Bava Metzia 102

בגובתא דקניא

to insert a mezuza inside a hollow reed and then affix the whole arrangement to the doorpost.

תנו רבנן המשכיר בית לחבירו על השוכר לעשות לו מזוזה וכשהוא יוצא לא יטלנה בידו ויוצא ומנכרי נוטלה בידו ויוצא ומעשה באחד שנטלה בידו ויצא וקבר אשתו ושני בניו

The Sages taught in a baraita: If one rents out a house to another, the responsibility to prepare a mezuza for it and affix it is upon the renter. And when he leaves, he may not take it in his hand and leave with it; rather, he must leave it there. But if he rented a house from a gentile, he may take it in his hand and leave with it. And there was an incident in which a renter took his mezuza in his hand and left with it, and as a punishment he eventually buried his wife and two sons.

מעשה לסתור אמר רב ששת ארישא

The Gemara asks: Was the incident cited to contradict the ruling immediately preceding it, which permits one to take the mezuza? Rav Sheshet said: The incident relates to the first clause.

הזבל של בעל הבית ואין לשוכר אלא היוצא מן התנור ומן הכירים בלבד במאי עסקינן אילימא בחצר דאגיר ליה לשוכר ותורי דשוכר אמאי של בעל הבית אלא בחצר דלא אגירא לשוכר ותורי דמשכיר פשיטא

§ The mishna teaches: The manure found in the courtyard of a rented house, is the property of the landlord, and the renter has rights only to the ashes that come out of the oven and the stove, which can also be used as a fertilizer. The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If we say that the mishna is referring to a courtyard that is rented out to the renter, or where the manure was produced by the oxen of the renter, then why should it be the property of the landlord? It is clearly the property of the renter. Rather, the mishna must be referring to a courtyard that is not rented out to the renter, and the manure was produced by the oxen of the landlord. The Gemara asks: But if so, the ruling is obvious and need not have been taught.

לא צריכא בחצר דמשכיר ותורי דאתו מעלמא קמו בה

The Gemara answers: No, the ruling is necessary in a case where the manure is in a courtyard of the landlord, and the source of the manure was oxen that came from the world at large and stood in the courtyard and produced the manure. The mishna rules that in such a case, the manure belongs to the landlord.

מסייע ליה לרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא דאמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו

The Gemara suggests: That ruling in the mishna that any manure deposited in the landlord’s courtyard belongs to him supports the ruling of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge.

מיתיבי אם אמר כל מציאות שיבאו לתוכו היום תקנה לי חצרי לא אמר כלום ואם איתא להא דאמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו אמאי לא אמר כלום

The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says: Any lost items that come into my courtyard today, my courtyard should effect acquisition of them for me, he has not said anything of legal significance, and does not acquire those items. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says is correct, i.e., that a person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge, then why has he not said anything of legal significance?

הכא במאי עסקינן בחצר שאינה משתמרת

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a courtyard that is not secured, as the halakha is that such a courtyard does not effect acquisition of items for its owner.

אי הכי אימא סיפא יצא לו שם מציאה בעיר דבריו קיימין ואי בחצר שאינה משתמרת כי יצא לו שם מציאה בעיר מאי הוי

The Gemara questions this resolution: If so, say and try to explain accordingly the latter clause of the baraita that states: If knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, his statement stands and his courtyard acquires it. The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if the baraita is referring to a courtyard that is not secured, even where knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, what of it? Such a courtyard is unable to effect acquisition for its owner of items placed in it.

כיון דיצא לו שם מציאה בעיר מיבדל בדילי אינשי מינה והויא לה כחצר המשתמרת

The Gemara answers: Once knowledge of the existence of that lost item spreads though the town, people withdraw themselves from it, as they assume that the owner of the courtyard will take it. Therefore, no one will even try to take it and the courtyard will be like a secured courtyard which can effect acquisition of items for its owner.

מיתיבי זבל היוצא מן התנור ומן הכירים והקולט מן האויר הרי הוא שלו ושברפת ושבחצר של בעל הבית ואם איתא להא דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא דאמר חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו קולט מאויר אמאי הרי הוא שלו אויר חצרו הוא

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling from a baraita: Refuse of the oven and of the stove, i.e., ashes, and that which is collected in the renter’s vessel from the airspace of the courtyard, is the renter’s property. And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard, i.e., the manure, is the property of the landlord. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yossi, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says is correct, i.e., that a person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then with regard to refuse collected from the airspace of the courtyard, why is it the renter’s property? It was first in the airspace of the landlord’s courtyard, and should consequently be acquired by him immediately.

