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Today's Daf Yomi

January 6, 2017 | 讞壮 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Bava Metzia 102

What items in the house are the responsibility of the landlord to fix and what are聽the responsibility of the renter? 聽Items that come into the courtyard of the landlord belong to the landlord, even if someone is renting the house. 聽This is supported by Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Chanina’s view that a courtyard can acquire items even without the knowledge of the owner. 聽 Various tannaitic sources are brought to question Rabbi Yossi’s opinion. 聽If one rents for a year and the year becomes a leap year, is the rental of the extra month included in the original price or does the renter need to pay extra? 聽It depends on whther the agreement was for month or for the year. 聽If the agreement mentioned both months and years, there is a debate about what the halacha will be.


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讘讙讜讘转讗 讚拽谞讬讗

to insert a mezuza inside a hollow reed and then affix the whole arrangement to the doorpost.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诪砖讻讬专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讛砖讜讻专 诇注砖讜转 诇讜 诪讝讜讝讛 讜讻砖讛讜讗 讬讜爪讗 诇讗 讬讟诇谞讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讜爪讗 讜诪谞讻专讬 谞讜讟诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讜爪讗 讜诪注砖讛 讘讗讞讚 砖谞讟诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬爪讗 讜拽讘专 讗砖转讜 讜砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜

The Sages taught in a baraita: If one rents out a house to another, the responsibility to prepare a mezuza for it and affix it is upon the renter. And when he leaves, he may not take it in his hand and leave with it; rather, he must leave it there. But if he rented a house from a gentile, he may take it in his hand and leave with it. And there was an incident in which a renter took his mezuza in his hand and left with it, and as a punishment he eventually buried his wife and two sons.

诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗专讬砖讗

The Gemara asks: Was the incident cited to contradict the ruling immediately preceding it, which permits one to take the mezuza? Rav Sheshet said: The incident relates to the first clause.

讛讝讘诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗讬谉 诇砖讜讻专 讗诇讗 讛讬讜爪讗 诪谉 讛转谞讜专 讜诪谉 讛讻讬专讬诐 讘诇讘讚 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚讗讙讬专 诇讬讛 诇砖讜讻专 讜转讜专讬 讚砖讜讻专 讗诪讗讬 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 讗讙讬专讗 诇砖讜讻专 讜转讜专讬 讚诪砖讻讬专 驻砖讬讟讗

搂 The mishna teaches: The manure found in the courtyard of a rented house, is the property of the landlord, and the renter has rights only to the ashes that come out of the oven and the stove, which can also be used as a fertilizer. The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If we say that the mishna is referring to a courtyard that is rented out to the renter, or where the manure was produced by the oxen of the renter, then why should it be the property of the landlord? It is clearly the property of the renter. Rather, the mishna must be referring to a courtyard that is not rented out to the renter, and the manure was produced by the oxen of the landlord. The Gemara asks: But if so, the ruling is obvious and need not have been taught.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讞爪专 讚诪砖讻讬专 讜转讜专讬 讚讗转讜 诪注诇诪讗 拽诪讜 讘讛

The Gemara answers: No, the ruling is necessary in a case where the manure is in a courtyard of the landlord, and the source of the manure was oxen that came from the world at large and stood in the courtyard and produced the manure. The mishna rules that in such a case, the manure belongs to the landlord.

诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara suggests: That ruling in the mishna that any manure deposited in the landlord鈥檚 courtyard belongs to him supports the ruling of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讗诐 讗诪专 讻诇 诪爪讬讗讜转 砖讬讘讗讜 诇转讜讻讜 讛讬讜诐 转拽谞讛 诇讬 讞爪专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says: Any lost items that come into my courtyard today, my courtyard should effect acquisition of them for me, he has not said anything of legal significance, and does not acquire those items. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge, then why has he not said anything of legal significance?

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a courtyard that is not secured, as the halakha is that such a courtyard does not effect acquisition of items for its owner.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉 讜讗讬 讘讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讻讬 讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara questions this resolution: If so, say and try to explain accordingly the latter clause of the baraita that states: If knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, his statement stands and his courtyard acquires it. The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if the baraita is referring to a courtyard that is not secured, even where knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, what of it? Such a courtyard is unable to effect acquisition for its owner of items placed in it.

讻讬讜谉 讚讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 诪讬讘讚诇 讘讚讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 诪讬谞讛 讜讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讻讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara answers: Once knowledge of the existence of that lost item spreads though the town, people withdraw themselves from it, as they assume that the owner of the courtyard will take it. Therefore, no one will even try to take it and the courtyard will be like a secured courtyard which can effect acquisition of items for its owner.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讝讘诇 讛讬讜爪讗 诪谉 讛转谞讜专 讜诪谉 讛讻讬专讬诐 讜讛拽讜诇讟 诪谉 讛讗讜讬专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 砖诇讜 讜砖讘专驻转 讜砖讘讞爪专 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 拽讜诇讟 诪讗讜讬专 讗诪讗讬 讛专讬 讛讜讗 砖诇讜 讗讜讬专 讞爪专讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling from a baraita: Refuse of the oven and of the stove, i.e., ashes, and that which is collected in the renter鈥檚 vessel from the airspace of the courtyard, is the renter鈥檚 property. And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard, i.e., the manure, is the property of the landlord. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yossi, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then with regard to refuse collected from the airspace of the courtyard, why is it the renter鈥檚 property? It was first in the airspace of the landlord鈥檚 courtyard, and should consequently be acquired by him immediately.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讘诪讚讘讬拽 讻诇讬 讘砖讜诇讬 驻专讛

