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Daf Yomi

March 15, 2024 | 讛壮 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

Bava Metzia 16

Today’s daf is sponsored by Miriam Adler in honor of her children鈥檚 return to Kibbutz Saad. “May they have many healthy and safe years while building and planting in 讗专爪谞讜 讛拽讚讜砖讛.”

Rav holds that if the seller of stolen land subsequently purchased the land from the original owner, the assumption is that the seller originally sold the land and any rights to the land that the seller may have in the future. Therefore, the land is fully owned by the buyer. The logic behind Rav’s ruling is a source of debate between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi. Is it because the seller doesn’t want the buyer to call him/her a thief or because the seller wants to be known as reliable? What is the practical difference between the two? Three answers are brought – the first two are rejected. The Gemara mentions variations on this case where Rav would theoretically rule that the seller did not intend to pass over rights to the buyer. At what stage in the judgment process is this ruling of Rav no longer relevant? Two questions are raised against Rav, but they are resolved. Another ruling of Rav on a related issue: If a seller says to a buyer, “This field will be yours from now, when I purchase it,” the sale is effective. Rav holds by Rabbi Meir that one can acquire an item that is “not yet in the world.” Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan debate whether a document in the street that was either ratified by the court or was a shtar hakna’a (in which the land is automatically liened from the date of the document regardless of whether the loan happened or not), gets returned to the credit. Can we assume that it was not yet paid, since if it was, the borrower would have ripped it up, or do we assume that it was paid back, since if it wasn’t, the lender never would have lost it?

讛讗 诪讬转 诇讬讛 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讘讛讚讬 讘谞讬 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


in this case, since the purchaser already died, the owner is not present to call the seller a robber, so he presumably did not intend to retroactively validate the sale. And conversely, according to the one who says that he bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability with regard to the purchaser鈥檚 children too.


住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讜 诇讬讛 讘谞讬 诇讜拽讞 讙讝诇谞讗


The Gemara challenges this distinction: Ultimately, the purchaser鈥檚 children will also call the seller a robber if the field is appropriated from them. Therefore, there is no difference between the two explanations of Rav鈥檚 ruling in a case where the purchaser has died.


讗诇讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚诪讬转 讙讝诇谉 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讚诇讗 诇拽专讬讜讛讜 讙讝诇谉 讛讗 诪讬转 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪讬转 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber himself died, and his children subsequently bought the field from its owner. According to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for a person not to be called a robber, he already died and this motive is not applicable. While according to the one who says that his motivation is that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in this case also, even though the robber died, it is still preferable for him to maintain his reliability, i.e., one is concerned about the reputation he will have after his death, not only while he is alive.


住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讜 诇讘谞讬讛 讘谞讬 讙讝诇谞讗


The Gemara rejects this distinction as well: Ultimately, if the sale is revoked after his death, people will call his children the children of a robber. Just as one does not want to be called a robber during his lifetime, one presumably does not want his children to be called the children of a robber after his death.


讗诇讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讬讛讘讛 讘诪转谞讛 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 谞拽专讬讜讛讜 讙讝诇谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讙讝诇讬谞讗 诪讬谞讱


Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber gave the land to the recipient as a gift rather than selling it. According to the one who says that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in the case of a gift also, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability. While according to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for him not to be called a robber, in this case the robber could say to the recipient of the gift: What did I rob you of? You incurred no loss.


驻砖讬讟讗 讝讘谞讛 讗讜专转讛 讜讬讛讘讛 讘诪转谞讛 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讛 拽诪讬 诇讜拽讞 拽讗 讘注讬


搂 The Gemara discusses various scenarios relating to the halakha of one who sold stolen land and then acquired it from the robbery victim. It is obvious that if, after selling the stolen land, the robber sold it again to another person, or bequeathed it, or gave it as a gift, it is clear that the robber does not want to establish it before, i.e., transfer ownership of it to, the original buyer. Therefore, the robber鈥檚 purchase of the land from the robbery victim is not assumed to be for the purpose of validating the original sale. The buyer can demand compensation from the robber for the invalid sale, but the land remains in the possession of the second buyer or the recipient of the gift or the inheritance.


谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讬专讜砖讛 诪诪讬诇讗 讛讬讗 讜诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 拽讗 讟专讞 讗讘转专讛


Likewise, it is clear that if the land that he stole and then sold later came into his possession not by purchase but as an inheritance, the buyer does not have the rights to it, as an inheritance is acquired passively, and the robber did not make an effort to acquire it. Here too, the buyer can claim only compensation and not the land itself.


讙讘讬 讗讬讛讜 讘讞讜讘讜 讞讝讬谞讗 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讜讗诪专 讛讗讬 讘注讬谞讗 诇讗讜拽诪讛 拽诪讬讛 诇讜拽讞 拽讗 讘注讬


If the robber collected the land that he had sold as payment for a debt owed to him by the robbery victim, we need to see the circumstances. If the robbery victim has other land from which the robber could have collected the debt, and nevertheless the robber said: I want to collect this land, apparently the robber wanted to establish it before the buyer and validate the sale.


讜讗讬 诇讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 讗驻专讜注讬


And if the robbery victim does not have other land, and the robber had no choice as to which land to collect, there is no reason to assume that the robber was attempting to validate the sale. He merely wanted to be paid money for his debt, and not to secure the land for the buyer.


