Bava Metzia 12
חָצֵר אִיתְרַבַּאי מִשּׁוּם יָד וְלָא גָּרְעָה מִשְּׁלִיחוּת. גַּבֵּי גֵּט דְּחוֹב הוּא לָהּ: אֵין חָבִין לְאָדָם אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו. גַּבֵּי מַתָּנָה דִּזְכוּת הוּא לוֹ: זָכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו.
One’s courtyard is included as a valid means of acquisition due to the fact that it acts as his hand; but it is no less effective than agency. Therefore, with regard to a bill of divorce, which is considered detrimental to the wife, one cannot transfer it to her by placing it in her courtyard in her absence, as one cannot act against the interests of a person unless it is in his presence. By contrast, with regard to a gift, which is beneficial for the recipient, one can give it to him by placing it in his courtyard in the recipient’s absence, as one can act in a person’s interest in his absence.
גּוּפָא. רָאָה אוֹתָן רָצִין אַחַר הַמְּצִיאָה וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וּמַגִּיעָן. בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בְּמַתָּנָה הֵיאַךְ? קַבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כָּהֲנָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וְאֵין מַגִּיעָן.
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. The mishna teaches: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: זָרַק אַרְנָקִי בְּפֶתַח זֶה וְיָצָא בְּפֶתַח אַחֵר, מַהוּ? אֲוִיר שֶׁאֵין סוֹפוֹ לָנוּחַ כְּמוּנָּח דָּמֵי, אוֹ לָא?
Rava raises a dilemma: If one threw a purse through this entrance of a house and it went through the house and exited through another entrance, what is the halakha? Does the owner of the house acquire the purse during the course of its flight? The dilemma is: Is an item in the airspace [avir] of a courtyard that will not eventually come to rest in the courtyard itself regarded as though it has come to rest, or is it not regarded as though it has come to rest?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: לָאו הַיְינוּ מַתְנִיתִין. רָאָה אוֹתָן רָצִין אַחַר הַמְּצִיאָה, וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וּמַגִּיעָן, וּבָעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בְּמַתָּנָה הֵיאַךְ? וְקַבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כָּהֲנָא: בְּמַתָּנָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וְאֵין מַגִּיעָן.
Rav Pappa said to Rava, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Mattana who said this to Rava, and some say that it was Ravina who said this to Rava: Isn’t this the same as the halakha in the mishna? As it is stated: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, מִתְגַּלְגֵּל קָאָמְרַתְּ? שָׁאנֵי מִתְגַּלְגֵּל דִּכְמוּנָּח דָּמֵי.
Rava said to him: Are you saying that a purse flying through the air is comparable to an item that is rolling, i.e., moving on the ground? A rolling item is different, as it is regarded as though it has come to rest. At any given instant throughout its movement, the item rests on the ground. Therefore, the dilemma cannot be resolved from the mishna.
מַתְנִי׳ מְצִיאַת בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים, מְצִיאַת עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הַכְּנַעֲנִים, מְצִיאַת אִשְׁתּוֹ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. מְצִיאַת בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, מְצִיאַת עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים, מְצִיאַת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁגֵּירְשָׁהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן כְּתוּבָּה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלָּהֶן.
MISHNA: With regard to the found item of one’s minor son or daughter, i.e., an ownerless item that they found; the found item of his Canaanite slave or maidservant; and the found item of his wife, they are his. By contrast, with regard to the found item of one’s adult son or daughter; the found item of his Hebrew slave or maidservant; and the found item of his ex-wife, whom he divorced, even if he has not yet given her payment of the marriage contract that he owes her, they are theirs.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ מְצִיאַת קָטָן לְאָבִיו – שֶׁבְּשָׁעָה שֶׁמּוֹצְאָהּ מְרִיצָהּ אֵצֶל אָבִיו, וְאֵינוֹ מְאַחֵר בְּיָדוֹ.
GEMARA: Shmuel says: For what reason did the Sages say that the found item of one’s minor son or daughter belongs to his father? It is because the minor does not intend to acquire it for himself, as when he finds it, he runs with it to his father and does not retain it in his possession.
לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל קָטָן לֵית לֵיהּ זְכִיָּיה לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֵל – יְלַקֵּט בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו. לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ – לֹא יְלַקֵּט בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו. רַבִּי יוֹסִי אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יְלַקֵּט בְּנוֹ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ אַחֲרָיו. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel holds that a minor does not have the capability of acquiring property for himself by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who hires a salaried laborer to harvest his field, the son of the laborer may glean fallen stalks from behind the laborer like all poor people who have a right to the stalks left in the field. But if one hires a laborer as a sharecropper, whether the laborer receives one-half, one-third, or one-quarter of the produce, his son may not glean stalks after him, as the laborer himself is considered a partial owner of the field and is consequently not considered poor. Rabbi Yosei says: In both this case and that case the laborer’s son and wife may glean after him. And Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא קָטָן אִית לֵיהּ זְכִיָּיה לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ, כִּי קָא מְלַקֵּט – לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָא מְלַקֵּט, וַאֲבוּהּ מִינֵּיהּ קָא זָכֵי. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ קָטָן לֵית לֵיהּ זְכִיָּיה לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ, כִּי קָא מְלַקֵּט – לְאָבִיו קָא מְלַקֵּט, אֲבוּהּ עָשִׁיר הוּא, אַמַּאי אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבְנוֹ מְלַקֵּט אַחֲרָיו?
Granted, if you say that a minor has the capability of acquiring property for himself, Shmuel’s opinion is understood, as when the son gleans stalks, he gleans them for himself and acquires them, and his father subsequently acquires them from him as a gift. Since the minor has no property of his own, his status is that of a poor person and it is permitted for him to glean stalks. But if you say that a minor does not have the capability of acquiring property for himself, then when he gleans the stalks, he gleans them for his father. Since his father is considered wealthy and is not entitled to the gleanings because he owns a portion of the produce, why may his wife and son glean stalks after him?
שְׁמוּאֵל, טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא דִּידַן קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: In Shmuel’s explanation, Shmuel is stating the reason of the tanna of our mishna, but he himself does not hold accordingly. Rather, Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei that a minor can acquire property for himself.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי קָטָן אִית לֵיהּ זְכִיָּיה מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְצִיאַת חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל מִפְּנֵי דַּרְכֵי שָׁלוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: גָּזֵל גָּמוּר.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that a minor has the capability of acquiring property by Torah law? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 59b): With regard to the found items of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, i.e., lost items that they found, although they are not considered to be halakhically competent and are unable to acquire found items by Torah law, taking such items from them is considered robbery, by rabbinic law, for the sake of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery.
וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: גָּזֵל גָּמוּר מִדִּבְרֵיהֶן. נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ לְהוֹצִיאָהּ בְּדַיָּינִין.
And Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yosei means that it is full-fledged robbery by rabbinic law. And the practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is that according to Rabbi Yosei, if the robber refuses to return the stolen item, it is appropriated by the judges and returned to its owner. In any event, it is evident from here that Rabbi Yosei also holds that a minor cannot acquire property for himself by Torah law.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: עֲשָׂאוּהָ כְּמִי שֶׁהָלְכוּ בָּהּ נָמוֹשׁוֹת. דַּעֲנִיִּים גּוּפַיְיהוּ מַסְּחִי דַּעְתַּיְיהוּ. סָבְרִי: בְּרֵיהּ דְּהַיְאךְ מְלַקֵּטי לֵיהּ.
Rather, Abaye rejected the above explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion in the baraita with regard to gleaning, and said: The reason that according to Rabbi Yosei a sharecropper’s son may glean after him despite the fact that he does not acquire property by Torah law is that in such a case the Sages rendered the field like one through which the last gleaners have walked. Once the poor people have finished gleaning stalks from a field, even wealthy people are permitted to collect whatever remains. In this case, since the sharecropper’s son is walking behind him, the poor people themselves dismiss the notion of gleaning in this field from their minds; they assume that the son of this sharecropper is gleaning for him and that they will therefore not find any gleanings in this field. Since the poor people themselves have finished taking stalks from the field, the sharecropper’s son can glean for his father.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְאַבָּיֵי: וְכִי מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לְהַרְבִּיץ אֲרִי בְּתוֹךְ שָׂדֵהוּ כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּרְאוּ עֲנִיִּים וְיִבְרְחוּ?