Abaye said: The baraita is referring to a case where the renter attached his vessel to a cow鈥檚 rear. Any manure produced by the cow would immediately enter the renter鈥檚 vessel, without first entering the airspace of the courtyard, and the renter would consequently acquire it.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讜讬专 砖讗讬谉 住讜驻讜 诇谞讜讞 诇讗讜 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬

Rava said: An item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself is not regarded as though it had come to rest. Accordingly, even if the refuse traveled through the airspace of the courtyard, since it was always on course to enter the renter鈥檚 vessel, it is not acquired by means of the landlord鈥檚 courtyard.

讜诪讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬 讘注讬 诇讛 讚讘注讬 专讘讗 讝专拽 讗专谞拽讬 讘驻转讞 讝讛 讜讬爪讗转讛 讘驻转讞 讝讛 诪讛讜 讗讜讬专 砖讗讬谉 住讜驻讜 诇谞讜讞 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬 讗讜 诇讗讜 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: And is this principle really so obvious to Rava? But didn鈥檛 he raise it as a dilemma? As Rava raised a dilemma: If one cast a purse through this doorway of a house and it went through the house and exited through that doorway, what is the halakha? Is an item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself regarded as though it had come to rest, or is it not regarded as though it had come to rest?

讛转诐 诇讗 诪讬驻住拽 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讛讻讗 诪讬驻住拽 讻诇讬

The Gemara explains that Rava鈥檚 dilemma concerned a different case: There, in the case of the purse, nothing at all interposes between the purse and the floor of the house, and therefore Rava was unsure about the halakha. Here, where the renter鈥檚 vessel interposes, it was obvious to Rava that the renter鈥檚 vessel effects acquisition of the item.

讜砖讘专驻转 讜砖讘讞爪专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 转专转讬

The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the above cited baraita: And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard is the property of the landlord. The Gemara asks: Can these two statements coincide? By stating that the refuse in the cowshed belongs to the landlord, it indicates that the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the renter. How, then, can the baraita continue to rule that even the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the landlord?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜砖讘专驻转 砖讘讞爪专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讛诪砖讻讬专 讞爪讬专讜 住转诐 诇讗 讛砖讻讬专 专驻转 砖讘讛

Abaye said that this is what the baraita is saying: And refuse that is in the cowshed that is located in the courtyard rented out to the renter is the property of the landlord. Extrapolating from Abaye鈥檚 statement, Rav Ashi said: That is to say that one who rents out his courtyard without specification of what is included in the rental agreement has not rented out a cowshed that is located in it.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讬讜谞讬 砖讜讘讱 讜讬讜谞讬 注诇讬讬讛 讞讬讬讘讜转 讘砖讬诇讜讞 讜讗住讜专讜转 讘讙讝诇 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling from another baraita: There is a mitzva to dispatch a mother bird if one wishes to take eggs from her nest (Deuteronomy 22:6鈥7). The mitzva applies only if the bird and eggs are ownerless. Doves of a dovecote and doves of an attic are subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, as they are ownerless. Nevertheless, they are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 拽专讬 讻讗谉 讻讬 讬拽专讗 驻专讟 诇诪讝讜诪谉

The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then a dovecote or attic will effect acquisition for its owner of any eggs inside them. Accordingly, one should apply here the principle that the mitzva to dispatch the mother bird from upon her nest applies only: 鈥淚f it happened before you鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:6) which excludes a bird or egg that is readily accessible, such as one that one owns, from the mitzva to dispatch the mother. Yet the baraita rules that the mitzva does apply in this case.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讬爪讛 讘讬爪讬讗转 专讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讞讬讬讘讛 诇讛 讘砖讬诇讜讞 讜诪讬拽谞讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 注讚 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讞爪专讜 讜讻讬 拽转谞讬 讞讬讬讘讜转 讘砖讬诇讜讞 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬驻讜诇 诇讞爪讬专讜

Rava said: It is from the time of the emergence of the majority of an egg from a mother bird鈥檚 body that one becomes subject to the obligation of dispatching her from upon her eggs. And the owner of a courtyard does not acquire the egg until it fully emerges and falls into his courtyard. And therefore, when the baraita teaches that in the case of doves of a dovecote and of an attic, one is subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, it is referring to a time before the egg falls into his courtyard.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 讗住讜专讜转 诪砖讜诐 讙讝诇 讗讗诪谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the egg has not fully emerged, why does the baraita rule that they are forbidden by rabbinic law for others to take due to the prohibition of robbery? The Gemara answers: That ruling of the baraita is referring to their mother, i.e., the mother bird.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讘讬爪讬诐 讜诪讚谞驻讬拽 专讜讘讛 讚注转讬讛 注讬诇讜讛

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, that ruling is referring to the eggs, and the reason the Sages enacted that taking them is robbery is because once the majority of an egg emerges, the dovecote or attic鈥檚 owner鈥檚 mind is upon the eggs to acquire them, although technically he will not acquire them until they fully emerge.

