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Today's Daf Yomi

November 1, 2016 | ืœืณ ื‘ืชืฉืจื™ ืชืฉืขืดื–

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 36

Some unique cases are brought where the owner rentout out an animal and subsequently borrowed it for part of the time and then rented out for part of the time and then borrowed it again for part of the time. ย If the animal dies during the borrowing period, one can be obligated to pay 3 or 4 cows to the renter. ย Others disagree with this. ย Can a shomer give an item to someone else to watch? ย Different reasons are given to explain why this would be a problem. ย They thought that Rav held it was ok, but it was later explained that it was based on a misunderstanding from a psak of Rav’s. ย If one was negligent and brought the animal to a marsh (where thieves could come or predators) but the animal died in a typical manner, Abaye and Rava debate what Raba held – whether he would be exempt or obligated. ย They each explain in their own way how this case is different from a classic case of tchilato b’pshia vesofo b’onesย (one who does a negligent act but in the end there is accidental damage.

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ืืฉื ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ืืฉื ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

there are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื›ืคื™ืจืช ืžืžื•ืŸ ืืฉื ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืฉืคืชื™ื ื—ื˜ืืช

The Gemara elaborates: How so? One who takes a false oath that involves the denial of a monetary matter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who takes a false oath on an utterance of the lips that involves no denial of a monetary debt is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ื ืื ืกื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ืžื™ืคื˜ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

The Gemara elaborates: There are times that both are liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to circumstances beyond his control. A renter, who in any case is exempt from paying whether it died of natural causes or due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay regardless of the circumstances of its death, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. In both cases, the oath involved no denial of monetary debt.

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ืืฉื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ื’ื ื‘ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ื“ืชืจื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ืงื ื›ืคืจื™ ืžืžื•ื ื ื“ื”ื ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจื™ ื ืคืฉื™ื™ื”ื•

There are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from a borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. That is a case where both denied a monetary matter, as they are both liable to pay in a case of theft, and both take an oath on a claim with which they seek to exempt themselves.

ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ืžื™ืคื˜ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจ ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื‘ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ื‘ืืฉื

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. A renter, who in any case is exempt, as he is exempt from paying in cases where the ox was damaged or died due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the false oath involved no denial of monetary debt. A borrower, who is liable to pay when the cow died in its typical manner and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died due to ordinary labor, is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ืืฉื ื•ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ื’ื ื‘ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื”ื•ื ื“ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื’ื ื™ื‘ื” ื•ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจ ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื‘ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื‘ืืฉื ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from the borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died in its typical manner. The renter, who is liable to pay in cases of theft and loss and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died in its typical manner, is liable to bring a guilt-offering. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay, is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ืžืื™ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ืฉื”ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืžืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื‘ื•ืขืช ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื• ื ืคืฉ ื›ื™ ืชืฉื‘ืข ืœื‘ื˜ื ื‘ืฉืคืชื™ื ื›ื™ ืชืฉื‘ืข ืžืขืฆืžื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™

The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yirmeya teaching us with this systematic presentation of these cases? They are merely details based on established halakhic principles. The Gemara answers: His statement serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ami, who says: With regard to any oath that the judges administer, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the passage concerning the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath: โ€œOr if a soul takes an oath clearly to utter with lipsโ€ (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara infers: The liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath applies only to one who takes an oath on his own initiative, but not when the oath is administered by others. Rabbi Yirmeya teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance even if it was administered by another.

ืืชืžืจ ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a bailee who conveyed to another bailee the deposit with which he was entrusted. Rav says: He is exempt from payment in the same cases in which he is exempt when the deposit is in his possession. And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: He is liable to pay even in cases of damage due to circumstances beyond his control.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื“ืขืœื•ื™ื™ ืขืœื™ื™ื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืžืกืจื” ืœื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช

Abaye says: According to Ravโ€™s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, as in that case the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, since a paid bailee is liable to pay in instances where an unpaid bailee is exempt. But even in the case of a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, where the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, he is exempt. What is the reason? He is exempt because he conveyed the deposit to a mentally competent person, thereby effectively safeguarded the deposit.