讬讛讘讛 谞讛诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 诪转谞讛 讻讬专讜砖讛 讚讛讗 诪诪讬诇讗 讜讞讚 讗诪专 诪转谞讛 讻诪讻专 讚讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讟专讞 讜讗专爪讬 拽诪讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 诪转谞讛 诇讛讻讬 讟专讞 讜讗专爪讬 拽诪讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


With regard to a case where the robbery victim gave the land as a gift to the robber, Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree. One says that a gift has the same status as an inheritance, as it is also acquired passively, and one says that a gift has the same status as a sale. This is because were it not for the fact that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with the owner, he would not have given it to him as a gift. It is clearly for this reason that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with him, i.e., in order to validate the sale and thereby maintain his reliability.


讜注讚 讗讬诪转 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 注讚 砖注转 讛注诪讚讛 讘讚讬谉


The Gemara asks: And until when can it be assumed that the robber bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability? Rav Huna says: Until the time of standing trial. Once the purchaser takes the robber to court, it is too late for the robber to protect his reputation, as the purchaser has demonstrated that he does not consider the robber to be trustworthy.


讞讬讬讗 讘专 专讘 讗诪专 注讚 讚诪讟讗 讗讚专讻转讗 诇讬讚讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 注讚 讚诪转讞诇谉 讬讜诪讬 讗讻专讝转讗


岣yya bar Rav says that the robber would still buy the land from the owner in order to maintain his reliability up until the time that a document of authorization by the court to locate and seize property from the robber comes into the purchaser鈥檚 possession. It is only once the robber avoids immediately reimbursing the purchaser and the court is compelled to authorize the purchaser to appropriate the robber鈥檚 property that the robber鈥檚 reliability is no longer a factor. Rav Pappa says that the robber鈥檚 reliability remains a motive to acquire the field until the days of announcement begin. During the days of announcement the court assesses the value of the robber鈥檚 property in order to compensate the purchaser.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬 诇讜拽讞 讘诪讗讬 拽谞讬 诇讛讗讬 讗专注讗 讘讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 讞住驻讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗


Rami bar 岣ma objects to Rav鈥檚 statement, the focal point of this discussion, that the robber transfers to the buyer any rights to the land that he might acquire; after all, by means of what mode of acquisition does this purchaser acquire this land? It is by means of this deed of sale that the robber gave him. The purchase is invalid, as this document is merely a shard, since the robber did not own, at the time of the sale, the land he purported to sell.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 转讛讗 讘诪讗诪讬谞讜 讘讛讛讜讗 讛谞讗讛 讚诇讗 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讜拽讗 住诪讬讱 注诇讬讛 讟专讞 讜诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛


Rava said to him in response: Let Rav鈥檚 statement be understood as applying to a case where the buyer said to the robber that he trusts him to resolve the legal issue. By virtue of that satisfaction that the robber received from the buyer鈥檚 not having said anything to him to question his rights to the land, but rather having relied on him, the robber therefore takes the trouble and brings to him the opportunity to purchase the land and resolves to transfer the land鈥檚 ownership to him.


诪转讬讘 专讘 砖砖转 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪讗讘讗 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪谉 讗讘讗 讛讬讜诐 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 讛讬讜诐 诪讻讜专 诇讱 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉


Rav Sheshet raises an objection to Rav鈥檚 statement from a baraita that states that if one says: That which I will inherit from my father is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch is sold to you, he has said nothing, as one cannot sell that which he does not yet own. But if one says: That which I will inherit from my father today is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch today is sold to you, his statement stands. The first halakha of the baraita indicates that one cannot sell that which he does not yet own, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 ruling.


讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛讗 讙讘专讗 讜讛讗 转讬讜讘转讗


Rami bar 岣ma said about this objection: This is the great man and this is his refutation of Rav鈥檚 opinion; i.e., this refutation is compelling.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讘专讗 拽讗 讞讝讬谞讗 讜转讬讜讘转讗 诇讗 拽讗 讞讝讬谞讗 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讚讗讝讬诇 讟专讞 讜诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 谞拽专讬讬讛 讙讝诇谞讗 讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


Rava said in response: I see that he is a great man, but I do not see the conclusive refutation. Here, in the case of validating a sale, the purchaser relies on the seller and is confident he will acquire the land; but there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller. The Gemara explains: Here, in the case of validating the sale, the purchaser relies on the seller to go take the trouble and provide him with the land so that he will not be called a robber. Whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller, as it is uncertain whether the seller will actually inherit his father鈥檚 property or catch anything with his net.


砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 讝讘讚讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讜 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜诇驻谞讬 诇驻谞讬诐 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


The Gemara relates that the Sages sent Rav Sheshet鈥檚 objection and presented it before Rabbi Abba bar Zavda for his evaluation. Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as it is clear and compelling. Rava disagreed and said: This objection needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall. In other words, it should be examined carefully, as it is not compelling. This is because here, the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.


讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讜讗讜转讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讬讜住祝 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜诇驻谞讬 诇驻谞讬诐 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


There was an incident in Pumbedita where the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the Sages refuted the ruling based on the baraita cited earlier. Rav Yosef said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as the objection is clear and compelling. And Abaye said to him: It needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall, as here the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住讬驻讗 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪讗讘讗 讛讬讜诐 诪砖讜诐 讻讘讜讚 讗讘讬讜 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 讛讬讜诐


The Gemara asks concerning the baraita cited earlier: And what is different in the first clause, where the sale is not valid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the sale is valid? In both cases, the seller does not yet own the merchandise. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: In the latter clause, when the seller states: I am selling that which I will inherit from my father today, he does so for the honor of his father. He believes that his father will die that day, and his intention is to raise money for the burial. Consequently, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the sale is valid. Similarly, in the case of a person who says: That which my net will catch today is sold to you,


诪砖讜诐 讻讚讬 讞讬讬讜


the Sages instituted an ordinance that the sale is effective because of their concern for his immediate livelihood.


讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘专讜 砖讚讛 砖讗谞讬 诇讜拽讞 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽谞讛


搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the matter of selling property that one does not yet own. Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: With regard to the field that I am about to buy, when I buy it, it will be retroactively transferred to your ownership from now, the stipulation takes effect, and once he buys it, the second party has acquired the field.


讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪诇转讗 讚专讘 讘砖讚讛 住转诐 讗讘诇 讘砖讚讛 讝讜 诇讗 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚诪讝讘讬谉 诇讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛


Rava said: The statement of Rav is reasonable only with regard to an unspecified field, as one is capable of buying a field. But with regard to a case where one says to another that he is selling him this specific field that is not yet in his possession, the transaction does not take effect, as who is to say that the current owner will sell it to him? Since it is not in his power alone to purchase the field, it is tantamount to an entity that has not yet come into being, and therefore he cannot sell it to anyone.


讜讛讗诇讛讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛 讝讜 诪讻讚讬 专讘 讻诪讗谉 讗诪专讛 诇砖诪注转讬讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐


The Gemara emphatically rejects Rava鈥檚 qualification of Rav鈥檚 statement in the form of an oath: By God! Rav said his statement even in a case where the seller said: This field. After all, in accordance with whose opinion did Rav state his halakha? It was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world.


讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讱 讬讘诪讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转


As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he is a slave and says: After I am freed, or if she is a maidservant and he says: After you are freed, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or if he says to a widow waiting for her yavam to perform the ritual through which he frees her from her levirate bonds [岣litza]: After your yavam performs 岣litza with you, or if he says to his wife鈥檚 sister: After your sister dies (see Leviticus 18:18), in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present moment, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective.


专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转


Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Meir holds that one can acquire that which is not yet available, and the acquisition will take effect once the item is available. In this case as well, the betrothal will take effect once it becomes possible for her to become betrothed to him.


讜讛讗 讗砖讛 讻砖讚讛 讝讜 讚诪讬讗 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪拽讜讚砖转


And isn鈥檛 the case of betrothing a specific woman comparable to the case of selling this specific field? And yet, Rabbi Meir says that she is betrothed. It is therefore clear that Rav, who accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir, holds that the sale is effective even if the seller specified a particular field.


讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪讜爪讗 砖讟专 讛拽谞讗讛 讘砖讜拽 讬讞讝讬专讜 诇讘注诇讬诐 讚讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讛讗 砖注讘讚 谞驻砖讬讛 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 驻专注讜谉 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉 讚讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚驻专注讬讛 诪拽专注 讛讜讛 拽专注 诇讬讛


Shmuel says: With regard to one who finds a deed of transfer, i.e., a promissory note that establishes a lien on the debtor鈥檚 property from the date it is written, regardless of whether or not he borrows the money at that time, in the marketplace, he must return it to its owner, i.e., the creditor, as, if one were to be concerned because of the possibility that the debtor wrote the note intending to borrow money, but did not borrow it in the end, he is nevertheless liable, since he committed himself to pay at the time it was written. And if one were to be concerned because of the possibility that repayment had already taken place, this is not a justified concern, as in general we are not concerned that there was repayment, as, if it were so that the debtor had repaid it, he certainly would have torn up the note.


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗讘讗 诪谉 住驻专讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讚诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讜讛 讜讛讜讬谞讗 讻讘专 砖讬转讗 讻讘专 砖讘注 讜讚讻专谞讗 讚讛讜讜 诪讻专讝讬 讜讗诪专讬 讛谞讬 砖讟专讬 讗拽谞讬讬转讗 讚诪砖转讻讞讬 讘砖讜拽讗 谞讛讚专讬谞讛讜 诇诪专讬讬讛讜


Rav Na岣an said: My father was one of the scribes of the judges of Mar Shmuel, and I was about six or seven years old, and I remember that they made an announcement, saying: Those deeds of transfer that are found in the marketplace should be returned to their owners, the creditors, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.


讗诪专 专讘 注诪专诐 讗祝 讗谞谉 转谞讬谞讗 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讬专 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讟专讬 讞诇讟讗转讗 讜讗讚专讻转讗 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 驻专注讜谉 谞讬谞讛讜


Rav Amram said: We, too, learn similarly in a mishna (20a): One must return any court enactment, i.e., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, to its owner. Apparently, we are not concerned that there may have been repayment. Rabbi Zeira said to him: The mishna is not proof for Shmuel鈥檚 ruling, as it is stated not with regard to all court enactments but with regard to bills of foreclosure, which award property to a creditor as payment for the debt owed to him, and bills of authorization to locate and seize property from the debtor, both of which are not subject to repayment.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讛谞讬 诇讗讜 讘谞讬 驻专注讜谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讛讗 讗诪专讬 谞讛专讚注讬 砖讜诪讗 讛讚专 注讚 转专讬住专 讬专讞讬 砖转讗 讜讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讗谞讗 诪谞讛专讚注讗 讗谞讗 讜住讘讬专讗 诇讬 讚砖讜诪讗 讛讚专 诇注讜诇诐