讜讛砖转讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讜专 诇讝讻讜转 讘讘讬爪讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛讗诐 专讜讘爪转 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讗诪专 砖诇讞 转砖诇讞 讗转 讛讗诐 讜讛讚专 讗转 讛讘谞讬诐 转拽讞 诇讱 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讛 诇讞爪专讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讛讜 诪爪讬 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 讝讻讬讗 诇讬讛 讜讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讛讜 诇讗 诪爪讬 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 讝讻讬讗 诇讬讛

And now that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is prohibited to acquire the eggs as long as the mother bird is upon them, as it is first stated: 鈥淪end away the mother鈥 and only then: 鈥淎nd take the young for yourself鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:7), even if you say that the eggs fully emerged and fell into his courtyard, he will not acquire them, because in any case in which a courtyard owner is able to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard can effect acquisition of it for him, but in any case in which he is unable to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard cannot effect acquisition of it for him either.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗住讜专讜转 讘讙讝诇 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐 讗讬 讚砖诇讞讛 讙讝诇 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 砖诇讞讛 讛讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜讞讛

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the courtyard cannot effect acquisition of the eggs for him, why does the baraita rule: They are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace? If one dispatched the mother bird, in which case the courtyard would automatically effect acquisition of the eggs, then taking them would be full-fledged robbery, and if one did not dispatch the mother bird, doesn鈥檛 he need to dispatch her before it is permitted to take the eggs? Either way, one will have transgressed Torah law. Why, then, does the baraita refer to a rabbinic prohibition of robbery, rather than one by Torah law?

讘拽讟谉 讚诇讗讜 讘专 砖讬诇讜讞 讛讜讗 拽讟谉 讘专 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐 讛讜讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讘讬讜 砖诇 拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a minor, who is not subject to the mitzva of dispatching the mother bird. The Gemara challenges this answer based on the latter clause of the baraita: Is a minor subject to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery enacted to maintain the ways of peace? The Gemara explains: This is what the latter clause of the baraita is saying: The father of a minor who took such eggs is obligated to return them to the owner of the dovecote or attic, due to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery instituted to maintain the ways of peace.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪砖讻讬专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 讛砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇砖讜讻专 讛砖讻讬专 诇讜 诇讞讚砖讬诐 谞转注讘专讛 讛砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇诪砖讻讬专

MISHNA: In the case of one who rents out a house to another for a year and then the year was intercalated, adding an additional month to that year, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the renter. Since the rental was defined in terms of a year, the additional month is automatically included, and the renter need not pay additional rent for it. If a landlord rented out a house to another for a year, with the price set as a certain sum for each of the months, and then the year was intercalated, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the landlord.

诪注砖讛 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讘讗讞讚 砖砖讻专 诪专讞抓 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讘 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖

An incident occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another where they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated.

讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗诪专讜 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗转 讞讚砖 讛注讬讘讜专

And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.

讙诪壮 诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讞住讜专讬 诪讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讜讘讬诐 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讘讗讞讚 砖砖讻专 诪专讞抓 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讜讘讬诐 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖 讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗诪专讜 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗转 讞讚砖 讛注讬讘讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the mishna鈥檚 initial ruling? The Gemara explains: The latter clause is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: But if the landlord said to the renter that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated, the intercalary month should be divided between them. And in addition, an incident like this occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another, and they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated. And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讛转诐 讛讜讛 讬讛讬讘谞讗 诇讬讛 讻讜诇讬讛 诇诪砖讻讬专

Rav said: If I had been there, as a judge, I would have given the entire month to the landlord and ruled that the renter must pay for it. Rav understood that the statement defining the rent should be understood based on the final expression used, i.e., a gold dinar per month.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉

The Gemara asks: What is Rav teaching us? Could he be teach-ing that when a statement consists of two expressions with contradictory implications one should attend only to the last statement?

讛讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬 专讘 讗住转讬专讗 诪讗讛 诪注讬 诪讗讛 诪注讬 诪讗讛 诪注讬 讗住转讬专讗 讗住转讬专讗

But didn鈥檛 Rav already say that one time before, as Rav Huna said with regard to a case in which a seller fixed the price for an item using two different expressions that indicate different amounts and the buyer agreed and took the item: They say in the study hall of Rav that if the seller said: An asteira, one hundred coins, i.e., copper perutot, then the buyer must pay him one hundred coins, despite the fact that an asteira is a coin worth ninety-six perutot. And if the seller said: One hundred coins, an asteira, the buyer must pay him an asteira. It is already apparent from this ruling that Rav holds that one should rule according to the final expression. Why did he restate his opinion with regard to the case of the intercalary month?

讗讬 诪讛转诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 驻专讜砖讬 拽讗 诪驻专砖 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains: If Rav鈥檚 opinion were known from there, I would say that the second expression is explaining the first, and that is the reason to follow it. But one would still not know the halakha in a case in which the second expression undeniably contradicts the first. Therefore, Rav teaches us that in all cases one acts in accordance with the final expression.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘讘讗 讘讗诪爪注 讞讚砖 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讗 讘转讞诇转 讞讚砖 讻讜诇讬讛 诇诪砖讻讬专 讘讗 讘住讜祝 讞讚砖 讻讜诇讬讛 诇砖讜讻专

And Shmuel said in explanation of the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei: In the mishna, we are dealing with a case where the landlord came before the court in the middle of the month. Only in that case is the disputed month divided between them. But if he came at the beginning of the month, the entire month鈥檚 rent would be awarded to the landlord, and if he came at the end of the month, the entire month鈥檚 rent would be awarded to the renter. The reason is that it is uncertain whether or not one always acts in accordance with the final expression, and, consequently, whether the renter must pay for the extra month. With regard to upcoming days of rental, since the landlord has possession of the property, he can demand rent. And with regard to days that have already passed, where the question is whether the renter must pay for them, since he is in possession of his money, he cannot be made to pay. Shmuel does not hold that only the second statement is followed.

