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Today's Daf Yomi

October 27, 2016 | 讻状讛 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Metzia 31

If you find an animal wandering, how do you determine if an animal is lost or if it is just wandering and the owner is aware that is has wandered? 聽Various drashot are brought regarding places in the Torah where a double language is used and what can be derived from there.


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讘讗住专讟讬讗 讜驻专讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 讟诇讬转 讘爪讚 讙讚专 拽专讚讜诐 讘爪讚 讙讚专 讜驻专讛 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专讗讛 诪讬诐 砖砖讜讟驻讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讜讚专 讘驻谞讬讛诐

on a main thoroughfare [be鈥檌sratiyya], or a cow running through the vineyards, that is lost property. If one found a cloak alongside a fence, an ax alongside a fence, or a cow grazing among the vineyards, that is not lost property. If one sees these items for three consecutive days, that is lost property. If one saw water that is flowing and coming to inundate another鈥檚 field, he must establish a barrier before the water in order to preserve the field.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讻诇 讗讘讬讚转 讗讞讬讱 诇专讘讜转 讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞谞讬讗 诇专讘讗 转谞讬讗 讚诪住讬讬注 诇讱 专讗讛 诪讬诐 砖砖讜讟驻讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讜讚专 讘驻谞讬讛诐

Rava says that the verse: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with every lost item of your brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3), serves to include an obligation to protect your brother from the loss of his land. Rav 岣nanya said to Rava: There is a baraita that is taught that supports your opinion. If one saw water that is flowing and coming to inundate another鈥檚 field, he must establish a barrier before the water in order to preserve the field.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 转住讬讬注讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讚讗讬讻讗 注讜诪专讬谉 讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注讜诪专讬谉 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬转 讘讛 注讜诪专讬谉 讚爪专讬讻讬 诇讗专注讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚爪专讬讻讬 诇讗专注讗 讻讬 讙讜驻讛 讚讗专注讗 讚诪讬讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rava said to Rav 岣nanya: If you are attempting to bring support for my ruling due to that baraita, do not support my ruling. With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a field in which there are sheaves of grain on the land. The tanna of the baraita is referring to preservation of the sheaves, not of the land itself. The Gemara asks: If the baraita is referring to a field in which there are sheaves of grain, what is the purpose of stating it? Isn鈥檛 it obvious that one is obligated to preserve the sheaves as he would any other item? No, it is necessary to state the halakha only in a case where there are sheaves that need the land in order to dry. Lest you say: Since they still need the land, their legal status is like that of the land itself and he is not obligated to return them, the baraita teaches us that the sheaves are independent of the land and must be preserved.

诪爪讗 讞诪讜专 讜驻专讛 [讜讻讜壮] 讛讗 讙讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 诪爪讗 讞诪讜专 讜驻专讛 专讜注讬谉 讘讚专讱 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专讜注讬谉 讘讚专讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讞诪讜专 讜讻诇讬讜 讛驻讜讻讬诐 讜驻专讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not deemed lost property. The Gemara asks: This itself is difficult. On the one hand you said: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, from which it may be inferred that only if it is grazing on the path it is not lost property, but if it was running on the path or grazing among the vineyards, it is a lost item. On the other hand, say the latter clause of the mishna: If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. From this wording it may be inferred that only if the animal is running through the vineyards is it lost property, but if it is running on the path or grazing among the vineyards, it is not lost property.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专注讜 转谞讗 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 转谞讗 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专爪讛 讘讚专讱

Abaye said that the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it (see Job 36:33), and the mishna distinguishes between grazing and running. The tanna taught a case of grazing on the path, where the animal is not considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is grazing among the vineyards. And the tanna taught a case of running through the vineyards, where the animal is considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is running on the path.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专注讜 诇讬转谞讬 拽讬诇转讗 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讞诪讬专转讗 诇讬转谞讬 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讜诇转谞讬 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱

Rava said to him: If the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it, let him teach the lenient case and all the more so it would apply to the stringent case. The Gemara elaborates: Let the tanna teach that when the animal is running on the path it is lost property and all the more so it is lost property when it is running through the vineyards. And let the tanna teach that when the animal is grazing among the vineyards it is not lost property, and all the more so it is not lost property when it is grazing on the path.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 专爪讛 讗专爪讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗驻讛 诇讙讘讬 讚讘专讗 讛讗 讚讗驻讛 诇讙讘讬 诪转讗

Rather, Rava said: The apparent contradiction between the inference from the first clause with regard to running on the path and the inference from the latter clause with regard to running on the path is not difficult. This inference from the first clause that an animal running on the path is lost property is referring to a case where its face is directed toward the field, and it is running away from the city. That inference from the latter clause that an animal running on the path is not lost property is referring to a case where its face is directed toward the city.

专讜注讛 讗专讜注讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讻讗谉 讘讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注

Rava continues: The apparent contradiction between the inference from the first clause with regard to grazing among the vineyards and the inference from the latter clause with regard to grazing among the vineyards is also not difficult. Here, the inference from the latter clause that an animal grazing among the vineyards is not lost property is with regard to loss of the animal itself. There, the inference from the first clause that the halakhot of lost property apply in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards is referring to loss in the sense of damage to the land.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讘讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讜讻讬 拽转谞讬 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讘讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讚专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诪住拽讘讗 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诇讗 诪住拽讘讗

The Gemara elaborates: When the tanna teaches that in the case of an animal grazing on the path, the halakhot of lost property do not apply, from which it is inferred: But in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do apply, it is referring to preventing loss in the sense of damage to the land caused by the animal. And when the tanna teaches that in the case of an animal running among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do apply, from which it is inferred: But in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do not apply, it is referring to loss of the animal itself, as an animal running among the vineyards is typically wounded with lacerations from the vines, but an animal grazing among the vineyards is not typically wounded.

讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 谞讛讬 讚诇讗 诪住拽讘讗 转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讘讚谞讻专讬

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the inference from the latter clause that in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do not apply, although it is not wounded, why not derive that the halakhot of lost property do apply due to loss in the sense of damage to the land caused by the animal? The Gemara answers: It is stated with regard to the land of a gentile, which one is not obligated to return or preserve.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讚讚诇诪讗 拽讟诇讜 诇讛 讘讗转专讗 讚诪转专讜 讜讛讚专 拽讟诇讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讗转专讜 讘讛 讗讬 讗转专讜 讘讛 讜诇讗 讗讝讚讛专讜 讘讛 讜讚讗讬 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讚注转 讛讬讗

The Gemara questions this explanation: But why not derive that one is obligated to return it due to loss of the animal itself, as perhaps the gentiles will kill it? The Gemara answers: It is stated with regard to a place where they forewarn the owner and only then kill the animal. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps they already forewarned the owner with regard to the animal. The Gemara explains: If they already forewarned the owner with regard to the animal and the owner did not heed the warning, this is certainly a case of deliberate loss, where there is no obligation to return it.

讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讘专讞讛 讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讘专讞讛 [讜讻讜壮] 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讗讬诪讗 讛砖讘 讞讚讗 讝诪谞讗 转砖讬讘诐 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them [hashev teshivem] to your brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:1). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥hashev teshivem,鈥 the mishna derives that one must return the lost animal multiple times if it flees. The Gemara asks: A certain one of the Sages said to Rava: Say that from hashev one derives the obligation to return the animal once, and from teshivem one derives the obligation to return the animal twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖讘 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转砖讬讘诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讘讬转讜 诇讙讬谞转讜 讜诇讞讜专讘转讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转砖讬讘诐 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诪讬谞讟专讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 诪讬谞讟专讗 讗诪讗讬

Rava said to him: 鈥Hashev鈥 indicates that there is an absolute obligation to return the animal, even if it flees one hundred times. 鈥Teshivem teaches another matter: I have derived only that one may return the animal to the owner鈥檚 house. From where is the halakha derived that one may return the animal to his garden or to his building in ruins? The verse states: 鈥Teshivem,鈥 to teach that in any case, wherever one returns the lost animal, he fulfills the mitzva of returning it. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If those areas are protected, it is obvious that one who returns the animal there fulfills his obligation. If they are not protected, why is he considered to have returned the lost animal? It will just flee again.

诇注讜诇诐 讚诪讬谞讟专讗 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讜讻讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讛讻诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讞讜抓 诪讛砖讘转 讗讘讬讚讛 砖讛转讜专讛 专讬讘转讛 讛砖讘讜转 讛专讘讛

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where the property is protected. And this teaches us that we do not require the owner鈥檚 knowledge in order to return the lost item to him. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Every instance involving return of an item to its owner, e.g., by a bailee or by a thief, requires the owner鈥檚 knowledge that it is being returned, except for the return of a lost item, as the Torah amplified the halakha to permit multiple forms of return by means of the compound verb 鈥hashev teshivem,鈥 among them return without the owner鈥檚 knowledge.

砖诇讞 转砖诇讞 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讞 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 转砖诇讞 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

The Gemara cites additional mitzvot where the Torah employs the compound verb form, and the Sages derived additional halakhot from the phrasing of the verse. With regard to the mitzva of dispatch of the mother bird from the nest before taking its eggs or fledglings, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall dispatch [shalle鈥檃岣 teshalla岣] the mother, but the young take for yourself; that it may be well with you, and that you may prolong your days鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:7). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥shalle鈥檃岣 teshalla岣,鈥 the Sages derive that one must dispatch the mother bird multiple times if it returns. The Gemara asks: Say that from shalle鈥檃岣 one derives the obligation to dispatch the mother once, and from teshalla岣 one derives the obligation to dispatch the mother twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇讞 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转砖诇讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讚讘专 讛专砖讜转 诇讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转砖诇讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

Rava said to him: 鈥Shalle鈥檃岣鈥 indicates that one must dispatch the mother even one hundred times. 鈥Teshalla岣 teaches another matter: I have derived only the obligation to dispatch the mother bird in a case where one takes the eggs or the fledglings and wants to take the mother bird for a non-compulsory matter, e.g., to eat it. In a case where one takes the eggs or the fledglings and needs the mother bird for a matter involving a mitzva, e.g., the purification of a leper, from where is the halakha that he must dispatch the mother derived? The verse states: 鈥Teshalla岣,鈥 to teach that in any case one must dispatch the mother bird.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讜讗讬诪讗 讛讜讻讞 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 转讜讻讬讞 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

With regard to the mitzva of rebuke, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall rebuke [hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣] your neighbor, and not bear sin because of him鈥 (Leviticus 19:17). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣,鈥 the Sages derive that one must rebuke another multiple times if necessary. A certain one of the Sages said to Rava: Say that from hokhe鈥檃岣 one derives the obligation to rebuke another once, and from tokhia岣 one derives the obligation to rebuke another twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜讻讞 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转讜讻讬讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讛专讘 诇转诇诪讬讚 转诇诪讬讚 诇专讘 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛讜讻讞 转讜讻讬讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

Rava said to him: 鈥Hokhe鈥檃岣鈥 indicates that one must rebuke another even one hundred times. 鈥Tokhia岣 teaches another matter: I have derived only the obligation of a teacher to rebuke a student. With regard to the obligation for a student to rebuke a teacher, from where is it derived? The verse states: 鈥Hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣 to teach that one is obligated to rebuke another in any case that warrants rebuke.

注讝讘 转注讝讘 注诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara cites additional derivations from compound verb forms. 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta鈥檃zov] with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). I have derived only that one is obligated to help unload the fallen animal in a case where its owner is with it. From where is the obligation to unload it in a case where its owner is not with it derived? The verse states: 鈥Azov ta鈥檃zov,鈥 indicating that there is an obligation to unload it in any case.

讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 注诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 donkey or his ox fallen by the wayside, and hide yourself from them; you shall lift them [hakem takim] with him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4). I have derived only that one is obligated to help load the animal in a case where its owner is with it. From where is the obligation to load it in a case where its owner is not with it derived? The verse states: 鈥Hakem takim,鈥 to teach that there is an obligation to load it in any case.

讜诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 驻专讬拽讛 讜诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 讟注讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 驻专讬拽讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讗讘诇 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讗讜 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讜诇讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讗讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara asks: And why does the Torah need to write the compound verb form to teach the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to unloading and why does the Torah need to write the compound verb form to teach the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to loading the animal? The Gemara answers: They are both necessary, as had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to unloading, I would say that one is obligated to unload the animal even when the owner is not present, due to the fact that in the failure to unload the animal there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss, as the burden might be damaged or the animal might die. But in the case of loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss, I would say no, there is no obligation to load the animal when the owner is not present.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讟注讬谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘砖讻专 讗讘诇 驻专讬拽讛 讚讘讞谞诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

The Gemara continues its answer: And had the Torah taught us the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to loading, I would say that it is due to the fact that his action is rewarded with remuneration, as one is paid for loading an animal. But with regard to unloading, which is performed for free, I would say no, there is no obligation to unload the animal when the owner is not present. Due to the unique element in each, both are necessary.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讗祝 讟注讬谞讛 讘讞谞诐 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that even loading must be performed for free, what is there to say to explain why it was necessary to repeat the obligation with regard to unloading? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, it is not clearly defined which of the verses is referring to loading and which is referring to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted to be referring to unloading and one might assume that he need not load an animal in the absence of the owner.

诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讻转讘 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讻转讘 讗讘讬讚讛 爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专讗 讚诪专讛 讗讬转讗 爪注专讗 讚讬讚讛 讗讬转讗 讗讘诇 讗讘讬讚讛 讚爪注专讗 讚诪专讛 讗讬转讗 讜爪注专讗 讚讬讚讛 诇讬转讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗讘讬讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讬转讗 诇诪专讛 讘讛讚讛

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the Torah to write these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, and why do I need the Torah to write the obligation to return a lost item? Write one of them, and derive the other from it, as they are all mitzvot to preserve another鈥檚 property. The Gemara answers: Both are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, one would say that it is due to the fact that in those cases there is the suffering of its owner and there is the suffering of the animal itself. But in the case of a lost item, where there is the suffering of its owner but there is no suffering of the lost item, I might say no, there is no obligation to return the lost item. And had the Torah taught us only the obligation to return a lost item, one would say that is due to the fact that its owner is not with it to care for it;

讗讘诇 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讚讗讬转讗 诇诪专讛 讘讛讚讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

but in the case of these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, where its owner is with it, I might say no, there is no need to assist him. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to write both.

诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讛诪讻讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讜 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转讜 讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讜 砖讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛诪讬转讜 讘讻诇 诪讬转讛 砖讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara cited additional derivations from compound verb forms. 鈥淥r in enmity struck him with his hand, that he died; he that struck him shall be put to death [mot yumat]鈥 (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is executed with the form of death written with regard to him, i.e., decapitation. From where is it derived that if you are unable to execute him with the form of death written with regard to him, it is permitted for you to execute him with any death with which you are able to execute him? The verse states: 鈥Mot yumat,鈥 to teach that you must execute him in any case.

讛讻讛 转讻讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘讛讻讗讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讛谉 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转谉 讘讛讻讗讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讛谉 砖讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛讻讜转谉 讘讻诇 讛讻讗讛 砖讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛讻讛 转讻讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to an idolatrous city, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall strike [hakeh takeh] the inhabitants of that city by sword, destroying it utterly鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:16). I have derived only that the residents of the idolatrous city are executed with the form of death written with regard to them, i.e., decapitation. From where is it derived that if you are unable to execute them with the form of death written with regard to them, it is permitted for you to execute them with any death with which you are able to execute them? The verse states: 鈥Hakeh takeh,鈥 to teach that you must execute him in any case.

讛砖讘 转砖讬讘 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诪砖讻谞讜 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪砖讻谞讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛砖讘 转砖讬讘 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to an item that a poor person needs, e.g., a blanket, that a lender took as collateral when lending him money, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall restore [hashev tashiv] to him the pledge when the sun goes down, that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be righteousness for you before the Lord your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:13). I have derived only the obligation to return his garment each night in a case where the lender took collateral with the sanction of the court. From where do I derive the obligation to return his garment each night even in a case where the lender took collateral without the sanction of the court? The verse states: 鈥Hashev tashiv,鈥 to teach that he must return it in any case.

讞讘诇 转讞讘诇 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诪砖讻谞讜 讘专砖讜转 诪砖讻谞讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讞讘诇 转讞讘诇 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara brings another derivation from a compound verb written with regard to returning collateral: 鈥淚f you take as collateral [岣vol ta岣ol] your neighbor鈥檚 garment, you shall restore it to him until the sun sets鈥 (Exodus 22:25). I have derived only the obligation to return his garment before sunset in a case where the lender took collateral with the sanction of the court. From where do I derive the obligation to return his garment each night even in a case where the lender took collateral without the sanction of the court? The verse states: 鈥岣vol ta岣ol,鈥 to teach that he must return it in any case.

讜讛谞讬 转专讬 拽专讗讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 讞讚 诇讻住讜转 讬讜诐 讜讞讚 诇讻住讜转 诇讬诇讛

The Gemara asks: And with regard to these two verses, why do I need both of them to teach the same halakha, that one must return to the debtor any garment that he needs? The Gemara answers: One is referring to a garment worn during the day, and one is referring to a garment worn during the night (see 114b).

驻转讞 转驻转讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬讬 注讬专讱 诇注谞讬讬 注讬专 讗讞专转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 驻转讞 转驻转讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of giving charity and granting loans, it is written: 鈥淔or the poor shall never cease out of the land; therefore I command you, saying: You shall open [patoa岣 tifta岣] your hand to your poor and needy brother in your land鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:11). I have derived only the obligation to give charity to the poor residents of your city. From where is the obligation to give charity to the poor residents of another city derived? The verse states: 鈥Patoa岣 tifta岣,鈥 to teach that you must give charity to the poor in any case.

谞转谉 转转谉 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪转谞讛 诪专讜讘讛 诪转谞讛 诪讜注讟转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 谞转谉 转转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of giving charity it is written: 鈥淏eware鈥nd your eye is stingy against your needy brother鈥You shall give [naton titten] him, and your heart shall not be grieved when you give unto him鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:9鈥10). I have derived only the obligation to give a large gift. From where is the obligation to give even a small gift derived? The verse states: 鈥Naton titten,鈥 to teach that one must give gifts in any case, whether a large gift or a small one.

讛注谞讬拽 转注谞讬拽 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 诇讗 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛注谞讬拽 转注谞讬拽 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the release of a Hebrew slave it is written: 鈥淵ou shall furnish [ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik] him liberally from your flock, and from your threshing floor, and from your winepress; of that which the Lord your God has blessed you, you shall give unto him鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:14). Based on the conclusion of the verse, I have derived only that when the house is blessed because of him, one furnishes the slave with gifts. From where have I derived the obligation to furnish him with gifts even when the house is not blessed because of him? The verse states: 鈥Ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik,鈥 to teach that one must furnish him with gifts in any case.

讜诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚讗诪专 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 诇讜 诇讗 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 讗讬谉 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 转注谞讬拽 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who says: If the house is blessed because of him, one furnishes him with gifts, and if the house is not blessed because of him, one need not furnish him with gifts, why do I need a compound verb, 鈥ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik鈥? The Gemara answers: The Torah speaks in the language of people. The compound verb is a common conversational style, and the Torah employs the same style. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya holds there is nothing extraordinary about it and therefore, nothing may be derived from it.

讛注讘讟 转注讘讬讟谞讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 转谉 诇讜 讚专讱 讛诇讜讗讛 讬砖 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转注讘讬讟谞讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of lending money to the poor it is written: 鈥淏ut you shall open your hand to him, and you shall lend [ha鈥檃vet ta鈥檃vitennu] him sufficient for his need that he is lacking鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:8). I have derived only that in a case where one does not have resources and does not want to be supported with charity, the Merciful One states: Provide for him by means of a loan. In a case where he has resources and he does not want to support himself with his resources, from where is the obligation to lend him money derived? The verse states: 鈥Ta鈥檃vitennu,鈥 to teach that you must grant him a loan in any case.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讬砖 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 转注讘讬讟谞讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that in a case where he has resources and does not want to support himself with his resources one is not obligated to attend to his needs, why do I need a doubled verb: 鈥Ha鈥檃vet ta鈥檃vitennu鈥? The Gemara answers: The Torah speaks in the language of people and nothing may be derived from it.

讛讬讛 讘讟诇 诪谉 讛住诇注 诇讗 讬讗诪专 诇讜 转谉 诇讬 住诇注 讗诇讗 谞讜转谉 诇讜 砖讻专讜 讻驻讜注诇 (讘讟诇) 转谞谉 谞讜转谉 诇讜 砖讻专讜 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇

搂 The mishna teaches: If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer. The Gemara cites that we learned in a baraita (Tosefta 4:11): The owner gives him his wage as if he were an idle laborer.

诪讗讬 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇 砖诇 讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讚讘讟诇 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: As if he were an idle laborer? In fact, he is not idle, but engaged in return of a lost item. Abaye said: It means that he is paid as a laborer who is idle from that typical labor of his from which he is kept idle. In other words, he must receive the amount of money a person would be willing to accept to refrain from his current occupation and engage in returning a lost item. This calculation accounts for both the degree of difficulty of his steady employment and the amount of his remuneration.

讗诐 讬砖 砖诐 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讛 讘驻谞讬讛诐 讗讬住讜专 讜专讘 住驻专讗 注讘讬讚 注讬住拽讗 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 讗讝诇 专讘 住驻专讗 驻诇讙 诇讬讛 讘诇讗 讚注转讬讛 讚讗讬住讜专 讘讗驻讬 讘讬 转专讬 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 讗讬讬转讬 转诇转讗 讚驻诇讙转 拽诪讬讬讛讜 讗讬 谞诪讬

搂 The mishna teaches: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. The Gemara relates: Issur and Rav Safra formed a joint venture with each other. Rav Safra went and dissolved their partnership without Issur鈥檚 knowledge in the presence of two witnesses. Rav Safra came before Rabba bar Rav Huna in order to ratify the dissolution of the partnership. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: Go and bring me the court of three before whom you dissolved your partnership. Alternatively, you may bring

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Metzia 31

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 31

讘讗住专讟讬讗 讜驻专讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 讟诇讬转 讘爪讚 讙讚专 拽专讚讜诐 讘爪讚 讙讚专 讜驻专讛 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专讗讛 诪讬诐 砖砖讜讟驻讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讜讚专 讘驻谞讬讛诐

on a main thoroughfare [be鈥檌sratiyya], or a cow running through the vineyards, that is lost property. If one found a cloak alongside a fence, an ax alongside a fence, or a cow grazing among the vineyards, that is not lost property. If one sees these items for three consecutive days, that is lost property. If one saw water that is flowing and coming to inundate another鈥檚 field, he must establish a barrier before the water in order to preserve the field.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讻诇 讗讘讬讚转 讗讞讬讱 诇专讘讜转 讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讞谞谞讬讗 诇专讘讗 转谞讬讗 讚诪住讬讬注 诇讱 专讗讛 诪讬诐 砖砖讜讟驻讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讜讚专 讘驻谞讬讛诐