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Abaye: But how is it permitted for one to allow his son to follow him in the field, thereby causing all the poor people to leave? Is a person permitted to have a lion crouch in his field so that the poor people will see it and flee?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:
Rather, Rava stated an alternative explanation:
עָשׂוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה כְּזוֹכֶה, מַאי טַעְמָא – עֲנִיִּים גּוּפַיְיהוּ נִיחָא לְהוּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּכִי אָגְרוּ לְדִידְהוּ נִלְקוֹט בְּנַיְיהוּ בָּתְרַיְיהוּ.
The Sages instituted an ordinance rendering a son of the sharecropper, who does not have the right to acquire property, like one who has the right to acquire property; i.e., they granted him a special right to acquire the gleanings. What is the reason for this ordinance? This arrangement is satisfactory for the poor people themselves, so that when they are hired under similar terms themselves, their sons will be able to glean the stalks after them.
וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא גָּדוֹל – גָּדוֹל מַמָּשׁ, וְלֹא קָטָן – קָטָן מַמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא גָּדוֹל וְסָמוּךְ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אָבִיו – זֶהוּ קָטָן. קָטָן וְאֵינוֹ סָמוּךְ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אָבִיו – זֶהוּ גָּדוֹל.
The Gemara comments: And Shmuel, in his above explanation of the mishna, disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The word adult in the mishna is not referring to an actual adult, and the word minor is not referring to an actual minor. Rather, with regard to an adult son who is dependent on the food of his father’s table for support, this is considered a minor in the context of the mishna. It is appropriate for one who is reliant on his father’s support to give items that he finds to his father. And with regard to a minor son who is not dependent on the food of his father’s table for support, this is considered an adult in this context, and any lost item that he finds is his.
מְצִיאַת עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים הֲרֵי הוּא שֶׁל עַצְמָן. אַמַּאי לֹא יְהֵא אֶלָּא פּוֹעֵל? וְתַנְיָא: מְצִיאַת פּוֹעֵל לְעַצְמוֹ. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״נַכֵּשׁ עִמִּי הַיּוֹם״, ״עֲדוֹר עַמִּי הַיּוֹם״.
§ The mishna teaches: The found item of his Hebrew slave or maidservant, it is theirs. The Gemara asks: Why does it not belong to the master? Let the slave be considered merely a laborer; and it is taught in a baraita: The found item of a laborer, i.e., a lost item that he found, belongs to him and not to his employer. In what case is this statement, that the item belongs to the laborer, said? It is said when the employer told the laborer to perform a specific task, e.g., he said to him: Weed for me today, or: Till for me today. Since the employer specified the task that he hired the laborer to perform, and that task did not include finding lost items, the laborer has rights to the item that he himself found.
אֲבָל אָמַר לוֹ ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי מְלָאכָה הַיּוֹם״ – מְצִיאָתוֹ לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת.
The baraita continues: But if the employer said to the laborer: Work for me today, without specifying the nature of the work, the found item is the employer’s, as finding ownerless items is included within the general category of work. Since a Hebrew slave is duty-bound to perform all types of labor for his master, why doesn’t his master acquire all items that he finds?
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָכָא בְּעֶבֶד נוֹקֵב מַרְגָּלִיּוֹת עָסְקִינַן, שֶׁאֵין רַבּוֹ רוֹצֶה לְשַׁנּוֹתוֹ לִמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Here we are dealing with a slave who pierces pearls [margaliyyot], which is such a profitable activity that his master would not want to transfer him to another line of work even for a moment. Therefore his status is like that of a laborer who is hired to perform a specific task.
רָבָא אָמַר: בְּמַגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה עִם מְלַאכְתּוֹ עָסְקִינַן.
Rava said: We are dealing with a case where the slave lifts a found item along with performing his work. Since there is no need for him to interrupt his work in order to take the item, his taking the item costs his master nothing, so it belongs to the slave.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׂכָרוֹ לְלַקֵּט מְצִיאוֹת. וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּאַקְּפַי אַגְמָא בִּכְווֹרֵי.
