Bava Metzia 27

בלוקח מן התגר אבל בלוקח מבעל הבית חייב להחזיר וכן תני תנא קמיה דרב נחמן לא שנו אלא בלוקח מן התגר אבל בלוקח מבעל הבית חייב להחזיר

in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, who acquired the produce from several suppliers and is unable to determine the source of the coins. But in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller. And likewise, the tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall of Rav Naḥman taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: The Sages taught that the coins belong to the buyer only in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, but in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller.

אמר ליה רב נחמן וכי בעל הבית בעצמו דשן אמר ליה איסמיה אמר ליה לא תתרגם מתניתין כגון שדשן על ידי עבדו ושפחתו הכנענים

Rav Naḥman said to the tanna: But does the owner thresh the grain himself? His workers thresh the grain, and the coins could belong to one of them. The tanna said to Rav Naḥman: Based on the difficulty you raise, should I delete it from the collection of authoritative baraitot? Rav Naḥman said to the tanna: No. Interpret the baraita as referring to a case where the grain was threshed by his Canaanite slave or maidservant, and therefore any coins found intermingled with the produce belong to the owner.

מתני׳ אף השמלה היתה בכלל כל אלו ולמה יצאת להקיש אליה לומר לך מה שמלה מיוחדת שיש בה סימנין ויש לה תובעין אף כל דבר שיש בו סימנין ויש לו תובעים חייב להכריז

MISHNA: This mishna is an excerpt from a halakhic midrash concerning lost items, based on the verse: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering, and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother…And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it” (Deuteronomy 22:1, 3). The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find.

גמ׳ מאי בכלל כל אלו אמר רבא בכלל כל אבדת אחיך

GEMARA: When the mishna says that the garment was included in the generalization that one must return all of these items, in what generalization is it included? Rava said: It is included in the generalization: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it” (Deuteronomy 22:3).

אמר רבא למה לי דכתב רחמנא שור חמור שה ושמלה

Rava says: Why do I need all the specific items that the Merciful One writes that one must return: An ox, a donkey, a sheep, and a garment? One of them would seem to suffice.

צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא שמלה הוה אמינא הני מילי בעדים דגופה וסימנין דגופה אבל חמור בעדים דאוכף וסימנין דאוכף אימא לא מהדרינן ליה כתב רחמנא חמור דאפילו חמור בסימני האוכף

Rava answers: They are all necessary, as a unique halakha is derived from each example. As, if the Merciful One had written only “garment,” I would say: This matter, i.e., the mitzva to return a lost item, applies only in a case where the owner brings witnesses capable of testifying about the item itself or he describes distinguishing marks concerning the item itself; but with regard to returning a donkey to its owner in a case where he brings witnesses with regard to the saddle or describes distinguishing marks concerning the saddle and not on the donkey, say that we do not return the donkey to the owner. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: “Donkey,” from which it is derived that a donkey is returned to its owner even in a case where he describes distinguishing marks on the saddle.

שור ושה דכתב רחמנא למה לי שור דאפילו לגיזת זנבו ושה לגיזותיו ולכתוב רחמנא שור דאפילו לגיזת זנבו וכל שכן שה לגיזותיו

Rava continues: With regard to the specific mentions of “ox” and “sheep” that the Merciful One writes, why do I need them? Rava answers: From “ox” it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail; and from “sheep” it is derived that one must return even its sheared wool. The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write only “ox,” from which it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail, and derive all the more so that one must return the more substantial sheared wool of a sheep.