ื•ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื“ืขืœื•ื™ื™ ืขืœื™ื™ื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ

According to Rabbi Yoแธฅananโ€™s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, as the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, since an unpaid bailee is exempt in instances where a paid bailee is liable to pay. But even in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, where the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, he is liable to pay. What is the reason? He is liable because the owner of the deposit said to him: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ืœืื• ื‘ืคื™ืจื•ืฉ ืืชืžืจ ืืœื ืžื›ืœืœื ื“ื”ื ื”ื• ื’ื™ื ืื™ ื“ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืžื ื”ื•ื• ืžืคืงื“ื™ ืžืจื™ื™ื”ื• ื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ื™ื•ืžื ื—ื“ ืืคืงื“ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื’ื‘ื™ ื—ื“ ืžื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืงืœื ื‘ื™ ื”ืœื•ืœื ื ืคืง ืื–ืœ ืืคืงื“ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ืื“ืื–ืœ ื•ืืชื ืื’ื ื•ื‘ ืžืจื™ื™ื”ื•

Rav แธคisda said: This statement that is attributed to Rav was not stated explicitly. Rather, it was inferred from another statement of his, as it is related: There were these gardeners who each day would deposit their spades with a certain old woman. One day they deposited their spades with one of gardeners. He heard noise from a wedding hall and set out and went there. He deposited the spades with that old woman. In the time that he went and came back from the wedding, their spades were stolen.

ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื•ืคื˜ืจื™ื” ืžืืŸ ื“ื—ื–ื ืกื‘ืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืžื ื ืžื™ ืื™ื ื”ื• ื’ื•ืคื™ื™ื”ื• ื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ื”ื•ื• ืžืคืงื“ื™ ืœื”ื•

The case came before Rav, and Rav exempted the gardener who deposited the spades with the old woman. One who observed Ravโ€™s ruling thought that Rav issued that ruling due to the fact that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is exempt. But that is not so. There, in the case of the spades, it is different, as the gardeners themselves would deposit their spades with that old woman. Since the gardeners cannot claim that it is not their desire for their deposit to be in the possession of this old woman, the gardener who did so is exempt.

ื™ืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื•ืงืืžืจ ืœื” ืœื”ื ืฉืžืขืชื ืื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจ ืžืžืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ืคืจื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ื”ืฉืื™ืœื” ืœืื—ืจ ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื™ืฉื‘ืข ื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ืžืฉืœื ืœืฉื•ื›ืจ ื•ืื ืื™ืชื ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืฉื ืชื ื• ืœื• ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืœื”ืฉืื™ืœ

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami sat and stated this halakha. Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to Rabbi Ami from the mishna: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner in the possession of the borrower, the halakha is that the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. And if the statement of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan is so, let the owner say to the renter: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and the renter should be liable to pay because he violated the ownerโ€™s wishes. Rabbi Ami said to him: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit to another.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื ื‘ืขื™ ืœืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื“ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืœื“ืขืชืš

The Gemara asks: If so, the borrower should be required to pay the owners, as the owner sanctioned the borrowing. Rabbi Abba bar Memel answers: The case in the mishna is one where the owner said to the renter: Lend this deposit to another at your discretion. Therefore, it is not considered as if the owner lent it to the borrower.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ืžืคืงื™ื“ ืžืขื•ืช ืืฆืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืฆืจืจืŸ ื•ื”ืคืฉื™ืœืŸ ืœืื—ื•ืจื™ื• ืžืกืจืŸ ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ื‘ืชื• ื”ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื•ื ืขืœ ื‘ืคื ื™ื”ื ืฉืœื ื›ืจืื•ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉืœื ืฉืžืจ ื›ื“ืจืš ื”ืฉื•ืžืจื™ื

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection from a mishna (42a): In the case of one who deposited coins with another, and that bailee bound it in a cloth and slung it behind him, or conveyed them to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, or locked the door before the coins in an inappropriate, i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is liable to pay for the coins, as he did not safeguard the coins in the manner typical of bailees.

ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื”ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืžืื™ ื ื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ

The Gemara infers: The reason he is liable to pay is that he conveyed the coins to his minor children, but if he conveyed them to his adult son or daughter he is exempt. Why? Let the owner say to him as Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and therefore even if the children are adults the bailee should be liable to pay.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ื”ืžืคืงื™ื“

Rava said: No proof can be cited, as it is clear that in the case of anyone who deposits an item with another,

ืขืœ ื“ืขืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ื‘ื ื™ื• ื”ื•ื ืžืคืงื™ื“

it is with the awareness that at times the baileeโ€™s wife and his children will safeguard the item that he deposits it, as the bailee cannot be with the deposit at all times.