Rava said to him: And are these bills not subject to repayment? But didn鈥檛 the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say that after property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court鈥檚 appraisal of its value, the property is returned if the debtor pays the debt until twelve months of the year have passed after the repossession? And furthermore, Ameimar said: I am from Neharde鈥檃, and nevertheless, I hold that property repossessed based on an appraisal of an article鈥檚 value can always be returned. If the debtor pays his debt, he can reclaim his property at any point. Consequently, even bills of foreclosure or authorization might be obsolete, and nevertheless the mishna states that one who finds them must return them to the creditor.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛转诐 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚 讗谞驻砖讬讛 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚驻专注讬讛 讗讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪拽专注讬讛 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 诇诪讻转讘 砖讟专讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 注讬诇讜讬讛


Rather, Rava said that the mishna is not proof for the ruling of Shmuel for a different reason: There, this is the reason that the documents are returned: As I can say that if the debtor has already repaid his debt, it is he who caused the loss to himself, as at the time he repaid his debt he should have either ripped up the document, or alternatively, he should have demanded of the creditor to write another document for the debtor鈥檚 redeemed property, returning it to him.


讚诪讚讬谞讗 讗专注讗 诇讗 讘注讬讗 诇诪讬讛讚专 讜诪砖讜诐 讜注砖讬转 讛讬砖专 讜讛讟讜讘 讘注讬谞讬 讛壮 讛讜讗 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 转讛讚专 讛诇讻讱 诪专讬砖讗 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 砖讟专 讝讘讬谞讬


The reason for a new document to be written is that according to the letter of the law, the land need not be returned by the creditor to the debtor, and it is due to the principle: 鈥淵ou shall do that which is right and good in the eyes of the Lord鈥 (Deuteronomy 6:18), that the Sages said that the land should be returned. Therefore, it is as though the debtor is purchasing it anew, and the creditor must write a bill of sale.


讙讘讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚驻专注讬讛 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬拽专注讬讛 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇诪讞专 讬讛讘谞讗 诇讱 讚讛砖转讗 诇讬转讬讛 讙讘讗讬 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗驻砖讬讟讬 讚住驻专讗 讝讬讬专 诇讬讛


The Gemara explains why this reasoning is not applicable to deeds of transfer or other promissory notes. With regard to a found promissory note, what is there to say to justify returning it to the creditor? That if it is so that the debtor repaid the debt, he should have ripped up the promissory note? This is not so, as one could say that the creditor avoided returning the note, as he said to him: Tomorrow I will give you the note, as it is not with me now. Alternatively, the creditor may have held back the note as security for the debtor鈥檚 payment of the fee of the scribe who wrote the promissory note. Consequently, it is possible that the debtor was never given back the note and was unable to rip it up, through no fault of his own.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讜爪讗 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讘砖讜拽 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专讜 诇讘注诇讬诐


Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: With regard to one who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, even if a ratification of the court is written in it, he may not return it to the owner, i.e., the creditor.


诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 讚诪拽讜讬诐 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉


The Gemara explains: It is not necessary to say that one should not return the promissory note in a case where a ratification is not written in it, as in that case there is room to say that the debtor wrote it intending to borrow money, but he did not end up borrowing it, and therefore the creditor has no rights to the promissory note. But even if a ratification is written in it, one should not return it. And what is this authorization? It is an approval that the promissory note has been ratified by the court, which examined the note and the signatures of the witnesses and found everything to be in order. The reason one may not return the promissory note to the creditor is that we are concerned that repayment has already taken place.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讬专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬专诪讬讛 讘专讬 诇讗 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讜讬诐 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉


Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from the mishna that states (20a): One must return any court enactment, i.e., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, to its owner. Apparently there is no concern about repayment. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Yirmeya, my son, not all court enactments are equal. Rather, the ruling that one must return such a document applies only in a case where the debtor has the presumptive status of one who denies his debts, and therefore, if he claims the debt was repaid, his claim is not accepted.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讞讚讗 讝诪谞讗 转讜 诇讗 驻专注 讻诇诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讟专 讞诇讟讗转讗 讜讗讚专讻转讗 讜讻讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗


In response to this explanation of that mishna, Rava said: But does it necessarily follow that just because a debtor assumed the presumptive status of one who denies his debts after one time that he did so, he will never again repay a debt that he owes, and therefore the promissory note should be returned to his creditor? Rather, Rava said: The mishna is referring to a bill of foreclosure, or a bill of authorization, which are not subject to repayment, in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Zeira.


讜讻驻专谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗 诇讬讚谉 谞讬诪讗 讘讬讛 诪诇转讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 爪讗 转谉 诇讜


The Gemara adds: And with regard to the topic of one who denies his debts, since it came to us, let us say something about it. As Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Na岣an said: If the court said to the litigant against whom they ruled: Go and give the other litigant what you owe him,


  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

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Bava Metzia 16

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 16

讛讗 诪讬转 诇讬讛 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讘讛讚讬 讘谞讬 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


in this case, since the purchaser already died, the owner is not present to call the seller a robber, so he presumably did not intend to retroactively validate the sale. And conversely, according to the one who says that he bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability with regard to the purchaser鈥檚 children too.