אלא אמר רבא חמור דבור לרבי יהודה ושה דאבידה לדברי הכל קשיא

Rather, Rava said: The term “donkey” stated with regard to damage in the category of Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (see Exodus 21:33 and Bava Kamma 54a), and the term “sheep” stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone, are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

ואימא לגללים הוא דאתא גללים אפקורי מפקר להו ודילמא לסימנין הוא דאתא דאיבעיא לן סימנין דאורייתא או דרבנן כתב רחמנא שה דאפילו בסימנין מהדרינן וסימנין דאורייתא

The Gemara suggests: And say that the term “sheep” comes to teach the obligation to return the animal’s dung? The Gemara answers: One need not return dung, because the owner has renounced its ownership. The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the term “sheep” comes to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks, as we raised a dilemma: Is the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Sheep” in order to teach that it is not only through the testimony of witnesses, but even based on distinguishing marks that we return lost items to their owner. Resolve the dilemma and conclude that the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

אמרי מדקתני להו תנא לסימנין גבי שמלה דקתני מה שמלה מיוחדת שיש בה סימנין ויש לה תובעין חייב להכריז אף כל דבר שיש בו סימנין ויש לו תובעין חייב להכריז שמע מינה דשה לאו לסימנין הוא דאתא

The Gemara rejects this proof. The Sages say: One can understand the matter from the fact that the tanna teaches the concept of distinguishing marks together with the term garment. As it is taught in the mishna: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Conclude from it that the term “sheep” does not come to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks

תנו רבנן אשר תאבד פרט לאבידה שאין בה שוה פרוטה רבי יהודה אומר ומצאתה פרט לאבידה שאין בה שוה פרוטה

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The Rabbis derive that this phrase serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta, which due to its negligible value is not considered lost. Rabbi Yehuda says that this halakha is derived from the conclusion of that verse: “Which shall be lost from him, and you have found it.” The term “and you have found it” serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta.

מאי בינייהו אמר אביי משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו מר נפקא ליה מאשר תאבד ומר נפקא ליה מומצאתה

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions? Ostensibly, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda both state the same halakha. Abaye said: There is no practical difference. Rather, the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. One Sage, the Rabbis, derives it from the phrase: “Which shall be lost from him”; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, derives it from the term: “And you have found it.”

ולמאן דנפקא ליה מאשר תאבד האי ומצאתה מאי עביד ליה

The Gemara asks: And according to the first Sage, the Rabbis, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the phrase “which shall be lost from him,” what does he do with the term: “And you have found it”?

ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדרבנאי דאמר רבנאי ומצאתה דאתאי לידיה משמע

The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, that term is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbenai. As Rabbenai says in interpreting the verse: “And so shall you do with every lost item of your brother’s, which he has lost, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3), that the term “and you have found it” means that it assumes the status of a found item only when it actually enters his possession.

ולמאן דנפקא ליה מומצאתה האי אשר תאבד מאי עביד ליה

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the term: “And you have found it,” what does he do with the phrase: “Which has been lost from him”?

מבעי ליה לכדרבי יוחנן דאמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחאי מניין לאבידה ששטפה נהר שהיא מותרת שנאמר כן תעשה לכל אבדת אחיך אשר תאבד ממנו ומצאתה מי שאבודה הימנו ומצויה אצל כל אדם יצתה זו שאבודה הימנו ואינה מצויה אצל כל אדם

The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yehuda, that phrase is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.

ואידך הא דרבנאי מנא ליה נפקא ליה מומצאתה

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, who derived from the term: “And you have found it,” that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where does he derive the halakha of Rabbenai that the item assumes the status of a found item only when it actually comes into his possession? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the superfluous conjunction “and” in the term “and you have found it.”

ואידך הא דרבי יוחנן מנא ליה נפקא ליה ממנו ואידך ממנו לא משמע ליה

The Gemara asks further: And the other tanna, the first tanna, who derives from the phrase “which shall be lost from him” that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where do they derive the halakha of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one need not return an item that is lost from him and is not available to be found by every person? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the superfluous term “from him,” in the phrase “which shall be lost from him.” And as for the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, he does not learn anything from the term “from him.”

רבא אמר פרוטה שהוזלה איכא בינייהו מאן דאמר מאשר תאבד איכא ומאן דאמר מומצאתה ליכא

Abaye explained that there is no practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda. By contrast, Rava said: The practical difference between them is with regard to an item that was worth one peruta when it was lost but that was then devalued and was worth less than one peruta when it was found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase “which shall be lost from him,” there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: “And you have found it,” there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it is found.

