Bava Metzia 34

מי יימר דמגנבא ואם תמצי לומר דמגנבא מי יימר דמשתכח גנב ואי משתכח גנב מי יימר דמשלם דלמא מודי ומפטר אמר רבא נעשה כאומר לו לכשתגנב ותרצה ותשלמני הרי פרתי קנויה לך מעכשיו

who could say that the deposit will be stolen? And if you say it will be stolen, who could say that the thief will be found? And even if the thief will be found, who could say that he will pay the double payment? Perhaps he will confess and will be exempted from the double payment. Rava said in response: It is as though the owner said to the bailee at the time that he gave him the deposit: When it will be stolen, and you will wish to refrain from taking an oath, and you will pay me instead, ownership of my cow is hereby transferred to you from this time, and the cow is an entity that already came into the world. Since ownership of the cow is retroactively transferred to the bailee from the time of the deposit, any profits generated by the cow, e.g., the double payment, belong to the bailee.

מתקיף לה רבי זירא אי הכי אפילו גיזותיה וולדותיה נמי אלמה תניא חוץ מגיזותיה וולדותיה אלא אמר רבי זירא נעשה כאומר לו חוץ מגיזותיה וולדותיה

Rabbi Zeira objects to this: If so, then even the fleece and offspring of the animal that grew while it was in the bailee’s possession should be the property of the bailee. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita that the bailee receives all profits generated by the animal except for its fleece and its offspring? Rather, Rabbi Zeira says that it is as though the owner said to the bailee: My animal is hereby transferred to you from this time except for its fleece and its offspring.

ומאי פסקא סתמא דמלתא שבחא דאתא מעלמא עביד איניש דמקני שבחא דמגופה לא עביד איניש דמקני

The Gemara asks: If so, why was this halakha stated in the mishna without qualification? Does every owner necessarily have that condition in mind? The Gemara answers: Typically, profit that comes from elsewhere, e.g., the double payment from a thief, which is difficult to anticipate, a person is apt to transfer to the bailee. But profit that originates from the body of the animal, which can be anticipated, a person is not apt to transfer to the bailee.

איכא דאמרי אמר רבא נעשה כאומר לו לכשתגנב ותרצה ותשלמני סמוך לגניבתה קנויה לך מאי בינייהו

Some say that Rava says his response differently. It is as though the owner said to the bailee at the time of the deposit: When it will be stolen, and you will wish to refrain from taking an oath, and you will pay me instead, ownership of my animal is transferred to you adjacent to, i.e., immediately before, its theft. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the formulations in Rava’s two responses?

איכא בינייהו קושיא דרבי זירא אי נמי דקיימא באגם

The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to the difficulty raised by Rabbi Zeira with regard to fleece and offspring, which is irrelevant according to the second formulation. Alternatively, there is a difference in a case where the animal is standing in a marsh [ba’agam] at the time of its theft. Since the animal was not on the bailee’s property at that time, he could not acquire it.

שילם ולא רצה לישבע [וכו׳] אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן לא שילם שילם ממש אלא כיון שאמר הריני משלם אף על פי שלא שילם

§ The mishna teaches that if the bailee paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath, the thief pays the double payment to the bailee. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the mishna says: If the bailee paid, it does not mean that he actually paid. Rather, once the bailee said: I hereby choose to pay, even if he did not yet actually pay, he acquired the double payment and all other profits.

תנן שילם ולא רצה לישבע שילם אין לא שילם לא אימא סיפא נשבע ולא רצה לשלם טעמא דלא רצה הא רצה אף על פי שלא שילם אלא מהא ליכא למשמע מינה

The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned in the mishna: If the bailee paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath, the thief pays the double payment to the bailee. The Gemara infers: If the bailee paid, yes, he acquires these rights; if the bailee did not pay, he does not. The Gemara answers: Say the latter clause of the mishna: In the case of a bailee who took an oath and did not wish to pay, the thief pays the double payment to the owner. The Gemara infers: The reason that the thief pays the owner is that the bailee did not wish to pay. But if the bailee wished to pay, although he did not actually pay, he acquires the rights to the double payment. Rather, because the inference from the first clause and the inference from the latter clause are contradictory, no inference is to be learned from this mishna.

תניא כותיה דרבי יוחנן השוכר פרה מחבירו ונגנבה ואמר הלה הריני משלם ואיני נשבע ואחר כך נמצא הגנב משלם תשלומי כפל לשוכר

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and it was stolen, and the other party, the renter, said: I hereby choose to pay and I will not take an oath, and the thief was located thereafter, the thief pays the double payment to the renter. Apparently, once the renter chooses to pay, he acquires the rights to the double payment.

אמר רב פפא שומר חנם כיון שאמר פשעתי מקנה ליה כפילא דאי בעי פטר נפשיה בגניבה שומר שכר כיון שאמר נגנבה מקנה ליה כפילא דאי בעי פטר נפשיה בשבורה ומתה

Rav Pappa says: In the case of an unpaid bailee, once he stated: I was negligent, thereby rendering himself liable to compensate the owner, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if the unpaid bailee wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim of theft. Admitting negligence is tantamount to agreeing to pay rather than taking an oath. Likewise, in the case of a paid bailee, once he stated: It was stolen, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if the paid bailee wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim that the animal was maimed or died due to circumstances beyond his control.

שואל שאומר הריני משלם לא מקני ליה כפילא במאי הוה ליה למפטר נפשיה במתה מחמת מלאכה מתה מחמת מלאכה לא שכיח

By contrast, in the case of a borrower who says: I hereby choose to pay, the owner does not transfer the rights to the double payment to him. The borrower’s statement that he chooses to pay is ineffectual, as he is liable to pay even without it. Because the statement is ineffectual, it does not confer any rights. With what claim would a borrower be able to exempt himself from payment? It is only with the claim that the animal died due to ordinary labor. A case of an animal that died due to ordinary labor is uncommon, and this claim is therefore accepted only with corroborating proof.

איכא דאמרי אמר רב פפא שואל נמי כיון שאמר הריני משלם מקני ליה כפילא דאי בעי פטר נפשיה במתה מחמת מלאכה אמר ליה רב זביד הכי אמר אביי שואל עד שישלם מאי טעמא הואיל וכל הנאה שלו בדיבורא לא מקני ליה כפילא

Some say that Rav Pappa said: In the case of a borrower, once he stated: I hereby choose to pay, the owner transfers rights to the double payment to him, as, if a borrower wishes, he can exempt himself from that liability with the claim that the animal died due to ordinary labor. Rav Zevid said to him that this is what Abaye said: A borrower acquires the rights to the double payment only when he actually pays for the item. What is the reason for this? Since all of the benefit accrues to the borrower, as he enjoys the use of the item without payment, the owner does not transfer the rights to the double payment to the borrower due to his statement that he chooses to pay.

תניא כוותיה דרב זביד השואל פרה מחבירו ונגנבה וקידם השואל ושילם ואחר כך נמצא הגנב משלם תשלומי כפל לשואל

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Zevid: In the case of one who borrows a cow from another, and it was stolen, and the borrower went ahead and paid, and the thief was located thereafter, the thief pays the double payment to the borrower. This indicates that the borrower receives the double payment only if he actually paid the owner for the item.

ללישנא קמא דרב פפא ודאי לא הויא תיובתא ללישנא בתרא לימא תיהוי תיובתיה

The Gemara comments: According to the first version of the statement of Rav Pappa, that the owner transfers rights to the double payment to the borrower only if he actually pays the owner, this baraita certainly is not a conclusive refutation [teyuvta] of the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the baraita corresponds to his opinion. According to the latter version of Rav Pappa’s statement, that the owner transfers rights to the double payment to the borrower even if the borrower merely says that he chooses to pay, shall we say that this baraita would be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Pappa?

אמר לך רב פפא מי אלימא ממתניתין דקתני שילם ואוקימנא באמר הכא נמי באמר

The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa could have said to you: Is the baraita stronger than the mishna, which teaches that the bailee receives the double payment if he already paid the owner, and nevertheless, we established that the mishna is referring to one who states his intent to pay but has not yet paid? Here, too, establish the baraita as referring to one who states his intent to pay but has not yet paid.

מי דמי התם לא קתני קידם הכא קתני קידם מאי קידם קידם ואמר

The Gemara questions this: Are these cases comparable? There, in the mishna, it is not taught that he went ahead and paid. Here, in the baraita, it is taught that he went ahead and paid, which indicates that he actually paid and not merely that he agreed to pay. The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of went ahead? It means that he went ahead and stated his intent to pay, although he did not yet actually pay.

הא מדקתני גבי שוכר ואמר וגבי שואל קידם שמע מינה דוקא קתני מידי גבי הדדי תניא

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the tanna teaches the halakha in the baraita cited earlier with regard to a renter with the formulation: And he said that he would pay, and in the baraita with regard to a borrower the tanna uses the formulation: Went ahead, conclude from it that the baraita concerning a borrower is teaching specifically that he actually paid. The Gemara rejects this proof: Are these two baraitot taught together so that one can draw a conclusion based on a discrepancy in their formulation? Perhaps the baraitot are unrelated and are simply formulated in different styles.

שיילינהו לתנאי דבי רבי חייא ודבי רבי אושעיא ואמרי גבי הדדי תניין

The Gemara comments: The Sages asked the tanna’im of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya, experts in mishnayot and baraitot, if these baraitot were formulated together. And they said that the baraitot were taught together as one long baraita, and therefore one can draw a conclusion based on a discrepancy in their formulation.

פשיטא אמר איני משלם וחזר ואמר הריני משלם הא קאמר הריני משלם אלא אמר הריני משלם

§ The Gemara comments that it is obvious that if the bailee initially said: I will not pay, and then said: I hereby choose to pay rather than taking an oath, he is entitled to the double payment, as didn’t he ultimately say: I hereby choose to pay? The Gemara raises a dilemma: But if he initially said: I hereby choose to pay,

וחזר ואמר איני משלם מאי מי אמרינן מהדר קא הדר ביה או דלמא במלתיה קאי ודחויי הוא דקא מדחי ליה

and then said: I will not pay, what is the halakha? Do we say he is retracting his intention to pay and therefore has no right to the double payment? Or, perhaps he stands committed to his initial statement and is merely postponing payment to a later date, in which case he maintains rights to the double payment.

אמר הריני משלם ומת ואמרו בניו אין אנו משלמין מאי מי אמרינן מהדר קא הדרי בהו או דלמא במלתא דאבוהון קיימי ודחויי הוא דקא מדחו ליה

The Gemara raises another dilemma. If the bailee said: I hereby choose to pay, and then he died before paying, and his sons said: We are not paying, what is the halakha? Do we say they are retracting their father’s decision to pay, or perhaps they stand committed to fulfilling their father’s statement and are merely postponing payment to a later date when they will be able to pay?

שלמו בנים מאי מצי אמר להו כי אקנאי כפילא לאבוכון דעבד לי נייח נפשאי לדידכו לא או דלמא לא שנא

The Gemara raises another dilemma. If the father died before he declared his willingness to pay and the sons paid, what is the halakha? Can the owner say to them: When I transferred rights to the double payment, I transferred them to your father, who pleased me, but to you, I did not transfer those rights? Or perhaps this case is no different, and the owner transfers rights to the double payment provided that he receives payment, and it does not matter whether it was the bailee or his sons who paid him.

שילם לבנים מאי מצו אמרי ליה כי אקני לך אבונא כפילא דעבדת ליה נייח נפשיה אבל אנן לדידן לא או דלמא לא שנא שלמו בנים לבנים מאי

If the owner of the deposit died and the bailee paid the payment to the owner’s sons, what is the halakha? Can the sons say to the bailee: When our father transferred rights to the double payment to you, it was because you pleased him, but as far as we are concerned, you did not please us? Or perhaps it is no different, and the bailee receives the double payment. Likewise, if both the owner and the bailee died, and sons of the bailee paid the sons of the owner, what is the halakha?