אמר אביי במדביק כלי בשולי פרה

Abaye said: The baraita is referring to a case where the renter attached his vessel to a cow’s rear. Any manure produced by the cow would immediately enter the renter’s vessel, without first entering the airspace of the courtyard, and the renter would consequently acquire it.

רבא אמר אויר שאין סופו לנוח לאו כמונח דמי

Rava said: An item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself is not regarded as though it had come to rest. Accordingly, even if the refuse traveled through the airspace of the courtyard, since it was always on course to enter the renter’s vessel, it is not acquired by means of the landlord’s courtyard.

ומי פשיטא ליה לרבא והא מיבעי בעי לה דבעי רבא זרק ארנקי בפתח זה ויצאתה בפתח זה מהו אויר שאין סופו לנוח כמונח דמי או לאו כמונח דמי

The Gemara asks: And is this principle really so obvious to Rava? But didn’t he raise it as a dilemma? As Rava raised a dilemma: If one cast a purse through this doorway of a house and it went through the house and exited through that doorway, what is the halakha? Is an item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself regarded as though it had come to rest, or is it not regarded as though it had come to rest?

התם לא מיפסק ולא מידי הכא מיפסק כלי

The Gemara explains that Rava’s dilemma concerned a different case: There, in the case of the purse, nothing at all interposes between the purse and the floor of the house, and therefore Rava was unsure about the halakha. Here, where the renter’s vessel interposes, it was obvious to Rava that the renter’s vessel effects acquisition of the item.

ושברפת ושבחצר הרי אלו של בעל הבית תרתי

The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the above cited baraita: And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard is the property of the landlord. The Gemara asks: Can these two statements coincide? By stating that the refuse in the cowshed belongs to the landlord, it indicates that the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the renter. How, then, can the baraita continue to rule that even the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the landlord?

אמר אביי הכי קאמר ושברפת שבחצר הרי אלו של בעל הבית אמר רב אשי זאת אומרת המשכיר חצירו סתם לא השכיר רפת שבה

Abaye said that this is what the baraita is saying: And refuse that is in the cowshed that is located in the courtyard rented out to the renter is the property of the landlord. Extrapolating from Abaye’s statement, Rav Ashi said: That is to say that one who rents out his courtyard without specification of what is included in the rental agreement has not rented out a cowshed that is located in it.

מיתיבי יוני שובך ויוני עלייה חייבות בשילוח ואסורות בגזל מפני דרכי שלום

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling from another baraita: There is a mitzva to dispatch a mother bird if one wishes to take eggs from her nest (Deuteronomy 22:6–7). The mitzva applies only if the bird and eggs are ownerless. Doves of a dovecote and doves of an attic are subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, as they are ownerless. Nevertheless, they are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace.

ואם איתא להא דאמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא חצרו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו קרי כאן כי יקרא פרט למזומן

The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says is correct, i.e., that a person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then a dovecote or attic will effect acquisition for its owner of any eggs inside them. Accordingly, one should apply here the principle that the mitzva to dispatch the mother bird from upon her nest applies only: “If it happened before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6) which excludes a bird or egg that is readily accessible, such as one that one owns, from the mitzva to dispatch the mother. Yet the baraita rules that the mitzva does apply in this case.

אמר רבא ביצה ביציאת רובה הוא דאיחייבה לה בשילוח ומיקנא לא קניא עד דנפלה לחצרו וכי קתני חייבות בשילוח מקמי דתיפול לחצירו

Rava said: It is from the time of the emergence of the majority of an egg from a mother bird’s body that one becomes subject to the obligation of dispatching her from upon her eggs. And the owner of a courtyard does not acquire the egg until it fully emerges and falls into his courtyard. And therefore, when the baraita teaches that in the case of doves of a dovecote and of an attic, one is subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, it is referring to a time before the egg falls into his courtyard.

אי הכי אמאי אסורות משום גזל אאמן

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the egg has not fully emerged, why does the baraita rule that they are forbidden by rabbinic law for others to take due to the prohibition of robbery? The Gemara answers: That ruling of the baraita is referring to their mother, i.e., the mother bird.

ואיבעית אימא לעולם אביצים ומדנפיק רובה דעתיה עילוה

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, that ruling is referring to the eggs, and the reason the Sages enacted that taking them is robbery is because once the majority of an egg emerges, the dovecote or attic’s owner’s mind is upon the eggs to acquire them, although technically he will not acquire them until they fully emerge.