ולמאן דאמר אשר תאבד הא בעינן ומצאתה וליכא

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the phrase “which shall be lost from him,” do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is found, based on the term “and you have found it”? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it is found, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

אלא פרוטה שהוקרה איכא בינייהו מאן דאמר ומצאתה איכא ומאן דאמר אשר תאבד ליכא

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to an item worth less than one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the term: “And you have found it,” there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to its value when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: “Which shall be lost from him,” there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost.

ולמאן דאמר ומצאתה הא בעינן אשר תאבד וליכא

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the term “and you have found it,” do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is lost, based on the phrase “which shall be lost from him”? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it was lost, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

אלא פרוטה שהוקרה והוזלה וחזרה והוקרה איכא בינייהו מאן דאמר אשר תאבד איכא ומאן דאמר ומצאתה בעינן דאית בה שיעור מציאה משעת אבידה ועד שעת מציאה

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to the case of an item worth one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and was devalued in the interim and was worth less than one peruta, and then appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: “Which shall be lost from him,” there is an obligation to return the item, as the verse is referring to its value only when it was lost and when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from: “And you have found it,” there is no obligation to return the item, as we require that there will be the value of one peruta, the requisite measure of a lost item, from the time of its loss and until the time of its finding, as the conjunction “and” connects the time of the finding to the time of the loss.

איבעיא להו סימנין דאורייתא או דרבנן מאי נפקא מינה

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? The Gemara asks: What difference is there whether it is by Torah law or by rabbinic law?

לאהדורי גט אשה בסימנים אי אמרת דאורייתא מהדרינן ואי אמרת דרבנן כי עבוד רבנן תקנתא בממונא אבל באיסורא לא עבוד רבנן תקנתא

The Gemara answers: The practical difference is with regard to returning the bill of divorce of a woman that was lost by an agent before its delivery, on the basis of distinguishing marks. If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, we return the document and allow the agent to transmit it to the woman. But if you say that it is by rabbinic law, we do not return the document, because when the Sages institute an ordinance, it is only with regard to monetary matters they have the authority to declare property ownerless; but with regard to ritual matters, the Sages do not institute an ordinance. They lack the authority to abrogate the prohibitions by Torah law that are associated with a woman’s marital status.

תא שמע אף השמלה היתה בכלל כל אלו ולמה יצאת להקיש אליה ולומר לך מה שמלה מיוחדת שיש לה סימנין ויש לה תובעין חייב להכריז אף כל דבר שיש לו סימנין ויש לו תובעין חייב להכריז תנא תובעין אצטריכא ליה סימנין כדי נסבא

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps it was necessary for the tanna to mention only the criterion of claimants, and the tanna cited the criterion of distinguishing marks for no reason, as by Torah law distinguishing marks is not a relevant factor.

תא שמע חמור בסימני אוכף אימא בעדי אוכף

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the aforementioned statement: The obligation to return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle is derived based on the mention of the word “donkey” in the verse from Deuteronomy. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: Emend the baraita and say: There is an obligation to return the donkey only on the basis of witnesses who testify with regard to the identity of the owner based on the fact that the saddle belongs to him, and not on the basis of distinguishing marks.

תא שמע והיה עמך עד דרש אחיך אתו וכי תעלה על דעתך שיתננו לו קודם שידרשנו אלא דרשהו אם רמאי הוא או אינו רמאי

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (28b): “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it, and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that he would give the lost item to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. Scrutinize him [darshehu] to determine whether the claimant is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. Only then may you return the lost item to him.

מאי לאו בסימנין לא בעדים

The Gemara states its suggested proof: What, is it not that the one who claims the lost item proves that he is not a swindler on the basis of distinguishing marks that he provides? Apparently, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the determination of whether he is a swindler is on the basis of scrutinizing his witnesses.

