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Today's Daf Yomi

October 22, 2016 | 讻壮 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Metzia 27

In a store or at a money changer, the location of where the item is found will determine if it clearly belongs to the owner or if it can be taken by the finder. 聽Various drashot are made from the items mentioned in the verses relating to lost items that need to be returned. 聽A question is raised about whether being able to retrieve a lost item by providing identifying mark is a Torah law or rabbinic. 聽various sources are brought to attempt to answer the question.


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讘诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛转讙专 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专 讜讻谉 转谞讬 转谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛转讙专 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专

in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, who acquired the produce from several suppliers and is unable to determine the source of the coins. But in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller. And likewise, the tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall of Rav Na岣an taught a baraita before Rav Na岣an: The Sages taught that the coins belong to the buyer only in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, but in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讘注爪诪讜 讚砖谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬住诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 转转专讙诐 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讚砖谉 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讻谞注谞讬诐

Rav Na岣an said to the tanna: But does the owner thresh the grain himself? His workers thresh the grain, and the coins could belong to one of them. The tanna said to Rav Na岣an: Based on the difficulty you raise, should I delete it from the collection of authoritative baraitot? Rav Na岣an said to the tanna: No. Interpret the baraita as referring to a case where the grain was threshed by his Canaanite slave or maidservant, and therefore any coins found intermingled with the produce belong to the owner.

诪转谞讬壮 讗祝 讛砖诪诇讛 讛讬转讛 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 讘讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝

MISHNA: This mishna is an excerpt from a halakhic midrash concerning lost items, based on the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 ox or his sheep wandering, and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother鈥nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:1, 3). The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗讘讚转 讗讞讬讱

GEMARA: When the mishna says that the garment was included in the generalization that one must return all of these items, in what generalization is it included? Rava said: It is included in the generalization: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3).

讗诪专 专讘讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 讞诪讜专 砖讛 讜砖诪诇讛

Rava says: Why do I need all the specific items that the Merciful One writes that one must return: An ox, a donkey, a sheep, and a garment? One of them would seem to suffice.

爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖诪诇讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘注讚讬诐 讚讙讜驻讛 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讙讜驻讛 讗讘诇 讞诪讜专 讘注讚讬诐 讚讗讜讻祝 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜讻祝 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讞诪讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讛讗讜讻祝

Rava answers: They are all necessary, as a unique halakha is derived from each example. As, if the Merciful One had written only 鈥済arment,鈥 I would say: This matter, i.e., the mitzva to return a lost item, applies only in a case where the owner brings witnesses capable of testifying about the item itself or he describes distinguishing marks concerning the item itself; but with regard to returning a donkey to its owner in a case where he brings witnesses with regard to the saddle or describes distinguishing marks concerning the saddle and not on the donkey, say that we do not return the donkey to the owner. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淒onkey,鈥 from which it is derived that a donkey is returned to its owner even in a case where he describes distinguishing marks on the saddle.

砖讜专 讜砖讛 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讙讬讝转 讝谞讘讜 讜砖讛 诇讙讬讝讜转讬讜 讜诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讙讬讝转 讝谞讘讜 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖讛 诇讙讬讝讜转讬讜

Rava continues: With regard to the specific mentions of 鈥渙x鈥 and 鈥渟heep鈥 that the Merciful One writes, why do I need them? Rava answers: From 鈥渙x鈥 it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail; and from 鈥渟heep鈥 it is derived that one must return even its sheared wool. The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write only 鈥渙x,鈥 from which it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail, and derive all the more so that one must return the more substantial sheared wool of a sheep.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讞诪讜专 讚讘讜专 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜砖讛 讚讗讘讬讚讛 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 拽砖讬讗

Rather, Rava said: The term 鈥渄onkey鈥 stated with regard to damage in the category of Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (see Exodus 21:33 and Bava Kamma 54a), and the term 鈥渟heep鈥 stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone, are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

讜讗讬诪讗 诇讙诇诇讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讙诇诇讬诐 讗驻拽讜专讬 诪驻拽专 诇讛讜 讜讚讬诇诪讗 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讜 讚专讘谞谉 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讛 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara suggests: And say that the term 鈥渟heep鈥 comes to teach the obligation to return the animal鈥檚 dung? The Gemara answers: One need not return dung, because the owner has renounced its ownership. The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the term 鈥渟heep鈥 comes to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks, as we raised a dilemma: Is the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淪heep鈥 in order to teach that it is not only through the testimony of witnesses, but even based on distinguishing marks that we return lost items to their owner. Resolve the dilemma and conclude that the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

讗诪专讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 诇讛讜 转谞讗 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讙讘讬 砖诪诇讛 讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 讘讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚砖讛 诇讗讜 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara rejects this proof. The Sages say: One can understand the matter from the fact that the tanna teaches the concept of distinguishing marks together with the term garment. As it is taught in the mishna: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Conclude from it that the term 鈥渟heep鈥 does not come to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 驻专讟 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 驻专讟 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3). The Rabbis derive that this phrase serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta, which due to its negligible value is not considered lost. Rabbi Yehuda says that this halakha is derived from the conclusion of that verse: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him, and you have found it.鈥 The term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥 serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪砖诪注讜转 讚讜专砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪专 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讜诪专 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions? Ostensibly, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda both state the same halakha. Abaye said: There is no practical difference. Rather, the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. One Sage, the Rabbis, derives it from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him鈥; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, derives it from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it.鈥

讜诇诪讗谉 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讛讗讬 讜诪爪讗转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And according to the first Sage, the Rabbis, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 what does he do with the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it鈥?

讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘谞讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘谞讗讬 讜诪爪讗转讛 讚讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 诪砖诪注

The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, that term is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbenai. As Rabbenai says in interpreting the verse: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with every lost item of your brother鈥檚, which he has lost, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3), that the term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥 means that it assumes the status of a found item only when it actually enters his possession.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛 讛讗讬 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 what does he do with the phrase: 鈥淲hich has been lost from him鈥?

诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖砖讟驻讛 谞讛专 砖讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 砖谞讗诪专 讻谉 转注砖讛 诇讻诇 讗讘讚转 讗讞讬讱 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诪诪谞讜 讜诪爪讗转讛 诪讬 砖讗讘讜讚讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讜诪爪讜讬讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖讗讘讜讚讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐

The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yehuda, that phrase is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. As Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.

讜讗讬讚讱 讛讗 讚专讘谞讗讬 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, who derived from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where does he derive the halakha of Rabbenai that the item assumes the status of a found item only when it actually comes into his possession? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the superfluous conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 in the term 鈥渁nd you have found it.鈥

讜讗讬讚讱 讛讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诪谞讜 讜讗讬讚讱 诪诪谞讜 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks further: And the other tanna, the first tanna, who derives from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him鈥 that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where do they derive the halakha of Rabbi Yo岣nan that one need not return an item that is lost from him and is not available to be found by every person? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the superfluous term 鈥渇rom him,鈥 in the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him.鈥 And as for the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, he does not learn anything from the term 鈥渇rom him.鈥

专讘讗 讗诪专 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜讝诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜诪爪讗转讛 诇讬讻讗

Abaye explained that there is no practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda. By contrast, Rava said: The practical difference between them is with regard to an item that was worth one peruta when it was lost but that was then devalued and was worth less than one peruta when it was found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it is found.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜诪爪讗转讛 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is found, based on the term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it is found, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

讗诇讗 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜拽专讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诇讬讻讗

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to an item worth less than one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to its value when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the term 鈥渁nd you have found it,鈥 do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is lost, based on the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him鈥? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it was lost, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

讗诇讗 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜拽专讛 讜讛讜讝诇讛 讜讞讝专讛 讜讛讜拽专讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讘注讬谞谉 讚讗讬转 讘讛 砖讬注讜专 诪爪讬讗讛 诪砖注转 讗讘讬讚讛 讜注讚 砖注转 诪爪讬讗讛

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to the case of an item worth one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and was devalued in the interim and was worth less than one peruta, and then appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as the verse is referring to its value only when it was lost and when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as we require that there will be the value of one peruta, the requisite measure of a lost item, from the time of its loss and until the time of its finding, as the conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 connects the time of the finding to the time of the loss.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讜 讚专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? The Gemara asks: What difference is there whether it is by Torah law or by rabbinic law?

诇讗讛讚讜专讬 讙讟 讗砖讛 讘住讬诪谞讬诐 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讚专讘谞谉 讻讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 讘诪诪讜谞讗 讗讘诇 讘讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗

The Gemara answers: The practical difference is with regard to returning the bill of divorce of a woman that was lost by an agent before its delivery, on the basis of distinguishing marks. If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, we return the document and allow the agent to transmit it to the woman. But if you say that it is by rabbinic law, we do not return the document, because when the Sages institute an ordinance, it is only with regard to monetary matters they have the authority to declare property ownerless; but with regard to ritual matters, the Sages do not institute an ordinance. They lack the authority to abrogate the prohibitions by Torah law that are associated with a woman鈥檚 marital status.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 讛砖诪诇讛 讛讬转讛 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 诇讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 诇讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 转谞讗 转讜讘注讬谉 讗爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讻讚讬 谞住讘讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps it was necessary for the tanna to mention only the criterion of claimants, and the tanna cited the criterion of distinguishing marks for no reason, as by Torah law distinguishing marks is not a relevant factor.

转讗 砖诪注 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讗讜讻祝 讗讬诪讗 讘注讚讬 讗讜讻祝

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the aforementioned statement: The obligation to return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle is derived based on the mention of the word 鈥渄onkey鈥 in the verse from Deuteronomy. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: Emend the baraita and say: There is an obligation to return the donkey only on the basis of witnesses who testify with regard to the identity of the owner based on the fact that the saddle belongs to him, and not on the basis of distinguishing marks.

