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Today's Daf Yomi

October 6, 2016 | 讚壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 10

The mishna discusses someone who sees an item and asks someone to pick it up for him. 聽As long as he hasn’t yet handed it to the person who asked him to pick it up, the person can claim that it is his own. 聽The gemara tries to reconcile this with a mishna in Peah that describes someone who takes part of the corner of another’s field on behalf of a poor person. 聽There is a concept that one who takes money from a debtor for a friend when the debtor also owes others and may not have enough funds to go around cannot acquire the money for his friend. 聽The question is does the same thing apply to a lost item since potentially it is causing everyone else not to acquire it or do we say since there is no potential financial loss for anyone as the lost item wasn’t something they are owed, then he can acquire it for the friend. 聽The mishna then discusses that one who jumps on an item also doesn’t acquire it. 聽Reish Lakish brings a halacha that one acquires everything within 4 cubits surrounding a person. 聽The gemara then questions this from a mishna in Peah and also our mishna and two answers are brought for each source to explain why it doesn’t contradict. 聽Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a minor girl’s divorce document can be given to her by placing in her courtyard or in the 4 cubits surrounding her. 聽The gemara explains that the argument is based on whether a courtyard functions as an extension of one’s hand or as a messenger.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘注砖讬专 讜注谞讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诪注谞讬 诇注谞讬 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讝讻讛 诇讜 讛讗 诪谞讬 诇讗 专讘谞谉 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot acquire an item for another in this manner. But if you say that the dispute is specifically in a case of a rich person and a poor person but in a case where the pe鈥檃 was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of a poor person everyone agrees that he acquired it on the latter鈥檚 behalf, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

Ulla said to Rav Na岣an: The mishna is referring to a case where the one lifting the item said: I intended to acquire the item for myself at the outset; I never had intention to acquire it on behalf of the rider.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诐 诪砖谞转谞讛 诇讜 讗诪专 讗谞讬 讝讻讬转讬 讘讛 转讞讬诇讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 转讞讬诇讛 讘住讬驻讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 驻砖讬讟讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛 转讞讬诇讛 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to explain the mishna in this manner, as it teaches in the last clause: But if, after giving it to the one riding the animal he said: I acquired it for myself at the outset, he has said nothing and the rider keeps the item. Why do I need the phrase: At the outset, to be mentioned in the last clause? It is obvious that even if he did not explicitly say: At the outset, he meant that he acquired it at the outset, before he gave it to the rider. Rather, isn鈥檛 this phrase mentioned to teach us this: The first clause of the mishna is also referring a case where he said: I intended to acquire it for myself at the outset?

讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

And the other Sage, Rav Na岣an, is of the opinion that the mishna taught this phrase in the last clause of the mishna in order to shed light on the first clause. The last clause is referring to a case where he said that he acquired the item at the outset in order to indicate that in the first clause, the one who lifts the item acquires it even in a case where he did not say that he acquired it for himself at the outset. In Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion, the rider does not acquire the item until it is given to him.

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛诪讙讘讬讛 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 拽谞讛 讞讘讬专讜

搂 The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rav Na岣an and Rav 岣sda, who both say: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person, i.e., the latter, does not acquire ownership of the item.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讜讬 转讜驻住 诇讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讞讘 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜讛转讜驻住 诇讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讞讘 诇讗讞专讬诐 诇讗 拽谞讛

What is the reason for this? The reason is that it is a case of one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owes money to other creditors as well; and one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others does not acquire the assets for him. Although a creditor can himself seize the assets as payment for the debt, no one else can take action that will benefit one person at the expense of others. Similarly, since everyone has equal rights to an ownerless item that is found, one person cannot deprive all others of that right on behalf of another person.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪爪讬讗转 驻讜注诇 诇注爪诪讜

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Na岣an from a baraita: The found item of a laborer, i.e., something that he found, belongs to him and not to the employer for whom he is working at that time.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讝诪谉 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 谞讻砖 注诪讬 讛讬讜诐 注讚讜专 注诪讬 讛讬讜诐 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讜 注砖讛 注诪讬 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讬讜诐 诪爪讬讗转讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗

In what case is this statement, that the item belongs to the laborer, said? It is said when the employer told the laborer to perform a specific task, e.g., he said to him: Weed for me today, or: Till for me today. Since the employer specified the task that he hired the laborer to perform, the laborer has rights to the item that the laborer found. But if the employer said to the laborer: Work for me today, without specifying the nature of the work, the found item is the employer鈥檚, as finding ownerless items is included within the general category of work. This indicates that a laborer can acquire an item for someone else, which contradicts Rav Na岣an鈥檚 principle.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 驻讜注诇 讚讬讚讜 讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: A laborer is different, as his hand is like the hand of the employer. He is considered his agent while he is working for him.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 驻讜注诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讞爪讬 讛讬讜诐

Rava responded: But doesn鈥檛 Rav say that a laborer may reconsider and quit his job, even at midday? Evidently, the relationship between the employer and the laborer is structured to the benefit of the laborer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诇 讻诪讛 讚诇讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗 讻讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讻讬 诇讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 注讘讚讬诐 注讘讚讬 讛诐 讜诇讗 注讘讚讬诐 诇注讘讚讬诐

Rav Na岣an said to him: As long as he does not retract his commitment, his hand is like the employer鈥檚 hand. When he does retract his commitment, he is able to do so. But this is not because matters are structured to the benefit of the laborer, but for a different reason, as it is written: 鈥淔or to Me the children of Israel are slaves; they are My slaves whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt鈥 (Leviticus 25:55), which indicates: They are My slaves, and not slaves of slaves, i.e., of other Jews. Consequently, a Jew can never be enslaved to another Jew with a contract from which he cannot release himself whenever he wishes. Nevertheless, as long as the laborer does not quit the job, he is considered his employer鈥檚 agent.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讙讘讬讛 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 拽谞讛 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诐 转讗诪专 诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讚讗诪专 转谞讛 诇讬 讜诇讗 讗诪专 讝讻讛 诇讬

Contrary to the opinion of Rav Na岣an and Rav 岣sda, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person acquires ownership of the item. And if you say that our mishna seems to suggest otherwise, it is referring to a case where the rider says to the pedestrian: Give it to me, but does not say: Acquire it for me. If he says give it to me, the rider acquires the item only when it reaches his possession. If he says acquire it for me, the rider acquires the item as soon as the pedestrian lifts it.

诪转谞讬壮 专讗讛 讗转 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讜谞驻诇 注诇讬讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讻讛 讘讛

MISHNA: If one saw a found item and fell upon it, intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, and then another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讗 讻讛谉 讘专讚诇讗 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 [诪讗讬 讟注诪讗] 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗谞爪讜讬讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 驻讬讗讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讬讚讬 谞讝讬拽讬谉

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: The area of four square cubits surrounding a person has the legal status of his courtyard, and it effects acquisition of every ownerless item located there for him, everywhere. What is the reason for this? The Sages instituted this ordinance so that people would not come to quarrel over an item. Abaye said that Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃. Rava said that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 驻讬讗讛 谞讟诇 诪拽爪转 驻讬讗讛 讜讝专拽 注诇 讛砖讗专 讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讛 讻诇讜诐 谞驻诇 诇讜 注诇讬讛 驻专住 讟诇讬转讜 注诇讬讛 诪注讘讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讻谉 讘注讜诪专 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said that Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃 (4:3), which states: If a poor person took some of the pe鈥檃 in the field and threw it on the rest of the pe鈥檃 in order to acquire it, he has nothing of it. The same is true if he fell upon the pe鈥檃, or if he spread his garment over it; others may remove him or his garment from the pe鈥檃 in order to take it for themselves, as he did not acquire it. And the same is true in the case of a forgotten sheaf left for the poor; a poor person cannot acquire it in any of these manners.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 谞拽谞讜 诇讬讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讚讬讚讬讛

Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef continues: And if you say that a person鈥檚 area of four square cubits effects acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his area of four square cubits effect acquisition of the pe鈥檃 or the forgotten sheaf for him.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗拽谞讬

The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire the pe鈥檃 through this action. He performed the action without revealing his intention; therefore, his acquisition is ineffective.

讜讗讬 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that the area of four cubits surrounding a person acquires property for him, then even in a case where he did not say: I will acquire the produce, what of it? Shouldn鈥檛 he have acquired it even without expressing his intent to do so?