Rav Pappa said: An item found by a laborer belongs to his employer only in a case where he hired him specifically to collect found items. The Gemara asks: But what are the circumstances in which one would hire a person to find ownerless items? The Gemara answers: It is in a case where a lake flooded its shore with fish, and after the water receded, the fish remained on the shore. One would hire laborers to gather those fish.
הַאי שִׁפְחָה הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאַיְיתַי שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, מַאי בָּעֲיָא גַּבֵּיהּ?
§ The mishna teaches that an item found by a Hebrew maidservant belongs to her. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this maidservant? If the reference is to a maidservant who has grown two pubic hairs, which is a sign of adulthood, why is she with her master? A Hebrew maidservant who reaches adulthood is emancipated.
וְאִי דְּלָא אַיְיתַי שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, אִי אִיתֵיהּ לְאָב – דַּאֲבוּהּ הָוְיָא! וְאִי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לָאָב – תִּיפּוֹק בְּמִיתַת הָאָב.
And if she is a maidservant who has not yet grown two pubic hairs and is still considered a minor, then if her father is still alive, the found item is her father’s, and if her father is not still alive, she should have gone free with the death of her father.
דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה קֹנָה עַצְמָהּ בְּמִיתַת הָאָב מֵרְשׁוּת הָאָדוֹן מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר. וְלָאו אִיתּוֹתַב רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ?
As Reish Lakish says: A Hebrew maidservant acquires herself from the authority of her master through the death of her father, and this halakha is derived from an a fortiori inference: Signs indicating puberty release her from her master’s authority but do not release her from her father’s authority, as although she shows signs indicating puberty she remains under her father’s authority with regard to certain matters. Therefore, is it not logical that her father’s death, which releases her entirely from the father’s authority, would release her from the authority of her master? Clearly, there is no situation where a Hebrew maidservant can acquire an item that she finds. The Gemara answers: But wasn’t the opinion of Reish Lakish conclusively refuted? It is not accepted as halakha.
נֵימָא מֵהַאי נָמֵי תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא!
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there is a conclusive refutation of his opinion from this mishna as well. If a Hebrew maidservant is emancipated once her father dies, there is no possible situation in which a Hebrew maidservant who finds an ownerless item acquires it for herself.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיתֵיהּ לְאָב, וּמַאי ״הֲרֵי הֵן שֶׁלָּהֶן״ – לְאַפּוֹקֵי דְּרַבָּה.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This mishna is not a refutation of Reish Lakish’s opinion, as perhaps it is actually referring to a case where the father is alive. And what is the meaning of the phrase: They are theirs? It does not mean that the item belongs to the maidservant; rather it is stated in order to exclude the possibility that it belongs to her master. The maidservant acquires the found item, and through her, her father acquires it.
מְצִיאַת אִשְׁתּוֹ. גֵּירְשָׁהּ פְּשִׁיטָא!
§ The mishna teaches that the found item of his ex-wife, whom he divorced, belongs to her, even if he has not yet given her payment of the marriage contract that he owes her. The Gemara asks: If he divorced her, it is obvious that the item is hers. Why does the mishna specify this?
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בִּמְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים ״מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״ – בַּעְלָהּ חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ.
The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. As Rabbi Zeira says that Shmuel says: Everywhere that the Sages said that there is uncertainty whether a woman is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband remains obligated to provide for her sustenance. Furthermore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that an item found by a wife belongs to her husband, and that this right is reciprocal to his obligation to provide for her sustenance. Therefore, one might reason that here too, since the husband is still obligated to provide for his wife he retains the right to items that she finds.
טַעְמָא מַאי אֲמוּר רַבָּנַן מְצִיאַת אִשָּׁה לְבַעְלָהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תֶּיהְוֵי לַהּ אֵיבָה. הָכָא אִית לַהּ אֵיבָה וְאֵיבָה.
But this is not the halakha, as what is the reason that the Sages said that an item found by a wife belongs to her husband? It is so that she should not be subject to her husband’s enmity due to the fact that he is supporting her and yet she keeps any item that she finds. Here, however, let her be subject to much enmity. He should resolve the uncertainty and finalize the divorce as soon as possible, and perhaps this enmity will facilitate reaching that goal.