转讗 砖诪注 讜讛讬讛 注诪讱 注讚 讚专砖 讗讞讬讱 讗转讜 讜讻讬 转注诇讛 注诇 讚注转讱 砖讬转谞谞讜 诇讜 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讚专砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讚专砖讛讜 讗诐 专诪讗讬 讛讜讗 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 专诪讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (28b): 鈥淎nd if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it, and you shall return it to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that he would give the lost item to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. Scrutinize him [darshehu] to determine whether the claimant is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. Only then may you return the lost item to him.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注讚讬诐

The Gemara states its suggested proof: What, is it not that the one who claims the lost item proves that he is not a swindler on the basis of distinguishing marks that he provides? Apparently, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the determination of whether he is a swindler is on the basis of scrutinizing his witnesses.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讗诇讗 注诇 驻专爪讜祝 讛驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬砖 住讬诪谞讬谉 讘讙讜驻讜 讜讘讻诇讬讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One testifies that a man died, thereby permitting his wife to remarry, only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [partzuf ] of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. Although there are distinguishing marks on his body and on his garments, which appear to indicate his identity, they cannot be used to identify the person.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讙讜驻讜 讚讗专讜讱 讜讙讜抓 讻诇讬讜 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛

The Gemara states its suggested proof: Conclude from it that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: The distinguishing marks on his body mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., that he was tall or short, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity. The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are ineffective in determining his identity, as we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, e.g., perhaps the husband loaned his clothes to the deceased.

讗讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讗讜讻祝 讛讬讻讬 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讗诪专讬 讗讜讻祝 诇讗 砖讗讜诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讜讻驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪住拽讘 诇讬讛 诇讞诪专讗

The Gemara asks: If we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, how do we return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle; perhaps it was borrowed? The Sages say in response: People do not typically borrow a saddle because saddles that are not custom fit wound the donkey.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇讬讜 讘讞讬讜专讬 讜讘住讜诪拽讬

If you wish, say instead: The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., where the witness said that they were white or red, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪爪讗讜 拽砖讜专 讘讻讬住 讗讜 讘讗专谞拽讬 讜讘讟讘注转 讗讜 砖诪爪讗讜 讘讬谉 讻诇讬讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝诪谉 诪专讜讘讛 讻砖专 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛 讻讬 诪爪讗讜 拽砖讜专 讘讻讬住 讗诪讗讬 讻砖专 谞讬讞讜砖 诇砖讗诇讛

The Gemara questions the previous answer with regard to the concern about the possibility of a loan. But there is that which is taught in a baraita: If the agent found the bill of divorce that he lost bound to his pouch, or his purse, or his signet ring, or if he found it among his garments, even if he found it a long time after he lost it, the distinguishing marks on those items are sufficient in order to identify the bill of divorce as the one that he lost, and it is valid. And if it enters your mind that we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, when he found the bill of divorce bound to his pouch, why is it valid? Let us be concerned about the possibility of a loan and that perhaps the pouch and the bill of divorce belong to someone else.

讗诪专讬 讻讬住 讜讗专谞拽讬 讜讟讘注转 诇讗 诪砖讗诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讻讬住 讜讗专谞拽讬 诪砖讜诐 讚诪住诪谞讬 讜讟讘注转 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讝讬讬祝

The Sages say in response: There is no concern in this case, as people do not loan a pouch, a purse, or a signet ring to another person. One does not loan his pouch and his purse to others due to the fact that it portends the loss of his good fortune. And one does not loan his signet ring to others due to the fact that it could be used to forge documents.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讛砖讜诪讗 讜讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪讛讘讗讬 讗讜诪专 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讛砖讜诪讗 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讘谞谉 讜讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪讛讘讗讬 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dilemma whether the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law or by rabbinic law is the subject of a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: One does not testify on the basis of a mole on the body of the deceased to determine the identity of a man who died and permit his wife to remarry. And Elazar ben Mahavai says: One testifies to identify the corpse on the basis of a mole. What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree; as the first tanna holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law and therefore, testimony concerning those marks cannot dissolve a marriage by Torah law; and Elazar ben Mahavai holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讻讗 讘砖讜诪讗 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 讜诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜

Rava said: That is not necessarily the crux of their dispute, as perhaps everyone agrees that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, and here, it is with regard to whether one needs to be concerned that a mole is often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, i.e., one born under the same constellation, rendering it useless as a means of identification, that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is often found on one鈥檚 contemporary and there-fore it is insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is not often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, and therefore it is sufficient as a means of identification.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 讜讛讻讗 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讛注砖讜讬谉 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 注砖讜讬诐 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜诪专 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讗讬谉 注砖讜讬诐 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, and here it is with regard to whether the appearance of distinguishing marks on the body is apt to change after death that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is apt to change after death, and that consequently they are insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is not apt to change after death, and therefore, they are sufficient as a means of identification.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 注砖讜讬讛 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讘谞谉 讜讛讻讗 讘砖讜诪讗 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗 讜诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 诇讗讜 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not apt to change after death, and that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law, and here it is with regard to whether a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that they disagree. One Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that can be relied upon without hesitation even in matters of Torah law, e.g., dissolving a marriage; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is not a clear-cut distinguishing mark. Since standard distinguishing marks are sufficient by rabbinic law, a marriage, which is in effect by Torah law, cannot be dissolved on the basis of a mole.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬讻讬 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讗讘讬讚转讗 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讚谞讛讚专 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讻讬 讗讘讚讛 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讛 谞诪讬 谞讛讚专讜 诇讬讛 讘住讬诪谞讬谉