讻讬讜谉 讚谞驻诇 讙诇讬 讚注转讬讛 讚讘谞驻讬诇讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬 讘讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬

The Gemara answers: This case is different. Since he fell upon it he thereby revealed his intention: That it is satisfactory for him to acquire the produce by falling on it and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the produce through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition that the Sages instituted, and falling on the produce is not a valid mode of acquisition, he did not acquire the produce.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讻讬 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讘注诇诪讗 讘砖讚讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 讘讙讜讛 讻讬 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讛诇讜讻讬 讘讛 讜诇谞拽讜讟讬 驻讬讗讛 诇诪讬讛讜讬 讞爪讬专讜 诇讗 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗

Rav Pappa said a different answer: When the Sages instituted an ordinance that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in the world, i.e., on public land. But the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition for him in a field belonging to an owner. And even though the Merciful One accorded a poor person certain rights in a landowner鈥檚 field during the distribution of pe鈥檃, this mode of acquisition is not included in those rights; when the Merciful One accorded him rights it was specifically to walk in the field and to collect pe鈥檃, but the Merciful One did not accord him the right that the field be considered his courtyard with regard to acquiring pe鈥檃. Therefore, the mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃 does not contradict the statement of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讬讚讬 谞讝讬拽讬谉 专讗讛 讗转 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讜谞驻诇 诇讜 注诇讬讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讻讛 讘讛 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 谞拽谞讜 诇讬讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讚讬讚讬讛

As mentioned previously, Rava said that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here states that if one saw a found item and fell upon it, and another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it. And if you say that a person鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his four square cubits effect acquisition of the found item for him.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗拽谞讬 讜讗讬 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讻讬讜谉 讚谞驻诇 注诇讬讛 讙诇讬 讚注转讬讛 讚讘谞驻讬诇讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬 讘讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire it. The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, then even in a case when he did not say: I will acquire the item, what of it? The item should still be his. The Gemara answers: Since he fell upon it, he revealed his intention that it is satisfactory for him to acquire the item by falling on it, and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the item through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition instituted by the Sages, he does not acquire the found item.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻讬 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘住诪讟讗 讚诇讗 讚讞拽讬 专讘讬诐 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讚拽讗 讚讞拽讬 专讘讬诐 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉

Rav Sheshet said a different answer: When the Sages instituted that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in a place like an alleyway, where the multitudes do not crowd, so the four square cubits surrounding a person can temporarily be considered his property and enable him to acquire an item; but the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition in the public domain, where the multitudes crowd.

讜讛讗 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 拽讗诪专

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 the wording of Reish Lakish鈥檚 statement indicate that there is no such limitation, as he says that the area of four square cubits surrounding a person effects acquisition of property for him everywhere? The indication is that this is true even in the public domain.

讻诇 诪拽讜诐 诇讗转讜讬讬 爪讬讚讬 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

The Gemara answers: The word everywhere is not to be taken literally; it was stated to include even the sides of the public domain, areas that are adjacent to the public domain but not actually part of it. Since the multitudes do not crowd there, one who is standing there acquires an item that is in his four square cubits.

讜讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讗 讻讛谉 讘专讚诇讗 拽讟谞讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讞爪专 讜讗讬谉 诇讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讗诪专 讬砖 诇讛 讞爪专 讜讬砖 诇讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转

And Reish Lakish says another halakha in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai that she has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she has the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讬讚 讞爪专 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚砖诇讬讞讜转 诇讬转 诇讛 讞爪专 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讛

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. Just as a minor girl has the ability to acquire property with her hand, she also has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency; and just as a minor girl has no power of agency, as a minor cannot appoint an agent, she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard either.

诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讘讬讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讜 讙讙讜 讞爪讬专讜 讜拽专驻讬驻讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛诪爪讗 转诪爪讗 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara asks: Is there anyone who says that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淚f the theft shall be found in his possession alive, whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double鈥 (Exodus 22:3)鈥 From the term 鈥渋n his possession [beyado],鈥 I have derived only a case where the stolen item is found in his hand [yado]. From where do I derive that the same halakha applies if it is found on his roof, in his yard, or in his enclosure? The verse states the repetitive phrase 鈥渋f the theft shall be found [himmatze timmatze],鈥 to indicate that the same halakha applies in any case, i.e., in any location that the stolen item is found.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讗诐 讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛

The Gemara explains: And if it enters your mind that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to agency, if so, we have found a case where there is agency for a transgression, i.e., theft. But we maintain that there is no agency for transgression. If one sends an agent to violate a transgression on his behalf, the agent is liable for the transgression and is not considered to be acting on behalf of the one who sent him.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讛讬讻讗 讚砖诇讬讞 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗讜 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 讛讜讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜

Ravina said: That baraita poses no problem, as where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is where the agent himself is subject to liability for transgression. Consequently, the agent is liable, not the one who sent him. But in the case of a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讜注讘讚 爪讗讜 讙谞讘讜 诇讬 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then in a case of one who says to a woman or a slave: Go out and steal for me, is the one who sent them indeed liable, since they are not subject to liability? Married women and slaves have no property of their own from which one could collect payment.

讗诪专转 讗砖讛 讜注讘讚 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讬转 诇讛讜 诇砖诇讜诪讬 讚转谞谉 谞转讙专砖讛 讛讗砖讛 谞砖转讞专专 讛注讘讚 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇砖诇诐

The Gemara answers: You can say in response: A woman and a slave are not comparable to a courtyard, as they are subject to liability if they steal; and only now, in any event, they do not have the means to pay. This is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 87a) concerning a married woman or Canaanite slave who injured another person: If the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and they then have their own money, they are liable to pay for the damage they inflicted. Evidently, although it is not possible to collect payment from them, they are liable for their actions.

专讘 住诪讗 讗诪专 讛讬讻讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讜讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讘诇 讞爪专 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讬讛 诪讜转讬讘 讘讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜

Rav Samma stated a different resolution to the difficulty based on the baraita: Where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is specifically in a case where if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can also opt to not do it. But in the case of a courtyard, where one places items without its consent, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讻讛谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 爪讗 讜拽讚砖 诇讬 讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗讬砖 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖讛 讗拽驻讬 诇讬 拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the answers of Ravina and Rav Samma? The practical difference between them is in the case of a priest who said to an Israelite: Go out and betroth a divorced woman for me. It is prohibited for a priest to betroth a divorc茅e, while it is permitted for an Israelite to do so. Alternatively, the difference is in the case of a man who said to a woman: Round the corners of the head of a minor boy for me. Rounding the corners of a man鈥檚 head, and a man having the corners of his head rounded, are prohibited in the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not round the corners of your head鈥 (Leviticus 19:27), but they are prohibited only for men and not for women.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚砖诇讬讞 诇讗讜 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉

The Gemara explains: According to the formulation in which it was said that anywhere that if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it the one who sent him is not liable for the transgression but rather the agent is liable, in these cases too, since if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it, the one who sent them is not liable. But according to the formulation in which it was said that wherever an agent is not subject to liability the one who sent him is liable, in these cases too, since the agents are not subject to liability, the one who sent them is liable.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞爪专 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讚讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讛 讙讙讛 讞爪讬专讛 讜拽专驻讬驻讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara asks about the explanation of the opinion of Abba Kohen Bardela: But is there anyone who says that placing an item in a courtyard is not included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: From the verse: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance, and he gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), I have derived only that a woman is divorced if her husband places the bill of divorce in her hand. From where is it derived that even if he places it on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure, she is divorced? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he gives,鈥 indicating that she is divorced in any case. Apparently one鈥檚 courtyard is considered an extension of his hand with regard to acquiring property, in this case, the bill of divorce.

诇注谞讬谉 讙讟 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 诇注谞讬谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪专 住讘专

The Gemara answers: With regard to a bill of divorce everyone agrees that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. When they disagree, it is with regard to acquiring a found item that was discovered in her courtyard. One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that

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Bava Metzia 10

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 10

诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪谞讬 专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘注砖讬专 讜注谞讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诪注谞讬 诇注谞讬 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讝讻讛 诇讜 讛讗 诪谞讬 诇讗 专讘谞谉 讜诇讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专

whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot acquire an item for another in this manner. But if you say that the dispute is specifically in a case of a rich person and a poor person but in a case where the pe鈥檃 was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of a poor person everyone agrees that he acquired it on the latter鈥檚 behalf, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

