Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

January 4, 2017 | 讜壮 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 100

If one buys (or trades) animals or slaves and the animal has offspring or he sold 2 animals or slaves – one small and one large and it’s unclear whether it was before the sale or after the sale or he sold 2 animals or slaves – one small and one large, various cases are brought (each one gives clear claims, each one says maybe it was born before/after the sale, or one is clear and the other not) and the halacha is determined for each case. 聽The gemara concludes that the mishna is in according with Sumchus who holds that money is doubt is split without swearing. 聽However, the gemara has further questions on that and to resolve those questions, suggests 4 possible readings of the mishna.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讞诇讬祝 驻专讛 讘讞诪讜专 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 讛诪讜讻专 砖驻讞转讜 讜讬诇讚讛 讝讛 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖诇讗 诪讻专转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖诇拽讞转讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜

MISHNA: With regard to one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, such that by virtue of the cow owner鈥檚 act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey鈥檚 erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, and afterward the cow is found to have calved; and similarly, with regard to one who sells his Canaanite maidservant, with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, and afterward she is found to have given birth to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother鈥檚 master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction. If this seller says: The birth occurred before I sold the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after I purchased the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, they divide the value of the offspring between them.

讛讬讜 诇讜 砖谞讬 注讘讚讬诐 讗讞讚 讙讚讜诇 讜讗讞讚 拽讟谉 讜讻谉 砖转讬 砖讚讜转 讗讞转 讙讚讜诇讛 讜讗讞转 拽讟谞讛

The mishna continues: There is a case of one who had two Canaanite slaves, one large, worth more on the slave market, and one small, worth less on the slave market, and similarly, one who had two fields, one large and one small. He sold one of them, and there was a dispute between the buyer and the seller concerning which one was sold.

讛诇讜拽讞 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 诇拽讞转讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讝讻讛 讘讙讚讜诇

If the buyer says: I purchased the large one, and the other one, i.e., the seller, says: I do not know which I sold; the buyer is entitled to take the large one.

讛诪讜讻专 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 诪讻专转讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗讬谉 诇讜 讗诇讗 拽讟谉

If the seller says: I sold the small one, and the other one, i.e., the buyer, says: I do not know which one I purchased; the buyer is entitled to take only the small one.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讛拽讟谉 诪讻专

If this one says: The large one was sold, and that one says: The small one was sold, then the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If this one says: I do not know which one was sold, and that one says: I do not know which one was sold, they divide the disputed amount between them.

讙诪壮 讗诪讗讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜诇讬讞讝讬 讘专砖讜转 讚诪讗谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜诇讛讜讬 讗讬讚讱 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: In the first clause of the mishna, why do the two parties divide the value of the offspring between them? Instead, let us see in whose domain the offspring currently is. That person has presumptive ownership of the offspring, and the other person will be considered to be the one who is exacting property from another, and accordingly, the burden of proof rests upon him. Since he cannot prove his claim, he is not entitled to take the offspring.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘注讜诪讚转 讘讗讙诐 砖驻讞讛 谞诪讬 讚拽讬讬诪讗 讘住讬诪讟讗

The Gemara answers: Rabbi 岣yya bar Avin says that Shmuel says: The mishna is referring to a case where the calf is standing in the marsh, i.e., it is in the domain of neither the buyer nor the seller, and so neither one has presumptive ownership. And with regard to the maidservant also, this is a case where the child is found in an alley which does not belong to either the buyer or the seller.

讜谞讜拽诪讗 讗讞讝拽转 讚诪专讗 拽诪讗 讜诇讬讛讜讬 讗讬讚讱 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

The Gemara asks further: But even if the offspring is not in either party鈥檚 domain, establish it to be in the presumptive ownership of its original owner, i.e., the seller, as he certainly owned the offspring when it was still a fetus. And so the other person will be considered to be the one who is exacting property from another, and accordingly, the burden of proof rests upon him. Since he cannot prove his claim, he is not entitled to take the offspring.

讛讗 诪谞讬 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is the ruling of this mishna, that the parties divide the value of the offspring equally? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: When there is property of uncertain ownership, the parties divide it equally without the need to take an oath.

讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讘砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讘讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诪讬 讗诪专

The Gemara challenges this: Say that Sumakhos says his ruling when there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, as each party admits that his claim to the property is uncertain, but did he say his ruling when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, as each party claims to be certain that the property belongs to him?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬 讜讘专讬

The Gemara offers two opinions concerning the ruling of Sumakhos. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讻讬 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讜转谞讬 讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪讗 注讚 砖诇讗 诪讻专转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪讗 诪砖诇拽讞转讬

Another opinion: Rava said: Actually, when Sumakhos said his ruling, it applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, he did not say his ruling. And in order that the mishna not pose a difficulty, emend it to refer to uncertain claims and teach: This seller says: Perhaps the birth occurred before I sold the cow or maidservant, and that buyer says: Perhaps the birth occurred after I purchased the cow or maidservant.

转谞谉 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

The Gemara challenges Rabba bar Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion: We learned in the mishna: If this one says: I do not know which one was sold, and that one says: I do not know which one was sold, they divide the disputed amount between them.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讛砖转讗 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 诪讬讘注讬讗

Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, from the fact that the last clause of the mishna is referring to a case where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, one can say that the first clause as well is referring to a case in which there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim. But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, there is the following difficulty: Now that the mishna teaches that even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim Sumakhos says that the parties divide the disputed amount between them, is it necessary for the mishna to state that where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim the parties divide the disputed amount between them?

讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 讗讬专讬讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 专讬砖讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜

The Gemara rejects the question: If the difficulty is due only to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. One can say that the mishna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you will not say that the ruling in the first clause applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but where there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim the ruling in the first clause does not apply, and the disputed amount is not divided. To dispel this notion, the mishna teaches the last clause, which is referring to a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim; and then by inference, the first clause must refer to a case where there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, and nevertheless, the parties divide the disputed amount between them.

转谞谉 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖拽讟谉 诪讻专

The Gemara again challenges Rabba bar Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion: We learned in the mishna: If this one says: The large one was sold, and that one says: The small one was sold, then the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讬砖讘注 讗诇讗 诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讜讻专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, who said that when Sumakhos says his ruling it applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim he did not say his ruling, it is due to that reason that in the clause in the mishna in which each party offers a certain claim, the seller takes an oath. But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, why does the mishna rule that the seller takes an oath; the mishna should have ruled that they divide the disputed amount between them.

诪讜讚讛 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讘讜注讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讻讚讘注讬谞谉 诇诪讬诪专 诇拽诪谉

The Gemara answers: Sumakhos concedes that where there is a requirement for one of the parties to take an oath required by Torah law the disputed amount is not divided, as we will need to say below to resolve another challenge to Sumakhos鈥 opinion.

讛讬讜 诇讜 砖谞讬 注讘讚讬诐 讗讞讚 讙讚讜诇 讜讗讞讚 拽讟谉 (讜讻讜壮) 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case of one who had two Canaanite slaves, one large, worth more on the slave market, and one small, worth less on the slave market, and the buyer and seller disagree as to whether it was the large slave or the small slave that was sold, the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one. The Gemara asks: Why does the seller take an oath? An oath is required only when a defendant admits to part of the claim made against him, but in this case, that which the buyer claimed from the seller, i.e., the larger slave, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, i.e., the smaller slave, the buyer had not claimed from him.

讜注讜讚 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗

And furthermore, with regard to the small slave, this is a case of: Here you are. The seller is not merely admitting that he is liable to give the slave in the future, but allows the buyer to take possession of the slave immediately. As Rav Sheshet explains on 4a, one who offers the disputed item immediately is not considered to be one who admits to part of a claim, and is exempt by Torah law from taking an oath.

讜注讜讚 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讛注讘讚讬诐

And furthermore, one does not take an oath concerning a claim about slaves, but only concerning claims about movable property. For these three reasons, there should be no requirement to take an oath.

讗诪专 专讘 讘讟讜注谞讜 讚诪讬 讚诪讬 注讘讚 讙讚讜诇 讚诪讬 注讘讚 拽讟谉 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 拽讟谞讛

Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claims money from the seller, not a slave or a field; the buyer claims that he gave the seller money equal to the value of a large slave and the seller admits to having received money equal to the value of a small slave. And in the case of the field, the buyer claims that he gave the seller money equal to the value of a large field, and the seller admits to having received money equal to the value of a small field.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘讟讜注谞讜 讻住讜转 注讘讚 讙讚讜诇 讻住讜转 注讘讚 拽讟谉 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 讙讚讜诇讛 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 拽讟谞讛

And Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claims he purchased a garment of a large slave, and the seller admits to having sold him a garment of a small slave. And in the case of the field, the buyer claims he purchased the sheaves yielded by a large field, and the seller admits to having sold him the sheaves yielded by a small field.

讻住讜转 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讻讚讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬

The Gemara challenges Shmuel鈥檚 interpretation: If the dispute is over which size garment was sold, the seller should not be required to take an oath, as that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The Gemara answers: Shmuel was referring to a case like that which Rav Pappa said below: The dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together. Here too, the dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together, and the disagreement was about how much of that garment was actually sold.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讻住讜转 拽转谞讬 注讘讚 拽转谞讬

Rabbi Hoshaya found Shmuel鈥檚 interpretation difficult: Does the mishna teach: A garment? No, it teaches: A slave. How can Shmuel claim the dispute was about a garment?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讟注谞讜 注讘讚 讘讻住讜转讜 讜砖讚讛 讘注讜诪专讬讛 讜讗讻转讬 讻住讜转 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬

Rather, Rabbi Hoshaya said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claimed a large slave along with his garment, or where he claimed a large field along with its sheaves. Since the seller admits to the part of the claim about the garment or sheaves, he is required to take an oath about them. Once he is required to take that oath, it can be extended to require him to take an oath even concerning the claim about the slave or field itself. The Gemara asks: But still, in the dispute over which type of garment was sold, that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa said: The dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together, and the dispute concerns how much of that garment was actually sold.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 砖砖转 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉

Rav Sheshet found Rabbi Hoshaya鈥檚 interpretation difficult: Does the mishna come only to teach us the halakha of binding? But we already learned that halakha in a mishna (Kiddushin 26a): Generally, one is not obligated to take an oath concerning the denial of a claim with regard to land. In a legal dispute involving both land and movable property, if the defendant admits to part of the claim with regard to the movable property, thereby rendering himself obligated to take an oath denying any responsibility for the remaining property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning the land as well.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讘讚讗 讻诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讚诪讬

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, who said: The legal status of a slave is like that of movable property. Even if the dispute is over the slave alone, the seller can be required to take an oath.

讜讗讻转讬 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚转谞谉 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬诐 讜讛讜讚讛 砖注讜专讬诐 驻讟讜专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara asks: But still, if the dispute is over which slave was sold, then that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The seller should not therefore be required to take an oath. The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one claimed wheat from another, and the defendant admitted only to owing him barley, the defendant is exempt from having to take an oath; but Rabban Gamliel deems him liable.

讗讻转讬 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 注讘讚讗 讚拽讟注 诇讬讚讬讛 讜砖讚讛 砖讞驻专 讘讛 讘讜专讜转 砖讬讞讬谉 讜诪注专讜转

The Gemara asks: Still, with regard to the small slave, this is a case of: Here you are, as the slave is immediately available to be taken. The small slave is not considered part of the buyer鈥檚 claim, as his claim is limited to the difference between the values of the slaves, and that amount is being entirely denied. Consequently, there should be no requirement to take an oath. To resolve this difficulty, Rava said: In the case of the slave, the mishna is referring to a case where, after the sale, the seller severed the slave鈥檚 hand, and in the case of the field, it is a case where, after the sale, the seller dug pits, ditches and caves in it, and therefore he cannot say: Here you are.

讜讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬驻讻讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讚转谞谉 讙讝诇 讘讛诪讛 讜讛讝拽讬谞讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜讛讝拽讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讘注讘讚讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

The Gemara offers another challenge to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Meir teach us the opposite? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 96b): If one robbed another of an animal and it aged and declined in value while in his possession, or if one robbed another of Canaanite slaves and they aged, since they are no longer in the condition that they were in when he robbed them, he cannot return them in their current state to his victim; rather, he pays according to their value at the time of the robbery. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves, he says to the victim: That which is yours is before you and no compensation is required. Apparently, Rabbi Meir holds that the legal status of a slave is like that of land, and not, as Rav Sheshet said, like that of movable property.

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讚诪讞诇讬祝 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讘注讘讚讬诐 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. Rav Sheshet apparently holds like Rabba bar Avuh, who reverses the attribution of the opinions in that mishna and teaches: Rabbi Meir says: He pays according to their value at the time of the robbery. And the Rabbis say: With regard to slaves, he says to the victim: That which is yours is before you and no compensation is required.

讗诇讗 诪诪讗讬 讚住讘专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪拽砖讬谞谉 拽专拽注 诇注讘讚 诪讛 注讘讚 谞砖讘注讬谉 讗祝 拽专拽注 谞砖讘注讬谉 讚诇诪讗 讗注讘讚 讛讜讗 讚谞砖讘注讬谉 讗讘诇 讗拽专拽注 诇讗

Since Rav Sheshet interprets the mishna as referring to a case where the dispute is over the slave alone and interprets it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he apparently also assumes that Rabbi Meir holds that an oath is taken even with regard to a claim of land, as his explanation would need to account for the case in the mishna concerning a dispute over the small or large field. The Gemara questions this assumption: But given that Rabbi Meir said only that the legal status of a slave is like that of movable property, from where does Rav Sheshet learn that Rabbi Meir holds that we compare land to a slave, so that just as for a claim about a slave, an oath is taken, so too, for a claim about land, an oath is taken? Perhaps Rabbi Meir holds that an oath is taken only on a claim about a slave but not on a claim about land.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讞诇讬祝 驻专讛 讘讞诪讜专 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 讛诪讜讻专 砖驻讞转讜 讜讬诇讚讛

The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that Rabbi Meir makes a distinction between slaves and land in this regard, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, such that by virtue of the cow owner鈥檚 act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey鈥檚 erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, and afterward the cow is found to have calved; and similarly, with regard to one who sells his Canaanite maidservant, with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, and afterward she is found to have given birth to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother鈥檚 master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 砖讜转拽 讝讻讛

If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer remains silent, the seller is entitled to take the offspring.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If this one says: I do not know what happened, and that one says: I do not know what happened, they divide the value of the offspring between them.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讘专砖讜转讜 讬诇讚讛 诇驻讬 砖讻诇 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 砖讘转讜专讛 谞砖讘注讬谉 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 诇讗 注诇 讛注讘讚讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转

If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after the cow or maidservant was already in my possession, then the seller takes an oath stating that the cow or maidservant gave birth in his possession and he is then entitled to take the offspring. This is because for anyone who takes an oath required by Torah law, he takes the oath and does not have to pay. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One does not take an oath, not on a claim concerning slaves and not on a claim concerning land.

诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 谞砖讘注讬谉

The Gemara explains its proof from this baraita: Since the Rabbis replied to Rabbi Meir that an oath is not taken on a claim concerning slaves or land, is it not correct that by inference, Rabbi Meir holds that one can take an oath on a claim concerning either slaves or land?

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讻砖诐 拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讜讚讬转 诇谉 讘拽专拽注讜转 讗讜讚讬 诇谉 谞诪讬 讘注讘讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects this inference: But from where is this inferred? Perhaps the Rabbis are speaking to him utilizing the style of: Just as, and they are saying as follows: Just as you concede to us with regard to land, concede to us also with regard to slaves.

转讚注 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬砖 讚讘专讬诐 砖讛谉 讻拽专拽注 讜讗讬谞谉 讻拽专拽注 讜讗讬谉 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讜讚讬诐 诇讜 讻讬爪讚 注砖专 讙驻谞讬诐 讟注讜谞讜转 诪住专转讬 诇讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞谉 讗诇讗 讞诪砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛诪讞讜讘专 诇拽专拽注 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讻拽专拽注

The Gemara adds: Know that Rabbi Meir holds that one does not take an oath for a claim concerning land, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b): Rabbi Meir says: There are some matters that have a legal status like that of land, but nevertheless, with regard to oaths they are not treated like land and so one takes an oath with regard to them. But the Rabbis do not concede to Rabbi Meir that this is the halakha. How so? If one claims: I delivered ten vines laden with grapes to you, and the other says: There were only five; Rabbi Meir deems him liable to take an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. But the Rabbis say: Anything that is attached to the ground has a legal status like that of land, so no oath is taken with regard to them.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 注谞讘讬诐 讛注讜诪讚讜转 诇讬讘爪专 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讘爪讜专讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讘爪讜专讜转 讚诪讬讬谉

The Gemara clarifies the scope of the dispute: And Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: The difference between them is only in a case of grapes that are ready to be picked, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds: They are considered as though they were already harvested, meaning that they are regarded as movable property, with regard to which an oath is taken. And the other Sage, the Rabbis, holds: They are not considered as though they were about to be picked, meaning that they are regarded as land, with regard to which an oath is not taken. Evidently, Rabbi Meir agrees that an oath is not taken concerning land.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讜讚拽砖讬讗 诇讱 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讻住讜转 注讘讚 讻注讘讚 讚诪讬 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 讻砖讚讛 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, actually the mishna can be explained only in accordance with the interpretation of Rabbi Hoshaya, cited above. And with regard to that which posed a difficulty to you, namely that according to his explanation, the novelty of the mishna is only that movable property binds land so that one can be required to take an oath with regard to it, and that halakha is already taught in the mishna in tractate Kiddushin, one can explain that it was necessary to also teach this in the mishna here, because it might enter your mind to say that the garment of a slave is like the slave himself, or that sheaves of a field are like the field itself. If so, there would be no basis to require an oath, even one based on the claims about the garment and sheaves themselves. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they are considered distinct items and the claims concerning them require the seller to take an oath which can then be extended to require an oath for the claim concerning the slave or land.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讛讗 诪谞讬 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉

搂 The Gemara analyzes one of the clauses of the baraita cited above: In a case in which it is unclear when the cow or maidservant gave birth, if this one says: I do not know what happened, and that one says: I do not know what happened, they divide the value of the offspring between them. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: When there is property of uncertain ownership, the parties divide it equally between them.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讘专砖讜转讜 讬诇讚讛 讜诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讜讻专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪讬讘注讬讗

The Gemara questions this attribution: If so, say and try to explain accordingly the latter clause of that baraita: If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after the cow or maidservant was already in my possession, then the seller takes an oath stating that it gave birth in his possession, and he is then entitled to take the offspring. The Gemara explains the difficulty: But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who says: Yes, Sumakhos said his ruling even in a case in which there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, why does the mishna rule that the seller takes an oath; the mishna should have ruled that they divide the value of the disputed offspring between them.

诪讜讚讛 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讘讜注讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讚拽讟注讛 诇讬讚讛 讻讚专讘讗

The Gemara answers: Sumakhos concedes that where there is a requirement for one of the parties to take an oath required by Torah law, that the disputed amount is not divided. And furthermore, this is not a case in which the seller could say: Here you are, because the case is where after the sale, the seller severed the slave鈥檚 hand, just like in the explanation of Rava above.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜讻专 讝讬转讬讜 诇注爪讬诐 讜注砖讜 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 诇住讗讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讝讬转讬诐

MISHNA: In the case of one who sells his olive trees to another so he can chop them down and use them for their wood, and before he chopped them down they yielded olives, if the olives are of a quality that could provide the value of less than a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, these olives are the property of the new owner of the olive trees, i.e., the buyer.

注砖讜 专讘讬注讬转 诇住讗讛 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讝讬转讬 讙讚诇讜 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗专爪讬 讙讚诇讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If they yielded olives that could provide the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, and this one, the buyer, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, the seller, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them.

砖讟祝 谞讛专 讝讬转讬讜 讜谞转谞诐 诇转讜讱 砖讚讛 讞讘讬专讜 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讝讬转讬 讙讚诇讜 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗专爪讬 讙讚诇讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜

In the event that a river swept away one鈥檚 olive trees and deposited them in the field of another, and they took root there and yielded olives, this one, i.e., the owner of the trees, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, i.e., the owner of the field, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them.

讙诪壮 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 拽讜抓 诇讗诇转专 讗驻讬诇讜 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 讛拽专拽注 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诇 讗讬诪转 讚讘注讬转 拽讜抓 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 讝讬转讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the sale? If this is a case where before the sale the seller said to the buyer: Cut down the trees immediately, then clearly he is particular that the buyer not derive benefit from the nourishment provided by his land. Therefore, even if the olives yielded could provide less than the value of a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, they will belong to the owner of the land, i.e., the seller. Conversely, if the case is where he said to him: Cut down the trees whenever you want, then it is clear that he is not particular about the buyer deriving benefit from the nourishment provided by his land. Therefore, even if the olives yielded could provide the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, they will belong to the owner of the olive trees, i.e., the buyer.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 诇讗 拽驻讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 专讘讬注讬转 拽驻讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬

The Gemara explains: No, the ruling is necessary in a case where the seller said to him to cut down the trees, without specification about when he should do so. Accordingly, if the olives yielded produce less than the value of a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, then since people are generally not particular to receive their share of such olives, the buyer may keep them. But where the olives yielded produce the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, people are generally particular to receive their share of such olives; consequently, they divide the olives between them.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 驻讝讬 讜专讘讬注讬转 砖讗诪专讜

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says: And the value of the quarterlog that they mentioned in the mishna

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bava Metzia 100

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 100

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讞诇讬祝 驻专讛 讘讞诪讜专 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 讛诪讜讻专 砖驻讞转讜 讜讬诇讚讛 讝讛 讗讜诪专 注讚 砖诇讗 诪讻专转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖诇拽讞转讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜

MISHNA: With regard to one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, such that by virtue of the cow owner鈥檚 act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey鈥檚 erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, and afterward the cow is found to have calved; and similarly, with regard to one who sells his Canaanite maidservant, with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, and afterward she is found to have given birth to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother鈥檚 master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction. If this seller says: The birth occurred before I sold the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after I purchased the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, they divide the value of the offspring between them.

讛讬讜 诇讜 砖谞讬 注讘讚讬诐 讗讞讚 讙讚讜诇 讜讗讞讚 拽讟谉 讜讻谉 砖转讬 砖讚讜转 讗讞转 讙讚讜诇讛 讜讗讞转 拽讟谞讛

The mishna continues: There is a case of one who had two Canaanite slaves, one large, worth more on the slave market, and one small, worth less on the slave market, and similarly, one who had two fields, one large and one small. He sold one of them, and there was a dispute between the buyer and the seller concerning which one was sold.

讛诇讜拽讞 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 诇拽讞转讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讝讻讛 讘讙讚讜诇

If the buyer says: I purchased the large one, and the other one, i.e., the seller, says: I do not know which I sold; the buyer is entitled to take the large one.

讛诪讜讻专 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 诪讻专转讬 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗讬谉 诇讜 讗诇讗 拽讟谉

If the seller says: I sold the small one, and the other one, i.e., the buyer, says: I do not know which one I purchased; the buyer is entitled to take only the small one.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讛拽讟谉 诪讻专

If this one says: The large one was sold, and that one says: The small one was sold, then the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If this one says: I do not know which one was sold, and that one says: I do not know which one was sold, they divide the disputed amount between them.

讙诪壮 讗诪讗讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜诇讬讞讝讬 讘专砖讜转 讚诪讗谉 拽讬讬诪讗 讜诇讛讜讬 讗讬讚讱 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: In the first clause of the mishna, why do the two parties divide the value of the offspring between them? Instead, let us see in whose domain the offspring currently is. That person has presumptive ownership of the offspring, and the other person will be considered to be the one who is exacting property from another, and accordingly, the burden of proof rests upon him. Since he cannot prove his claim, he is not entitled to take the offspring.

讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘注讜诪讚转 讘讗讙诐 砖驻讞讛 谞诪讬 讚拽讬讬诪讗 讘住讬诪讟讗

The Gemara answers: Rabbi 岣yya bar Avin says that Shmuel says: The mishna is referring to a case where the calf is standing in the marsh, i.e., it is in the domain of neither the buyer nor the seller, and so neither one has presumptive ownership. And with regard to the maidservant also, this is a case where the child is found in an alley which does not belong to either the buyer or the seller.

讜谞讜拽诪讗 讗讞讝拽转 讚诪专讗 拽诪讗 讜诇讬讛讜讬 讗讬讚讱 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

The Gemara asks further: But even if the offspring is not in either party鈥檚 domain, establish it to be in the presumptive ownership of its original owner, i.e., the seller, as he certainly owned the offspring when it was still a fetus. And so the other person will be considered to be the one who is exacting property from another, and accordingly, the burden of proof rests upon him. Since he cannot prove his claim, he is not entitled to take the offspring.

讛讗 诪谞讬 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is the ruling of this mishna, that the parties divide the value of the offspring equally? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: When there is property of uncertain ownership, the parties divide it equally without the need to take an oath.

讗讬诪讜专 讚讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讘砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讘讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诪讬 讗诪专

The Gemara challenges this: Say that Sumakhos says his ruling when there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, as each party admits that his claim to the property is uncertain, but did he say his ruling when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, as each party claims to be certain that the property belongs to him?

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讘专讬 讜讘专讬

The Gemara offers two opinions concerning the ruling of Sumakhos. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讻讬 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讜转谞讬 讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪讗 注讚 砖诇讗 诪讻专转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 砖诪讗 诪砖诇拽讞转讬

Another opinion: Rava said: Actually, when Sumakhos said his ruling, it applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, he did not say his ruling. And in order that the mishna not pose a difficulty, emend it to refer to uncertain claims and teach: This seller says: Perhaps the birth occurred before I sold the cow or maidservant, and that buyer says: Perhaps the birth occurred after I purchased the cow or maidservant.

转谞谉 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

The Gemara challenges Rabba bar Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion: We learned in the mishna: If this one says: I do not know which one was sold, and that one says: I do not know which one was sold, they divide the disputed amount between them.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗诇讗 诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讛砖转讗 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 诪讬讘注讬讗

Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, from the fact that the last clause of the mishna is referring to a case where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, one can say that the first clause as well is referring to a case in which there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim. But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, there is the following difficulty: Now that the mishna teaches that even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim Sumakhos says that the parties divide the disputed amount between them, is it necessary for the mishna to state that where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim the parties divide the disputed amount between them?

讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 讗讬专讬讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 诇讙诇讜讬讬 专讬砖讗 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 专讬砖讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 诪讻诇诇 讚专讬砖讗 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜

The Gemara rejects the question: If the difficulty is due only to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. One can say that the mishna taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you will not say that the ruling in the first clause applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but where there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim the ruling in the first clause does not apply, and the disputed amount is not divided. To dispel this notion, the mishna teaches the last clause, which is referring to a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim; and then by inference, the first clause must refer to a case where there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, and nevertheless, the parties divide the disputed amount between them.

转谞谉 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讙讚讜诇 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 拽讟谉 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖拽讟谉 诪讻专

The Gemara again challenges Rabba bar Rav Huna鈥檚 opinion: We learned in the mishna: If this one says: The large one was sold, and that one says: The small one was sold, then the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻讬 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 砖诪讗 讜砖诪讗 讗讘诇 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讬砖讘注 讗诇讗 诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讜讻专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, who said that when Sumakhos says his ruling it applies only where there is a conflict between an uncertain claim and an uncertain claim, but when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim he did not say his ruling, it is due to that reason that in the clause in the mishna in which each party offers a certain claim, the seller takes an oath. But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who said: Yes, Sumakhos says his ruling even when there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, why does the mishna rule that the seller takes an oath; the mishna should have ruled that they divide the disputed amount between them.

诪讜讚讛 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讘讜注讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讻讚讘注讬谞谉 诇诪讬诪专 诇拽诪谉

The Gemara answers: Sumakhos concedes that where there is a requirement for one of the parties to take an oath required by Torah law the disputed amount is not divided, as we will need to say below to resolve another challenge to Sumakhos鈥 opinion.

讛讬讜 诇讜 砖谞讬 注讘讚讬诐 讗讞讚 讙讚讜诇 讜讗讞讚 拽讟谉 (讜讻讜壮) 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case of one who had two Canaanite slaves, one large, worth more on the slave market, and one small, worth less on the slave market, and the buyer and seller disagree as to whether it was the large slave or the small slave that was sold, the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one. The Gemara asks: Why does the seller take an oath? An oath is required only when a defendant admits to part of the claim made against him, but in this case, that which the buyer claimed from the seller, i.e., the larger slave, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, i.e., the smaller slave, the buyer had not claimed from him.

讜注讜讚 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗

And furthermore, with regard to the small slave, this is a case of: Here you are. The seller is not merely admitting that he is liable to give the slave in the future, but allows the buyer to take possession of the slave immediately. As Rav Sheshet explains on 4a, one who offers the disputed item immediately is not considered to be one who admits to part of a claim, and is exempt by Torah law from taking an oath.

讜注讜讚 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讛注讘讚讬诐

And furthermore, one does not take an oath concerning a claim about slaves, but only concerning claims about movable property. For these three reasons, there should be no requirement to take an oath.

讗诪专 专讘 讘讟讜注谞讜 讚诪讬 讚诪讬 注讘讚 讙讚讜诇 讚诪讬 注讘讚 拽讟谉 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 拽讟谞讛

Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claims money from the seller, not a slave or a field; the buyer claims that he gave the seller money equal to the value of a large slave and the seller admits to having received money equal to the value of a small slave. And in the case of the field, the buyer claims that he gave the seller money equal to the value of a large field, and the seller admits to having received money equal to the value of a small field.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘讟讜注谞讜 讻住讜转 注讘讚 讙讚讜诇 讻住讜转 注讘讚 拽讟谉 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 讙讚讜诇讛 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 拽讟谞讛

And Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claims he purchased a garment of a large slave, and the seller admits to having sold him a garment of a small slave. And in the case of the field, the buyer claims he purchased the sheaves yielded by a large field, and the seller admits to having sold him the sheaves yielded by a small field.

讻住讜转 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讻讚讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬

The Gemara challenges Shmuel鈥檚 interpretation: If the dispute is over which size garment was sold, the seller should not be required to take an oath, as that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The Gemara answers: Shmuel was referring to a case like that which Rav Pappa said below: The dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together. Here too, the dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together, and the disagreement was about how much of that garment was actually sold.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讻住讜转 拽转谞讬 注讘讚 拽转谞讬

Rabbi Hoshaya found Shmuel鈥檚 interpretation difficult: Does the mishna teach: A garment? No, it teaches: A slave. How can Shmuel claim the dispute was about a garment?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讟注谞讜 注讘讚 讘讻住讜转讜 讜砖讚讛 讘注讜诪专讬讛 讜讗讻转讬 讻住讜转 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬讬诇驻讬

Rather, Rabbi Hoshaya said: The mishna is referring to a case where the buyer claimed a large slave along with his garment, or where he claimed a large field along with its sheaves. Since the seller admits to the part of the claim about the garment or sheaves, he is required to take an oath about them. Once he is required to take that oath, it can be extended to require him to take an oath even concerning the claim about the slave or field itself. The Gemara asks: But still, in the dispute over which type of garment was sold, that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa said: The dispute is with regard to a garment that was formed from several pieces of cloth that were attached together, and the dispute concerns how much of that garment was actually sold.

拽砖讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘 砖砖转 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗转讗 诇讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛谉

Rav Sheshet found Rabbi Hoshaya鈥檚 interpretation difficult: Does the mishna come only to teach us the halakha of binding? But we already learned that halakha in a mishna (Kiddushin 26a): Generally, one is not obligated to take an oath concerning the denial of a claim with regard to land. In a legal dispute involving both land and movable property, if the defendant admits to part of the claim with regard to the movable property, thereby rendering himself obligated to take an oath denying any responsibility for the remaining property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning the land as well.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讘讚讗 讻诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讚诪讬

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, who said: The legal status of a slave is like that of movable property. Even if the dispute is over the slave alone, the seller can be required to take an oath.

讜讗讻转讬 诪讛 砖讟注谞讜 诇讗 讛讜讚讛 诇讜 讜诪讛 砖讛讜讚讛 诇讜 诇讗 讟注谞讜 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讚转谞谉 讟注谞讜 讞讟讬诐 讜讛讜讚讛 砖注讜专讬诐 驻讟讜专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara asks: But still, if the dispute is over which slave was sold, then that which the buyer claimed from him, the seller did not admit to at all, and that which the seller admitted to, the buyer had not claimed from him. The seller should not therefore be required to take an oath. The Gemara answers: The tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one claimed wheat from another, and the defendant admitted only to owing him barley, the defendant is exempt from having to take an oath; but Rabban Gamliel deems him liable.

讗讻转讬 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 注讘讚讗 讚拽讟注 诇讬讚讬讛 讜砖讚讛 砖讞驻专 讘讛 讘讜专讜转 砖讬讞讬谉 讜诪注专讜转

The Gemara asks: Still, with regard to the small slave, this is a case of: Here you are, as the slave is immediately available to be taken. The small slave is not considered part of the buyer鈥檚 claim, as his claim is limited to the difference between the values of the slaves, and that amount is being entirely denied. Consequently, there should be no requirement to take an oath. To resolve this difficulty, Rava said: In the case of the slave, the mishna is referring to a case where, after the sale, the seller severed the slave鈥檚 hand, and in the case of the field, it is a case where, after the sale, the seller dug pits, ditches and caves in it, and therefore he cannot say: Here you are.