Rava says that the verse: 鈥淎nd so shall you do with every lost item of your brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:3), serves to include an obligation to protect your brother from the loss of his land. Rav 岣nanya said to Rava: There is a baraita that is taught that supports your opinion. If one saw water that is flowing and coming to inundate another鈥檚 field, he must establish a barrier before the water in order to preserve the field.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛讗 诇讗 转住讬讬注讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘讚讗讬讻讗 注讜诪专讬谉 讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注讜诪专讬谉 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬转 讘讛 注讜诪专讬谉 讚爪专讬讻讬 诇讗专注讗 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚爪专讬讻讬 诇讗专注讗 讻讬 讙讜驻讛 讚讗专注讗 讚诪讬讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rava said to Rav 岣nanya: If you are attempting to bring support for my ruling due to that baraita, do not support my ruling. With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a field in which there are sheaves of grain on the land. The tanna of the baraita is referring to preservation of the sheaves, not of the land itself. The Gemara asks: If the baraita is referring to a field in which there are sheaves of grain, what is the purpose of stating it? Isn鈥檛 it obvious that one is obligated to preserve the sheaves as he would any other item? No, it is necessary to state the halakha only in a case where there are sheaves that need the land in order to dry. Lest you say: Since they still need the land, their legal status is like that of the land itself and he is not obligated to return them, the baraita teaches us that the sheaves are independent of the land and must be preserved.

诪爪讗 讞诪讜专 讜驻专讛 [讜讻讜壮] 讛讗 讙讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 诪爪讗 讞诪讜专 讜驻专讛 专讜注讬谉 讘讚专讱 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专讜注讬谉 讘讚专讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讞诪讜专 讜讻诇讬讜 讛驻讜讻讬诐 讜驻专讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛专讬 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讗讬谉 讝讜 讗讘讬讚讛

搂 The mishna teaches: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not deemed lost property. The Gemara asks: This itself is difficult. On the one hand you said: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, from which it may be inferred that only if it is grazing on the path it is not lost property, but if it was running on the path or grazing among the vineyards, it is a lost item. On the other hand, say the latter clause of the mishna: If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. From this wording it may be inferred that only if the animal is running through the vineyards is it lost property, but if it is running on the path or grazing among the vineyards, it is not lost property.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专注讜 转谞讗 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 转谞讗 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇专爪讛 讘讚专讱

Abaye said that the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it (see Job 36:33), and the mishna distinguishes between grazing and running. The tanna taught a case of grazing on the path, where the animal is not considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is grazing among the vineyards. And the tanna taught a case of running through the vineyards, where the animal is considered lost property, and the same is true of a case where the animal is running on the path.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗讬 讬讙讬讚 注诇讬讜 专注讜 诇讬转谞讬 拽讬诇转讗 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讞诪讬专转讗 诇讬转谞讬 专爪讛 讘讚专讱 讚讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讜诇转谞讬 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讚诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱

Rava said to him: If the tanna employs the style of: Its counterpart tells about it, let him teach the lenient case and all the more so it would apply to the stringent case. The Gemara elaborates: Let the tanna teach that when the animal is running on the path it is lost property and all the more so it is lost property when it is running through the vineyards. And let the tanna teach that when the animal is grazing among the vineyards it is not lost property, and all the more so it is not lost property when it is grazing on the path.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 专爪讛 讗专爪讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗驻讛 诇讙讘讬 讚讘专讗 讛讗 讚讗驻讛 诇讙讘讬 诪转讗

Rather, Rava said: The apparent contradiction between the inference from the first clause with regard to running on the path and the inference from the latter clause with regard to running on the path is not difficult. This inference from the first clause that an animal running on the path is lost property is referring to a case where its face is directed toward the field, and it is running away from the city. That inference from the latter clause that an animal running on the path is not lost property is referring to a case where its face is directed toward the city.

专讜注讛 讗专讜注讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讻讗谉 讘讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注

Rava continues: The apparent contradiction between the inference from the first clause with regard to grazing among the vineyards and the inference from the latter clause with regard to grazing among the vineyards is also not difficult. Here, the inference from the latter clause that an animal grazing among the vineyards is not lost property is with regard to loss of the animal itself. There, the inference from the first clause that the halakhot of lost property apply in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards is referring to loss in the sense of damage to the land.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 专讜注讛 讘讚专讱 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讘讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讜讻讬 拽转谞讬 专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讗 专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诇讗 讛讜讬讗 讗讘讬讚讛 讘讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讚专爪讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诪住拽讘讗 讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 诇讗 诪住拽讘讗

The Gemara elaborates: When the tanna teaches that in the case of an animal grazing on the path, the halakhot of lost property do not apply, from which it is inferred: But in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do apply, it is referring to preventing loss in the sense of damage to the land caused by the animal. And when the tanna teaches that in the case of an animal running among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do apply, from which it is inferred: But in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do not apply, it is referring to loss of the animal itself, as an animal running among the vineyards is typically wounded with lacerations from the vines, but an animal grazing among the vineyards is not typically wounded.

讜专讜注讛 讘讬谉 讛讻专诪讬诐 谞讛讬 讚诇讗 诪住拽讘讗 转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讬讚转 拽专拽注 讘讚谞讻专讬

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the inference from the latter clause that in the case of an animal grazing among the vineyards the halakhot of lost property do not apply, although it is not wounded, why not derive that the halakhot of lost property do apply due to loss in the sense of damage to the land caused by the animal? The Gemara answers: It is stated with regard to the land of a gentile, which one is not obligated to return or preserve.

讜转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讗讘讬讚转 讙讜驻讛 讚讚诇诪讗 拽讟诇讜 诇讛 讘讗转专讗 讚诪转专讜 讜讛讚专 拽讟诇讬 讜讚诇诪讗 讗转专讜 讘讛 讗讬 讗转专讜 讘讛 讜诇讗 讗讝讚讛专讜 讘讛 讜讚讗讬 讗讘讬讚讛 诪讚注转 讛讬讗

The Gemara questions this explanation: But why not derive that one is obligated to return it due to loss of the animal itself, as perhaps the gentiles will kill it? The Gemara answers: It is stated with regard to a place where they forewarn the owner and only then kill the animal. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps they already forewarned the owner with regard to the animal. The Gemara explains: If they already forewarned the owner with regard to the animal and the owner did not heed the warning, this is certainly a case of deliberate loss, where there is no obligation to return it.

讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讘专讞讛 讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讘专讞讛 [讜讻讜壮] 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讗讬诪讗 讛砖讘 讞讚讗 讝诪谞讗 转砖讬讘诐 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them [hashev teshivem] to your brother鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:1). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥hashev teshivem,鈥 the mishna derives that one must return the lost animal multiple times if it flees. The Gemara asks: A certain one of the Sages said to Rava: Say that from hashev one derives the obligation to return the animal once, and from teshivem one derives the obligation to return the animal twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛砖讘 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转砖讬讘诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讘讬转讜 诇讙讬谞转讜 讜诇讞讜专讘转讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转砖讬讘诐 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚诪讬谞讟专讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 诪讬谞讟专讗 讗诪讗讬

Rava said to him: 鈥Hashev鈥 indicates that there is an absolute obligation to return the animal, even if it flees one hundred times. 鈥Teshivem teaches another matter: I have derived only that one may return the animal to the owner鈥檚 house. From where is the halakha derived that one may return the animal to his garden or to his building in ruins? The verse states: 鈥Teshivem,鈥 to teach that in any case, wherever one returns the lost animal, he fulfills the mitzva of returning it. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If those areas are protected, it is obvious that one who returns the animal there fulfills his obligation. If they are not protected, why is he considered to have returned the lost animal? It will just flee again.

诇注讜诇诐 讚诪讬谞讟专讗 讜讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讜讻讚专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讛讻诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 讞讜抓 诪讛砖讘转 讗讘讬讚讛 砖讛转讜专讛 专讬讘转讛 讛砖讘讜转 讛专讘讛

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where the property is protected. And this teaches us that we do not require the owner鈥檚 knowledge in order to return the lost item to him. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Every instance involving return of an item to its owner, e.g., by a bailee or by a thief, requires the owner鈥檚 knowledge that it is being returned, except for the return of a lost item, as the Torah amplified the halakha to permit multiple forms of return by means of the compound verb 鈥hashev teshivem,鈥 among them return without the owner鈥檚 knowledge.

砖诇讞 转砖诇讞 讗讬诪讗 砖诇讞 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 转砖诇讞 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

The Gemara cites additional mitzvot where the Torah employs the compound verb form, and the Sages derived additional halakhot from the phrasing of the verse. With regard to the mitzva of dispatch of the mother bird from the nest before taking its eggs or fledglings, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall dispatch [shalle鈥檃岣 teshalla岣] the mother, but the young take for yourself; that it may be well with you, and that you may prolong your days鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:7). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥shalle鈥檃岣 teshalla岣,鈥 the Sages derive that one must dispatch the mother bird multiple times if it returns. The Gemara asks: Say that from shalle鈥檃岣 one derives the obligation to dispatch the mother once, and from teshalla岣 one derives the obligation to dispatch the mother twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 砖诇讞 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转砖诇讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讚讘专 讛专砖讜转 诇讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转砖诇讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

Rava said to him: 鈥Shalle鈥檃岣鈥 indicates that one must dispatch the mother even one hundred times. 鈥Teshalla岣 teaches another matter: I have derived only the obligation to dispatch the mother bird in a case where one takes the eggs or the fledglings and wants to take the mother bird for a non-compulsory matter, e.g., to eat it. In a case where one takes the eggs or the fledglings and needs the mother bird for a matter involving a mitzva, e.g., the purification of a leper, from where is the halakha that he must dispatch the mother derived? The verse states: 鈥Teshalla岣,鈥 to teach that in any case one must dispatch the mother bird.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 诇专讘讗 讜讗讬诪讗 讛讜讻讞 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 转讜讻讬讞 转专讬 讝诪谞讬

With regard to the mitzva of rebuke, the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall rebuke [hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣] your neighbor, and not bear sin because of him鈥 (Leviticus 19:17). The Gemara understands that from the use of the compound form of the verb, 鈥hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣,鈥 the Sages derive that one must rebuke another multiple times if necessary. A certain one of the Sages said to Rava: Say that from hokhe鈥檃岣 one derives the obligation to rebuke another once, and from tokhia岣 one derives the obligation to rebuke another twice, and beyond that there is no obligation.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讜讻讞 讗驻讬诇讜 诪讗讛 驻注诪讬诐 诪砖诪注 转讜讻讬讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讛专讘 诇转诇诪讬讚 转诇诪讬讚 诇专讘 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛讜讻讞 转讜讻讬讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

Rava said to him: 鈥Hokhe鈥檃岣鈥 indicates that one must rebuke another even one hundred times. 鈥Tokhia岣 teaches another matter: I have derived only the obligation of a teacher to rebuke a student. With regard to the obligation for a student to rebuke a teacher, from where is it derived? The verse states: 鈥Hokhe鈥檃岣 tokhia岣 to teach that one is obligated to rebuke another in any case that warrants rebuke.

注讝讘 转注讝讘 注诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara cites additional derivations from compound verb forms. 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta鈥檃zov] with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). I have derived only that one is obligated to help unload the fallen animal in a case where its owner is with it. From where is the obligation to unload it in a case where its owner is not with it derived? The verse states: 鈥Azov ta鈥檃zov,鈥 indicating that there is an obligation to unload it in any case.

讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 注诪讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not see your brother鈥檚 donkey or his ox fallen by the wayside, and hide yourself from them; you shall lift them [hakem takim] with him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4). I have derived only that one is obligated to help load the animal in a case where its owner is with it. From where is the obligation to load it in a case where its owner is not with it derived? The verse states: 鈥Hakem takim,鈥 to teach that there is an obligation to load it in any case.

讜诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 驻专讬拽讛 讜诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讻转讘 讟注讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 驻专讬拽讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜讗讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讗讘诇 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讗讜 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讗讬讻讗 讜诇讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讗讬讻讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara asks: And why does the Torah need to write the compound verb form to teach the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to unloading and why does the Torah need to write the compound verb form to teach the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to loading the animal? The Gemara answers: They are both necessary, as had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to unloading, I would say that one is obligated to unload the animal even when the owner is not present, due to the fact that in the failure to unload the animal there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss, as the burden might be damaged or the animal might die. But in the case of loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss, I would say no, there is no obligation to load the animal when the owner is not present.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讟注讬谞讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讘砖讻专 讗讘诇 驻专讬拽讛 讚讘讞谞诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

The Gemara continues its answer: And had the Torah taught us the obligation in the owner鈥檚 absence with regard to loading, I would say that it is due to the fact that his action is rewarded with remuneration, as one is paid for loading an animal. But with regard to unloading, which is performed for free, I would say no, there is no obligation to unload the animal when the owner is not present. Due to the unique element in each, both are necessary.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讗祝 讟注讬谞讛 讘讞谞诐 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that even loading must be performed for free, what is there to say to explain why it was necessary to repeat the obligation with regard to unloading? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, it is not clearly defined which of the verses is referring to loading and which is referring to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted to be referring to unloading and one might assume that he need not load an animal in the absence of the owner.

诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讻转讘 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诇诪讻转讘 讗讘讬讚讛 爪专讬讻讬 讚讗讬 讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专讗 讚诪专讛 讗讬转讗 爪注专讗 讚讬讚讛 讗讬转讗 讗讘诇 讗讘讬讚讛 讚爪注专讗 讚诪专讛 讗讬转讗 讜爪注专讗 讚讬讚讛 诇讬转讗 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讗讘讬讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讬转讗 诇诪专讛 讘讛讚讛

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the Torah to write these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, and why do I need the Torah to write the obligation to return a lost item? Write one of them, and derive the other from it, as they are all mitzvot to preserve another鈥檚 property. The Gemara answers: Both are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, one would say that it is due to the fact that in those cases there is the suffering of its owner and there is the suffering of the animal itself. But in the case of a lost item, where there is the suffering of its owner but there is no suffering of the lost item, I might say no, there is no obligation to return the lost item. And had the Torah taught us only the obligation to return a lost item, one would say that is due to the fact that its owner is not with it to care for it;

讗讘诇 讛谞讬 转专转讬 讚讗讬转讗 诇诪专讛 讘讛讚讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

but in the case of these two mitzvot of unloading and loading, where its owner is with it, I might say no, there is no need to assist him. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to write both.

诪讜转 讬讜诪转 讛诪讻讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讜 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转讜 讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讜 砖讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛诪讬转讜 讘讻诇 诪讬转讛 砖讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诪讜转 讬讜诪转 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

搂 The Gemara cited additional derivations from compound verb forms. 鈥淥r in enmity struck him with his hand, that he died; he that struck him shall be put to death [mot yumat]鈥 (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is executed with the form of death written with regard to him, i.e., decapitation. From where is it derived that if you are unable to execute him with the form of death written with regard to him, it is permitted for you to execute him with any death with which you are able to execute him? The verse states: 鈥Mot yumat,鈥 to teach that you must execute him in any case.

讛讻讛 转讻讛 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讘讛讻讗讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讛谉 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗讬 讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 诇讛诪讬转谉 讘讛讻讗讛 讛讻转讜讘讛 讘讛谉 砖讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛讻讜转谉 讘讻诇 讛讻讗讛 砖讗转讛 讬讻讜诇 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛讻讛 转讻讛 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to an idolatrous city, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall strike [hakeh takeh] the inhabitants of that city by sword, destroying it utterly鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:16). I have derived only that the residents of the idolatrous city are executed with the form of death written with regard to them, i.e., decapitation. From where is it derived that if you are unable to execute them with the form of death written with regard to them, it is permitted for you to execute them with any death with which you are able to execute them? The verse states: 鈥Hakeh takeh,鈥 to teach that you must execute him in any case.

讛砖讘 转砖讬讘 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诪砖讻谞讜 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪砖讻谞讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛砖讘 转砖讬讘 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to an item that a poor person needs, e.g., a blanket, that a lender took as collateral when lending him money, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall restore [hashev tashiv] to him the pledge when the sun goes down, that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be righteousness for you before the Lord your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:13). I have derived only the obligation to return his garment each night in a case where the lender took collateral with the sanction of the court. From where do I derive the obligation to return his garment each night even in a case where the lender took collateral without the sanction of the court? The verse states: 鈥Hashev tashiv,鈥 to teach that he must return it in any case.

讞讘诇 转讞讘诇 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诪砖讻谞讜 讘专砖讜转 诪砖讻谞讜 砖诇讗 讘专砖讜转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讞讘诇 转讞讘诇 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Gemara brings another derivation from a compound verb written with regard to returning collateral: 鈥淚f you take as collateral [岣vol ta岣ol] your neighbor鈥檚 garment, you shall restore it to him until the sun sets鈥 (Exodus 22:25). I have derived only the obligation to return his garment before sunset in a case where the lender took collateral with the sanction of the court. From where do I derive the obligation to return his garment each night even in a case where the lender took collateral without the sanction of the court? The verse states: 鈥岣vol ta岣ol,鈥 to teach that he must return it in any case.

讜讛谞讬 转专讬 拽专讗讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 讞讚 诇讻住讜转 讬讜诐 讜讞讚 诇讻住讜转 诇讬诇讛

The Gemara asks: And with regard to these two verses, why do I need both of them to teach the same halakha, that one must return to the debtor any garment that he needs? The Gemara answers: One is referring to a garment worn during the day, and one is referring to a garment worn during the night (see 114b).

驻转讞 转驻转讞 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬讬 注讬专讱 诇注谞讬讬 注讬专 讗讞专转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 驻转讞 转驻转讞 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of giving charity and granting loans, it is written: 鈥淔or the poor shall never cease out of the land; therefore I command you, saying: You shall open [patoa岣 tifta岣] your hand to your poor and needy brother in your land鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:11). I have derived only the obligation to give charity to the poor residents of your city. From where is the obligation to give charity to the poor residents of another city derived? The verse states: 鈥Patoa岣 tifta岣,鈥 to teach that you must give charity to the poor in any case.

谞转谉 转转谉 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诪转谞讛 诪专讜讘讛 诪转谞讛 诪讜注讟转 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 谞转谉 转转谉 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of giving charity it is written: 鈥淏eware鈥nd your eye is stingy against your needy brother鈥You shall give [naton titten] him, and your heart shall not be grieved when you give unto him鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:9鈥10). I have derived only the obligation to give a large gift. From where is the obligation to give even a small gift derived? The verse states: 鈥Naton titten,鈥 to teach that one must give gifts in any case, whether a large gift or a small one.

讛注谞讬拽 转注谞讬拽 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 诇讗 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讛注谞讬拽 转注谞讬拽 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the release of a Hebrew slave it is written: 鈥淵ou shall furnish [ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik] him liberally from your flock, and from your threshing floor, and from your winepress; of that which the Lord your God has blessed you, you shall give unto him鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:14). Based on the conclusion of the verse, I have derived only that when the house is blessed because of him, one furnishes the slave with gifts. From where have I derived the obligation to furnish him with gifts even when the house is not blessed because of him? The verse states: 鈥Ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik,鈥 to teach that one must furnish him with gifts in any case.

讜诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚讗诪专 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 诇讜 诇讗 谞转讘专讱 讛讘讬转 讘讙诇诇讜 讗讬谉 诪注谞讬拽讬谉 转注谞讬拽 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who says: If the house is blessed because of him, one furnishes him with gifts, and if the house is not blessed because of him, one need not furnish him with gifts, why do I need a compound verb, 鈥ha鈥檃neik ta鈥檃nik鈥? The Gemara answers: The Torah speaks in the language of people. The compound verb is a common conversational style, and the Torah employs the same style. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya holds there is nothing extraordinary about it and therefore, nothing may be derived from it.

讛注讘讟 转注讘讬讟谞讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讗讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 转谉 诇讜 讚专讱 讛诇讜讗讛 讬砖 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 转注讘讬讟谞讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

With regard to the mitzva of lending money to the poor it is written: 鈥淏ut you shall open your hand to him, and you shall lend [ha鈥檃vet ta鈥檃vitennu] him sufficient for his need that he is lacking鈥 (Deuteronomy 15:8). I have derived only that in a case where one does not have resources and does not want to be supported with charity, the Merciful One states: Provide for him by means of a loan. In a case where he has resources and he does not want to support himself with his resources, from where is the obligation to lend him money derived? The verse states: 鈥Ta鈥檃vitennu,鈥 to teach that you must grant him a loan in any case.

讜诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 讬砖 诇讜 讜讗讬谞讜 专讜爪讛 诇讛转驻专谞住 讗讬谉 谞讝拽拽讬谉 诇讜 转注讘讬讟谞讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讚讘专讛 转讜专讛 讻诇砖讜谉 讘谞讬 讗讚诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that in a case where he has resources and does not want to support himself with his resources one is not obligated to attend to his needs, why do I need a doubled verb: 鈥Ha鈥檃vet ta鈥檃vitennu鈥? The Gemara answers: The Torah speaks in the language of people and nothing may be derived from it.

讛讬讛 讘讟诇 诪谉 讛住诇注 诇讗 讬讗诪专 诇讜 转谉 诇讬 住诇注 讗诇讗 谞讜转谉 诇讜 砖讻专讜 讻驻讜注诇 (讘讟诇) 转谞谉 谞讜转谉 诇讜 砖讻专讜 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇

搂 The mishna teaches: If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer. The Gemara cites that we learned in a baraita (Tosefta 4:11): The owner gives him his wage as if he were an idle laborer.

诪讗讬 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻驻讜注诇 讘讟诇 砖诇 讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讚讘讟诇 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: As if he were an idle laborer? In fact, he is not idle, but engaged in return of a lost item. Abaye said: It means that he is paid as a laborer who is idle from that typical labor of his from which he is kept idle. In other words, he must receive the amount of money a person would be willing to accept to refrain from his current occupation and engage in returning a lost item. This calculation accounts for both the degree of difficulty of his steady employment and the amount of his remuneration.

讗诐 讬砖 砖诐 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讛 讘驻谞讬讛诐 讗讬住讜专 讜专讘 住驻专讗 注讘讬讚 注讬住拽讗 讘讛讚讬 讛讚讚讬 讗讝诇 专讘 住驻专讗 驻诇讙 诇讬讛 讘诇讗 讚注转讬讛 讚讗讬住讜专 讘讗驻讬 讘讬 转专讬 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 讗讬讬转讬 转诇转讗 讚驻诇讙转 拽诪讬讬讛讜 讗讬 谞诪讬

搂 The mishna teaches: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. The Gemara relates: Issur and Rav Safra formed a joint venture with each other. Rav Safra went and dissolved their partnership without Issur鈥檚 knowledge in the presence of two witnesses. Rav Safra came before Rabba bar Rav Huna in order to ratify the dissolution of the partnership. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: Go and bring me the court of three before whom you dissolved your partnership. Alternatively, you may bring

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