住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讜 诇讬讛 讘谞讬 诇讜拽讞 讙讝诇谞讗


The Gemara challenges this distinction: Ultimately, the purchaser鈥檚 children will also call the seller a robber if the field is appropriated from them. Therefore, there is no difference between the two explanations of Rav鈥檚 ruling in a case where the purchaser has died.


讗诇讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚诪讬转 讙讝诇谉 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 讚诇讗 诇拽专讬讜讛讜 讙讝诇谉 讛讗 诪讬转 诇讬讛 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪讬转 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber himself died, and his children subsequently bought the field from its owner. According to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for a person not to be called a robber, he already died and this motive is not applicable. While according to the one who says that his motivation is that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in this case also, even though the robber died, it is still preferable for him to maintain his reliability, i.e., one is concerned about the reputation he will have after his death, not only while he is alive.


住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讜 诇讘谞讬讛 讘谞讬 讙讝诇谞讗


The Gemara rejects this distinction as well: Ultimately, if the sale is revoked after his death, people will call his children the children of a robber. Just as one does not want to be called a robber during his lifetime, one presumably does not want his children to be called the children of a robber after his death.


讗诇讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讬讛讘讛 讘诪转谞讛 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 诪转谞讛 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讗 谞拽专讬讜讛讜 讙讝诇谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讙讝诇讬谞讗 诪讬谞讱


Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber gave the land to the recipient as a gift rather than selling it. According to the one who says that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in the case of a gift also, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability. While according to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for him not to be called a robber, in this case the robber could say to the recipient of the gift: What did I rob you of? You incurred no loss.


驻砖讬讟讗 讝讘谞讛 讗讜专转讛 讜讬讛讘讛 讘诪转谞讛 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讛 拽诪讬 诇讜拽讞 拽讗 讘注讬


搂 The Gemara discusses various scenarios relating to the halakha of one who sold stolen land and then acquired it from the robbery victim. It is obvious that if, after selling the stolen land, the robber sold it again to another person, or bequeathed it, or gave it as a gift, it is clear that the robber does not want to establish it before, i.e., transfer ownership of it to, the original buyer. Therefore, the robber鈥檚 purchase of the land from the robbery victim is not assumed to be for the purpose of validating the original sale. The buyer can demand compensation from the robber for the invalid sale, but the land remains in the possession of the second buyer or the recipient of the gift or the inheritance.


谞驻诇讛 诇讬讛 讘讬专讜砖讛 讬专讜砖讛 诪诪讬诇讗 讛讬讗 讜诇讗讜 讗讬讛讜 拽讗 讟专讞 讗讘转专讛


Likewise, it is clear that if the land that he stole and then sold later came into his possession not by purchase but as an inheritance, the buyer does not have the rights to it, as an inheritance is acquired passively, and the robber did not make an effort to acquire it. Here too, the buyer can claim only compensation and not the land itself.


讙讘讬 讗讬讛讜 讘讞讜讘讜 讞讝讬谞讗 讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗专注讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讜讗诪专 讛讗讬 讘注讬谞讗 诇讗讜拽诪讛 拽诪讬讛 诇讜拽讞 拽讗 讘注讬


If the robber collected the land that he had sold as payment for a debt owed to him by the robbery victim, we need to see the circumstances. If the robbery victim has other land from which the robber could have collected the debt, and nevertheless the robber said: I want to collect this land, apparently the robber wanted to establish it before the buyer and validate the sale.


讜讗讬 诇讗 讝讜讝讬 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 讗驻专讜注讬


And if the robbery victim does not have other land, and the robber had no choice as to which land to collect, there is no reason to assume that the robber was attempting to validate the sale. He merely wanted to be paid money for his debt, and not to secure the land for the buyer.


讬讛讘讛 谞讛诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 诪转谞讛 讻讬专讜砖讛 讚讛讗 诪诪讬诇讗 讜讞讚 讗诪专 诪转谞讛 讻诪讻专 讚讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讟专讞 讜讗专爪讬 拽诪讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 诪转谞讛 诇讛讻讬 讟专讞 讜讗专爪讬 拽诪讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛


With regard to a case where the robbery victim gave the land as a gift to the robber, Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree. One says that a gift has the same status as an inheritance, as it is also acquired passively, and one says that a gift has the same status as a sale. This is because were it not for the fact that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with the owner, he would not have given it to him as a gift. It is clearly for this reason that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with him, i.e., in order to validate the sale and thereby maintain his reliability.


讜注讚 讗讬诪转 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽讜诐 讘讛诪谞讜转讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 注讚 砖注转 讛注诪讚讛 讘讚讬谉


The Gemara asks: And until when can it be assumed that the robber bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability? Rav Huna says: Until the time of standing trial. Once the purchaser takes the robber to court, it is too late for the robber to protect his reputation, as the purchaser has demonstrated that he does not consider the robber to be trustworthy.