Rava says: If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law, how do we return a lost item to the presumed owner on the basis of distinguishing marks; perhaps it will result in the return of property to one who was in fact not the owner? Rava answers: We return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the finder of a lost item to return it on the basis of distinguishing marks, rather than exercise his right by Torah law to retain it, so that when an item is lost from him in the future, the finder will return it to him on the basis of distinguishing marks as well.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 住驻专讗 诇专讘讗 讜讻讬 讗讚诐 注讜砖讛 讟讜讘讛 诇注爪诪讜 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜

Rav Safra said to Rava: But can a person perform an act that results in benefit for himself with property that is not his? The lost item belongs not to the finder but to the one who lost it. How can the finder waive the right of the true owner to the lost item so that he may recover his own lost item in the future?

讗诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讗讘讬讚讛 诇诪讬讛讘 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜诇诪砖拽诇讬讛 诪讬讚注 讬讚注 讚注讚讬诐 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜诪讬诪专 讗诪专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 讬讚注讬 住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讜讘讛拽讬诐 讚讬讚讛 讜讗谞讗 讬讛讬讘谞讗 住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讜讘讛拽讬诐 讚讬讚讛 讜砖拽诇谞讗 诇讛

Rather, we return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the owner of the lost item to be able to provide a description using distinguishing marks and on that basis take possession of the item. He knows that he has no witnesses to testify to his ownership, and he says: No one else knows the clear-cut distinguishing marks that are on the item. And I will provide a description using the clear-cut distinguishing marks, and based on that information I will take possession of the item. Each owner gives his tacit agreement to the return of lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks, based on the belief that he is best able to identify them.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讛诇讜讛 诪砖诇砖讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇诇讜讛 砖诇砖讛 砖诇讜讜 诪谉 讛讗讞讚 讬讞讝讬专 诇诪诇讜讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诇讜讛 诇讗讛讚讜专讬 诇讬讛 诇诪诇讜讛

The Gemara asks: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (20a), that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he must return the documents to the debtor. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he must return the documents to the creditor. If one returns lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks due to the tacit agreement of the owners, is it satisfactory to the debtor to have the documents returned to the creditor, as doing so would enable the creditor to collect payment of the loan?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讛诇讜讛 诪砖诇砖讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇诇讜讛 讚讙讘讬 诇讜讛 砖讻讬讞讬 讙讘讬 诪诇讜讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪诇讜讛 谞驻讜诇 砖诇砖讛 砖诇讜讜 诪讗讞讚 讬讞讝讬专 诇诪诇讜讛 讚讙讘讬 诪诇讜讛 砖讻讬讞讬 讙讘讬 诇讜讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬

Rava said to Rav Safra: There, the obligation to return the promissory notes to the creditor is not on the basis of distinguishing marks; rather, it is based on logical reasoning. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he shall return the documents to the debtor, because a group of several documents indicating that one debtor borrowed money from several creditors is typically found with the debtor and is not typically found with a creditor, as the only element common to all the documents is the debtor. Conclude from it that the group of documents fell from the debtor while they were in his possession. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he shall return the documents to the creditor, because a group of several documents indicating that multiple debtors borrowed money from a single creditor is typically found with the creditor and is not typically found with a debtor, as the only element common to all the documents is the creditor.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Metzia 27

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 27

讘诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛转讙专 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专 讜讻谉 转谞讬 转谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘诇讜拽讞 诪谉 讛转讙专 讗讘诇 讘诇讜拽讞 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讞讝讬专

in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, who acquired the produce from several suppliers and is unable to determine the source of the coins. But in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller. And likewise, the tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall of Rav Na岣an taught a baraita before Rav Na岣an: The Sages taught that the coins belong to the buyer only in the case of one who purchases produce from a merchant, but in the case of one who purchases produce from a single owner, he is obligated to return the coins to the seller.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讘注爪诪讜 讚砖谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬住诪讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗 转转专讙诐 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讚砖谉 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讻谞注谞讬诐

Rav Na岣an said to the tanna: But does the owner thresh the grain himself? His workers thresh the grain, and the coins could belong to one of them. The tanna said to Rav Na岣an: Based on the difficulty you raise, should I delete it from the collection of authoritative baraitot? Rav Na岣an said to the tanna: No. Interpret the baraita as referring to a case where the grain was threshed by his Canaanite slave or maidservant, and therefore any coins found intermingled with the produce belong to the owner.

诪转谞讬壮 讗祝 讛砖诪诇讛 讛讬转讛 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 讘讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬诐 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝

MISHNA: This mishna is an excerpt from a halakhic midrash concerning lost items, based on the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 ox or his sheep wandering, and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother鈥nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:1, 3). The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗讘讚转 讗讞讬讱

GEMARA: When the mishna says that the garment was included in the generalization that one must return all of these items, in what generalization is it included? Rava said: It is included in the generalization: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3).

讗诪专 专讘讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 讞诪讜专 砖讛 讜砖诪诇讛

Rava says: Why do I need all the specific items that the Merciful One writes that one must return: An ox, a donkey, a sheep, and a garment? One of them would seem to suffice.

爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖诪诇讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讘注讚讬诐 讚讙讜驻讛 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讙讜驻讛 讗讘诇 讞诪讜专 讘注讚讬诐 讚讗讜讻祝 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜讻祝 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讞诪讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讛讗讜讻祝

Rava answers: They are all necessary, as a unique halakha is derived from each example. As, if the Merciful One had written only 鈥済arment,鈥 I would say: This matter, i.e., the mitzva to return a lost item, applies only in a case where the owner brings witnesses capable of testifying about the item itself or he describes distinguishing marks concerning the item itself; but with regard to returning a donkey to its owner in a case where he brings witnesses with regard to the saddle or describes distinguishing marks concerning the saddle and not on the donkey, say that we do not return the donkey to the owner. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淒onkey,鈥 from which it is derived that a donkey is returned to its owner even in a case where he describes distinguishing marks on the saddle.

砖讜专 讜砖讛 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讙讬讝转 讝谞讘讜 讜砖讛 诇讙讬讝讜转讬讜 讜诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讜专 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讙讬讝转 讝谞讘讜 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 砖讛 诇讙讬讝讜转讬讜

Rava continues: With regard to the specific mentions of 鈥渙x鈥 and 鈥渟heep鈥 that the Merciful One writes, why do I need them? Rava answers: From 鈥渙x鈥 it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail; and from 鈥渟heep鈥 it is derived that one must return even its sheared wool. The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write only 鈥渙x,鈥 from which it is derived that one must return even the sheared wool of its tail, and derive all the more so that one must return the more substantial sheared wool of a sheep.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讞诪讜专 讚讘讜专 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜砖讛 讚讗讘讬讚讛 诇讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 拽砖讬讗

Rather, Rava said: The term 鈥渄onkey鈥 stated with regard to damage in the category of Pit, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (see Exodus 21:33 and Bava Kamma 54a), and the term 鈥渟heep鈥 stated with regard to a lost item, according to the opinion of everyone, are difficult. There is no explanation for why they are stated.

讜讗讬诪讗 诇讙诇诇讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讙诇诇讬诐 讗驻拽讜专讬 诪驻拽专 诇讛讜 讜讚讬诇诪讗 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讚讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讜 讚专讘谞谉 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 砖讛 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara suggests: And say that the term 鈥渟heep鈥 comes to teach the obligation to return the animal鈥檚 dung? The Gemara answers: One need not return dung, because the owner has renounced its ownership. The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the term 鈥渟heep鈥 comes to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks, as we raised a dilemma: Is the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? Therefore, the Merciful One writes: 鈥淪heep鈥 in order to teach that it is not only through the testimony of witnesses, but even based on distinguishing marks that we return lost items to their owner. Resolve the dilemma and conclude that the halakha that an item can be identified using distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

讗诪专讬 诪讚拽转谞讬 诇讛讜 转谞讗 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讙讘讬 砖诪诇讛 讚拽转谞讬 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 讘讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚砖讛 诇讗讜 诇住讬诪谞讬谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗

The Gemara rejects this proof. The Sages say: One can understand the matter from the fact that the tanna teaches the concept of distinguishing marks together with the term garment. As it is taught in the mishna: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Conclude from it that the term 鈥渟heep鈥 does not come to teach the obligation to return an item based on its owner providing distinguishing marks

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 驻专讟 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 驻专讟 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3). The Rabbis derive that this phrase serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta, which due to its negligible value is not considered lost. Rabbi Yehuda says that this halakha is derived from the conclusion of that verse: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him, and you have found it.鈥 The term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥 serves to exclude a lost item in which there is not the value of one peruta.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪砖诪注讜转 讚讜专砖讬谉 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪专 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讜诪专 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions? Ostensibly, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda both state the same halakha. Abaye said: There is no practical difference. Rather, the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. One Sage, the Rabbis, derives it from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him鈥; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, derives it from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it.鈥

讜诇诪讗谉 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讛讗讬 讜诪爪讗转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And according to the first Sage, the Rabbis, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 what does he do with the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it鈥?

讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘谞讗讬 讚讗诪专 专讘谞讗讬 讜诪爪讗转讛 讚讗转讗讬 诇讬讚讬讛 诪砖诪注

The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, that term is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbenai. As Rabbenai says in interpreting the verse: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with every lost item of your brother鈥檚, which he has lost, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3), that the term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥 means that it assumes the status of a found item only when it actually enters his possession.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛 讛讗讬 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who derives the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 what does he do with the phrase: 鈥淲hich has been lost from him鈥?

诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讗讘讬讚讛 砖砖讟驻讛 谞讛专 砖讛讬讗 诪讜转专转 砖谞讗诪专 讻谉 转注砖讛 诇讻诇 讗讘讚转 讗讞讬讱 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诪诪谞讜 讜诪爪讗转讛 诪讬 砖讗讘讜讚讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讜诪爪讜讬讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐 讬爪转讛 讝讜 砖讗讘讜讚讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讗爪诇 讻诇 讗讚诐

The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yehuda, that phrase is necessary for the derivation of the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. As Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.