שילם מחצה מאי שאל שתי פרות ושילם אחת מהן מאי שאל מן השותפין ושילם לאחד מהן מאי שותפין ששאלו ושילם אחד מהן מאי שאל מן האשה ושילם לבעלה מאי אשה ששאלה ושילם בעלה מאי תיקו

The Gemara raises additional dilemmas: If the bailee paid half the value of the deposit before the thief was discovered, what is the halakha? If one borrowed two cows, and they were stolen, and he paid the value of one of them, what is the halakha? If one borrowed an item from partners, and he paid one of them, what is the halakha? In the case of partners who borrowed an item and one of them paid, what is the halakha? If one borrowed an item from a woman and paid her husband, what is the halakha? In the case of a woman who borrowed an item, and her husband paid, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All of these dilemmas shall stand unresolved [teiku].

אמר רב הונא משביעין אותו שבועה שאינה ברשותו מאי טעמא חיישינן שמא עיניו נתן בה

§ Rav Huna says: Even if the bailee declares his intention to pay for the deposit, the court administers an oath to him that the item was actually stolen or lost and is not in his possession. What is the reason for this oath? We are concerned that perhaps he coveted that item.

מיתיבי המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ואבד המשכון ואמר לו סלע הלויתיך עליו שקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו סלע היה שוה פטור

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Shevuot 43a): In the case of one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost, and the creditor says to the debtor: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and that collateral was worth a shekel, i.e., a half-sela. Therefore you owe me a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says in response to that claim: That is not the case. Rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth a sela; I owe you nothing. In this case, the debtor is exempt from payment.

סלע הלויתיך עליו שקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו שלשה דינרים היה שוה חייב

The mishna continues: If the creditor claimed: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is obligated to take an oath, due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the creditor with a partial admission.

סלע הלויתני עליו שנים היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתיך עליו סלע היה שוה פטור

The mishna continues: If the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. Here, the creditor is exempt.

סלע הלויתני עליו שנים היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתיך עליו חמשה דינרים היה שוה חייב

If the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth five dinars. Here, the creditor is obligated to take an oath due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the debtor with a partial admission.

מי נשבע מי שהפקדון אצלו שמא ישבע זה ויוציא הלה את הפקדון

The mishna concludes: Who takes the oath? The one in whose possession the deposit was located, i.e., the creditor, who took collateral from the debtor. The Sages instituted this provision lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.

אהייא אילימא אסיפא ותיפוק ליה דשבועה גבי מלוה היא דהא קא מודי מקצת הטענה אלא אמר שמואל ארישא

The Gemara seeks to clarify the mishna: To which case in the mishna is this halakha referring? If we say it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, where the debtor claims that the creditor owes him money, the mishna’s explanation is unnecessary: Derive that the obligation to take the oath is incumbent upon the creditor due to the fact that he admits to part of the debtor’s claim, which renders one obligated to take an oath by Torah law. Rather, Shmuel says: This halakha is referring to the first clause of the mishna.

מאי ארישא אסיפא דרישא סלע הלויתיך עליו שקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו שלשה דינרין היה שוה חייב דשבועה גבי לוה הוא ואמור רבנן לשתבע מלוה שמא ישבע זה ויוציא הלה את הפקדון

The Gemara clarifies further: What is the meaning of Shmuel’s statement that this halakha is referring to the first clause of the mishna? It is referring to the latter part of the first clause: The creditor says: I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars. Here, the halakha is that the debtor is obligated to take an oath. Fundamentally, the obligation to take the oath is that of the borrower, as he is the one who responds to the creditor’s claim with a partial admission. But the Sages said: Let the creditor take the oath to bolster his claim, lest this party, the debtor, take an oath and the other party, the creditor, produce the deposit.

ואם

After explaining this mishna from tractate Shevuot, the Gemara analyzes its connection to the statement of Rav Huna: But if