讜讛讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讬驻讻讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讚转谞谉 讙讝诇 讘讛诪讛 讜讛讝拽讬谞讛 注讘讚讬诐 讜讛讝拽讬谞讜 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讘注讘讚讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

The Gemara offers another challenge to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 interpretation: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Meir teach us the opposite? As we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 96b): If one robbed another of an animal and it aged and declined in value while in his possession, or if one robbed another of Canaanite slaves and they aged, since they are no longer in the condition that they were in when he robbed them, he cannot return them in their current state to his victim; rather, he pays according to their value at the time of the robbery. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves, he says to the victim: That which is yours is before you and no compensation is required. Apparently, Rabbi Meir holds that the legal status of a slave is like that of land, and not, as Rav Sheshet said, like that of movable property.

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讚诪讞诇讬祝 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪砖诇诐 讻砖注转 讛讙讝讬诇讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讘注讘讚讬诐 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. Rav Sheshet apparently holds like Rabba bar Avuh, who reverses the attribution of the opinions in that mishna and teaches: Rabbi Meir says: He pays according to their value at the time of the robbery. And the Rabbis say: With regard to slaves, he says to the victim: That which is yours is before you and no compensation is required.

讗诇讗 诪诪讗讬 讚住讘专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪拽砖讬谞谉 拽专拽注 诇注讘讚 诪讛 注讘讚 谞砖讘注讬谉 讗祝 拽专拽注 谞砖讘注讬谉 讚诇诪讗 讗注讘讚 讛讜讗 讚谞砖讘注讬谉 讗讘诇 讗拽专拽注 诇讗

Since Rav Sheshet interprets the mishna as referring to a case where the dispute is over the slave alone and interprets it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he apparently also assumes that Rabbi Meir holds that an oath is taken even with regard to a claim of land, as his explanation would need to account for the case in the mishna concerning a dispute over the small or large field. The Gemara questions this assumption: But given that Rabbi Meir said only that the legal status of a slave is like that of movable property, from where does Rav Sheshet learn that Rabbi Meir holds that we compare land to a slave, so that just as for a claim about a slave, an oath is taken, so too, for a claim about land, an oath is taken? Perhaps Rabbi Meir holds that an oath is taken only on a claim about a slave but not on a claim about land.

诇讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讞诇讬祝 驻专讛 讘讞诪讜专 讜讬诇讚讛 讜讻谉 讛诪讜讻专 砖驻讞转讜 讜讬诇讚讛

The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that Rabbi Meir makes a distinction between slaves and land in this regard, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, such that by virtue of the cow owner鈥檚 act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey鈥檚 erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, and afterward the cow is found to have calved; and similarly, with regard to one who sells his Canaanite maidservant, with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, and afterward she is found to have given birth to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother鈥檚 master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 砖讜转拽 讝讻讛

If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer remains silent, the seller is entitled to take the offspring.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If this one says: I do not know what happened, and that one says: I do not know what happened, they divide the value of the offspring between them.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讘专砖讜转讜 讬诇讚讛 诇驻讬 砖讻诇 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 砖讘转讜专讛 谞砖讘注讬谉 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 诇讗 注诇 讛注讘讚讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转

If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after the cow or maidservant was already in my possession, then the seller takes an oath stating that the cow or maidservant gave birth in his possession and he is then entitled to take the offspring. This is because for anyone who takes an oath required by Torah law, he takes the oath and does not have to pay. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One does not take an oath, not on a claim concerning slaves and not on a claim concerning land.

诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 谞砖讘注讬谉

The Gemara explains its proof from this baraita: Since the Rabbis replied to Rabbi Meir that an oath is not taken on a claim concerning slaves or land, is it not correct that by inference, Rabbi Meir holds that one can take an oath on a claim concerning either slaves or land?

诪诪讗讬 讚诇诪讗 讻砖诐 拽讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讜讚讬转 诇谉 讘拽专拽注讜转 讗讜讚讬 诇谉 谞诪讬 讘注讘讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects this inference: But from where is this inferred? Perhaps the Rabbis are speaking to him utilizing the style of: Just as, and they are saying as follows: Just as you concede to us with regard to land, concede to us also with regard to slaves.

转讚注 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬砖 讚讘专讬诐 砖讛谉 讻拽专拽注 讜讗讬谞谉 讻拽专拽注 讜讗讬谉 讞讻诪讬诐 诪讜讚讬诐 诇讜 讻讬爪讚 注砖专 讙驻谞讬诐 讟注讜谞讜转 诪住专转讬 诇讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞谉 讗诇讗 讞诪砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诇 讛诪讞讜讘专 诇拽专拽注 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讻拽专拽注

The Gemara adds: Know that Rabbi Meir holds that one does not take an oath for a claim concerning land, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b): Rabbi Meir says: There are some matters that have a legal status like that of land, but nevertheless, with regard to oaths they are not treated like land and so one takes an oath with regard to them. But the Rabbis do not concede to Rabbi Meir that this is the halakha. How so? If one claims: I delivered ten vines laden with grapes to you, and the other says: There were only five; Rabbi Meir deems him liable to take an oath of one who admits to part of a claim. But the Rabbis say: Anything that is attached to the ground has a legal status like that of land, so no oath is taken with regard to them.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 注谞讘讬诐 讛注讜诪讚讜转 诇讬讘爪专 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚诪专 住讘专 讻讘爪讜专讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗讜 讻讘爪讜专讜转 讚诪讬讬谉