诪讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉 讜讛讗 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讻讜专 讘砖诇砖讬诐 讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讗讛 讗讞专讜谞讛 讻讜专 讘砖诇砖讬诐 住讗讛 讘住诇注 讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛

The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say that we do not say that one should attend only to the last statement? But don鈥檛 Rav and Shmuel both say: If a seller says to a buyer: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, then he can renege on the sale even while transferring to him the last se鈥檃 of grain. As a kor is equal to thirty se鈥檃, it is apparent that each se鈥檃 is being sold for one sela, but since that breakdown was not made explicit, the sale of the entire kor is considered as a single entity. Until the entire kor has been transferred, the sale does not take effect. If the seller used two expressions: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, a se鈥檃 per sela, then the buyer acquires each of the thirty se鈥檃 of grain one by one, immediately upon each being transferred to him, and the seller cannot renege on the sale of any se鈥檃 that has taken place. Although the implications of the seller鈥檚 two expressions are contradictory, Shmuel rules that one should act in accordance with the final expression.

讛转诐 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚转驻讬住 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 拽讗 转驻讬住

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the grain, Shmuel鈥檚 ruling was not due to the fact that we attend to the final expression, since it is uncertain whether or not we do. Rather, what is the reason for his ruling? It is due to the fact that the buyer has already taken hold of the grain and consequently has presumptive ownership of it. Here too, in the case of the bathhouse, each party is holding onto the basis of his claim, i.e., the landlord has possession of his property and the renter has possession of his money, and it is only due to this reason that Shmuel rules as he does.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 拽专拽注 讘讞讝拽转 讘注诇讬讛 拽讬讬诪转 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉 讛讬讬谞讜 讚专讘 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗驻讬讱 诪讬驻讱

And Rav Na岣an said: I would have ruled that since the halakha is that land is always in its owner鈥檚 possession, even when rented out, the landlord is entitled to the entire month鈥檚 rent. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Na岣an teaching us? Could his ruling be based on saying that one should attend only to the last statement? But then this is identical to the ruling of Rav. The Gemara clarifies: Rav Na岣an鈥檚 ruling is unlike Rav鈥檚, as Rav Na岣an would award the extra month to the landlord even where the order of the two expressions is reversed. Rather, as he explained, his ruling is based on the fact the landlord has possession of the property.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 砖讜讻专 讗诪专 谞转转讬 讜诪砖讻讬专 讗诪专 诇讗 谞讟诇转讬 注诇 诪讬 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛

搂 The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: If a renter says to his landlord: I already gave the rental fee to you, and the landlord says: I did not take any payment from you, upon whom is the burden of proof?

讗讬诪转 讗讬 讘转讜讱 讝诪谞讜 转谞讬谞讗 讗讬 诇讗讞专 讝诪谞讜 转谞讬谞讗 讚转谞谉 诪转 讛讗讘 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讘讞讝拽转 砖诇讗 谞驻讚讛 注讚 砖讬讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖谞驻讚讛 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讘讞讝拽转 砖谞驻讚讛 注讚 砖讬讗诪专讜 诇讜 砖诇讗 谞驻讚讛

The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When did the renter make his claim? If it was during his rental period, we already learned the halakha in this case and the Sages would not have asked about it. Similarly, if it was after his rental period, we already learned the halakha in that case as well. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 49a): A father is obligated to redeem his firstborn son after the son is thirty days old by paying five shekels to a priest. If the father died within thirty days of the birth, the son has the presumptive status of being unredeemed, until he brings a proof that he was redeemed. If he died after thirty days, the son has the presumptive status of having been redeemed, until people tell him that he was not redeemed. It is apparent from this mishna that a person is presumed not to pay money before he must, and he is presumed to have paid money once he is required to do so. This logic can be applied to the paying of a rental fee.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讝诪谞讬讛 诪讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚驻专注 讘讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讝诪谞讬讛 讗讜 诇讗

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where the renter makes his claim on the day on which his rental period is completed. The dilemma is whether a person is apt to pay his debts on the very day on which the period in which to pay them is completed, or he is not.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 转谞讬转讜讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to them: Also this, you have already learned in a mishna (111a):

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Bava Metzia 102

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 102

讘讙讜讘转讗 讚拽谞讬讗

to insert a mezuza inside a hollow reed and then affix the whole arrangement to the doorpost.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诪砖讻讬专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讛砖讜讻专 诇注砖讜转 诇讜 诪讝讜讝讛 讜讻砖讛讜讗 讬讜爪讗 诇讗 讬讟诇谞讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讜爪讗 讜诪谞讻专讬 谞讜讟诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讜爪讗 讜诪注砖讛 讘讗讞讚 砖谞讟诇讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讬爪讗 讜拽讘专 讗砖转讜 讜砖谞讬 讘谞讬讜

The Sages taught in a baraita: If one rents out a house to another, the responsibility to prepare a mezuza for it and affix it is upon the renter. And when he leaves, he may not take it in his hand and leave with it; rather, he must leave it there. But if he rented a house from a gentile, he may take it in his hand and leave with it. And there was an incident in which a renter took his mezuza in his hand and left with it, and as a punishment he eventually buried his wife and two sons.

诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗专讬砖讗

The Gemara asks: Was the incident cited to contradict the ruling immediately preceding it, which permits one to take the mezuza? Rav Sheshet said: The incident relates to the first clause.

讛讝讘诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗讬谉 诇砖讜讻专 讗诇讗 讛讬讜爪讗 诪谉 讛转谞讜专 讜诪谉 讛讻讬专讬诐 讘诇讘讚 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘讞爪专 讚讗讙讬专 诇讬讛 诇砖讜讻专 讜转讜专讬 讚砖讜讻专 讗诪讗讬 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讚诇讗 讗讙讬专讗 诇砖讜讻专 讜转讜专讬 讚诪砖讻讬专 驻砖讬讟讗

搂 The mishna teaches: The manure found in the courtyard of a rented house, is the property of the landlord, and the renter has rights only to the ashes that come out of the oven and the stove, which can also be used as a fertilizer. The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If we say that the mishna is referring to a courtyard that is rented out to the renter, or where the manure was produced by the oxen of the renter, then why should it be the property of the landlord? It is clearly the property of the renter. Rather, the mishna must be referring to a courtyard that is not rented out to the renter, and the manure was produced by the oxen of the landlord. The Gemara asks: But if so, the ruling is obvious and need not have been taught.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讞爪专 讚诪砖讻讬专 讜转讜专讬 讚讗转讜 诪注诇诪讗 拽诪讜 讘讛

The Gemara answers: No, the ruling is necessary in a case where the manure is in a courtyard of the landlord, and the source of the manure was oxen that came from the world at large and stood in the courtyard and produced the manure. The mishna rules that in such a case, the manure belongs to the landlord.

诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜

The Gemara suggests: That ruling in the mishna that any manure deposited in the landlord鈥檚 courtyard belongs to him supports the ruling of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says: A person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讗诐 讗诪专 讻诇 诪爪讬讗讜转 砖讬讘讗讜 诇转讜讻讜 讛讬讜诐 转拽谞讛 诇讬 讞爪专讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says: Any lost items that come into my courtyard today, my courtyard should effect acquisition of them for me, he has not said anything of legal significance, and does not acquire those items. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it, even without his knowledge, then why has he not said anything of legal significance?

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a courtyard that is not secured, as the halakha is that such a courtyard does not effect acquisition of items for its owner.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉 讜讗讬 讘讞爪专 砖讗讬谞讛 诪砖转诪专转 讻讬 讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 诪讗讬 讛讜讬

The Gemara questions this resolution: If so, say and try to explain accordingly the latter clause of the baraita that states: If knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, his statement stands and his courtyard acquires it. The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if the baraita is referring to a courtyard that is not secured, even where knowledge of the existence of that lost item spread though the town, what of it? Such a courtyard is unable to effect acquisition for its owner of items placed in it.

讻讬讜谉 讚讬爪讗 诇讜 砖诐 诪爪讬讗讛 讘注讬专 诪讬讘讚诇 讘讚讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 诪讬谞讛 讜讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讻讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara answers: Once knowledge of the existence of that lost item spreads though the town, people withdraw themselves from it, as they assume that the owner of the courtyard will take it. Therefore, no one will even try to take it and the courtyard will be like a secured courtyard which can effect acquisition of items for its owner.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讝讘诇 讛讬讜爪讗 诪谉 讛转谞讜专 讜诪谉 讛讻讬专讬诐 讜讛拽讜诇讟 诪谉 讛讗讜讬专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 砖诇讜 讜砖讘专驻转 讜砖讘讞爪专 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 拽讜诇讟 诪讗讜讬专 讗诪讗讬 讛专讬 讛讜讗 砖诇讜 讗讜讬专 讞爪专讜 讛讜讗

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling from a baraita: Refuse of the oven and of the stove, i.e., ashes, and that which is collected in the renter鈥檚 vessel from the airspace of the courtyard, is the renter鈥檚 property. And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard, i.e., the manure, is the property of the landlord. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yossi, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then with regard to refuse collected from the airspace of the courtyard, why is it the renter鈥檚 property? It was first in the airspace of the landlord鈥檚 courtyard, and should consequently be acquired by him immediately.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讘诪讚讘讬拽 讻诇讬 讘砖讜诇讬 驻专讛

Abaye said: The baraita is referring to a case where the renter attached his vessel to a cow鈥檚 rear. Any manure produced by the cow would immediately enter the renter鈥檚 vessel, without first entering the airspace of the courtyard, and the renter would consequently acquire it.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讜讬专 砖讗讬谉 住讜驻讜 诇谞讜讞 诇讗讜 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬

Rava said: An item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself is not regarded as though it had come to rest. Accordingly, even if the refuse traveled through the airspace of the courtyard, since it was always on course to enter the renter鈥檚 vessel, it is not acquired by means of the landlord鈥檚 courtyard.