Ulla said to Rav Na岣an: The mishna is referring to a case where the one lifting the item said: I intended to acquire the item for myself at the outset; I never had intention to acquire it on behalf of the rider.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗诐 诪砖谞转谞讛 诇讜 讗诪专 讗谞讬 讝讻讬转讬 讘讛 转讞讬诇讛 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 转讞讬诇讛 讘住讬驻讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 驻砖讬讟讗 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛 转讞讬诇讛 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 专讬砖讗 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to explain the mishna in this manner, as it teaches in the last clause: But if, after giving it to the one riding the animal he said: I acquired it for myself at the outset, he has said nothing and the rider keeps the item. Why do I need the phrase: At the outset, to be mentioned in the last clause? It is obvious that even if he did not explicitly say: At the outset, he meant that he acquired it at the outset, before he gave it to the rider. Rather, isn鈥檛 this phrase mentioned to teach us this: The first clause of the mishna is also referring a case where he said: I intended to acquire it for myself at the outset?

讜讗讬讚讱 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 住讬驻讗 讚讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 转讞讬诇讛

And the other Sage, Rav Na岣an, is of the opinion that the mishna taught this phrase in the last clause of the mishna in order to shed light on the first clause. The last clause is referring to a case where he said that he acquired the item at the outset in order to indicate that in the first clause, the one who lifts the item acquires it even in a case where he did not say that he acquired it for himself at the outset. In Rav Na岣an鈥檚 opinion, the rider does not acquire the item until it is given to him.

专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛诪讙讘讬讛 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 拽谞讛 讞讘讬专讜

搂 The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rav Na岣an and Rav 岣sda, who both say: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person, i.e., the latter, does not acquire ownership of the item.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讜讬 转讜驻住 诇讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讞讘 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜讛转讜驻住 诇讘注诇 讞讜讘 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讞讘 诇讗讞专讬诐 诇讗 拽谞讛

What is the reason for this? The reason is that it is a case of one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owes money to other creditors as well; and one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others does not acquire the assets for him. Although a creditor can himself seize the assets as payment for the debt, no one else can take action that will benefit one person at the expense of others. Similarly, since everyone has equal rights to an ownerless item that is found, one person cannot deprive all others of that right on behalf of another person.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 诪爪讬讗转 驻讜注诇 诇注爪诪讜

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Na岣an from a baraita: The found item of a laborer, i.e., something that he found, belongs to him and not to the employer for whom he is working at that time.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讝诪谉 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 谞讻砖 注诪讬 讛讬讜诐 注讚讜专 注诪讬 讛讬讜诐 讗讘诇 讗诪专 诇讜 注砖讛 注诪讬 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讬讜诐 诪爪讬讗转讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗

In what case is this statement, that the item belongs to the laborer, said? It is said when the employer told the laborer to perform a specific task, e.g., he said to him: Weed for me today, or: Till for me today. Since the employer specified the task that he hired the laborer to perform, the laborer has rights to the item that the laborer found. But if the employer said to the laborer: Work for me today, without specifying the nature of the work, the found item is the employer鈥檚, as finding ownerless items is included within the general category of work. This indicates that a laborer can acquire an item for someone else, which contradicts Rav Na岣an鈥檚 principle.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖讗谞讬 驻讜注诇 讚讬讚讜 讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗

Rav Na岣an said to him: A laborer is different, as his hand is like the hand of the employer. He is considered his agent while he is working for him.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 驻讜注诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讞爪讬 讛讬讜诐

Rava responded: But doesn鈥檛 Rav say that a laborer may reconsider and quit his job, even at midday? Evidently, the relationship between the employer and the laborer is structured to the benefit of the laborer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诇 讻诪讛 讚诇讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讻讬讚 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讛讜讗 讻讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讻讬 诇讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 注讘讚讬诐 注讘讚讬 讛诐 讜诇讗 注讘讚讬诐 诇注讘讚讬诐