讞讬讬讗 讘专 专讘 讗诪专 注讚 讚诪讟讗 讗讚专讻转讗 诇讬讚讬讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 注讚 讚诪转讞诇谉 讬讜诪讬 讗讻专讝转讗


岣yya bar Rav says that the robber would still buy the land from the owner in order to maintain his reliability up until the time that a document of authorization by the court to locate and seize property from the robber comes into the purchaser鈥檚 possession. It is only once the robber avoids immediately reimbursing the purchaser and the court is compelled to authorize the purchaser to appropriate the robber鈥檚 property that the robber鈥檚 reliability is no longer a factor. Rav Pappa says that the robber鈥檚 reliability remains a motive to acquire the field until the days of announcement begin. During the days of announcement the court assesses the value of the robber鈥檚 property in order to compensate the purchaser.


诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诪讻讚讬 讛讗讬 诇讜拽讞 讘诪讗讬 拽谞讬 诇讛讗讬 讗专注讗 讘讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 讞住驻讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗


Rami bar 岣ma objects to Rav鈥檚 statement, the focal point of this discussion, that the robber transfers to the buyer any rights to the land that he might acquire; after all, by means of what mode of acquisition does this purchaser acquire this land? It is by means of this deed of sale that the robber gave him. The purchase is invalid, as this document is merely a shard, since the robber did not own, at the time of the sale, the land he purported to sell.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 转讛讗 讘诪讗诪讬谞讜 讘讛讛讜讗 讛谞讗讛 讚诇讗 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬讚讬 讜拽讗 住诪讬讱 注诇讬讛 讟专讞 讜诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛


Rava said to him in response: Let Rav鈥檚 statement be understood as applying to a case where the buyer said to the robber that he trusts him to resolve the legal issue. By virtue of that satisfaction that the robber received from the buyer鈥檚 not having said anything to him to question his rights to the land, but rather having relied on him, the robber therefore takes the trouble and brings to him the opportunity to purchase the land and resolves to transfer the land鈥檚 ownership to him.


诪转讬讘 专讘 砖砖转 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪讗讘讗 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪谉 讗讘讗 讛讬讜诐 诪讻讜专 诇讱 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 讛讬讜诐 诪讻讜专 诇讱 讚讘专讬讜 拽讬讬诪讬谉


Rav Sheshet raises an objection to Rav鈥檚 statement from a baraita that states that if one says: That which I will inherit from my father is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch is sold to you, he has said nothing, as one cannot sell that which he does not yet own. But if one says: That which I will inherit from my father today is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch today is sold to you, his statement stands. The first halakha of the baraita indicates that one cannot sell that which he does not yet own, which contradicts Rav鈥檚 ruling.


讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛讗 讙讘专讗 讜讛讗 转讬讜讘转讗


Rami bar 岣ma said about this objection: This is the great man and this is his refutation of Rav鈥檚 opinion; i.e., this refutation is compelling.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讙讘专讗 拽讗 讞讝讬谞讗 讜转讬讜讘转讗 诇讗 拽讗 讞讝讬谞讗 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讚讗讝讬诇 讟专讞 讜诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 谞拽专讬讬讛 讙讝诇谞讗 讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


Rava said in response: I see that he is a great man, but I do not see the conclusive refutation. Here, in the case of validating a sale, the purchaser relies on the seller and is confident he will acquire the land; but there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller. The Gemara explains: Here, in the case of validating the sale, the purchaser relies on the seller to go take the trouble and provide him with the land so that he will not be called a robber. Whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller, as it is uncertain whether the seller will actually inherit his father鈥檚 property or catch anything with his net.


砖诇讞讜讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讗 讘专 讝讘讚讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讗 讝讜 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜诇驻谞讬 诇驻谞讬诐 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


The Gemara relates that the Sages sent Rav Sheshet鈥檚 objection and presented it before Rabbi Abba bar Zavda for his evaluation. Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as it is clear and compelling. Rava disagreed and said: This objection needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall. In other words, it should be examined carefully, as it is not compelling. This is because here, the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.


讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讜讗讜转讘讬讛 讗诪专 诇讛讜 专讘 讬讜住祝 讝讜 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 爪专讬讻讛 诇驻谞讬诐 讜诇驻谞讬 诇驻谞讬诐 讛讻讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛 讛讻讗 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讬讛


There was an incident in Pumbedita where the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the Sages refuted the ruling based on the baraita cited earlier. Rav Yosef said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as the objection is clear and compelling. And Abaye said to him: It needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall, as here the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住讬驻讗 诪讛 砖讗讬专砖 诪讗讘讗 讛讬讜诐 诪砖讜诐 讻讘讜讚 讗讘讬讜 诪讛 砖转注诇讛 诪爪讜讚转讬 讛讬讜诐


The Gemara asks concerning the baraita cited earlier: And what is different in the first clause, where the sale is not valid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the sale is valid? In both cases, the seller does not yet own the merchandise. Rabbi Yo岣nan said: In the latter clause, when the seller states: I am selling that which I will inherit from my father today, he does so for the honor of his father. He believes that his father will die that day, and his intention is to raise money for the burial. Consequently, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the sale is valid. Similarly, in the case of a person who says: That which my net will catch today is sold to you,


诪砖讜诐 讻讚讬 讞讬讬讜


the Sages instituted an ordinance that the sale is effective because of their concern for his immediate livelihood.


讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘专讜 砖讚讛 砖讗谞讬 诇讜拽讞 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 拽谞讜讬讛 诇讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 拽谞讛


搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the matter of selling property that one does not yet own. Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: With regard to the field that I am about to buy, when I buy it, it will be retroactively transferred to your ownership from now, the stipulation takes effect, and once he buys it, the second party has acquired the field.


