Bava Metzia 41

צריך דעת בעלים

One requires the knowledge of the owner for the item to be considered returned.

אי רבי ישמעאל מאי איריא לא יחדו אפילו יחדו נמי

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, why did the tanna in the first clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner did not designate a specific place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house? Even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, the bailee should be exempt because he replaced the barrel.

לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא יחדו דמקומה הוא אלא אפילו לא יחדו דלאו מקומה הוא לא בעינן דעת בעלים

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners designated a place for the barrel, as after the bailee replaced the barrel, that is its place. But even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, and after the bailee replaces the barrel that is not its place, we do not require the knowledge of the owners. In both cases, once he replaces the barrel, he is exempt from payment.

אימא סיפא יחדו לה הבעלים מקום וטלטלה ונשברה בין מתוך ידו בין משהניחה לצרכו חייב לצרכה פטור אתאן לרבי עקיבא דאמר בעינן דעת בעלים

The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owners designated a specific place for the barrel, and the bailee moved it and it broke, whether it broke while still in his hand or whether it broke after he replaced the barrel, if he moved it for his purposes he is liable to pay, and if he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt. We arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: We require the knowledge of the owners. Since the bailee moved the barrel from its place for his own purposes, he is a robber and is responsible for damages.

אי רבי עקיבא מאי איריא יחדו אפילו לא יחדו נמי

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, why did the tanna in the latter clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner designated a particular place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house? Even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, the bailee should be liable to pay, because the barrel is not considered to have been returned.

לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא לא יחדו דלאו מקומה הוא אלא אפילו יחדו נמי דמקומה הוא בעינן דעת בעלים

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners did not designate a place for the barrel, as the place that the bailee placed the barrel is not its place. But even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, where the place that the bailee placed the barrel is its place, we require the knowledge of the owners for it to be considered as if the bailee returned the barrel.

רישא רבי ישמעאל וסיפא רבי עקיבא אין דאמר רבי יוחנן מאן דמתרגם לי חבית אליבא דחד תנא מובלנא מאניה בתריה לבי מסותא

The Gemara asks: The result of that explanation is that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who explains to me both clauses of the mishna with regard to a barrel according to the opinion of one tanna I will honor, and carry his garments after him to the bathhouse, and treat him as a servant treats his master.

תרגמה רבי יעקב בר אבא קמיה דרב שנטלה על מנת לגוזלה

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it, and that is the meaning of the term: For his purposes. Since he intended to rob the owner of the barrel, he must return it to its place. In the first clause of the mishna, where the owner of the barrel did not designate a place for it, anywhere that he places it constitutes a return to its place. In the latter clause of the mishna, where the owner designated a place for the barrel, since the bailee did not return the barrel to that place, it is not considered to have been returned.

תרגמה רבי נתן בר אבא קמיה דרב שנטלה על מנת לשלוח בה יד

Rabbi Natan bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it, as one who misappropriates the property of another is responsible for any subsequent damage to it.

במאי קמיפלגי בשליחות יד צריכה חסרון מאן דאמר לגוזלה קסבר שליחות יד צריכה חסרון ומאן דאמר לשלוח בה יד קסבר שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Natan disagree? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to whether misappropriation requires loss: Is one liable for misappropriation only if it results in depreciation of the deposit, or is one liable for misappropriation even if he only intended to damage the deposit but there was no depreciation? The one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it holds that misappropriation requires loss. And the one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it holds that misappropriation does not require loss.

מתקיף לה רב ששת מידי נטלה קתני טלטלה קתני אלא אמר רב ששת הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שטלטלה להביא עליה גוזלות וקא סבר שואל שלא מדעת גזלן הוי וכולה רבי ישמעאל היא וסיפא שהניחה במקום שאינה מקומה

Rav Sheshet objects to that explanation: Does the tanna teach that the bailee took it? It is taught in the mishna: The bailee moved it, indicating that he sought neither to misappropriate it nor to rob the owner of it. Rather, Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the bailee moved the barrel to stand upon it and bring fledglings from a nest in a tree. The bailee did not attempt to use its contents. He merely climbed on the barrel. And the tanna of the mishna holds: The legal status of one who borrows without the knowledge of the owners is that of a robber in terms of responsibility. And the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And the latter clause is referring to a case where the bailee is responsible because he placed the barrel in a place that is not its designated place.