讜讗讬讚讱 讛讗 讚专讘谞讗讬 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪讜诪爪讗转讛

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, who derived from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where does he derive the halakha of Rabbenai that the item assumes the status of a found item only when it actually comes into his possession? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the superfluous conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 in the term 鈥渁nd you have found it.鈥

讜讗讬讚讱 讛讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪谞讗 诇讬讛 谞驻拽讗 诇讬讛 诪诪谞讜 讜讗讬讚讱 诪诪谞讜 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks further: And the other tanna, the first tanna, who derives from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him鈥 that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta, from where do they derive the halakha of Rabbi Yo岣nan that one need not return an item that is lost from him and is not available to be found by every person? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the superfluous term 鈥渇rom him,鈥 in the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him.鈥 And as for the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, he does not learn anything from the term 鈥渇rom him.鈥

专讘讗 讗诪专 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜讝诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪讜诪爪讗转讛 诇讬讻讗

Abaye explained that there is no practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda. By contrast, Rava said: The practical difference between them is with regard to an item that was worth one peruta when it was lost but that was then devalued and was worth less than one peruta when it was found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it is found.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜诪爪讗转讛 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him,鈥 do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is found, based on the term 鈥渁nd you have found it鈥? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it is found, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

讗诇讗 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜拽专讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 诇讬讻讗

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to an item worth less than one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the term: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to its value when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as that verse is referring to the value of the item when it was lost.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讛讗 讘注讬谞谉 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讜诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks: But even according to the one who says that the halakha is derived from the term 鈥渁nd you have found it,鈥 do we not require the item to be worth one peruta when it is lost, based on the phrase 鈥渨hich shall be lost from him鈥? And in this case, it is not worth one peruta when it was lost, so he should agree that it need not be returned.

讗诇讗 驻专讜讟讛 砖讛讜拽专讛 讜讛讜讝诇讛 讜讞讝专讛 讜讛讜拽专讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗砖专 转讗讘讚 讗讬讻讗 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讜诪爪讗转讛 讘注讬谞谉 讚讗讬转 讘讛 砖讬注讜专 诪爪讬讗讛 诪砖注转 讗讘讬讚讛 讜注讚 砖注转 诪爪讬讗讛

Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to the case of an item worth one peruta when it was lost that appreciated in value and was devalued in the interim and was worth less than one peruta, and then appreciated in value and is worth one peruta when it is found. According to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from the phrase: 鈥淲hich shall be lost from him,鈥 there is an obligation to return the item, as the verse is referring to its value only when it was lost and when it is found. And according to the one who says that the halakha that one need not return a lost item worth less than one peruta is derived from: 鈥淎nd you have found it,鈥 there is no obligation to return the item, as we require that there will be the value of one peruta, the requisite measure of a lost item, from the time of its loss and until the time of its finding, as the conjunction 鈥渁nd鈥 connects the time of the finding to the time of the loss.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讜 讚专讘谞谉 诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks by Torah law or is it by rabbinic law? The Gemara asks: What difference is there whether it is by Torah law or by rabbinic law?

诇讗讛讚讜专讬 讙讟 讗砖讛 讘住讬诪谞讬诐 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讚专讘谞谉 讻讬 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 讘诪诪讜谞讗 讗讘诇 讘讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 注讘讜讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗

The Gemara answers: The practical difference is with regard to returning the bill of divorce of a woman that was lost by an agent before its delivery, on the basis of distinguishing marks. If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, we return the document and allow the agent to transmit it to the woman. But if you say that it is by rabbinic law, we do not return the document, because when the Sages institute an ordinance, it is only with regard to monetary matters they have the authority to declare property ownerless; but with regard to ritual matters, the Sages do not institute an ordinance. They lack the authority to abrogate the prohibitions by Torah law that are associated with a woman鈥檚 marital status.

转讗 砖诪注 讗祝 讛砖诪诇讛 讛讬转讛 讘讻诇诇 讻诇 讗诇讜 讜诇诪讛 讬爪讗转 诇讛拽讬砖 讗诇讬讛 讜诇讜诪专 诇讱 诪讛 砖诪诇讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讬砖 诇讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讛 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 讗祝 讻诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 诇讜 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜讬砖 诇讜 转讜讘注讬谉 讞讬讬讘 诇讛讻专讬讝 转谞讗 转讜讘注讬谉 讗爪讟专讬讻讗 诇讬讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 讻讚讬 谞住讘讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps it was necessary for the tanna to mention only the criterion of claimants, and the tanna cited the criterion of distinguishing marks for no reason, as by Torah law distinguishing marks is not a relevant factor.

转讗 砖诪注 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讗讜讻祝 讗讬诪讗 讘注讚讬 讗讜讻祝

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the aforementioned statement: The obligation to return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle is derived based on the mention of the word 鈥渄onkey鈥 in the verse from Deuteronomy. Clearly, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: Emend the baraita and say: There is an obligation to return the donkey only on the basis of witnesses who testify with regard to the identity of the owner based on the fact that the saddle belongs to him, and not on the basis of distinguishing marks.