讗诪专 专讘讗 诪住转讘专讗 诪诇转讗 讚专讘 讘砖讚讛 住转诐 讗讘诇 讘砖讚讛 讝讜 诇讗 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚诪讝讘讬谉 诇讛 谞讬讛诇讬讛


Rava said: The statement of Rav is reasonable only with regard to an unspecified field, as one is capable of buying a field. But with regard to a case where one says to another that he is selling him this specific field that is not yet in his possession, the transaction does not take effect, as who is to say that the current owner will sell it to him? Since it is not in his power alone to purchase the field, it is tantamount to an entity that has not yet come into being, and therefore he cannot sell it to anyone.


讜讛讗诇讛讬诐 讗诪专 专讘 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛 讝讜 诪讻讚讬 专讘 讻诪讗谉 讗诪专讛 诇砖诪注转讬讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗讚诐 诪拽谞讛 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐


The Gemara emphatically rejects Rava鈥檚 qualification of Rav鈥檚 statement in the form of an oath: By God! Rav said his statement even in a case where the seller said: This field. After all, in accordance with whose opinion did Rav state his halakha? It was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world.


讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛转拽讚砖讬 诇讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗转讙讬讬专 诇讗讞专 砖转转讙讬讬专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讗砖转讞专专 诇讗讞专 砖转砖转讞专专讬 诇讗讞专 砖讬诪讜转 讘注诇讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖讬讞诇讜抓 诇讱 讬讘诪讬讱 诇讗讞专 砖转诪讜转 讗讞讜转讬讱 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转


As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he is a slave and says: After I am freed, or if she is a maidservant and he says: After you are freed, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or if he says to a widow waiting for her yavam to perform the ritual through which he frees her from her levirate bonds [岣litza]: After your yavam performs 岣litza with you, or if he says to his wife鈥檚 sister: After your sister dies (see Leviticus 18:18), in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present moment, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective.


专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪拽讜讚砖转


Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Meir holds that one can acquire that which is not yet available, and the acquisition will take effect once the item is available. In this case as well, the betrothal will take effect once it becomes possible for her to become betrothed to him.


讜讛讗 讗砖讛 讻砖讚讛 讝讜 讚诪讬讗 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪拽讜讚砖转


And isn鈥檛 the case of betrothing a specific woman comparable to the case of selling this specific field? And yet, Rabbi Meir says that she is betrothed. It is therefore clear that Rav, who accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir, holds that the sale is effective even if the seller specified a particular field.


讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诪讜爪讗 砖讟专 讛拽谞讗讛 讘砖讜拽 讬讞讝讬专讜 诇讘注诇讬诐 讚讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讛讗 砖注讘讚 谞驻砖讬讛 讜讗讬 诪砖讜诐 驻专注讜谉 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉 讚讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚驻专注讬讛 诪拽专注 讛讜讛 拽专注 诇讬讛


Shmuel says: With regard to one who finds a deed of transfer, i.e., a promissory note that establishes a lien on the debtor鈥檚 property from the date it is written, regardless of whether or not he borrows the money at that time, in the marketplace, he must return it to its owner, i.e., the creditor, as, if one were to be concerned because of the possibility that the debtor wrote the note intending to borrow money, but did not borrow it in the end, he is nevertheless liable, since he committed himself to pay at the time it was written. And if one were to be concerned because of the possibility that repayment had already taken place, this is not a justified concern, as in general we are not concerned that there was repayment, as, if it were so that the debtor had repaid it, he certainly would have torn up the note.


讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗讘讗 诪谉 住驻专讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讚诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讜讛 讜讛讜讬谞讗 讻讘专 砖讬转讗 讻讘专 砖讘注 讜讚讻专谞讗 讚讛讜讜 诪讻专讝讬 讜讗诪专讬 讛谞讬 砖讟专讬 讗拽谞讬讬转讗 讚诪砖转讻讞讬 讘砖讜拽讗 谞讛讚专讬谞讛讜 诇诪专讬讬讛讜


Rav Na岣an said: My father was one of the scribes of the judges of Mar Shmuel, and I was about six or seven years old, and I remember that they made an announcement, saying: Those deeds of transfer that are found in the marketplace should be returned to their owners, the creditors, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.


讗诪专 专讘 注诪专诐 讗祝 讗谞谉 转谞讬谞讗 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讬专 讗诇诪讗 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讟专讬 讞诇讟讗转讗 讜讗讚专讻转讗 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 驻专注讜谉 谞讬谞讛讜


Rav Amram said: We, too, learn similarly in a mishna (20a): One must return any court enactment, i.e., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, to its owner. Apparently, we are not concerned that there may have been repayment. Rabbi Zeira said to him: The mishna is not proof for Shmuel鈥檚 ruling, as it is stated not with regard to all court enactments but with regard to bills of foreclosure, which award property to a creditor as payment for the debt owed to him, and bills of authorization to locate and seize property from the debtor, both of which are not subject to repayment.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讛谞讬 诇讗讜 讘谞讬 驻专注讜谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讛讗 讗诪专讬 谞讛专讚注讬 砖讜诪讗 讛讚专 注讚 转专讬住专 讬专讞讬 砖转讗 讜讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讗谞讗 诪谞讛专讚注讗 讗谞讗 讜住讘讬专讗 诇讬 讚砖讜诪讗 讛讚专 诇注讜诇诐