והשתא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסור לזכות בביצים כל זמן שהאם רובצת עליהם שנאמר שלח תשלח את האם והדר את הבנים תקח לך אפילו תימא דנפלה לה לחצרו כל היכא דאיהו מצי זכי ליה חצרו זכיא ליה וכל היכא דאיהו לא מצי זכי ליה חצרו נמי לא זכיא ליה

And now that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is prohibited to acquire the eggs as long as the mother bird is upon them, as it is first stated: “Send away the mother” and only then: “And take the young for yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:7), even if you say that the eggs fully emerged and fell into his courtyard, he will not acquire them, because in any case in which a courtyard owner is able to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard can effect acquisition of it for him, but in any case in which he is unable to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard cannot effect acquisition of it for him either.

אי הכי אסורות בגזל מפני דרכי שלום אי דשלחה גזל מעליא הוא אי דלא שלחה הא בעי שלוחה

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the courtyard cannot effect acquisition of the eggs for him, why does the baraita rule: They are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace? If one dispatched the mother bird, in which case the courtyard would automatically effect acquisition of the eggs, then taking them would be full-fledged robbery, and if one did not dispatch the mother bird, doesn’t he need to dispatch her before it is permitted to take the eggs? Either way, one will have transgressed Torah law. Why, then, does the baraita refer to a rabbinic prohibition of robbery, rather than one by Torah law?

בקטן דלאו בר שילוח הוא קטן בר דרכי שלום הוא הכי קאמר אביו של קטן חייב להחזיר לו מפני דרכי שלום

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a minor, who is not subject to the mitzva of dispatching the mother bird. The Gemara challenges this answer based on the latter clause of the baraita: Is a minor subject to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery enacted to maintain the ways of peace? The Gemara explains: This is what the latter clause of the baraita is saying: The father of a minor who took such eggs is obligated to return them to the owner of the dovecote or attic, due to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery instituted to maintain the ways of peace.

מתני׳ המשכיר בית לחבירו לשנה נתעברה השנה נתעברה לשוכר השכיר לו לחדשים נתעברה השנה נתעברה למשכיר

MISHNA: In the case of one who rents out a house to another for a year and then the year was intercalated, adding an additional month to that year, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the renter. Since the rental was defined in terms of a year, the additional month is automatically included, and the renter need not pay additional rent for it. If a landlord rented out a house to another for a year, with the price set as a certain sum for each of the months, and then the year was intercalated, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the landlord.

מעשה בציפורי באחד ששכר מרחץ מחבירו בשנים עשר זהב לשנה מדינר זהב לחדש

An incident occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another where they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated.

ובא מעשה לפני רבן שמעון בן גמליאל ולפני רבי יוסי ואמרו יחלוקו את חדש העיבור

And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.

גמ׳ מעשה לסתור חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני ואם אמר לו בשנים עשר זהובים לשנה מדינר זהב לחדש יחלוקו ומעשה נמי בציפורי באחד ששכר מרחץ מחבירו בשנים עשר זהובים לשנה מדינר זהב לחדש ובא מעשה לפני רבן שמעון בן גמליאל ולפני רבי יוסי ואמרו יחלוקו את חדש העיבור

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the mishna’s initial ruling? The Gemara explains: The latter clause is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: But if the landlord said to the renter that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated, the intercalary month should be divided between them. And in addition, an incident like this occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another, and they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated. And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them.

אמר רב אי הואי התם הוה יהיבנא ליה כוליה למשכיר

Rav said: If I had been there, as a judge, I would have given the entire month to the landlord and ruled that the renter must pay for it. Rav understood that the statement defining the rent should be understood based on the final expression used, i.e., a gold dinar per month.

מאי קא משמע לן תפוס לשון אחרון

The Gemara asks: What is Rav teaching us? Could he be teach-ing that when a statement consists of two expressions with contradictory implications one should attend only to the last statement?

הא אמר רב חדא זימנא דאמר רב הונא אמרי בי רב אסתירא מאה מעי מאה מעי מאה מעי אסתירא אסתירא

But didn’t Rav already say that one time before, as Rav Huna said with regard to a case in which a seller fixed the price for an item using two different expressions that indicate different amounts and the buyer agreed and took the item: They say in the study hall of Rav that if the seller said: An asteira, one hundred coins, i.e., copper perutot, then the buyer must pay him one hundred coins, despite the fact that an asteira is a coin worth ninety-six perutot. And if the seller said: One hundred coins, an asteira, the buyer must pay him an asteira. It is already apparent from this ruling that Rav holds that one should rule according to the final expression. Why did he restate his opinion with regard to the case of the intercalary month?

אי מהתם הוה אמינא פרושי קא מפרש קמשמע לן

The Gemara explains: If Rav’s opinion were known from there, I would say that the second expression is explaining the first, and that is the reason to follow it. But one would still not know the halakha in a case in which the second expression undeniably contradicts the first. Therefore, Rav teaches us that in all cases one acts in accordance with the final expression.