讜诪讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讗 讜讛讗 诪讬讘注讬 讘注讬 诇讛 讚讘注讬 专讘讗 讝专拽 讗专谞拽讬 讘驻转讞 讝讛 讜讬爪讗转讛 讘驻转讞 讝讛 诪讛讜 讗讜讬专 砖讗讬谉 住讜驻讜 诇谞讜讞 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬 讗讜 诇讗讜 讻诪讜谞讞 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: And is this principle really so obvious to Rava? But didn鈥檛 he raise it as a dilemma? As Rava raised a dilemma: If one cast a purse through this doorway of a house and it went through the house and exited through that doorway, what is the halakha? Is an item in the airspace of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself regarded as though it had come to rest, or is it not regarded as though it had come to rest?

讛转诐 诇讗 诪讬驻住拽 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讛讻讗 诪讬驻住拽 讻诇讬

The Gemara explains that Rava鈥檚 dilemma concerned a different case: There, in the case of the purse, nothing at all interposes between the purse and the floor of the house, and therefore Rava was unsure about the halakha. Here, where the renter鈥檚 vessel interposes, it was obvious to Rava that the renter鈥檚 vessel effects acquisition of the item.

讜砖讘专驻转 讜砖讘讞爪专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 转专转讬

The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the above cited baraita: And refuse that is in the cowshed and in the courtyard is the property of the landlord. The Gemara asks: Can these two statements coincide? By stating that the refuse in the cowshed belongs to the landlord, it indicates that the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the renter. How, then, can the baraita continue to rule that even the refuse in the courtyard belongs to the landlord?

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜砖讘专驻转 砖讘讞爪专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讝讗转 讗讜诪专转 讛诪砖讻讬专 讞爪讬专讜 住转诐 诇讗 讛砖讻讬专 专驻转 砖讘讛

Abaye said that this is what the baraita is saying: And refuse that is in the cowshed that is located in the courtyard rented out to the renter is the property of the landlord. Extrapolating from Abaye鈥檚 statement, Rav Ashi said: That is to say that one who rents out his courtyard without specification of what is included in the rental agreement has not rented out a cowshed that is located in it.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讬讜谞讬 砖讜讘讱 讜讬讜谞讬 注诇讬讬讛 讞讬讬讘讜转 讘砖讬诇讜讞 讜讗住讜专讜转 讘讙讝诇 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling from another baraita: There is a mitzva to dispatch a mother bird if one wishes to take eggs from her nest (Deuteronomy 22:6鈥7). The mitzva applies only if the bird and eggs are ownerless. Doves of a dovecote and doves of an attic are subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, as they are ownerless. Nevertheless, they are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace.

讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讞爪专讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 拽讜谞讛 诇讜 砖诇讗 诪讚注转讜 拽专讬 讻讗谉 讻讬 讬拽专讗 驻专讟 诇诪讝讜诪谉

The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so, that this ruling that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, says is correct, i.e., that a person鈥檚 courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then a dovecote or attic will effect acquisition for its owner of any eggs inside them. Accordingly, one should apply here the principle that the mitzva to dispatch the mother bird from upon her nest applies only: 鈥淚f it happened before you鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:6) which excludes a bird or egg that is readily accessible, such as one that one owns, from the mitzva to dispatch the mother. Yet the baraita rules that the mitzva does apply in this case.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讬爪讛 讘讬爪讬讗转 专讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讞讬讬讘讛 诇讛 讘砖讬诇讜讞 讜诪讬拽谞讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 注讚 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讞爪专讜 讜讻讬 拽转谞讬 讞讬讬讘讜转 讘砖讬诇讜讞 诪拽诪讬 讚转讬驻讜诇 诇讞爪讬专讜

Rava said: It is from the time of the emergence of the majority of an egg from a mother bird鈥檚 body that one becomes subject to the obligation of dispatching her from upon her eggs. And the owner of a courtyard does not acquire the egg until it fully emerges and falls into his courtyard. And therefore, when the baraita teaches that in the case of doves of a dovecote and of an attic, one is subject to the obligation of dispatching the mother bird, it is referring to a time before the egg falls into his courtyard.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗诪讗讬 讗住讜专讜转 诪砖讜诐 讙讝诇 讗讗诪谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the egg has not fully emerged, why does the baraita rule that they are forbidden by rabbinic law for others to take due to the prohibition of robbery? The Gemara answers: That ruling of the baraita is referring to their mother, i.e., the mother bird.

讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讘讬爪讬诐 讜诪讚谞驻讬拽 专讜讘讛 讚注转讬讛 注讬诇讜讛

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, that ruling is referring to the eggs, and the reason the Sages enacted that taking them is robbery is because once the majority of an egg emerges, the dovecote or attic鈥檚 owner鈥檚 mind is upon the eggs to acquire them, although technically he will not acquire them until they fully emerge.