Rav Na岣an said to him: As long as he does not retract his commitment, his hand is like the employer鈥檚 hand. When he does retract his commitment, he is able to do so. But this is not because matters are structured to the benefit of the laborer, but for a different reason, as it is written: 鈥淔or to Me the children of Israel are slaves; they are My slaves whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt鈥 (Leviticus 25:55), which indicates: They are My slaves, and not slaves of slaves, i.e., of other Jews. Consequently, a Jew can never be enslaved to another Jew with a contract from which he cannot release himself whenever he wishes. Nevertheless, as long as the laborer does not quit the job, he is considered his employer鈥檚 agent.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讙讘讬讛 诪爪讬讗讛 诇讞讘讬专讜 拽谞讛 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗诐 转讗诪专 诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讚讗诪专 转谞讛 诇讬 讜诇讗 讗诪专 讝讻讛 诇讬

Contrary to the opinion of Rav Na岣an and Rav 岣sda, Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person acquires ownership of the item. And if you say that our mishna seems to suggest otherwise, it is referring to a case where the rider says to the pedestrian: Give it to me, but does not say: Acquire it for me. If he says give it to me, the rider acquires the item only when it reaches his possession. If he says acquire it for me, the rider acquires the item as soon as the pedestrian lifts it.

诪转谞讬壮 专讗讛 讗转 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讜谞驻诇 注诇讬讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讻讛 讘讛

MISHNA: If one saw a found item and fell upon it, intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, and then another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讗 讻讛谉 讘专讚诇讗 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 [诪讗讬 讟注诪讗] 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讚诇讗 讗转讬 诇讗谞爪讜讬讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 驻讬讗讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讬讚讬 谞讝讬拽讬谉

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: The area of four square cubits surrounding a person has the legal status of his courtyard, and it effects acquisition of every ownerless item located there for him, everywhere. What is the reason for this? The Sages instituted this ordinance so that people would not come to quarrel over an item. Abaye said that Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃. Rava said that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讬讜住祝 驻讬讗讛 谞讟诇 诪拽爪转 驻讬讗讛 讜讝专拽 注诇 讛砖讗专 讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讛 讻诇讜诐 谞驻诇 诇讜 注诇讬讛 驻专住 讟诇讬转讜 注诇讬讛 诪注讘讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 讛讬诪谞讛 讜讻谉 讘注讜诪专 砖讻讞讛

The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said that Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃 (4:3), which states: If a poor person took some of the pe鈥檃 in the field and threw it on the rest of the pe鈥檃 in order to acquire it, he has nothing of it. The same is true if he fell upon the pe鈥檃, or if he spread his garment over it; others may remove him or his garment from the pe鈥檃 in order to take it for themselves, as he did not acquire it. And the same is true in the case of a forgotten sheaf left for the poor; a poor person cannot acquire it in any of these manners.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 谞拽谞讜 诇讬讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讚讬讚讬讛

Rabbi 岣yya bar Yosef continues: And if you say that a person鈥檚 area of four square cubits effects acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his area of four square cubits effect acquisition of the pe鈥檃 or the forgotten sheaf for him.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗拽谞讬

The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire the pe鈥檃 through this action. He performed the action without revealing his intention; therefore, his acquisition is ineffective.

讜讗讬 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that the area of four cubits surrounding a person acquires property for him, then even in a case where he did not say: I will acquire the produce, what of it? Shouldn鈥檛 he have acquired it even without expressing his intent to do so?

讻讬讜谉 讚谞驻诇 讙诇讬 讚注转讬讛 讚讘谞驻讬诇讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬 讘讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬

The Gemara answers: This case is different. Since he fell upon it he thereby revealed his intention: That it is satisfactory for him to acquire the produce by falling on it and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the produce through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition that the Sages instituted, and falling on the produce is not a valid mode of acquisition, he did not acquire the produce.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讻讬 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讘注诇诪讗 讘砖讚讛 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 讘讙讜讛 讻讬 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讛诇讜讻讬 讘讛 讜诇谞拽讜讟讬 驻讬讗讛 诇诪讬讛讜讬 讞爪讬专讜 诇讗 讝讻讛 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗

Rav Pappa said a different answer: When the Sages instituted an ordinance that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in the world, i.e., on public land. But the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition for him in a field belonging to an owner. And even though the Merciful One accorded a poor person certain rights in a landowner鈥檚 field during the distribution of pe鈥檃, this mode of acquisition is not included in those rights; when the Merciful One accorded him rights it was specifically to walk in the field and to collect pe鈥檃, but the Merciful One did not accord him the right that the field be considered his courtyard with regard to acquiring pe鈥檃. Therefore, the mishna in tractate Pe鈥檃 does not contradict the statement of Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讬讚讬 谞讝讬拽讬谉 专讗讛 讗转 讛诪爪讬讗讛 讜谞驻诇 诇讜 注诇讬讛 讜讘讗 讗讞专 讜讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讛 砖讛讞讝讬拽 讘讛 讝讻讛 讘讛 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讜转 诇讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 谞拽谞讜 诇讬讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讚讬讚讬讛