ושמואל אמר בבא באמצע חדש עסקינן אבל בא בתחלת חדש כוליה למשכיר בא בסוף חדש כוליה לשוכר

And Shmuel said in explanation of the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei: In the mishna, we are dealing with a case where the landlord came before the court in the middle of the month. Only in that case is the disputed month divided between them. But if he came at the beginning of the month, the entire month’s rent would be awarded to the landlord, and if he came at the end of the month, the entire month’s rent would be awarded to the renter. The reason is that it is uncertain whether or not one always acts in accordance with the final expression, and, consequently, whether the renter must pay for the extra month. With regard to upcoming days of rental, since the landlord has possession of the property, he can demand rent. And with regard to days that have already passed, where the question is whether the renter must pay for them, since he is in possession of his money, he cannot be made to pay. Shmuel does not hold that only the second statement is followed.

מי אמר שמואל לא אמרינן תפוס לשון אחרון והא רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו כור בשלשים אני מוכר לך יכול לחזור בו אפילו בסאה אחרונה כור בשלשים סאה בסלע אני מוכר לך ראשון ראשון קנה

The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say that we do not say that one should attend only to the last statement? But don’t Rav and Shmuel both say: If a seller says to a buyer: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, then he can renege on the sale even while transferring to him the last se’a of grain. As a kor is equal to thirty se’a, it is apparent that each se’a is being sold for one sela, but since that breakdown was not made explicit, the sale of the entire kor is considered as a single entity. Until the entire kor has been transferred, the sale does not take effect. If the seller used two expressions: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, a se’a per sela, then the buyer acquires each of the thirty se’a of grain one by one, immediately upon each being transferred to him, and the seller cannot renege on the sale of any se’a that has taken place. Although the implications of the seller’s two expressions are contradictory, Shmuel rules that one should act in accordance with the final expression.

התם טעמא מאי משום דתפיס הכא נמי קא תפיס

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the grain, Shmuel’s ruling was not due to the fact that we attend to the final expression, since it is uncertain whether or not we do. Rather, what is the reason for his ruling? It is due to the fact that the buyer has already taken hold of the grain and consequently has presumptive ownership of it. Here too, in the case of the bathhouse, each party is holding onto the basis of his claim, i.e., the landlord has possession of his property and the renter has possession of his money, and it is only due to this reason that Shmuel rules as he does.

ורב נחמן אמר קרקע בחזקת בעליה קיימת מאי קא משמע לן תפוס לשון אחרון היינו דרב אף על גב דאפיך מיפך

And Rav Naḥman said: I would have ruled that since the halakha is that land is always in its owner’s possession, even when rented out, the landlord is entitled to the entire month’s rent. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Naḥman teaching us? Could his ruling be based on saying that one should attend only to the last statement? But then this is identical to the ruling of Rav. The Gemara clarifies: Rav Naḥman’s ruling is unlike Rav’s, as Rav Naḥman would award the extra month to the landlord even where the order of the two expressions is reversed. Rather, as he explained, his ruling is based on the fact the landlord has possession of the property.

בעו מיניה מרבי ינאי שוכר אמר נתתי ומשכיר אמר לא נטלתי על מי להביא ראיה

§ The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: If a renter says to his landlord: I already gave the rental fee to you, and the landlord says: I did not take any payment from you, upon whom is the burden of proof?

אימת אי בתוך זמנו תנינא אי לאחר זמנו תנינא דתנן מת האב בתוך שלשים יום בחזקת שלא נפדה עד שיביא ראיה שנפדה לאחר שלשים יום בחזקת שנפדה עד שיאמרו לו שלא נפדה

The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When did the renter make his claim? If it was during his rental period, we already learned the halakha in this case and the Sages would not have asked about it. Similarly, if it was after his rental period, we already learned the halakha in that case as well. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 49a): A father is obligated to redeem his firstborn son after the son is thirty days old by paying five shekels to a priest. If the father died within thirty days of the birth, the son has the presumptive status of being unredeemed, until he brings a proof that he was redeemed. If he died after thirty days, the son has the presumptive status of having been redeemed, until people tell him that he was not redeemed. It is apparent from this mishna that a person is presumed not to pay money before he must, and he is presumed to have paid money once he is required to do so. This logic can be applied to the paying of a rental fee.

לא צריכא ביומא דמשלם זמניה מי עביד איניש דפרע ביומא דמשלם זמניה או לא

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where the renter makes his claim on the day on which his rental period is completed. The dilemma is whether a person is apt to pay his debts on the very day on which the period in which to pay them is completed, or he is not.

אמר להו רבי יוחנן תניתוה

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: Also this, you have already learned in a mishna (111a):