מַתְנִי׳ מָצָא שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב, אִם יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – לֹא יַחְזִיר, שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן. אֵין בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – יַחְזִיר, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who found promissory notes, if they include a property guarantee for the loan he may not return them to the creditor, as, if he were to return them, the court would then use them to collect repayment of the debts from land that belonged to the debtor at the time of the loan, even if that land was subsequently sold to others. If they do not include a property guarantee, he returns them to the creditor, as in this case the court will not use them to collect repayment of the debt from purchasers of the debtor’s land. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ לֹא יַחְזִיר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבֵּית דִּין נִפְרָעִין מֵהֶן.
And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case he should not return the promissory notes to the creditor, as, if he were to return them, the court would in any event use them to collect repayment of the loan from purchasers of the debtor’s land.
גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה, כִּי יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים אַמַּאי לֹא יַחְזִיר? הָא מוֹדֶה! וְאִי כְּשֶׁאֵין חַיָּיב מוֹדֶה, כִּי אֵין בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים אַמַּאי יַחְזִיר? נְהִי דְּלָא גָּבֵי מִמְּשַׁעְבְּדֵי – מִבְּנֵי חָרֵי מִגְבָּא גָּבֵי!
GEMARA: With what case are we dealing? If we say it is a case when the liable party, i.e., the debtor, admits that he wrote the promissory notes and that the debts have not yet been repaid, then when the promissory notes include a property guarantee, why should the finder not return them to the creditor? Doesn’t the debtor admit to the debts? And if it is in a case when the debtor does not admit to the debts, claiming that he dropped the promissory notes after he repaid his debts, then even when the promissory notes do not include a property guarantee, why should the finder return them to the creditor? Granted, the creditor cannot collect these debts from liened property that has been sold, but he can collect from unsold property. The returning of the promissory note would be disadvantageous to the borrower, who claims that he repaid the loan.
לְעוֹלָם כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: דְּחָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִלְוֹת בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא לָוָה עַד תִּשְׁרִי, וְאָתֵי לְמִטְרַף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case when the liable party admits to the debts, and here, this is the reason that the finder may not return the promissory notes: It is that we are concerned that perhaps the debtor wrote in the promissory note that he would borrow the money in Nisan but he did not actually borrow the money until Tishrei, and between Nisan and Tishrei he sold land. These lands are not liened to the debt, as the liability to repay the loan took effect only when he actually borrowed the money. And the creditor will come to repossess the land that was sold between Nisan and Tishrei from the purchasers, unlawfully.
אִי הָכִי, כֹּל שְׁטָרֵי דְּאָתוּ לְקַמַּן נֵיחוּשׁ לְהוּ הָכִי!
The Gemara asks: If so, if the court must be concerned that the date on a promissory note predates the actual loan, we should likewise be concerned that all promissory notes that come before us to the court are perhaps predated.
כֹּל שְׁטָרֵי לָא רִיעֵי, הָנֵי רִיעֵי.
The Gemara answers: The credibility of all promissory notes in general has not been compromised, as they remain in the creditor’s possession, which is the correct location in the case of an outstanding loan. The credibility of these promissory notes has been compromised by the fact that they were lost.
אֶלָּא הָא דִּתְנַן: כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר לַלֹּוֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מַלְוֶה עִמּוֹ. לְכַתְּחִילָּה הֵיכִי כָּתְבִינַן? נֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִלְוֹת בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא לָוָה עַד תִּשְׁרִי, וְאָתֵי לְמִטְרַף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין!
The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 167b): One may write a promissory note for a borrower even if the lender is not with him because it is the borrower who assumes liability based on the note, the question arises: How can one write this promissory note ab initio? Let us be concerned that perhaps the borrower wants to write the note as he intends to borrow money in Nisan, but will ultimately not borrow the money until Tishrei, and the lender might then come to repossess the land that the borrower sells between Nisan and Tishrei from the purchasers, unlawfully.
אָמַר רַב אַסִּי:
Rav Asi said:
