Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

September 29, 2016 | 讻状讜 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 3

The gemara continues to compare the law in our mishna to other tannatic opinions relating to other cases of disputed money which seem to reach聽different conclusions. 聽Each time the gemara distinguishes between the cases and explains that they could potentially agree with the law in our mishna. 聽Then the gemara compares two of the cases brought to each other showing that neither of the opinions work together. 聽But again the gemara distinguishes between the cases. 聽Rabbi Chiya bring s a halacha about a case where the defendant denies a clim but witnesses testify about half of the amount. 聽The law requires the defendant to pay the half and swear that he doesn’t owe the other half. 聽This is learned by聽a kal vachomer from modeh bemiktzat (one who admits half a claim). 聽The gemara brings our mishna as a proof for this law of rabbi Chiya and then proceed to try to figure what is the kal vachomer that Rabbi Chiya was referring to.

讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻讜诇讛 诇诪专 讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻讜诇讛 诇诪专 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 讚专专讗 讚诪诪讜谞讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讬讗 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

and there is room to say that it belongs entirely to one of them, and there is also room to say that it belongs entirely to the other one, and nevertheless Sumakhos says that since it is property of uncertain ownership they divide it without taking an oath, then here, where the litigants have no financial association with the item, as there is room to say that it belongs to both of them, all the more so is it not clear that they should divide it without taking an oath?

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 住讜诪讻讜住 砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 诪讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讻讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜诇讱 讜转讜拽祝 讘讟诇讬转讜 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讜诪专 砖诇讬 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos: This oath is instituted by rabbinic law in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan. As Rabbi Yo岣nan says: This oath, administered in the case of two people holding a garment, is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so that everyone will not go and seize the garment of another and say: It is mine.

诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讗 讗诪专 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 讛驻住讬讚 专诪讗讬 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜

搂 The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As, if you say that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, doesn鈥檛 he say that a case cannot be decided in a manner in which there is no deterrent for one taking a false claim to court (37a)? He says this with regard to a case where two people deposited money with the same person. One deposited one hundred dinars and one deposited two hundred, and the bailee forgot which of them deposited the larger sum. Subsequently, each claimed ownership of the larger sum and was prepared to take an oath to that effect. The Rabbis say that each should receive the smaller sum and the remainder should be held until Elijah the prophet prophetically resolves the uncertainty. Rabbi Yosei says: If so, what did the swindler lose? Rather, the entire deposit will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes.

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 专讘谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛砖讗专 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讗 谞诪讬 讻砖讗专 讚诪讬 讚住驻讬拽讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara counters: Rather, what is suggested? Is it suggested that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei? Since the Rabbis say there: The remainder is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, this case of the mishna concerning the garment is also comparable to the remainder in the case of the deposit, as it is uncertain to whom the entire garment belongs. It should therefore be placed in a safe place until the matter is resolved.

讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讚讜讚讗讬 讛讗讬 诪谞讛 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 驻诇讙讬 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis there, in the case of the depositors, where these one hundred dinars certainly belong to only one of them and the Rabbis say that it is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, here, in the case of this mishna, where there is room to say that it belongs to both of them, the Rabbis say that they divide it with the proviso that they take an oath.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讛砖转讗 讜诪讛 讛转诐 讚讘讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诪谞讛 诇诪专 讜讗讬讻讗 诪谞讛 诇诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

But if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there is a difficulty. Now consider, if there, in a case where it is certain that there are one hundred dinars that belong to one of the litigants and there are one hundred dinars that belong to the other one, nevertheless, Rabbi Yosei says that the entire sum is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, here, where there is room to say that it all belongs to only one of them, all the more so is it not clear that it should be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, as one of the claims may be entirely fraudulent?

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬 讛讻讗 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬 讗讬诪讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 讗讙讘讛讜讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: There, in the case of the deposit, there is certainly a swindler between the two depositors. By contrast, here, in the case of the mishna, who is to say that there is a swindler? Say that both of them lifted the garment at the same time, and therefore there is no reason to penalize them by placing the garment in a safe place.

讗讬 谞诪讬 讛转诐 拽谞讬住 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇专诪讗讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 讛讻讗 诪讗讬 驻住讬讚讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚诇讜讚讬

Alternatively, there is room to distinguish between the cases: There, Rabbi Yosei penalizes the swindler by confiscating his deposit so that he will admit that he lied in order to receive his original deposit of one hundred dinars from the bailee. Here, in the case of the garment, what loss would a swindler incur that would prompt him to admit that he is lying? If the item is placed in a safe place, he loses nothing.

转讬谞讞 诪爪讬讗讛 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚砖谞讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗

The Gemara rejects this alternative explanation: This distinction works out well in the case of a found item where he did not pay anything for it. Consequently, he has no incentive to admit that he lied. But in a case of buying and selling, what is there to say? Both parties paid for the item and prefer to receive the item. Rather, the distinction is clearly as we explained initially. The difference between the cases is that in the mishna, there is no certainty that one of them is lying.

讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讜讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讙讘讬 讞谞讜谞讬 注诇 驻谞拽住讜 讚拽转谞讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜谞讜讟诇 讜讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜谞讜讟诇

The Gemara asks: Both according to the opinion of the Rabbis and according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there, with regard to the case of a storekeeper relying on his ledger, it is unclear why the money is not held until the matter is clarified. This is referring to a case where an employer tells a storekeeper to give food to his laborer in lieu of his salary, and later the storekeeper claims that he gave it to him but the laborer claims that he did not receive it. Both parties therefore claim payment from the employer. As the mishna (Shevuot 45a) teaches that this one, the storekeeper, takes an oath that he gave the food to the laborer and receives payment from the employer, and that one, the laborer, takes an oath that he was not given the food and takes his salary from the employer.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 谞驻拽讬讛 诇诪诪讜谞讗 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讚讛讗 讘讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬

What is different in that case, that we do not say: Appropriate the money from the employer, and it is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes? Apparently, we should say this because there is certainly a swindler among the litigants, since it is impossible that both the storekeeper and the laborer are telling the truth.

讗诪专讬 讛转诐 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞谞讜谞讬 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗谞讗 砖诇讬讞讜转讗 讚讬讚讱 拽讗 注讘讚讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬 讙讘讬 砖讻讬专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽讗 诪砖转讘注 诇讬 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诇讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讗转 讛讗诪谞转讬讛 讚诇讗 讗诪专转 诇讬 讘住讛讚讬 讛讘 诇讬讛

The Sages say in response: There, this is the reason that the money is not set aside: Because the storekeeper can say to the employer: I carried out your agency to give the food to the laborer, and I have dealings only with you. What business do I have with the hired laborer? Even if he takes an oath to me that he did not receive the food, he is not trustworthy to me by virtue of his oath. You are the one who trusted him, as you did not say to me: Give him the food in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, you are obligated to pay me. If you have a grievance, settle it with your employee.

讜砖讻讬专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗谞讗 注讘讚讬 注讘讬讚转讗 讙讘讱 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬 讙讘讬 讞谞讜谞讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪砖转讘注 诇讬 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诇讬 讛诇讻讱 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖转讘注讬 讜砖拽诇讬 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转

And the hired laborer can also say to the employer: I worked for you. What relationship do I have with the storekeeper? Even if he takes an oath to me that he gave me the change, he is not trustworthy to me by virtue of his oath. Therefore, both parties take an oath and take payment from the employer.

转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讻诇讜诐 讜讛注讚讬诐 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗讜转讜 砖讬砖 诇讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讬砖讘注 注诇 讛砖讗专

Rabbi 岣yya taught a baraita: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars [maneh] in your possession that you borrowed from me and did not repay, and the other party says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and the witnesses testify that he has fifty dinars that he owes the claimant, he gives him fifty dinars and takes an oath about the remainder, i.e., that he did not borrow the fifty remaining dinars from him.

砖诇讗 转讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

This ruling is derived via an a fortiori inference from the halakha that one who admits to part of a claim that is brought against him is obligated to take an oath that he owes no more than the amount that he admits to have borrowed. The inference is: As the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth should not carry greater weight than the testimony of witnesses. Since in this case witnesses testify that he owes an amount equal to part of the claim, he is all the more so obligated to take an oath with regard to the rest of the sum.

讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗谞讬 诪爪讗转讬讛 讜讻讜壮 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗 讜拽转谞讬 讬砖讘注

The Gemara comments: And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha: In a case of two people who came to court holding a garment, where this one says: I found it, and the other one says: I found it, each litigant takes an oath and they divide the garment. And here, in the case of a found item, since each litigant is holding part of the garment, it is clear to us that what is in this one鈥檚 grasp is his, and what is in that one鈥檚 grasp is his. This is tantamount to witnesses testifying that part of the claim of each litigant is legitimate. And the mishna teaches that each of them takes an oath.

诪讗讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讛讜讗 讚专诪讬讗 专讞诪谞讗 砖讘讜注讛 注诇讬讛 讻讚专讘讛

The Gemara clarifies: For what reason is it necessary to have the a fortiori inference: As the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth should not carry greater weight than the testimony of witnesses? Isn鈥檛 the comparison to the case of an admission to part of a claim self-evident? The Gemara answers: It is necessary so that you will not say that it is only in a case of the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth that the Merciful One imposes an oath upon him, in accordance with the explanation of Rabba.

讚讗诪专 专讘讛 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚谞讻驻专讬讛 讜讛讗 讚诇讗 讻驻专讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜

As Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim must take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor, who had done him a favor by lending money to him. And this person who denies part of the claim actually wants to deny all of the debt, so as to be exempt, and this fact that he does not deny all of it is because a person does not exhibit insolence.

讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讜讚讬 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪讬砖转诪讟 诪讬谞讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讜 诇讬 讝讜讝讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 专诪讬 砖讘讜注讛 注诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘讻讜诇讬讛

And in order not to exhibit insolence, this person wants to admit to the creditor with regard to all of the debt, and this fact that he denies owing him in part is because he reasons: If I admit to him with regard to all of the debt, he will lodge a claim against me with regard to all of it, and right now I do not have the money to pay. He was evading his creditor, and thought: I will continue doing so until I have money, and then I will pay him all of it. This rationalization enables one to falsely deny part of a claim. And therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on him, in order to ensure that he will admit to him with regard to all of the debt.

讗讘诇 讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

But in a case where the testimony of witnesses renders him liable to pay part of the debt, as one cannot say this explanation since this logic applies only when it is the debtor admitting to part of the claim, say that he has no intention to repay the debt at all, and he is completely dishonest and therefore his oath is worthless. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the defendant鈥檚 obligation to take an oath is derived by means of an a fortiori inference.

讜诪讗讬 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 驻讬讜 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara explains: And what is the explanation of this a fortiori inference? It should be explained as follows: If admitting to part of a claim by his own mouth, which does not render him liable to pay the money he admitted to owing, nevertheless obligates him to take an oath, with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which does render him liable to pay money, is it not logical that it should obligate him to take an oath with regard to the remaining sum?

讜驻讬讜 讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讻诪讗讛 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: But does the admission of his own mouth not render him liable to pay money? But isn鈥檛 the legal status of the admission of a litigant similar to that of one hundred witnesses?

诪讗讬 诪诪讜谉 拽谞住 讜诪讛 驻讬讜 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 拽谞住 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽谞住 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: What is the money that one is not liable to pay based on his own admission? It is referring to the payment of a fine [kenas]. In all cases where the Torah imposes a fine, if the defendant admits his liability voluntarily he is not required to pay it. Therefore, the a fortiori inference is as follows: If the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth, which does not render him liable to pay a fine, nevertheless renders him liable to take an oath with regard to the part of the claim to which he did not admit, with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which does render him liable to pay a fine, is it not logical that it should render him liable to take an oath with regard to the remaining sum?

诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 拽专讘谉 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽专讘谉

The Gemara attempts to refute the inference: What is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders him liable to bring an offering. One who admits that he transgressed a prohibition unwittingly is obligated to bring an offering for atonement. Would you say that the halakhot of admission apply with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which, in a case where they testify that one transgressed a prohibition, does not obligate him to bring an offering if he denies it?

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 注讚讬诐 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽专讘谉 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Rabbi 岣yya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the testimony of witnesses renders him liable to bring an offering, based on an a fortiori inference.

讚转谞谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

As we learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b): If two witnesses say to a person: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring an offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt from bringing an offering.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诐 讛讘讬讗讜讛讜 砖谞讬诐 诇讬讚讬 诪讬转讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜讛讜 诇讬讚讬 拽专讘谉 讛拽诇 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗诐 讬专爪讛 诇讜诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讬讬转讬 讬驻讟专

Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: If two witnesses can cause a person to receive the death penalty, which is a severe penalty, can they not also cause one to receive the light penalty of having to bring an offering? The Rabbis said to him: What if he would want to say: I sinned intentionally? Wouldn鈥檛 he be exempt? Since one does not bring an offering for an intentional sin, the testimony of witnesses has no bearing in this matter, as they cannot prove that his transgression was unwitting. Therefore, even if he claims that he did not sin at all, the testimony does not obligate him to bring an offering.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 讗砖诐 讗砖诐 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专讘谉

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders a robber liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who admits that he robbed another is required to bring a guilt-offering for atonement, whereas if witnesses testify that he robbed another he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering. The Gemara answers: A guilt-offering is the same as any other offering, about which there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis as to whether the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to bring an offering.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 讞讜诪砖 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 讞讜诪砖 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders one who unlawfully possessed the money of another liable to pay an additional one-fifth of the value of that money when he returns it of his own accord (see Leviticus 5:20鈥26). By contrast, if witnesses testify that he unlawfully possessed the money of another, he is not obligated to add one-fifth to his payment. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; Rabbi 岣yya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Just as Rabbi Meir holds that the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to bring an offering due to an a fortiori inference, he also holds that the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to add one-fifth, via an a fortiori inference.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜讘讛讝诪讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讬砖谞谉 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜讘讛讝诪讛

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it is not subject to contradiction or to refutation as applies to the testimony of conspiring witnesses, as the testimony of witnesses cannot negate the admission of a litigant. Would you say the same halakhot with regard to witnesses, who are subject to contradiction and to refutation as conspiring witnesses? Evidently, the testimony of witnesses is weaker, in some aspects, than the admission of a litigant.

讗诇讗 讗转讬讗 诪注讚 讗讞讚 讜诪讛 注讚 讗讞讚 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

Rather, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference is apparently derived from the halakha of the testimony of one witness. If the testimony of one witness, which does not render the defendant liable to pay money, obligates him to take an oath to contradict the testimony, is it not logical that the testimony of two witnesses, which render one liable to pay money, also obligates him to take an oath?

诪讛 诇注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 注诇 诪讛 砖讛讜讗 诪注讬讚 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注

The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning which he testifies, not with regard to other claims raised by the claimant.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Bava Metzia 3

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 3

讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻讜诇讛 诇诪专 讜讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻讜诇讛 诇诪专 讗诪专 住讜诪讻讜住 诪诪讜谉 讛诪讜讟诇 讘住驻拽 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 讚专专讗 讚诪诪讜谞讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讬讗 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

and there is room to say that it belongs entirely to one of them, and there is also room to say that it belongs entirely to the other one, and nevertheless Sumakhos says that since it is property of uncertain ownership they divide it without taking an oath, then here, where the litigants have no financial association with the item, as there is room to say that it belongs to both of them, all the more so is it not clear that they should divide it without taking an oath?