ורבי יוחנן הניחה במקומה משמע

The Gemara asks: And why doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan, who claimed that it is not possible to establish both clauses of the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the same tanna, explain the mishna in that manner? He holds that the term: He placed it, indicates that he replaced it in its designated place. Therefore, the latter clause cannot be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the contradiction remains.

איתמר רב ולוי חד אמר שליחות יד צריכה חסרון וחד אמר שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון תסתיים דרב הוא דאמר שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון דתניא רועה שהיה רועה עדרו והניח עדרו ובא לעיר ובא זאב וטרף ובא ארי ודרס פטור הניח מקלו ותרמילו עליה חייב

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute between Rav and Levi. One says: Misappropriation requires loss. And one says: Misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara comments: It may be concluded that it is Rav who says: Misappropriation does not require loss, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a shepherd who was herding his flock, which included the animals of others, and he abandoned his flock and went to the city, and a wolf came and devoured an animal, and a lion came and clawed an animal, the shepherd is exempt, as in any case, the attacks occurred through circumstances beyond his control. If he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal that was later attacked, he is liable to pay for the animal. Since he utilized the animal, it is as if he misappropriated it, and therefore he is liable to pay even in a case involving circumstances beyond his control.

והוינן בה משום דהניח מקלו ותרמילו עליה חייב הא שקלינהו

And we discussed this baraita: Due to the fact that he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal, is he liable to pay? Didn’t he already remove them? Even if he improperly used the animal, he already removed his staff and satchel, and it is tantamount to returning it to the owners.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב בעודן עליה וכי עודן עליה מאי הוי הא לא משכה

And Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The tanna is referring to a case where the wolf devoured the animal when the staff and satchel were still on the animal. Since the bailee is still using the animal, it is considered his in terms of liability to pay for the damage caused. The Gemara asks: And if the staff and satchel are still on the animal, what of it? But he did not pull the animal and therefore did not acquire it.

ואמר רב שמואל בר רב יצחק אמר רב שהכישה במקל ורצתה לפניו והא לא חסרה אלא לאו שמע מינה קסבר שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון

And Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: The tanna is referring to a case where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff and it ran before him, which is a form of pulling. The Gemara asks: But by causing the animal to run, he did not cause a loss to the animal. Why is he liable to pay? Rather, must one not conclude from it that Rav holds: Misappropriation does not require loss?

אימא שהכחישה במקל דיקא נמי דקתני שהכישה במקל שמע מינה

The Gemara rejects that proof: Say that he weakened the animal with a staff, and that is the only reason that he is liable to pay. The Gemara comments: Rav’s language is also precise, as he teaches: Where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff. The reason that he explains that he struck the animal with a staff, as opposed to his hand, is to indicate that the animal was weakened. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss.

ומדרב סבר שליחות יד צריכה חסרון לוי סבר שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון מאי טעמא דלוי אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי יוסי בן נהוראי משונה שליחות יד האמורה בשומר שכר משליחות יד האמורה בשומר חנם

The Gemara comments: And from the fact that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss, it may be inferred that Levi holds that misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Levi? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Nehorai: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee. There is no need for the Torah to state the halakha of misappropriation twice. If an unpaid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation, all the more so is a paid bailee liable to pay. The reason that the Torah repeated this halakha is to teach that a paid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation even if there is no loss.

ואני אומר אינה משונה

Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: And I say that misappropriation by a paid bailee is not different.