转讗 砖诪注 讜讛讬讛 注诪讱 注讚 讚专砖 讗讞讬讱 讗转讜 讜讻讬 转注诇讛 注诇 讚注转讱 砖讬转谞谞讜 诇讜 拽讜讚诐 砖讬讚专砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讚专砖讛讜 讗诐 专诪讗讬 讛讜讗 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 专诪讗讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (28b): 鈥淎nd if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it, and you shall return it to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that he would give the lost item to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. Scrutinize him [darshehu] to determine whether the claimant is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. Only then may you return the lost item to him.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注讚讬诐

The Gemara states its suggested proof: What, is it not that the one who claims the lost item proves that he is not a swindler on the basis of distinguishing marks that he provides? Apparently, the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the determination of whether he is a swindler is on the basis of scrutinizing his witnesses.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 讗诇讗 注诇 驻专爪讜祝 讛驻谞讬诐 注诐 讛讞讜讟诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬砖 住讬诪谞讬谉 讘讙讜驻讜 讜讘讻诇讬讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One testifies that a man died, thereby permitting his wife to remarry, only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [partzuf ] of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. Although there are distinguishing marks on his body and on his garments, which appear to indicate his identity, they cannot be used to identify the person.

砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讙讜驻讜 讚讗专讜讱 讜讙讜抓 讻诇讬讜 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛

The Gemara states its suggested proof: Conclude from it that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: The distinguishing marks on his body mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., that he was tall or short, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity. The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are ineffective in determining his identity, as we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, e.g., perhaps the husband loaned his clothes to the deceased.

讗讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛 讞诪讜专 讘住讬诪谞讬 讗讜讻祝 讛讬讻讬 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讗诪专讬 讗讜讻祝 诇讗 砖讗讜诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讜讻驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪住拽讘 诇讬讛 诇讞诪专讗

The Gemara asks: If we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, how do we return a donkey to its owner on the basis of the distinguishing marks of the saddle; perhaps it was borrowed? The Sages say in response: People do not typically borrow a saddle because saddles that are not custom fit wound the donkey.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻诇讬讜 讘讞讬讜专讬 讜讘住讜诪拽讬

If you wish, say instead: The distinguishing marks on his garments mentioned in the mishna are non-specific distinguishing marks, e.g., where the witness said that they were white or red, and that is the reason that the distinguishing marks are ineffective in determining his identity.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 诪爪讗讜 拽砖讜专 讘讻讬住 讗讜 讘讗专谞拽讬 讜讘讟讘注转 讗讜 砖诪爪讗讜 讘讬谉 讻诇讬讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讝诪谉 诪专讜讘讛 讻砖专 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖讗诇讛 讻讬 诪爪讗讜 拽砖讜专 讘讻讬住 讗诪讗讬 讻砖专 谞讬讞讜砖 诇砖讗诇讛

The Gemara questions the previous answer with regard to the concern about the possibility of a loan. But there is that which is taught in a baraita: If the agent found the bill of divorce that he lost bound to his pouch, or his purse, or his signet ring, or if he found it among his garments, even if he found it a long time after he lost it, the distinguishing marks on those items are sufficient in order to identify the bill of divorce as the one that he lost, and it is valid. And if it enters your mind that we are concerned about the possibility of a loan, when he found the bill of divorce bound to his pouch, why is it valid? Let us be concerned about the possibility of a loan and that perhaps the pouch and the bill of divorce belong to someone else.

讗诪专讬 讻讬住 讜讗专谞拽讬 讜讟讘注转 诇讗 诪砖讗诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讻讬住 讜讗专谞拽讬 诪砖讜诐 讚诪住诪谞讬 讜讟讘注转 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讝讬讬祝

The Sages say in response: There is no concern in this case, as people do not loan a pouch, a purse, or a signet ring to another person. One does not loan his pouch and his purse to others due to the fact that it portends the loss of his good fortune. And one does not loan his signet ring to others due to the fact that it could be used to forge documents.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讗讬谉 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讛砖讜诪讗 讜讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪讛讘讗讬 讗讜诪专 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 讛砖讜诪讗 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讘谞谉 讜讗诇注讝专 讘谉 诪讛讘讗讬 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dilemma whether the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law or by rabbinic law is the subject of a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: One does not testify on the basis of a mole on the body of the deceased to determine the identity of a man who died and permit his wife to remarry. And Elazar ben Mahavai says: One testifies to identify the corpse on the basis of a mole. What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree; as the first tanna holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law and therefore, testimony concerning those marks cannot dissolve a marriage by Torah law; and Elazar ben Mahavai holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 住讬诪谞讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讻讗 讘砖讜诪讗 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 讜诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜

Rava said: That is not necessarily the crux of their dispute, as perhaps everyone agrees that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, and here, it is with regard to whether one needs to be concerned that a mole is often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, i.e., one born under the same constellation, rendering it useless as a means of identification, that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is often found on one鈥檚 contemporary and there-fore it is insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is not often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, and therefore it is sufficient as a means of identification.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 诪爪讜讬讛 讘讘谉 讙讬诇讜 讜讛讻讗 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讛注砖讜讬谉 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 注砖讜讬诐 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜诪专 住讘专 住讬诪谞讬谉 讗讬谉 注砖讜讬诐 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not often found on one鈥檚 contemporary, and here it is with regard to whether the appearance of distinguishing marks on the body is apt to change after death that they disagree. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is apt to change after death, and that consequently they are insufficient as a means of identification; and one Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that the appearance of distinguishing marks is not apt to change after death, and therefore, they are sufficient as a means of identification.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖讜诪讗 讗讬谞讛 注砖讜讬讛 诇讛砖转谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛 讜住讬诪谞讬谉 讚专讘谞谉 讜讛讻讗 讘砖讜诪讗 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗 讜诪专 住讘专 砖讜诪讗 诇讗讜 住讬诪谉 诪讜讘讛拽 讛讜讗

If you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that a mole is not apt to change after death, and that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by rabbinic law, and here it is with regard to whether a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that they disagree. One Sage, Elazar ben Mahavai, holds that a mole is a clear-cut distinguishing mark that can be relied upon without hesitation even in matters of Torah law, e.g., dissolving a marriage; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that a mole is not a clear-cut distinguishing mark. Since standard distinguishing marks are sufficient by rabbinic law, a marriage, which is in effect by Torah law, cannot be dissolved on the basis of a mole.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 住讬诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬讻讬 诪讛讚专讬谞谉 讗讘讬讚转讗 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讚谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讜爪讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讚谞讛讚专 讘住讬诪谞讬谉 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讻讬 讗讘讚讛 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讛 谞诪讬 谞讛讚专讜 诇讬讛 讘住讬诪谞讬谉

Rava says: If you say that the identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is not by Torah law, how do we return a lost item to the presumed owner on the basis of distinguishing marks; perhaps it will result in the return of property to one who was in fact not the owner? Rava answers: We return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the finder of a lost item to return it on the basis of distinguishing marks, rather than exercise his right by Torah law to retain it, so that when an item is lost from him in the future, the finder will return it to him on the basis of distinguishing marks as well.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 住驻专讗 诇专讘讗 讜讻讬 讗讚诐 注讜砖讛 讟讜讘讛 诇注爪诪讜 讘诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜

Rav Safra said to Rava: But can a person perform an act that results in benefit for himself with property that is not his? The lost item belongs not to the finder but to the one who lost it. How can the finder waive the right of the true owner to the lost item so that he may recover his own lost item in the future?

讗诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讗讘讬讚讛 诇诪讬讛讘 住讬诪谞讬谉 讜诇诪砖拽诇讬讛 诪讬讚注 讬讚注 讚注讚讬诐 诇讬转 诇讬讛 讜诪讬诪专 讗诪专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 讬讚注讬 住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讜讘讛拽讬诐 讚讬讚讛 讜讗谞讗 讬讛讬讘谞讗 住讬诪谞讬谉 诪讜讘讛拽讬诐 讚讬讚讛 讜砖拽诇谞讗 诇讛

Rather, we return the lost item, as it is satisfactory to the owner of the lost item to be able to provide a description using distinguishing marks and on that basis take possession of the item. He knows that he has no witnesses to testify to his ownership, and he says: No one else knows the clear-cut distinguishing marks that are on the item. And I will provide a description using the clear-cut distinguishing marks, and based on that information I will take possession of the item. Each owner gives his tacit agreement to the return of lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks, based on the belief that he is best able to identify them.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚转谞谉 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讞讚 讛诇讜讛 诪砖诇砖讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇诇讜讛 砖诇砖讛 砖诇讜讜 诪谉 讛讗讞讚 讬讞讝讬专 诇诪诇讜讛 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诇讜讛 诇讗讛讚讜专讬 诇讬讛 诇诪诇讜讛

The Gemara asks: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (20a), that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he must return the documents to the debtor. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he must return the documents to the creditor. If one returns lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks due to the tacit agreement of the owners, is it satisfactory to the debtor to have the documents returned to the creditor, as doing so would enable the creditor to collect payment of the loan?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛转诐 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 讗讞讚 讛诇讜讛 诪砖诇砖讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇诇讜讛 讚讙讘讬 诇讜讛 砖讻讬讞讬 讙讘讬 诪诇讜讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪诇讜讛 谞驻讜诇 砖诇砖讛 砖诇讜讜 诪讗讞讚 讬讞讝讬专 诇诪诇讜讛 讚讙讘讬 诪诇讜讛 砖讻讬讞讬 讙讘讬 诇讜讛 诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬

Rava said to Rav Safra: There, the obligation to return the promissory notes to the creditor is not on the basis of distinguishing marks; rather, it is based on logical reasoning. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loan of one debtor who borrowed money from three creditors, he shall return the documents to the debtor, because a group of several documents indicating that one debtor borrowed money from several creditors is typically found with the debtor and is not typically found with a creditor, as the only element common to all the documents is the debtor. Conclude from it that the group of documents fell from the debtor while they were in his possession. If one found three promissory notes relating to the loans of three debtors who borrowed money from one creditor, he shall return the documents to the creditor, because a group of several documents indicating that multiple debtors borrowed money from a single creditor is typically found with the creditor and is not typically found with a debtor, as the only element common to all the documents is the creditor.

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