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 住讜诪讻讜住 砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 诪讚专讘谞谉 讛讬讗 讻讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜诇讱 讜转讜拽祝 讘讟诇讬转讜 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讜诪专 砖诇讬 讛讜讗

The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos: This oath is instituted by rabbinic law in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yo岣nan. As Rabbi Yo岣nan says: This oath, administered in the case of two people holding a garment, is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so that everyone will not go and seize the garment of another and say: It is mine.

诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讗 讗诪专 讗诐 讻谉 诪讛 讛驻住讬讚 专诪讗讬 讗诇讗 讛讻诇 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜

搂 The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As, if you say that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, doesn鈥檛 he say that a case cannot be decided in a manner in which there is no deterrent for one taking a false claim to court (37a)? He says this with regard to a case where two people deposited money with the same person. One deposited one hundred dinars and one deposited two hundred, and the bailee forgot which of them deposited the larger sum. Subsequently, each claimed ownership of the larger sum and was prepared to take an oath to that effect. The Rabbis say that each should receive the smaller sum and the remainder should be held until Elijah the prophet prophetically resolves the uncertainty. Rabbi Yosei says: If so, what did the swindler lose? Rather, the entire deposit will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes.

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 专讘谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讛砖讗专 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讗 谞诪讬 讻砖讗专 讚诪讬 讚住驻讬拽讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara counters: Rather, what is suggested? Is it suggested that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei? Since the Rabbis say there: The remainder is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, this case of the mishna concerning the garment is also comparable to the remainder in the case of the deposit, as it is uncertain to whom the entire garment belongs. It should therefore be placed in a safe place until the matter is resolved.

讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讚讜讚讗讬 讛讗讬 诪谞讛 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 驻诇讙讬 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis there, in the case of the depositors, where these one hundred dinars certainly belong to only one of them and the Rabbis say that it is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, here, in the case of this mishna, where there is room to say that it belongs to both of them, the Rabbis say that they divide it with the proviso that they take an oath.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讛砖转讗 讜诪讛 讛转诐 讚讘讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诪谞讛 诇诪专 讜讗讬讻讗 诪谞讛 诇诪专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讛讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讗 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

But if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there is a difficulty. Now consider, if there, in a case where it is certain that there are one hundred dinars that belong to one of the litigants and there are one hundred dinars that belong to the other one, nevertheless, Rabbi Yosei says that the entire sum is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, here, where there is room to say that it all belongs to only one of them, all the more so is it not clear that it should be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes, as one of the claims may be entirely fraudulent?

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬 讛讻讗 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬 讗讬诪讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 讗讙讘讛讜讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: There, in the case of the deposit, there is certainly a swindler between the two depositors. By contrast, here, in the case of the mishna, who is to say that there is a swindler? Say that both of them lifted the garment at the same time, and therefore there is no reason to penalize them by placing the garment in a safe place.

讗讬 谞诪讬 讛转诐 拽谞讬住 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇专诪讗讬 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 讛讻讗 诪讗讬 驻住讬讚讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚诇讜讚讬

Alternatively, there is room to distinguish between the cases: There, Rabbi Yosei penalizes the swindler by confiscating his deposit so that he will admit that he lied in order to receive his original deposit of one hundred dinars from the bailee. Here, in the case of the garment, what loss would a swindler incur that would prompt him to admit that he is lying? If the item is placed in a safe place, he loses nothing.

转讬谞讞 诪爪讬讗讛 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 讻讚砖谞讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗

The Gemara rejects this alternative explanation: This distinction works out well in the case of a found item where he did not pay anything for it. Consequently, he has no incentive to admit that he lied. But in a case of buying and selling, what is there to say? Both parties paid for the item and prefer to receive the item. Rather, the distinction is clearly as we explained initially. The difference between the cases is that in the mishna, there is no certainty that one of them is lying.