ืืžืจื™ ื ื”ืจื“ืขื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื ืžื™ ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื• ืฉืžืกืจืŸ ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ื‘ืชื• ื”ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื‘ืชื• ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœืื—ืจื™ื ืœื ืฉื ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืงื˜ื ื™ื ืกืชืžื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

The Sages of Nehardeโ€™a say: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Or if he conveyed the coins to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, he is liable to pay. But if he conveyed them to his adult son and daughter, he is exempt. By inference, one can conclude that with regard to others, it is no different if they are adults and it is no different if they are minors. Either way, the bailee is liable to pay, as, if there were a difference, let the tanna teach: If he conveyed the coins to minors, without qualification. The Gemara concludes: Since the tanna specifically addressed the case of oneโ€™s minor children, learn from the wording of the mishna that the difference between minors and adults exists only with regard to oneโ€™s children.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืœื›ืชื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืืช ืžื”ื™ืžื ืช ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื”ืื™ืš ืœื ืžื”ื™ืžืŸ ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื”

Rava says: The halakha is: A bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay. It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha if he was a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit to an unpaid bailee, as in that case the first bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from paying in instances where a paid bailee is obligated to do so. But even if it was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, the first bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable in that case? He is liable, as the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost. That person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath.

ืืชืžืจ ืคืฉืข ื‘ื” ื•ื™ืฆืืช ืœืื’ื ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: In the case of one who was negligent in safeguarding an animal, and it went into a marsh, where it was susceptible to thieves and predatory animals, but it died in its typical manner despite this negligence, i.e., it was neither stolen nor devoured, Abaye says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is liable to pay. Rava says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is exempt from doing so.

ืื‘ื™ื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืื• ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืชื—ื™ืœืชื• ื‘ืคืฉื™ืขื” ื•ืกื•ืคื• ื‘ืื•ื ืก ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื›ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื‘ืœื ื“ืื’ืžื ืงื˜ืœื”

The Gemara elaborates. Abaye said in the name of Rabba: He is liable to pay, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is liable in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is liable to pay. But even according to the one who says: If the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident one is exempt, here the bailee is still liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable? It is because we say: The air of the marsh killed the animal. The negligence led to the death of the animal, and it was not due to circumstances beyond his control.

ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื›ืœ ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืื• ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืชื—ื™ืœืชื• ื‘ืคืฉื™ืขื” ื•ืกื•ืคื• ื‘ืื•ื ืก ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื›ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื

Rava says in the name of Rabba: He is exempt, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is exempt in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is exempt from payment. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is exempt. But even according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay, here the bailee is still exempt from payment. What is the reason that he is exempt? It is because we say with regard to the Angel of Death, who causes death by natural causes: What difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? The cause of the animalโ€™s death was natural, and there is no relevance given to the location of the death. Consequently, the bailee is exempt.

ื•ืžื•ื“ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ืื™ ื”ื“ืจื ืœื‘ื™ ืžืจื” ื•ืžืชื” ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ื”ื“ืจื ืœื” ื•ืœื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื”ื‘ืœื ื“ืื’ืžื ืงื˜ืœื” ื•ืžื•ื“ื™ ืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื’ื ื‘ื” ื’ื ื‘ ื‘ืื’ื ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื‘ื™ ื’ื ื‘ ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืื™ ืฉื‘ืงื” ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ื‘ื‘ื™ืชื™ื” ื“ื’ื ื‘ื ื”ื•ื” ืงื™ื™ืžื

The Gemara notes: And Abaye concedes that if the animal returned from the marsh to its ownerโ€™s house and died there that the bailee is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? He is exempt due to the fact that the animal returned, and since it was able to return there is no justification to say that the air of the marsh killed it. And Rava concedes that anytime the animal was stolen from the marsh and then dies in its typical manner in the house of the thief that the bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable to pay? He is liable because even if the Angel of Death spared the life of the animal, it would be standing in the house of the thief due to the negligence of the bailee.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืœื“ื™ื“ืš ื“ืืžืจืช ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื ื”ืื™ ื“ืื•ืชื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจ ืžืžืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื•ืฉื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืฉื ืชื ื• ืœื• ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืจืฉื•ืช ืœื”ืฉืื™ืœ ื•ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื

Abaye said to Rava: According to you, who said with regard to the Angel of Death: What difference is there to me if the animal was here and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? How will you explain the exchange between Rabbi Abba bar Memel and Rabbi Ami? As there is that objection that was raised by Rabbi Abba bar Memel to Rabbi Ami from the mishna with regard to one who rents a cow from another, and then lends it to another person, and Rabbi Ami answered him: It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit. Abaye states his challenge: But according to your explanation, let Rabbi Ami say to him that the bailee is exempt because with regard to the Angel of Death, what difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there. If the death would have happened regardless of the location of the animal, it makes no difference whether it was in the possession of the first renter or in the possession of the one he lent it to.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื“ื™ื“ื›ื• ื“ืžืชื ื™ืชื• ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ ืื™ื›ื ืœืื•ืชื‘ื” ืœื”ื”ื™ื ืœื“ื™ื“ื™ ื“ืืžื™ื ื ืื ืช ืžื”ื™ืžื ืช ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื•ื”ืื™ืš ืœื ืžื”ื™ืžืŸ ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ืœื™ื›ื ืœืื•ืชื‘ื” ื›ืœืœ

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, that you teach that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, there is room to raise that objection. But according to me, as I say that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost; that person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath, there is no room to raise that objection at all.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ืขืœื” ืœืจืืฉื™ ืฆื•ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœื” ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืื™ ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื•ื™ืจื ื“ื”ืจ ืงื˜ืœื” ืื™ ื ืžื™ ืื•ื‘ืฆื ื ื“ื”ืจ ืงื˜ืœื”

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection to the opinion of Abaye from a mishna (93b): If one brought the animal to the edge of a cliff and it fell, that is not considered an accident, and he is liable to pay. One may infer that if he brought it to the edge of the cliff and it died in its typical manner, that is considered an accident and he is exempt. But why? Let the owner of the animal say to the bailee: It is the air of the mountain that killed it, or: The exhaustion from climbing the mountain killed it.

ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉื”ืขืœื” ืœืžืจืขื” ืฉืžืŸ ื•ื˜ื•ื‘ ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืœื” ื ืžื™ ืฉื”ื™ื” ืœื• ืœืชื•ืงืคื” ื•ืœื ืชืงืคื”

The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the bailee took the animal to a bountiful and high-quality pasture. Since shepherds typically herd their flocks there, taking the animal there is not negligent. The Gemara asks: If so, then the bailee should be exempt even if the animal fell. The Gemara answers: He is liable to pay because he should have subdued the animal to prevent it from falling, and he did not subdue it.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื™ืžื ืจื™ืฉื ืขืœืชื” ืœืจืืฉื™ ืฆื•ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ืื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœืžื™ืชืงืคื” ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ืฉืชืงืคืชื• ื•ืขืœืชื” ืชืงืคืชื• ื•ื™ืจื“ื”

The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of the mishna: If the animal climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is a circumstance beyond his control and he is exempt. Shouldnโ€™t he be liable, since he was required to subdue it and prevent it from falling? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the tanna to say that the bailee is exempt only in a case where the animal overpowered him and ascended and the animal overpowered him and descended. Although he attempted to prevent the animal from falling, it overpowered the bailee and fell.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื”ืœื” ืขื•ืฉื” ืกื—ื•ืจื” ื‘ืคืจืชื• ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจืช ืœืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื—ืœื•ืง ื”ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™

ยง The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party do business with and profit from anotherโ€™s cow? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: You told us in the name of Shmuel that Rabbi Yosei was in disagreement with the first tanna

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Metzia 36

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 36

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ืืฉื ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ืืฉื ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

there are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering; there are times that the renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and the borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื›ืคื™ืจืช ืžืžื•ืŸ ืืฉื ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืฉืคืชื™ื ื—ื˜ืืช

The Gemara elaborates: How so? One who takes a false oath that involves the denial of a monetary matter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. One who takes a false oath on an utterance of the lips that involves no denial of a monetary debt is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ื ืื ืกื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ืžื™ืคื˜ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

The Gemara elaborates: There are times that both are liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to circumstances beyond his control. A renter, who in any case is exempt from paying whether it died of natural causes or due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay regardless of the circumstances of its death, is liable to bring a sin-offering if he took a false oath. In both cases, the oath involved no denial of monetary debt.

ืคืขืžื™ื ืฉืฉื ื™ื”ื ื‘ืืฉื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ื’ื ื‘ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ื“ืชืจื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ืงื ื›ืคืจื™ ืžืžื•ื ื ื“ื”ื ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจื™ ื ืคืฉื™ื™ื”ื•

There are times that both are liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from a borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. That is a case where both denied a monetary matter, as they are both liable to pay in a case of theft, and both take an oath on a claim with which they seek to exempt themselves.

ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื•ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ืืฉื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ืžื™ืคื˜ืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจ ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื‘ืžืชื” ืžื—ืžืช ืžืœืื›ื” ื‘ืืฉื

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a sin-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering. This is in a case where the cow died in its typical manner and the renter and the borrower both said that it died due to ordinary labor. A renter, who in any case is exempt, as he is exempt from paying in cases where the ox was damaged or died due to circumstances beyond his control, is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the false oath involved no denial of monetary debt. A borrower, who is liable to pay when the cow died in its typical manner and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died due to ordinary labor, is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื‘ืืฉื ื•ืฉื•ืืœ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืฉื ื’ื ื‘ื” ื•ืืžืจื• ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ืฉื•ื›ืจ ื”ื•ื ื“ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื’ื ื™ื‘ื” ื•ืื‘ื™ื“ื” ื•ืงื ืคื˜ืจ ื ืคืฉื™ื” ื‘ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื‘ืืฉื ืฉื•ืืœ ื“ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื›ืš ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžื™ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื—ื˜ืืช

There are times when a renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering and a borrower is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is in a case where the cow was stolen from the borrower, and the renter and the borrower both said that it died in its typical manner. The renter, who is liable to pay in cases of theft and loss and attempted to exempt himself with the claim that it died in its typical manner, is liable to bring a guilt-offering. A borrower, who in any case is liable to pay, is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ืžืื™ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ืœืืคื•ืงื™ ืžื“ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื“ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ืฉื”ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืžืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ื ืื•ืชื” ืื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื” ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื‘ื•ืขืช ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืฉื ืืžืจ ืื• ื ืคืฉ ื›ื™ ืชืฉื‘ืข ืœื‘ื˜ื ื‘ืฉืคืชื™ื ื›ื™ ืชืฉื‘ืข ืžืขืฆืžื” ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™

The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yirmeya teaching us with this systematic presentation of these cases? They are merely details based on established halakhic principles. The Gemara answers: His statement serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ami, who says: With regard to any oath that the judges administer, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the passage concerning the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath: โ€œOr if a soul takes an oath clearly to utter with lipsโ€ (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara infers: The liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath applies only to one who takes an oath on his own initiative, but not when the oath is administered by others. Rabbi Yirmeya teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath on an utterance even if it was administered by another.

ืืชืžืจ ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a bailee who conveyed to another bailee the deposit with which he was entrusted. Rav says: He is exempt from payment in the same cases in which he is exempt when the deposit is in his possession. And Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: He is liable to pay even in cases of damage due to circumstances beyond his control.

ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื“ืขืœื•ื™ื™ ืขืœื™ื™ื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ืžืกืจื” ืœื‘ืŸ ื“ืขืช

Abaye says: According to Ravโ€™s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, as in that case the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, since a paid bailee is liable to pay in instances where an unpaid bailee is exempt. But even in the case of a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, where the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, he is exempt. What is the reason? He is exempt because he conveyed the deposit to a mentally competent person, thereby effectively safeguarded the deposit.

ื•ืœื˜ืขืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื“ืขืœื•ื™ื™ ืขืœื™ื™ื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ

According to Rabbi Yoแธฅananโ€™s line of reasoning, it is not necessary to state his ruling in a case where he was initially a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, as the paid bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, since an unpaid bailee is exempt in instances where a paid bailee is liable to pay. But even in the case of an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, where the unpaid bailee enhanced the level of his safeguarding, he is liable to pay. What is the reason? He is liable because the owner of the deposit said to him: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ืœืื• ื‘ืคื™ืจื•ืฉ ืืชืžืจ ืืœื ืžื›ืœืœื ื“ื”ื ื”ื• ื’ื™ื ืื™ ื“ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืžื ื”ื•ื• ืžืคืงื“ื™ ืžืจื™ื™ื”ื• ื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ื™ื•ืžื ื—ื“ ืืคืงื“ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื’ื‘ื™ ื—ื“ ืžื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื• ืฉืžืข ืงืœื ื‘ื™ ื”ืœื•ืœื ื ืคืง ืื–ืœ ืืคืงื“ื™ื ื”ื• ืœื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ืื“ืื–ืœ ื•ืืชื ืื’ื ื•ื‘ ืžืจื™ื™ื”ื•

Rav แธคisda said: This statement that is attributed to Rav was not stated explicitly. Rather, it was inferred from another statement of his, as it is related: There were these gardeners who each day would deposit their spades with a certain old woman. One day they deposited their spades with one of gardeners. He heard noise from a wedding hall and set out and went there. He deposited the spades with that old woman. In the time that he went and came back from the wedding, their spades were stolen.

ืืชื ืœืงืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ ื•ืคื˜ืจื™ื” ืžืืŸ ื“ื—ื–ื ืกื‘ืจ ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื ื“ื›ืœ ื™ื•ืžื ื ืžื™ ืื™ื ื”ื• ื’ื•ืคื™ื™ื”ื• ื’ื‘ื” ื“ื”ื”ื™ื ืกื‘ืชื ื”ื•ื• ืžืคืงื“ื™ ืœื”ื•

The case came before Rav, and Rav exempted the gardener who deposited the spades with the old woman. One who observed Ravโ€™s ruling thought that Rav issued that ruling due to the fact that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is exempt. But that is not so. There, in the case of the spades, it is different, as the gardeners themselves would deposit their spades with that old woman. Since the gardeners cannot claim that it is not their desire for their deposit to be in the possession of this old woman, the gardener who did so is exempt.

ื™ืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื•ืงืืžืจ ืœื” ืœื”ื ืฉืžืขืชื ืื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจ ืžืžืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ืคืจื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ื”ืฉืื™ืœื” ืœืื—ืจ ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื™ืฉื‘ืข ื”ืฉื•ื›ืจ ืฉืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื•ื”ืฉื•ืืœ ืžืฉืœื ืœืฉื•ื›ืจ ื•ืื ืื™ืชื ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืฉื ืชื ื• ืœื• ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืœื”ืฉืื™ืœ

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami sat and stated this halakha. Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to Rabbi Ami from the mishna: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner in the possession of the borrower, the halakha is that the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. And if the statement of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan is so, let the owner say to the renter: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and the renter should be liable to pay because he violated the ownerโ€™s wishes. Rabbi Ami said to him: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit to another.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ื ื‘ืขื™ ืœืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื“ืืžืจื• ืœื™ื” ืœื“ืขืชืš

The Gemara asks: If so, the borrower should be required to pay the owners, as the owner sanctioned the borrowing. Rabbi Abba bar Memel answers: The case in the mishna is one where the owner said to the renter: Lend this deposit to another at your discretion. Therefore, it is not considered as if the owner lent it to the borrower.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ืžืคืงื™ื“ ืžืขื•ืช ืืฆืœ ื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ืฆืจืจืŸ ื•ื”ืคืฉื™ืœืŸ ืœืื—ื•ืจื™ื• ืžืกืจืŸ ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ื‘ืชื• ื”ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื•ื ืขืœ ื‘ืคื ื™ื”ื ืฉืœื ื›ืจืื•ื™ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืฉืœื ืฉืžืจ ื›ื“ืจืš ื”ืฉื•ืžืจื™ื

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection from a mishna (42a): In the case of one who deposited coins with another, and that bailee bound it in a cloth and slung it behind him, or conveyed them to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, or locked the door before the coins in an inappropriate, i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is liable to pay for the coins, as he did not safeguard the coins in the manner typical of bailees.

ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื”ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืžืื™ ื ื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ

The Gemara infers: The reason he is liable to pay is that he conveyed the coins to his minor children, but if he conveyed them to his adult son or daughter he is exempt. Why? Let the owner say to him as Rabbi Yoแธฅanan said: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, and therefore even if the children are adults the bailee should be liable to pay.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ื”ืžืคืงื™ื“

Rava said: No proof can be cited, as it is clear that in the case of anyone who deposits an item with another,

ืขืœ ื“ืขืช ืืฉืชื• ื•ื‘ื ื™ื• ื”ื•ื ืžืคืงื™ื“

it is with the awareness that at times the baileeโ€™s wife and his children will safeguard the item that he deposits it, as the bailee cannot be with the deposit at all times.