As mentioned previously, Rava said that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here states that if one saw a found item and fell upon it, and another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it. And if you say that a person鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his four square cubits effect acquisition of the found item for him.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讗拽谞讬 讜讗讬 转拽讜谉 专讘谞谉 讻讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讻讬讜谉 讚谞驻诇 注诇讬讛 讙诇讬 讚注转讬讛 讚讘谞驻讬诇讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬 讘讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚谞拽谞讬

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire it. The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, then even in a case when he did not say: I will acquire the item, what of it? The item should still be his. The Gemara answers: Since he fell upon it, he revealed his intention that it is satisfactory for him to acquire the item by falling on it, and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the item through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition instituted by the Sages, he does not acquire the found item.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻讬 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘住诪讟讗 讚诇讗 讚讞拽讬 专讘讬诐 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讚拽讗 讚讞拽讬 专讘讬诐 诇讗 转拽讬谞讜 专讘谞谉

Rav Sheshet said a different answer: When the Sages instituted that one鈥檚 four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was in a place like an alleyway, where the multitudes do not crowd, so the four square cubits surrounding a person can temporarily be considered his property and enable him to acquire an item; but the Sages did not institute this mode of acquisition in the public domain, where the multitudes crowd.

讜讛讗 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 拽讗诪专

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 the wording of Reish Lakish鈥檚 statement indicate that there is no such limitation, as he says that the area of four square cubits surrounding a person effects acquisition of property for him everywhere? The indication is that this is true even in the public domain.

讻诇 诪拽讜诐 诇讗转讜讬讬 爪讬讚讬 专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐

The Gemara answers: The word everywhere is not to be taken literally; it was stated to include even the sides of the public domain, areas that are adjacent to the public domain but not actually part of it. Since the multitudes do not crowd there, one who is standing there acquires an item that is in his four square cubits.

讜讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讗 讻讛谉 讘专讚诇讗 拽讟谞讛 讗讬谉 诇讛 讞爪专 讜讗讬谉 诇讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讗诪专 讬砖 诇讛 讞爪专 讜讬砖 诇讛 讗专讘注 讗诪讜转

And Reish Lakish says another halakha in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai that she has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard, and she has the ability to acquire property by means of her four square cubits.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬转 诇讛 讬讚 讞爪专 谞诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 讜诪专 住讘专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚砖诇讬讞讜转 诇讬转 诇讛 讞爪专 谞诪讬 诇讬转 诇讛

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. Just as a minor girl has the ability to acquire property with her hand, she also has the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard. And one Sage, Abba Kohen Bardela, holds that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency; and just as a minor girl has no power of agency, as a minor cannot appoint an agent, she does not have the ability to acquire property by means of her courtyard either.

诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讘讬讚讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讜 讙讙讜 讞爪讬专讜 讜拽专驻讬驻讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛诪爪讗 转诪爪讗 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara asks: Is there anyone who says that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the option of acquiring property via agency? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淚f the theft shall be found in his possession alive, whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double鈥 (Exodus 22:3)鈥 From the term 鈥渋n his possession [beyado],鈥 I have derived only a case where the stolen item is found in his hand [yado]. From where do I derive that the same halakha applies if it is found on his roof, in his yard, or in his enclosure? The verse states the repetitive phrase 鈥渋f the theft shall be found [himmatze timmatze],鈥 to indicate that the same halakha applies in any case, i.e., in any location that the stolen item is found.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 砖诇讬讞讜转 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讗诐 讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛

The Gemara explains: And if it enters your mind that a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to agency, if so, we have found a case where there is agency for a transgression, i.e., theft. But we maintain that there is no agency for transgression. If one sends an agent to violate a transgression on his behalf, the agent is liable for the transgression and is not considered to be acting on behalf of the one who sent him.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讛讬讻讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讛讬讻讗 讚砖诇讬讞 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗讜 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 讛讜讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜

Ravina said: That baraita poses no problem, as where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is where the agent himself is subject to liability for transgression. Consequently, the agent is liable, not the one who sent him. But in the case of a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讜注讘讚 爪讗讜 讙谞讘讜 诇讬 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then in a case of one who says to a woman or a slave: Go out and steal for me, is the one who sent them indeed liable, since they are not subject to liability? Married women and slaves have no property of their own from which one could collect payment.