Rava said to him: And are these bills not subject to repayment? But didn鈥檛 the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say that after property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court鈥檚 appraisal of its value, the property is returned if the debtor pays the debt until twelve months of the year have passed after the repossession? And furthermore, Ameimar said: I am from Neharde鈥檃, and nevertheless, I hold that property repossessed based on an appraisal of an article鈥檚 value can always be returned. If the debtor pays his debt, he can reclaim his property at any point. Consequently, even bills of foreclosure or authorization might be obsolete, and nevertheless the mishna states that one who finds them must return them to the creditor.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛转诐 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚 讗谞驻砖讬讛 讚讘注讬讚谞讗 讚驻专注讬讛 讗讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪拽专注讬讛 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 诇诪讻转讘 砖讟专讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 注讬诇讜讬讛


Rather, Rava said that the mishna is not proof for the ruling of Shmuel for a different reason: There, this is the reason that the documents are returned: As I can say that if the debtor has already repaid his debt, it is he who caused the loss to himself, as at the time he repaid his debt he should have either ripped up the document, or alternatively, he should have demanded of the creditor to write another document for the debtor鈥檚 redeemed property, returning it to him.


讚诪讚讬谞讗 讗专注讗 诇讗 讘注讬讗 诇诪讬讛讚专 讜诪砖讜诐 讜注砖讬转 讛讬砖专 讜讛讟讜讘 讘注讬谞讬 讛壮 讛讜讗 讚讗诪讜专 专讘谞谉 转讛讚专 讛诇讻讱 诪专讬砖讗 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 讝讘讬谉 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 砖讟专 讝讘讬谞讬


The reason for a new document to be written is that according to the letter of the law, the land need not be returned by the creditor to the debtor, and it is due to the principle: 鈥淵ou shall do that which is right and good in the eyes of the Lord鈥 (Deuteronomy 6:18), that the Sages said that the land should be returned. Therefore, it is as though the debtor is purchasing it anew, and the creditor must write a bill of sale.


讙讘讬 砖讟专 讞讜讘 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚驻专注讬讛 讗讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇诪讬拽专注讬讛 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗讬诪讜专 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 拽讗 诪砖转诪讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇诪讞专 讬讛讘谞讗 诇讱 讚讛砖转讗 诇讬转讬讛 讙讘讗讬 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗驻砖讬讟讬 讚住驻专讗 讝讬讬专 诇讬讛


The Gemara explains why this reasoning is not applicable to deeds of transfer or other promissory notes. With regard to a found promissory note, what is there to say to justify returning it to the creditor? That if it is so that the debtor repaid the debt, he should have ripped up the promissory note? This is not so, as one could say that the creditor avoided returning the note, as he said to him: Tomorrow I will give you the note, as it is not with me now. Alternatively, the creditor may have held back the note as security for the debtor鈥檚 payment of the fee of the scribe who wrote the promissory note. Consequently, it is possible that the debtor was never given back the note and was unable to rip it up, through no fault of his own.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪讜爪讗 砖讟专 讞讜讘 讘砖讜拽 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专讜 诇讘注诇讬诐


Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: With regard to one who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, even if a ratification of the court is written in it, he may not return it to the owner, i.e., the creditor.


诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讜讘 讘讜 讛谞驻拽 讜诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 讚诪拽讜讬诐 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻专注讜谉


The Gemara explains: It is not necessary to say that one should not return the promissory note in a case where a ratification is not written in it, as in that case there is room to say that the debtor wrote it intending to borrow money, but he did not end up borrowing it, and therefore the creditor has no rights to the promissory note. But even if a ratification is written in it, one should not return it. And what is this authorization? It is an approval that the promissory note has been ratified by the court, which examined the note and the signatures of the witnesses and found everything to be in order. The reason one may not return the promissory note to the creditor is that we are concerned that repayment has already taken place.


讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讬专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讬专诪讬讛 讘专讬 诇讗 讻诇 诪注砖讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖讜讬诐 讗诇讗 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉


Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from the mishna that states (20a): One must return any court enactment, i.e., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, to its owner. Apparently there is no concern about repayment. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Yirmeya, my son, not all court enactments are equal. Rather, the ruling that one must return such a document applies only in a case where the debtor has the presumptive status of one who denies his debts, and therefore, if he claims the debt was repaid, his claim is not accepted.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讞讚讗 讝诪谞讗 转讜 诇讗 驻专注 讻诇诇 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讟专 讞诇讟讗转讗 讜讗讚专讻转讗 讜讻讚专讘讬 讝讬专讗


In response to this explanation of that mishna, Rava said: But does it necessarily follow that just because a debtor assumed the presumptive status of one who denies his debts after one time that he did so, he will never again repay a debt that he owes, and therefore the promissory note should be returned to his creditor? Rather, Rava said: The mishna is referring to a bill of foreclosure, or a bill of authorization, which are not subject to repayment, in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Zeira.


讜讻驻专谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗转讗 诇讬讚谉 谞讬诪讗 讘讬讛 诪诇转讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 爪讗 转谉 诇讜


The Gemara adds: And with regard to the topic of one who denies his debts, since it came to us, let us say something about it. As Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Na岣an said: If the court said to the litigant against whom they ruled: Go and give the other litigant what you owe him,


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