a task must exercise care in executing it. Otherwise, he will be held liable to pay for damage.

התם בקראי פליגי

The Gemara explains why this cannot be the statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel was referring to: There, in that mishna, the Sages disagree with regard to the interpretation of biblical verses, not logical reasoning, as the Gemara explains there, and conclusions cannot be drawn from that halakha to this one.

אלא הא רבי מאיר דתנן לצבוע לו אדום וצבעו שחור שחור וצבעו אדום רבי מאיר אומר נותן לו דמי צמרו התם בידים קלאו מיניה

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and he dyed it black, or to dye it black, and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner the value of his wool, indicating that he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara rejects this opinion: This statement also does not prove that according to Rabbi Meir a worker is liable to pay for a job performed improperly, since there, the dyer burned the wool, thereby removing it from the owner by direct action.

אלא הא רבי מאיר דתנן נשברה כדו ולא סילקה נפלה גמלו ולא העמידה רבי מאיר אומר חייב בנזקן וחכמים אומרים פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים וקיימא לן דבנתקל פושע הוא פליגי

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel is referring to, as we learned in a baraita: If one’s jug broke on the road and he did not remove it, or if his camel fell on the road and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir says: He is liable for the damage that they cause, and the Rabbis say: He is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. The Gemara notes: And we maintain that they disagree with regard to the question of whether one who stumbles is considered negligent. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, one who stumbles is considered negligent, since he should have paid attention while walking. He is therefore liable for whatever damage he causes. In the case of an expert butcher as well, Rabbi Meir holds that he is considered negligent when damaging the animal he slaughtered, and the Rabbis hold that he is not negligent and therefore exempt from liability.

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן טבח אומן שקלקל חייב ואפילו הוא אומן כטבחי ציפורי ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי והאמר רבה בר בר חנה עובדא הוה קמיה דרבי יוחנן בכנישתא דמעון ואמר ליה זיל אייתי ראיה דממחית לתרנגולים ואפטרך

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion concerning the case of an expert butcher. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An expert butcher who damaged an animal by slaughtering it incorrectly, thereby rendering it non-kosher, is liable to pay the owner of the animal, and even if he is as expert as the butchers of Tzippori, it is not considered an accident, and he is considered to be at fault. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that there was an incident in which a butcher who damaged an animal was brought to court before Rabbi Yoḥanan in the synagogue of the town Maon, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the butcher: Go bring proof that you are an expert at slaughtering chickens, and I will exempt you from payment.

לא קשיא כאן בחנם כאן בשכר כי הא דאמר רבי זירא הרוצה שיתחייב לו טבח יקדים לו דינר

The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, in the aforementioned incident, the butcher slaughtered the animal for free, and he is therefore exempt, while there, in Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s previous statement, he slaughtered the animal for pay, and is therefore liable to pay for the damage. This is in accordance with that which Rabbi Zeira says: One who wants a butcher to be liable to pay him in the event that he damages the animal during slaughter should advance him a dinar, so that he is paid for his services, and he is consequently liable to pay damages.

מיתיבי המוליך חטים לטחון ולא לתתן ועשאן סובין או מורסן קמח לנחתום ועשאו פת ניפולין בהמה לטבח וניבלה חייב מפני שהוא כנושא שכר אימא מפני שהוא נושא שכר

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (10:9): One who brought wheat to another to grind for him, and the miller did not wet the grains sufficiently for the grinding to be performed effectively, and as a result he converted the grain into bran or coarse bran; or if one gave flour to the baker and he made bread that is underbaked and tends to crumble; or if one gave an animal to a butcher and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an unslaughtered animal carcass, the worker is liable, because he is like a paid bailee. This indicates that even if the work was done for free, the worker has the legal status of one who is paid, and he is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara answers by emending the baraita: Say instead: Because he is a paid bailee and actually receives payment.

ההוא מגרומתא דאתאי לקמיה דרב טרפיה ופטריה לטבח מלשלומי דמי פגעו ביה רב כהנא ורב אסי בההוא גברא אמרו ליה עביד בך רב תרתי

The Gemara relates: There was a certain animal that was slaughtered with an incision not in the neck that was brought before Rav. He declared it non-kosher, and exempted the butcher from paying its value. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi encountered that man, i.e., the owner of the animal, and they said to him: Rav did two for you.