讗诪专转 讗砖讛 讜注讘讚 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讬转 诇讛讜 诇砖诇讜诪讬 讚转谞谉 谞转讙专砖讛 讛讗砖讛 谞砖转讞专专 讛注讘讚 讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇砖诇诐

The Gemara answers: You can say in response: A woman and a slave are not comparable to a courtyard, as they are subject to liability if they steal; and only now, in any event, they do not have the means to pay. This is as we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 87a) concerning a married woman or Canaanite slave who injured another person: If the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and they then have their own money, they are liable to pay for the damage they inflicted. Evidently, although it is not possible to collect payment from them, they are liable for their actions.

专讘 住诪讗 讗诪专 讛讬讻讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬谉 砖诇讬讞 诇讚讘专 注讘讬专讛 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讜讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 讗讘诇 讞爪专 讚讘注诇 讻专讞讬讛 诪讜转讬讘 讘讛 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜

Rav Samma stated a different resolution to the difficulty based on the baraita: Where do we say that there is no agency for transgression? It is specifically in a case where if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can also opt to not do it. But in the case of a courtyard, where one places items without its consent, its sender, i.e., its owner, is liable.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讻讛谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 爪讗 讜拽讚砖 诇讬 讗砖讛 讙专讜砖讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗讬砖 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讗砖讛 讗拽驻讬 诇讬 拽讟谉

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the answers of Ravina and Rav Samma? The practical difference between them is in the case of a priest who said to an Israelite: Go out and betroth a divorced woman for me. It is prohibited for a priest to betroth a divorc茅e, while it is permitted for an Israelite to do so. Alternatively, the difference is in the case of a man who said to a woman: Round the corners of the head of a minor boy for me. Rounding the corners of a man鈥檚 head, and a man having the corners of his head rounded, are prohibited in the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not round the corners of your head鈥 (Leviticus 19:27), but they are prohibited only for men and not for women.

诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬 讘注讬 诇讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉 诇讛讱 诇讬砖谞讗 讚讗诪专转 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚砖诇讬讞 诇讗讜 讘专 讞讬讜讘讗 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞讜 讛谞讬 谞诪讬 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讞讬讜讘讗 谞讬谞讛讜 诪讬讞讬讬讘 砖讜诇讞谉

The Gemara explains: According to the formulation in which it was said that anywhere that if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it the one who sent him is not liable for the transgression but rather the agent is liable, in these cases too, since if the agent wants to execute his assignment he can do so, and if he wants to refrain from executing it he can opt to not do it, the one who sent them is not liable. But according to the formulation in which it was said that wherever an agent is not subject to liability the one who sent him is liable, in these cases too, since the agents are not subject to liability, the one who sent them is liable.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞爪专 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讚讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讬讚讛 讙讙讛 讞爪讬专讛 讜拽专驻讬驻讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讜谞转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara asks about the explanation of the opinion of Abba Kohen Bardela: But is there anyone who says that placing an item in a courtyard is not included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: From the verse: 鈥淎nd he writes her a scroll of severance, and he gives it in her hand鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:1), I have derived only that a woman is divorced if her husband places the bill of divorce in her hand. From where is it derived that even if he places it on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure, she is divorced? The verse states: 鈥淎nd he gives,鈥 indicating that she is divorced in any case. Apparently one鈥檚 courtyard is considered an extension of his hand with regard to acquiring property, in this case, the bill of divorce.

诇注谞讬谉 讙讟 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讞爪专 诪砖讜诐 讬讚讛 讗讬转专讘讗讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 诇注谞讬谉 诪爪讬讗讛 诪专 住讘专

The Gemara answers: With regard to a bill of divorce everyone agrees that placing an item in a courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as her hand. When they disagree, it is with regard to acquiring a found item that was discovered in her courtyard. One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that

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