讜讛砖转讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讜专 诇讝讻讜转 讘讘讬爪讬诐 讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛讗诐 专讜讘爪转 注诇讬讛诐 砖谞讗诪专 砖诇讞 转砖诇讞 讗转 讛讗诐 讜讛讚专 讗转 讛讘谞讬诐 转拽讞 诇讱 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讚谞驻诇讛 诇讛 诇讞爪专讜 讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讛讜 诪爪讬 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 讝讻讬讗 诇讬讛 讜讻诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讛讜 诇讗 诪爪讬 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讞爪专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 讝讻讬讗 诇讬讛

And now that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is prohibited to acquire the eggs as long as the mother bird is upon them, as it is first stated: 鈥淪end away the mother鈥 and only then: 鈥淎nd take the young for yourself鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:7), even if you say that the eggs fully emerged and fell into his courtyard, he will not acquire them, because in any case in which a courtyard owner is able to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard can effect acquisition of it for him, but in any case in which he is unable to acquire an item by himself, his courtyard cannot effect acquisition of it for him either.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗住讜专讜转 讘讙讝诇 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐 讗讬 讚砖诇讞讛 讙讝诇 诪注诇讬讗 讛讜讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 砖诇讞讛 讛讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜讞讛

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the courtyard cannot effect acquisition of the eggs for him, why does the baraita rule: They are subject to the prohibition of robbery, due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace? If one dispatched the mother bird, in which case the courtyard would automatically effect acquisition of the eggs, then taking them would be full-fledged robbery, and if one did not dispatch the mother bird, doesn鈥檛 he need to dispatch her before it is permitted to take the eggs? Either way, one will have transgressed Torah law. Why, then, does the baraita refer to a rabbinic prohibition of robbery, rather than one by Torah law?

讘拽讟谉 讚诇讗讜 讘专 砖讬诇讜讞 讛讜讗 拽讟谉 讘专 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐 讛讜讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讘讬讜 砖诇 拽讟谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专 诇讜 诪驻谞讬 讚专讻讬 砖诇讜诐

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a minor, who is not subject to the mitzva of dispatching the mother bird. The Gemara challenges this answer based on the latter clause of the baraita: Is a minor subject to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery enacted to maintain the ways of peace? The Gemara explains: This is what the latter clause of the baraita is saying: The father of a minor who took such eggs is obligated to return them to the owner of the dovecote or attic, due to the rabbinic prohibition of robbery instituted to maintain the ways of peace.

诪转谞讬壮 讛诪砖讻讬专 讘讬转 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 讛砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇砖讜讻专 讛砖讻讬专 诇讜 诇讞讚砖讬诐 谞转注讘专讛 讛砖谞讛 谞转注讘专讛 诇诪砖讻讬专

MISHNA: In the case of one who rents out a house to another for a year and then the year was intercalated, adding an additional month to that year, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the renter. Since the rental was defined in terms of a year, the additional month is automatically included, and the renter need not pay additional rent for it. If a landlord rented out a house to another for a year, with the price set as a certain sum for each of the months, and then the year was intercalated, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the landlord.

诪注砖讛 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讘讗讞讚 砖砖讻专 诪专讞抓 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讘 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖

An incident occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another where they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated.

讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗诪专讜 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗转 讞讚砖 讛注讬讘讜专

And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.

讙诪壮 诪注砖讛 诇住转讜专 讞住讜专讬 诪讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讜讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讜讘讬诐 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讜诪注砖讛 谞诪讬 讘爪讬驻讜专讬 讘讗讞讚 砖砖讻专 诪专讞抓 诪讞讘讬专讜 讘砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讝讛讜讘讬诐 诇砖谞讛 诪讚讬谞专 讝讛讘 诇讞讚砖 讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讗诪专讜 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗转 讞讚砖 讛注讬讘讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the mishna鈥檚 initial ruling? The Gemara explains: The latter clause is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: But if the landlord said to the renter that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated, the intercalary month should be divided between them. And in addition, an incident like this occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another, and they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated. And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them.

讗诪专 专讘 讗讬 讛讜讗讬 讛转诐 讛讜讛 讬讛讬讘谞讗 诇讬讛 讻讜诇讬讛 诇诪砖讻讬专

Rav said: If I had been there, as a judge, I would have given the entire month to the landlord and ruled that the renter must pay for it. Rav understood that the statement defining the rent should be understood based on the final expression used, i.e., a gold dinar per month.

诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉

The Gemara asks: What is Rav teaching us? Could he be teach-ing that when a statement consists of two expressions with contradictory implications one should attend only to the last statement?

讛讗 讗诪专 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬 专讘 讗住转讬专讗 诪讗讛 诪注讬 诪讗讛 诪注讬 诪讗讛 诪注讬 讗住转讬专讗 讗住转讬专讗

But didn鈥檛 Rav already say that one time before, as Rav Huna said with regard to a case in which a seller fixed the price for an item using two different expressions that indicate different amounts and the buyer agreed and took the item: They say in the study hall of Rav that if the seller said: An asteira, one hundred coins, i.e., copper perutot, then the buyer must pay him one hundred coins, despite the fact that an asteira is a coin worth ninety-six perutot. And if the seller said: One hundred coins, an asteira, the buyer must pay him an asteira. It is already apparent from this ruling that Rav holds that one should rule according to the final expression. Why did he restate his opinion with regard to the case of the intercalary month?