מאי תרתי אילימא תרתי לגריעותא דאיבעי ליה לאכשורי כרבי יוסי ברבי יהודה וטרפה כרבנן ואי נמי כרבנן דאיבעי ליה חיובא לטבחא ומי שרי למימר כי האי גונא

The Gemara asks: What are the two? If we say there were two unfavorable rulings, what are they? One is that he should have declared the animal kosher, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an animal that has been slaughtered in this manner is kosher, and instead he declared it non-kosher, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not kosher. And the second is that even if he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, he should have ruled that the butcher is liable to pay for the damage. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But if these are the two that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi are referring to, is it permitted for them to say this type of statement to the owner of the animal?

והתניא לכשיצא לא יאמר אני מזכה וחבירי מחייבין אבל מה אעשה שחבירי רבו עלי ועל זה נאמר הולך רכיל מגלה סוד

But isn’t it taught in a baraita that when a judge leaves the courthouse, he should not say to the litigant: I found you innocent and my colleagues found you liable, but what can I do, since my colleagues outnumber me? And it is concerning a circumstance such as this that it is stated: “He that goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets; but he that is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).

אלא תרתי למעליותא דלא אוכלך ספק איסורא ומנעך מספק גזילה

Rather, the intention is that they told him that there were two favorable rulings: First, that by declaring the animal to be non-kosher, he did not allow you to eat an item about which there is uncertainty as to whether it is forbidden, and second, by exempting the butcher from paying you, he prevented you from being in a situation where there is uncertainty as to whether receiving payment from the butcher constitutes robbery, since you would have been given the butcher’s money when he may be exempt, as the animal may in fact be kosher.

איתמר המראה דינר לשולחני ונמצא רע תני חדא אומן פטור הדיוט חייב ותניא אידך בין אומן בין הדיוט חייב

§ The Gemara continues the discussion of an expert who erred, thereby causing a loss. It was stated: With regard to one who presents a dinar to a money changer to assess its value or authenticity and the money changer declares it valid, and it is found to be bad, i.e., invalid, causing its owner a monetary loss, it is taught in one baraita that if the money changer is an expert, he is exempt, while if he is an ordinary person he is liable. And it is taught in another baraita that irrespective of whether he is an expert or whether he is an ordinary person, he is liable to pay for the owner’s loss.

אמר רב פפא כי תניא אומן פטור כגון דנכו ואיסור דלא צריכי למיגמר כלל אלא במאי טעו טעו בסיכתא חדתא דההיא שעתא דנפק מתותי סיכתא

To reconcile the baraitot, Rav Pappa said: When the baraita teaches that an expert is exempt from liability, it is referring to renowned experts such as the money changers Dankhu and Issur, whose expertise is so great that they do not need to learn about assessing currency at all. The Gemara asks: But if they are so proficient, in what did they err? The Gemara answers: They erred with regard to a coin from a new press, which at that time was leaving the press, and they did not know its value.

ההיא איתתא דאחזיא דינרא לרבי חייא אמר לה מעליא הוא למחר אתאי לקמיה ואמרה ליה אחזיתיה ואמרו לי בישא הוא ולא קא נפיק לי אמר ליה לרב זיל חלפיה ניהלה וכתוב אפנקסי דין עסק ביש

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who presented a dinar to Rabbi Ḥiyya to assess its authenticity. He said to her: It is a proper coin. The next day she came before him and said to him: I presented it to others, and they told me that it is a bad dinar, and I am not able to spend it. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go exchange it for her, and write on my tablet [apinkasi]: This was a bad transaction, as I should not have assessed the coin.

ומאי שנא דנכו ואיסור דפטירי משום דלא צריכי למיגמר רבי חייא נמי לאו למיגמר קא בעי רבי חייא לפנים משורת הדין הוא דעבד כדתני רב יוסף והודעת להם זה

The Gemara asks: But what is different about Dankhu and Issur, who are exempt due to the fact that they do not need to learn about assessing currency? Rabbi Ḥiyya too did not need to learn, as he was also an expert. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Ḥiyya was not actually required to return a dinar to this woman, but when he did so he acted beyond the letter of the law. This is as that which Rav Yosef taught concerning the verse: “And you shall show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do” (Exodus 18:20): “And you shall show them”; this is referring to