תא שמע אין מעידין אלא על פרצוף הפנים עם החוטם אף על פי שיש סימנין בגופו ובכליו

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One testifies that a man died, thereby permitting his wife to remarry, only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [partzuf ] of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. Although there are distinguishing marks on his body and on his garments, which appear to indicate his identity, they cannot be used to identify the person.

שמע מינה סימנין לאו דאורייתא אמרי גופו דארוך וגוץ כליו דחיישינן לשאלה

The Gemara states its suggested proof: Conclude from it that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: The distinguishing marks on his body mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., that he was tall or short, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity. The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are ineffective in determining his identity, as we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, e.g., perhaps the husband loaned his clothes to the deceased.

אי חיישינן לשאלה חמור בסימני אוכף היכי מהדרינן אמרי אוכף לא שאולי אינשי אוכפא משום דמסקב ליה לחמרא

The Gemara asks: If we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, how do we return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle; perhaps it was borrowed? The Sages say in response: People do not typically borrow a saddle because saddles that are not custom fit wound the donkey.

איבעית אימא כליו בחיורי ובסומקי

If you wish, say instead: The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., where the witness said that they were white or red, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity.

אלא הא דתניא מצאו קשור בכיס או בארנקי ובטבעת או שמצאו בין כליו אפילו לזמן מרובה כשר ואי סלקא דעתך חיישינן לשאלה כי מצאו קשור בכיס אמאי כשר ניחוש לשאלה

The Gemara questions the previous answer with regard to the concern about the possibility of a loan. But there is that which is taught in a baraita: If the agent found the bill of divorce that he lost bound to his pouch, or his purse, or his signet ring, or if he found it among his garments, even if he found it a long time after he lost it, the distinguishing marks on those items are sufficient in order to identify the bill of divorce as the one that he lost, and it is valid. And if it enters your mind that we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, when he found the bill of divorce bound to his pouch, why is it valid? Let us be concerned about the possibility of a loan and that perhaps the pouch and the bill of divorce belong to someone else.

אמרי כיס וארנקי וטבעת לא משאלי אינשי כיס וארנקי משום דמסמני וטבעת משום דמזייף

The Sages say in response: There is no concern in this case, as people do not loan a pouch, a purse, or a signet ring to another person. One does not loan his pouch and his purse to others due to the fact that it portends the loss of his good fortune. And one does not loan his signet ring to others due to the fact that it could be used to forge documents.

לימא כתנאי אין מעידין על השומא ואלעזר בן מהבאי אומר מעידין על השומא מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דתנא קמא סבר סימנין דרבנן ואלעזר בן מהבאי סבר סימנין דאורייתא

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dilemma whether the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law or by rabbinic law is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One does not testify on the basis of a mole on the body of the deceased to determine the identity of a man who died and permit his wife to remarry. And Elazar ben Mahavai says: One testifies to identify the corpse on the basis of a mole. What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree; as the first tanna holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law and therefore, testimony concerning those marks cannot dissolve a marriage by Torah law; and Elazar ben Mahavai holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

אמר רבא דכולי עלמא סימנין דאורייתא והכא בשומא מצויה בבן גילו קמיפלגי מר סבר שומא מצויה בבן גילו ומר סבר שומא אינה מצויה בבן גילו

Rava said: That is not necessarily the crux of their dispute, as perhaps everyone agrees that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, and here, it is with regard to whether one needs to be concerned that a mole is often found on one’s contemporary, i.e., one born under the same constellation, rendering it useless as a means of identification, that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is often found on one’s contemporary and there-fore it is insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is not often found on one’s contemporary, and therefore it is sufficient as a means of identification.

איבעית אימא דכולי עלמא שומא אינה מצויה בבן גילו והכא בסימנין העשוין להשתנות לאחר מיתה קמיפלגי מר סבר סימנין עשוים להשתנות לאחר מיתה ומר סבר סימנין אין עשוים להשתנות לאחר מיתה

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not often found on one’s contemporary, and here it is with regard to whether the appearance of distinguishing marks on the body is apt to change after death that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is apt to change after death, and that consequently they are insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is not apt to change after death, and therefore, they are sufficient as a means of identification.