The Gemara clarifies the scope of the dispute: And Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: The difference between them is only in a case of grapes that are ready to be picked, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds: They are considered as though they were already harvested, meaning that they are regarded as movable property, with regard to which an oath is taken. And the other Sage, the Rabbis, holds: They are not considered as though they were about to be picked, meaning that they are regarded as land, with regard to which an oath is not taken. Evidently, Rabbi Meir agrees that an oath is not taken concerning land.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讜讚拽砖讬讗 诇讱 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讻住讜转 注讘讚 讻注讘讚 讚诪讬 注讜诪专讬 砖讚讛 讻砖讚讛 讚诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, actually the mishna can be explained only in accordance with the interpretation of Rabbi Hoshaya, cited above. And with regard to that which posed a difficulty to you, namely that according to his explanation, the novelty of the mishna is only that movable property binds land so that one can be required to take an oath with regard to it, and that halakha is already taught in the mishna in tractate Kiddushin, one can explain that it was necessary to also teach this in the mishna here, because it might enter your mind to say that the garment of a slave is like the slave himself, or that sheaves of a field are like the field itself. If so, there would be no basis to require an oath, even one based on the claims about the garment and sheaves themselves. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they are considered distinct items and the claims concerning them require the seller to take an oath which can then be extended to require an oath for the claim concerning the slave or land.

讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讛讗 诪谞讬 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉

搂 The Gemara analyzes one of the clauses of the baraita cited above: In a case in which it is unclear when the cow or maidservant gave birth, if this one says: I do not know what happened, and that one says: I do not know what happened, they divide the value of the offspring between them. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: When there is property of uncertain ownership, the parties divide it equally between them.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转讬 讬砖讘注 讛诪讜讻专 砖讘专砖讜转讜 讬诇讚讛 讜诇专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 讗驻讬诇讜 讘专讬 讜讘专讬 讗诪讗讬 讬砖讘注 诪讜讻专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 诪讬讘注讬讗

The Gemara questions this attribution: If so, say and try to explain accordingly the latter clause of that baraita: If this seller says: The birth occurred while the cow or maidservant was still in my possession, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after the cow or maidservant was already in my possession, then the seller takes an oath stating that it gave birth in his possession, and he is then entitled to take the offspring. The Gemara explains the difficulty: But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who says: Yes, Sumakhos said his ruling even in a case in which there is a conflict between a certain claim and a certain claim, why does the mishna rule that the seller takes an oath; the mishna should have ruled that they divide the value of the disputed offspring between them.

诪讜讚讛 住讜诪讻讜住 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 砖讘讜注讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讚拽讟注讛 诇讬讚讛 讻讚专讘讗

The Gemara answers: Sumakhos concedes that where there is a requirement for one of the parties to take an oath required by Torah law, that the disputed amount is not divided. And furthermore, this is not a case in which the seller could say: Here you are, because the case is where after the sale, the seller severed the slave鈥檚 hand, just like in the explanation of Rava above.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪讜讻专 讝讬转讬讜 诇注爪讬诐 讜注砖讜 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 诇住讗讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讝讬转讬诐

MISHNA: In the case of one who sells his olive trees to another so he can chop them down and use them for their wood, and before he chopped them down they yielded olives, if the olives are of a quality that could provide the value of less than a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, these olives are the property of the new owner of the olive trees, i.e., the buyer.

注砖讜 专讘讬注讬转 诇住讗讛 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讝讬转讬 讙讚诇讜 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗专爪讬 讙讚诇讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜

If they yielded olives that could provide the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, and this one, the buyer, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, the seller, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them.

砖讟祝 谞讛专 讝讬转讬讜 讜谞转谞诐 诇转讜讱 砖讚讛 讞讘讬专讜 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讝讬转讬 讙讚诇讜 讜讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗专爪讬 讙讚诇讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜

In the event that a river swept away one鈥檚 olive trees and deposited them in the field of another, and they took root there and yielded olives, this one, i.e., the owner of the trees, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, i.e., the owner of the field, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them.

讙诪壮 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 拽讜抓 诇讗诇转专 讗驻讬诇讜 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 讛拽专拽注 讗讬 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻诇 讗讬诪转 讚讘注讬转 拽讜抓 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬注讬转 谞诪讬 诇讘注诇 讝讬转讬诐

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the sale? If this is a case where before the sale the seller said to the buyer: Cut down the trees immediately, then clearly he is particular that the buyer not derive benefit from the nourishment provided by his land. Therefore, even if the olives yielded could provide less than the value of a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, they will belong to the owner of the land, i.e., the seller. Conversely, if the case is where he said to him: Cut down the trees whenever you want, then it is clear that he is not particular about the buyer deriving benefit from the nourishment provided by his land. Therefore, even if the olives yielded could provide the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, they will belong to the owner of the olive trees, i.e., the buyer.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 驻讞讜转 诪专讘讬注讬转 诇讗 拽驻讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 专讘讬注讬转 拽驻讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬

The Gemara explains: No, the ruling is necessary in a case where the seller said to him to cut down the trees, without specification about when he should do so. Accordingly, if the olives yielded produce less than the value of a quarterlog of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, then since people are generally not particular to receive their share of such olives, the buyer may keep them. But where the olives yielded produce the value of a quarterlog or more of oil per se鈥檃 of olives, people are generally particular to receive their share of such olives; consequently, they divide the olives between them.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 驻讝讬 讜专讘讬注讬转 砖讗诪专讜

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says: And the value of the quarterlog that they mentioned in the mishna

Scroll To Top