讗讬 诪讛转诐 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 驻专讜砖讬 拽讗 诪驻专砖 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains: If Rav鈥檚 opinion were known from there, I would say that the second expression is explaining the first, and that is the reason to follow it. But one would still not know the halakha in a case in which the second expression undeniably contradicts the first. Therefore, Rav teaches us that in all cases one acts in accordance with the final expression.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讘讘讗 讘讗诪爪注 讞讚砖 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讗 讘转讞诇转 讞讚砖 讻讜诇讬讛 诇诪砖讻讬专 讘讗 讘住讜祝 讞讚砖 讻讜诇讬讛 诇砖讜讻专

And Shmuel said in explanation of the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei: In the mishna, we are dealing with a case where the landlord came before the court in the middle of the month. Only in that case is the disputed month divided between them. But if he came at the beginning of the month, the entire month鈥檚 rent would be awarded to the landlord, and if he came at the end of the month, the entire month鈥檚 rent would be awarded to the renter. The reason is that it is uncertain whether or not one always acts in accordance with the final expression, and, consequently, whether the renter must pay for the extra month. With regard to upcoming days of rental, since the landlord has possession of the property, he can demand rent. And with regard to days that have already passed, where the question is whether the renter must pay for them, since he is in possession of his money, he cannot be made to pay. Shmuel does not hold that only the second statement is followed.

诪讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉 讜讛讗 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讻讜专 讘砖诇砖讬诐 讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讗讛 讗讞专讜谞讛 讻讜专 讘砖诇砖讬诐 住讗讛 讘住诇注 讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜谉 拽谞讛

The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say that we do not say that one should attend only to the last statement? But don鈥檛 Rav and Shmuel both say: If a seller says to a buyer: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, then he can renege on the sale even while transferring to him the last se鈥檃 of grain. As a kor is equal to thirty se鈥檃, it is apparent that each se鈥檃 is being sold for one sela, but since that breakdown was not made explicit, the sale of the entire kor is considered as a single entity. Until the entire kor has been transferred, the sale does not take effect. If the seller used two expressions: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, a se鈥檃 per sela, then the buyer acquires each of the thirty se鈥檃 of grain one by one, immediately upon each being transferred to him, and the seller cannot renege on the sale of any se鈥檃 that has taken place. Although the implications of the seller鈥檚 two expressions are contradictory, Shmuel rules that one should act in accordance with the final expression.

讛转诐 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚转驻讬住 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 拽讗 转驻讬住

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the grain, Shmuel鈥檚 ruling was not due to the fact that we attend to the final expression, since it is uncertain whether or not we do. Rather, what is the reason for his ruling? It is due to the fact that the buyer has already taken hold of the grain and consequently has presumptive ownership of it. Here too, in the case of the bathhouse, each party is holding onto the basis of his claim, i.e., the landlord has possession of his property and the renter has possession of his money, and it is only due to this reason that Shmuel rules as he does.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 拽专拽注 讘讞讝拽转 讘注诇讬讛 拽讬讬诪转 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 转驻讜住 诇砖讜谉 讗讞专讜谉 讛讬讬谞讜 讚专讘 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗驻讬讱 诪讬驻讱

And Rav Na岣an said: I would have ruled that since the halakha is that land is always in its owner鈥檚 possession, even when rented out, the landlord is entitled to the entire month鈥檚 rent. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Na岣an teaching us? Could his ruling be based on saying that one should attend only to the last statement? But then this is identical to the ruling of Rav. The Gemara clarifies: Rav Na岣an鈥檚 ruling is unlike Rav鈥檚, as Rav Na岣an would award the extra month to the landlord even where the order of the two expressions is reversed. Rather, as he explained, his ruling is based on the fact the landlord has possession of the property.

讘注讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诪专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 砖讜讻专 讗诪专 谞转转讬 讜诪砖讻讬专 讗诪专 诇讗 谞讟诇转讬 注诇 诪讬 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛

搂 The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: If a renter says to his landlord: I already gave the rental fee to you, and the landlord says: I did not take any payment from you, upon whom is the burden of proof?

讗讬诪转 讗讬 讘转讜讱 讝诪谞讜 转谞讬谞讗 讗讬 诇讗讞专 讝诪谞讜 转谞讬谞讗 讚转谞谉 诪转 讛讗讘 讘转讜讱 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讘讞讝拽转 砖诇讗 谞驻讚讛 注讚 砖讬讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖谞驻讚讛 诇讗讞专 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 讘讞讝拽转 砖谞驻讚讛 注讚 砖讬讗诪专讜 诇讜 砖诇讗 谞驻讚讛

The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When did the renter make his claim? If it was during his rental period, we already learned the halakha in this case and the Sages would not have asked about it. Similarly, if it was after his rental period, we already learned the halakha in that case as well. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 49a): A father is obligated to redeem his firstborn son after the son is thirty days old by paying five shekels to a priest. If the father died within thirty days of the birth, the son has the presumptive status of being unredeemed, until he brings a proof that he was redeemed. If he died after thirty days, the son has the presumptive status of having been redeemed, until people tell him that he was not redeemed. It is apparent from this mishna that a person is presumed not to pay money before he must, and he is presumed to have paid money once he is required to do so. This logic can be applied to the paying of a rental fee.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讘讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讝诪谞讬讛 诪讬 注讘讬讚 讗讬谞讬砖 讚驻专注 讘讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇诐 讝诪谞讬讛 讗讜 诇讗

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where the renter makes his claim on the day on which his rental period is completed. The dilemma is whether a person is apt to pay his debts on the very day on which the period in which to pay them is completed, or he is not.

讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 转谞讬转讜讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan said to them: Also this, you have already learned in a mishna (111a):

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