讘讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讜讘讬谉 诇专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讙讘讬 讞谞讜谞讬 注诇 驻谞拽住讜 讚拽转谞讬 讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜谞讜讟诇 讜讝讛 谞砖讘注 讜谞讜讟诇

The Gemara asks: Both according to the opinion of the Rabbis and according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there, with regard to the case of a storekeeper relying on his ledger, it is unclear why the money is not held until the matter is clarified. This is referring to a case where an employer tells a storekeeper to give food to his laborer in lieu of his salary, and later the storekeeper claims that he gave it to him but the laborer claims that he did not receive it. Both parties therefore claim payment from the employer. As the mishna (Shevuot 45a) teaches that this one, the storekeeper, takes an oath that he gave the food to the laborer and receives payment from the employer, and that one, the laborer, takes an oath that he was not given the food and takes his salary from the employer.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 谞驻拽讬讛 诇诪诪讜谞讗 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讬讛讗 诪讜谞讞 注讚 砖讬讘讗 讗诇讬讛讜 讚讛讗 讘讜讚讗讬 讗讬讻讗 专诪讗讬

What is different in that case, that we do not say: Appropriate the money from the employer, and it is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes? Apparently, we should say this because there is certainly a swindler among the litigants, since it is impossible that both the storekeeper and the laborer are telling the truth.

讗诪专讬 讛转诐 讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讞谞讜谞讬 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗谞讗 砖诇讬讞讜转讗 讚讬讚讱 拽讗 注讘讚讬谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬 讙讘讬 砖讻讬专 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚拽讗 诪砖转讘注 诇讬 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诇讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讗转 讛讗诪谞转讬讛 讚诇讗 讗诪专转 诇讬 讘住讛讚讬 讛讘 诇讬讛

The Sages say in response: There, this is the reason that the money is not set aside: Because the storekeeper can say to the employer: I carried out your agency to give the food to the laborer, and I have dealings only with you. What business do I have with the hired laborer? Even if he takes an oath to me that he did not receive the food, he is not trustworthy to me by virtue of his oath. You are the one who trusted him, as you did not say to me: Give him the food in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, you are obligated to pay me. If you have a grievance, settle it with your employee.

讜砖讻讬专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗谞讗 注讘讚讬 注讘讬讚转讗 讙讘讱 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讬 讙讘讬 讞谞讜谞讬 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诪砖转讘注 诇讬 诇讗 诪讛讬诪谉 诇讬 讛诇讻讱 转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖转讘注讬 讜砖拽诇讬 诪讘注诇 讛讘讬转

And the hired laborer can also say to the employer: I worked for you. What relationship do I have with the storekeeper? Even if he takes an oath to me that he gave me the change, he is not trustworthy to me by virtue of his oath. Therefore, both parties take an oath and take payment from the employer.

转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讻诇讜诐 讜讛注讚讬诐 诪注讬讚讬诐 讗讜转讜 砖讬砖 诇讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝 谞讜转谉 诇讜 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讬砖讘注 注诇 讛砖讗专

Rabbi 岣yya taught a baraita: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars [maneh] in your possession that you borrowed from me and did not repay, and the other party says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and the witnesses testify that he has fifty dinars that he owes the claimant, he gives him fifty dinars and takes an oath about the remainder, i.e., that he did not borrow the fifty remaining dinars from him.

砖诇讗 转讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

This ruling is derived via an a fortiori inference from the halakha that one who admits to part of a claim that is brought against him is obligated to take an oath that he owes no more than the amount that he admits to have borrowed. The inference is: As the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth should not carry greater weight than the testimony of witnesses. Since in this case witnesses testify that he owes an amount equal to part of the claim, he is all the more so obligated to take an oath with regard to the rest of the sum.

讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转 讝讛 讗讜诪专 讗谞讬 诪爪讗转讬讛 讜讻讜壮 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗 讜诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讗讬 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讗 讜拽转谞讬 讬砖讘注

The Gemara comments: And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha: In a case of two people who came to court holding a garment, where this one says: I found it, and the other one says: I found it, each litigant takes an oath and they divide the garment. And here, in the case of a found item, since each litigant is holding part of the garment, it is clear to us that what is in this one鈥檚 grasp is his, and what is in that one鈥檚 grasp is his. This is tantamount to witnesses testifying that part of the claim of each litigant is legitimate. And the mishna teaches that each of them takes an oath.

诪讗讬 砖诇讗 转讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讙讚讜诇讛 诪讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讛讜讚讗转 驻讬讜 讛讜讗 讚专诪讬讗 专讞诪谞讗 砖讘讜注讛 注诇讬讛 讻讚专讘讛

The Gemara clarifies: For what reason is it necessary to have the a fortiori inference: As the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth should not carry greater weight than the testimony of witnesses? Isn鈥檛 the comparison to the case of an admission to part of a claim self-evident? The Gemara answers: It is necessary so that you will not say that it is only in a case of the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth that the Merciful One imposes an oath upon him, in accordance with the explanation of Rabba.

讚讗诪专 专讘讛 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗诪专讛 转讜专讛 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讞讝拽讛 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜 讘驻谞讬 讘注诇 讞讜讘讜 讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚谞讻驻专讬讛 讜讛讗 讚诇讗 讻驻专讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪注讬讝 驻谞讬讜

As Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to part of the claim must take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor, who had done him a favor by lending money to him. And this person who denies part of the claim actually wants to deny all of the debt, so as to be exempt, and this fact that he does not deny all of it is because a person does not exhibit insolence.

讜讛讗讬 讘讻讜诇讬讛 讘注讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讜讛讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讜讚讬 讗砖转诪讜讟讬 讛讜讗 讚拽讗 诪讬砖转诪讟 诪讬谞讬讛 住讘专 注讚 讚讛讜讜 诇讬 讝讜讝讬 讜驻专注谞讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 专诪讬 砖讘讜注讛 注诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讜讚讬 诇讬讛 讘讻讜诇讬讛

And in order not to exhibit insolence, this person wants to admit to the creditor with regard to all of the debt, and this fact that he denies owing him in part is because he reasons: If I admit to him with regard to all of the debt, he will lodge a claim against me with regard to all of it, and right now I do not have the money to pay. He was evading his creditor, and thought: I will continue doing so until I have money, and then I will pay him all of it. This rationalization enables one to falsely deny part of a claim. And therefore, the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on him, in order to ensure that he will admit to him with regard to all of the debt.

讗讘诇 讛注讚讗转 注讚讬诐 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

But in a case where the testimony of witnesses renders him liable to pay part of the debt, as one cannot say this explanation since this logic applies only when it is the debtor admitting to part of the claim, say that he has no intention to repay the debt at all, and he is completely dishonest and therefore his oath is worthless. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the defendant鈥檚 obligation to take an oath is derived by means of an a fortiori inference.

讜诪讗讬 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 驻讬讜 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara explains: And what is the explanation of this a fortiori inference? It should be explained as follows: If admitting to part of a claim by his own mouth, which does not render him liable to pay the money he admitted to owing, nevertheless obligates him to take an oath, with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which does render him liable to pay money, is it not logical that it should obligate him to take an oath with regard to the remaining sum?

讜驻讬讜 讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讛讗 讛讜讚讗转 讘注诇 讚讬谉 讻诪讗讛 注讚讬诐 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: But does the admission of his own mouth not render him liable to pay money? But isn鈥檛 the legal status of the admission of a litigant similar to that of one hundred witnesses?

诪讗讬 诪诪讜谉 拽谞住 讜诪讛 驻讬讜 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 拽谞住 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽谞住 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara answers: What is the money that one is not liable to pay based on his own admission? It is referring to the payment of a fine [kenas]. In all cases where the Torah imposes a fine, if the defendant admits his liability voluntarily he is not required to pay it. Therefore, the a fortiori inference is as follows: If the admission of one鈥檚 own mouth, which does not render him liable to pay a fine, nevertheless renders him liable to take an oath with regard to the part of the claim to which he did not admit, with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which does render him liable to pay a fine, is it not logical that it should render him liable to take an oath with regard to the remaining sum?

诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 拽专讘谉 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽专讘谉

The Gemara attempts to refute the inference: What is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders him liable to bring an offering. One who admits that he transgressed a prohibition unwittingly is obligated to bring an offering for atonement. Would you say that the halakhot of admission apply with regard to the testimony of witnesses, which, in a case where they testify that one transgressed a prohibition, does not obligate him to bring an offering if he denies it?

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专 注讚讬诐 诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 拽专讘谉 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Rabbi 岣yya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the testimony of witnesses renders him liable to bring an offering, based on an a fortiori inference.

讚转谞谉 讗诪专讜 诇讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讻诇转 讞诇讘 讜讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬诐

As we learned in a mishna (Karetot 11b): If two witnesses say to a person: You ate forbidden fat, and he says: I did not eat it, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring an offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt from bringing an offering.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诐 讛讘讬讗讜讛讜 砖谞讬诐 诇讬讚讬 诪讬转讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 讬讘讬讗讜讛讜 诇讬讚讬 拽专讘谉 讛拽诇 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪讛 讗诐 讬专爪讛 诇讜诪专 诪讝讬讚 讛讬讬转讬 讬驻讟专

Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: If two witnesses can cause a person to receive the death penalty, which is a severe penalty, can they not also cause one to receive the light penalty of having to bring an offering? The Rabbis said to him: What if he would want to say: I sinned intentionally? Wouldn鈥檛 he be exempt? Since one does not bring an offering for an intentional sin, the testimony of witnesses has no bearing in this matter, as they cannot prove that his transgression was unwitting. Therefore, even if he claims that he did not sin at all, the testimony does not obligate him to bring an offering.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 讗砖诐 讗砖诐 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专讘谉

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders a robber liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who admits that he robbed another is required to bring a guilt-offering for atonement, whereas if witnesses testify that he robbed another he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering. The Gemara answers: A guilt-offering is the same as any other offering, about which there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis as to whether the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to bring an offering.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 讞讜诪砖 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讞讬讬讘 诇讬讛 讞讜诪砖 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it renders one who unlawfully possessed the money of another liable to pay an additional one-fifth of the value of that money when he returns it of his own accord (see Leviticus 5:20鈥26). By contrast, if witnesses testify that he unlawfully possessed the money of another, he is not obligated to add one-fifth to his payment. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; Rabbi 岣yya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Just as Rabbi Meir holds that the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to bring an offering due to an a fortiori inference, he also holds that the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to add one-fifth, via an a fortiori inference.

讗诇讗 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜讘讛讝诪讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讬砖谞谉 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜讘讛讝诪讛

The Gemara suggests another refutation: Rather, what is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth? It is notable in that it is not subject to contradiction or to refutation as applies to the testimony of conspiring witnesses, as the testimony of witnesses cannot negate the admission of a litigant. Would you say the same halakhot with regard to witnesses, who are subject to contradiction and to refutation as conspiring witnesses? Evidently, the testimony of witnesses is weaker, in some aspects, than the admission of a litigant.

讗诇讗 讗转讬讗 诪注讚 讗讞讚 讜诪讛 注讚 讗讞讚 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬诐 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 诪诪讜谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讗讜转讜 砖讘讜注讛

Rather, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference is apparently derived from the halakha of the testimony of one witness. If the testimony of one witness, which does not render the defendant liable to pay money, obligates him to take an oath to contradict the testimony, is it not logical that the testimony of two witnesses, which render one liable to pay money, also obligates him to take an oath?

诪讛 诇注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 注诇 诪讛 砖讛讜讗 诪注讬讚 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注

The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning which he testifies, not with regard to other claims raised by the claimant.

Scroll To Top