ืืžืจื™ ื ื”ืจื“ืขื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื ืžื™ ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื• ืฉืžืกืจืŸ ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ื‘ืชื• ื”ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื ืœื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื‘ืชื• ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืœืื—ืจื™ื ืœื ืฉื ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืงื˜ื ื™ื ืกืชืžื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

The Sages of Nehardeโ€™a say: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Or if he conveyed the coins to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, he is liable to pay. But if he conveyed them to his adult son and daughter, he is exempt. By inference, one can conclude that with regard to others, it is no different if they are adults and it is no different if they are minors. Either way, the bailee is liable to pay, as, if there were a difference, let the tanna teach: If he conveyed the coins to minors, without qualification. The Gemara concludes: Since the tanna specifically addressed the case of oneโ€™s minor children, learn from the wording of the mishna that the difference between minors and adults exists only with regard to oneโ€™s children.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ื”ืœื›ืชื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ื“ื’ืจื•ืขื™ ื’ืจืขื” ืœืฉืžื™ืจืชื• ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืฉื•ืžืจ ื—ื ื ืฉืžืกืจ ืœืฉื•ืžืจ ืฉื›ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืืช ืžื”ื™ืžื ืช ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื”ืื™ืš ืœื ืžื”ื™ืžืŸ ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื”

Rava says: The halakha is: A bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay. It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha if he was a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit to an unpaid bailee, as in that case the first bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from paying in instances where a paid bailee is obligated to do so. But even if it was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, the first bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable in that case? He is liable, as the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost. That person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath.

ืืชืžืจ ืคืฉืข ื‘ื” ื•ื™ืฆืืช ืœืื’ื ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: In the case of one who was negligent in safeguarding an animal, and it went into a marsh, where it was susceptible to thieves and predatory animals, but it died in its typical manner despite this negligence, i.e., it was neither stolen nor devoured, Abaye says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is liable to pay. Rava says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is exempt from doing so.

ืื‘ื™ื™ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื›ืœ ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืื• ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžื‘ืขื™ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืชื—ื™ืœืชื• ื‘ืคืฉื™ืขื” ื•ืกื•ืคื• ื‘ืื•ื ืก ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื”ื›ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื‘ืœื ื“ืื’ืžื ืงื˜ืœื”

The Gemara elaborates. Abaye said in the name of Rabba: He is liable to pay, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is liable in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is liable to pay. But even according to the one who says: If the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident one is exempt, here the bailee is still liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable? It is because we say: The air of the marsh killed the animal. The negligence led to the death of the animal, and it was not due to circumstances beyond his control.

ืจื‘ื ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื›ืœ ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื“ืœื ื“ืื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื“ื™ื ื ืœืื• ื“ื™ื™ื ื ื”ื•ื ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืชื—ื™ืœืชื• ื‘ืคืฉื™ืขื” ื•ืกื•ืคื• ื‘ืื•ื ืก ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืืœื ืืคื™ืœื• ืœืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื›ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื

Rava says in the name of Rabba: He is exempt, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is exempt in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is exempt from payment. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is exempt. But even according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay, here the bailee is still exempt from payment. What is the reason that he is exempt? It is because we say with regard to the Angel of Death, who causes death by natural causes: What difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? The cause of the animalโ€™s death was natural, and there is no relevance given to the location of the death. Consequently, the bailee is exempt.

ื•ืžื•ื“ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ืื™ ื”ื“ืจื ืœื‘ื™ ืžืจื” ื•ืžืชื” ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ื”ื ื”ื“ืจื ืœื” ื•ืœื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ื”ื‘ืœื ื“ืื’ืžื ืงื˜ืœื” ื•ืžื•ื“ื™ ืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื’ื ื‘ื” ื’ื ื‘ ื‘ืื’ื ื•ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื‘ื™ ื’ื ื‘ ื“ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืื™ ืฉื‘ืงื” ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ื‘ื‘ื™ืชื™ื” ื“ื’ื ื‘ื ื”ื•ื” ืงื™ื™ืžื

The Gemara notes: And Abaye concedes that if the animal returned from the marsh to its ownerโ€™s house and died there that the bailee is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? He is exempt due to the fact that the animal returned, and since it was able to return there is no justification to say that the air of the marsh killed it. And Rava concedes that anytime the animal was stolen from the marsh and then dies in its typical manner in the house of the thief that the bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable to pay? He is liable because even if the Angel of Death spared the life of the animal, it would be standing in the house of the thief due to the negligence of the bailee.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืœืจื‘ื ืœื“ื™ื“ืš ื“ืืžืจืช ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื ื”ืื™ ื“ืื•ืชื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ืื‘ื ื‘ืจ ืžืžืœ ืœืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื•ืฉื ื™ ืœื™ื” ื‘ืฉื ืชื ื• ืœื• ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืจืฉื•ืช ืœื”ืฉืื™ืœ ื•ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืžืœืืš ื”ืžื•ืช ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ื›ื ื•ืžื” ืœื™ ื”ืชื