איבעית אימא דכולי עלמא שומא אינה עשויה להשתנות לאחר מיתה וסימנין דרבנן והכא בשומא סימן מובהק הוא קמיפלגי מר סבר שומא סימן מובהק הוא ומר סבר שומא לאו סימן מובהק הוא

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not apt to change after death, and that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law, and here it is with regard to whether a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that they disagree. One Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that can be relied upon without hesitation even in matters of Torah law, e.g., dissolving a marriage; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is not a clear-cut distinguishing mark. Since standard distinguishing marks are sufficient by rabbinic law, a marriage, which is in effect by Torah law, cannot be dissolved on the basis of a mole.

אמר רבא אם תמצי לומר סימנין לאו דאורייתא היכי מהדרינן אבידתא בסימנין דניחא ליה למוצא אבידה דנהדר בסימנין כי היכי דכי אבדה ליה לדידה נמי נהדרו ליה בסימנין

Rava says: If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law, how do we return a lost item to the presumed owner on the basis of distinguishing marks; perhaps it will result in the return of property to one who was in fact not the owner? Rava answers: We return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the finder of a lost item to return it on the basis of distinguishing marks, rather than exercise his right by Torah law to retain it, so that when an item is lost from him in the future, the finder will return it to him on the basis of distinguishing marks as well.

אמר ליה רב ספרא לרבא וכי אדם עושה טובה לעצמו בממון שאינו שלו

Rav Safra said to Rava: But can a person perform an act that results in benefit for himself with property that is not his? The lost item belongs not to the finder but to the one who lost it. How can the finder waive the right of the true owner to the lost item so that he may recover his own lost item in the future?

אלא ניחא ליה לבעל אבידה למיהב סימנין ולמשקליה מידע ידע דעדים לית ליה ומימר אמר כולי עלמא לא ידעי סימנין מובהקים דידה ואנא יהיבנא סימנין מובהקים דידה ושקלנא לה

Rather, we return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the owner of the lost item to be able to provide a description using distinguishing marks and on that basis take possession of the item. He knows that he has no witnesses to testify to his ownership, and he says: No one else knows the clear-cut distinguishing marks that are on the item. And I will provide a description using the clear-cut distinguishing marks, and based on that information I will take possession of the item. Each owner gives his tacit agreement to the return of lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks, based on the belief that he is best able to identify them.

אלא הא דתנן רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אחד הלוה משלשה יחזיר ללוה שלשה שלוו מן האחד יחזיר למלוה ניחא ליה ללוה לאהדורי ליה למלוה

The Gemara asks: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (20a), that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he must return the documents to the debtor. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he must return the documents to the creditor. If one returns lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks due to the tacit agreement of the owners, is it satisfactory to the debtor to have the documents returned to the creditor, as doing so would enable the creditor to collect payment of the loan?

אמר ליה התם סברא הוא אחד הלוה משלשה יחזיר ללוה דגבי לוה שכיחי גבי מלוה לא שכיחי שמע מינה מלוה נפול שלשה שלוו מאחד יחזיר למלוה דגבי מלוה שכיחי גבי לוה לא שכיחי

Rava said to Rav Safra: There, the obligation to return the promissory notes to the creditor is not on the basis of distinguishing marks; rather, it is based on logical reasoning. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he shall return the documents to the debtor, because a group of several documents indicating that one debtor borrowed money from several creditors is typically found with the debtor and is not typically found with a creditor, as the only element common to all the documents is the debtor. Conclude from it that the group of documents fell from the debtor while they were in his possession. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he shall return the documents to the creditor, because a group of several documents indicating that multiple debtors borrowed money from a single creditor is typically found with the creditor and is not typically found with a debtor, as the only element common to all the documents is the creditor.