ומאי משונה לא תאמר שליחות יד בשומר שכר ותיתי משומר חנם ומה שומר חנם שפטור בגנבה ואבדה שלח בה יד חייב שומר שכר שחייב בגנבה ואבידה לא כל שכן למאי הלכתא כתבינהו רחמנא לומר לך שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון

The Gemara elaborates: And what is meant by: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee? As one could claim: Let misappropriation not be stated with regard to a paid bailee, and derive it from misappropriation with regard to an unpaid bailee by means of an a fortiori inference: And if an unpaid bailee, who is exempt in cases where he claims theft and loss, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then a paid bailee, who is liable in cases where he claims theft and loss, all the more so is it not clear that he is liable if he misappropriated the deposit? With regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write misappropriation in the case of a paid bailee? It is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss; intent to misappropriate is enough to render him liable to pay.

ואני אומר אינה משונה כרבי אלעזר דאמר דא ודא אחת היא מאי דא ודא אחת משום דאיכא למפרך מה לשומר חנם שכן משלם תשלומי כפל בטוען טענת גנב

Rabbi Yoḥanan stated: And I say that it is not different, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: This case and that case are one. The Gemara elaborates: What is the meaning of: This and that are one? It means that it was necessary to teach misappropriation in both cases due to the fact that it can be refuted by an a fortiori inference: What is notable about an unpaid bailee? He is notable in that he pays the double payment when he falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. A paid bailee reimburses the owner only for the cost of the deposit in that case. The legal status of the paid bailee is not consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore no a fortiori inference is possible.

ומאן דלא פריך סבר קרנא בלא שבועה עדיפא מכפילא בשבועה

The Gemara comments: And the one who does not refute the a fortiori inference holds: The absolute requirement to pay the principal even without having taken a false oath is more stringent than the requirement to pay the double payment that is effected only with the bailee taking a false oath. In his opinion, the legal status of the paid bailee is consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore an a fortiori inference is possible.

רבא אמר לא תאמר שליחות יד לא בשומר חנם ולא בשומר שכר ותיתי משואל ומה שואל דלדעת בעלים קא עביד שלח בה יד חייב שומר חנם ושומר שכר לא כל שכן

Rava says: The verse should not state misappropriation, neither with regard to an unpaid bailee nor with regard to a paid bailee, and one can derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from misappropriation with regard to a borrower: And if a borrower, who utilizes the deposit with the knowledge of the owner, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then with regard to an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee, who may not utilize the deposit at all, all the more so is it not clear that they are liable to pay if they misappropriate the deposit?

למה נאמר חדא לומר לך שליחות יד אין צריכה חסרון ואידך שלא תאמר דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנידון מה שואל בבעלים פטור אף שומר חנם ושומר שכר בבעלים פטור

Why, then, is the halakha of misappropriation stated in the cases of the unpaid and paid bailees? One mention is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss. And the other mention is so that you will not say: With regard to this a fortiori inference, there is principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion inferred from an a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference, and thereby conclude: Just as a borrower who is in partnership with the owner is exempt, so too, an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee who are in partnership with the owner are exempt. Consequently, it was necessary for the verse to mention the halakha of misappropriation with regard to both the paid and unpaid bailee.

ולמאן דאמר שליחות יד צריכה חסרון הני תרתי שליחות יד למה לי חדא שלא תאמר דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says: Misappropriation requires a loss, why do I need these two mentions of misappropriation? The Gemara explains: One mention is so that you will not say with regard to this a fortiori inference the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

ואידך לכדתניא ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים לשבועה אתה אומר לשבועה או אינו אלא לדין נאמרה שליחות יד למטה ונאמרה שליחות יד למעלה מה להלן לשבועה אף כאן לשבועה

And the other mention is for that which is taught in a baraita. It is written: “And the master of the house shall approach the judges to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). This is stated with regard to an oath. Do you say that it is stated with regard to an oath, or is it stated only with regard to judgment? Misappropriation is stated below, in a later verse in the chapter: “Whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:10), and misappropriation is stated above, in an earlier verse in the chapter: “Whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). Just as below it is stated explicitly with regard to an oath: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:10), so too here, it is stated with regard to an oath and not merely for judgment.