Abaye said to Rava: According to you, who said with regard to the Angel of Death: What difference is there to me if the animal was here and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? How will you explain the exchange between Rabbi Abba bar Memel and Rabbi Ami? As there is that objection that was raised by Rabbi Abba bar Memel to Rabbi Ami from the mishna with regard to one who rents a cow from another, and then lends it to another person, and Rabbi Ami answered him: It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit. Abaye states his challenge: But according to your explanation, let Rabbi Ami say to him that the bailee is exempt because with regard to the Angel of Death, what difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there. If the death would have happened regardless of the location of the animal, it makes no difference whether it was in the possession of the first renter or in the possession of the one he lent it to.

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืœื“ื™ื“ื›ื• ื“ืžืชื ื™ืชื• ืื™ืŸ ืจืฆื•ื ื™ ืฉื™ื”ื ืคืงื“ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ ืื—ืจ ืื™ื›ื ืœืื•ืชื‘ื” ืœื”ื”ื™ื ืœื“ื™ื“ื™ ื“ืืžื™ื ื ืื ืช ืžื”ื™ืžื ืช ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ื•ื”ืื™ืš ืœื ืžื”ื™ืžืŸ ืœื™ ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื” ืœื™ื›ื ืœืื•ืชื‘ื” ื›ืœืœ

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, that you teach that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, there is room to raise that objection. But according to me, as I say that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost; that person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath, there is no room to raise that objection at all.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจืžื™ ื‘ืจ ื—ืžื ื”ืขืœื” ืœืจืืฉื™ ืฆื•ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœื” ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื ืžืชื” ื›ื“ืจื›ื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืื™ ืœื™ืžื ืœื™ื” ืื•ื™ืจื ื“ื”ืจ ืงื˜ืœื” ืื™ ื ืžื™ ืื•ื‘ืฆื ื ื“ื”ืจ ืงื˜ืœื”

Rami bar แธคama raises an objection to the opinion of Abaye from a mishna (93b): If one brought the animal to the edge of a cliff and it fell, that is not considered an accident, and he is liable to pay. One may infer that if he brought it to the edge of the cliff and it died in its typical manner, that is considered an accident and he is exempt. But why? Let the owner of the animal say to the bailee: It is the air of the mountain that killed it, or: The exhaustion from climbing the mountain killed it.

ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ืฉื”ืขืœื” ืœืžืจืขื” ืฉืžืŸ ื•ื˜ื•ื‘ ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื ืคืœื” ื ืžื™ ืฉื”ื™ื” ืœื• ืœืชื•ืงืคื” ื•ืœื ืชืงืคื”

The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the bailee took the animal to a bountiful and high-quality pasture. Since shepherds typically herd their flocks there, taking the animal there is not negligent. The Gemara asks: If so, then the bailee should be exempt even if the animal fell. The Gemara answers: He is liable to pay because he should have subdued the animal to prevent it from falling, and he did not subdue it.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื™ืžื ืจื™ืฉื ืขืœืชื” ืœืจืืฉื™ ืฆื•ืงื™ืŸ ื•ื ืคืœื” ื”ืจื™ ื–ื” ืื•ื ืก ืื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœืžื™ืชืงืคื” ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ืฉืชืงืคืชื• ื•ืขืœืชื” ืชืงืคืชื• ื•ื™ืจื“ื”

The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of the mishna: If the animal climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is a circumstance beyond his control and he is exempt. Shouldnโ€™t he be liable, since he was required to subdue it and prevent it from falling? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the tanna to say that the bailee is exempt only in a case where the animal overpowered him and ascended and the animal overpowered him and descended. Although he attempted to prevent the animal from falling, it overpowered the bailee and fell.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื”ืœื” ืขื•ืฉื” ืกื—ื•ืจื” ื‘ืคืจืชื• ื›ื•ืณ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื‘ืจ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืœืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืืžืจืช ืœืŸ ืžืฉืžื™ื” ื“ืฉืžื•ืืœ ื—ืœื•ืง ื”ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™

ยง The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party do business with and profit from anotherโ€™s cow? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: You told us in the name of Shmuel that Rabbi Yosei was in disagreement with the first tanna

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