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Today's Daf Yomi

November 6, 2016 | 讛壮 讘诪专讞砖讜讜谉 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Metzia 41

If one moves a barrel that one is supposed to watch and it broke, the mishna depends the halacha upon why it was moved (for the sake of the item or for the shomer’s use of the item) and at what point it broke (while in the shomer’s hand or after it was returned) and was it a case where the owner had specified where the shomer should keep it. 聽The gemara attempts to explain the logic behind the mishna and as it especially relates to something contradictory. 聽One approach is to say that the mishna is composed of two different opinions. 聽A different approach is to bring in an additional parameter not mentioned explicitly in the mishna – was it returned to its proper place or returned to a different location. 聽within the latter interpretation there are 3 opinions about why the shomer moved the item – to use part of it (shilchut yad), to steal the whole thing or to borrow it? 聽The difference between the first two opinions is based on a difference of opinion regarding the case of shlichut yad 聽where one becomes responsible even for unanticipated damages – is it only if the item depreciates in value or even if there is no loss? 聽 Derivations from the repetition of the verses where shlichut yad is mentioned are brought as it seems unnecessarily mentioned both by a shomer chinam and a shomer sachar. 聽4 different derivations are brought. Study Guide Bava Metzia 41


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爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

One requires the knowledge of the owner for the item to be considered returned.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, why did the tanna in the first clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner did not designate a specific place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee鈥檚 house? Even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, the bailee should be exempt because he replaced the barrel.

诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诇讗讜 诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners designated a place for the barrel, as after the bailee replaced the barrel, that is its place. But even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, and after the bailee replaces the barrel that is not its place, we do not require the knowledge of the owners. In both cases, once he replaces the barrel, he is exempt from payment.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讬讞讚讜 诇讛 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪拽讜诐 讜讟诇讟诇讛 讜谞砖讘专讛 讘讬谉 诪转讜讱 讬讚讜 讘讬谉 诪砖讛谞讬讞讛 诇爪专讻讜 讞讬讬讘 诇爪专讻讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讗谉 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owners designated a specific place for the barrel, and the bailee moved it and it broke, whether it broke while still in his hand or whether it broke after he replaced the barrel, if he moved it for his purposes he is liable to pay, and if he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt. We arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: We require the knowledge of the owners. Since the bailee moved the barrel from its place for his own purposes, he is a robber and is responsible for damages.

讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讬讞讚讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, why did the tanna in the latter clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner designated a particular place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee鈥檚 house? Even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, the bailee should be liable to pay, because the barrel is not considered to have been returned.

诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诇讗讜 诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬 讚诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners did not designate a place for the barrel, as the place that the bailee placed the barrel is not its place. But even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, where the place that the bailee placed the barrel is its place, we require the knowledge of the owners for it to be considered as if the bailee returned the barrel.

专讬砖讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讗谉 讚诪转专讙诐 诇讬 讞讘讬转 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讞讚 转谞讗 诪讜讘诇谞讗 诪讗谞讬讛 讘转专讬讛 诇讘讬 诪住讜转讗

The Gemara asks: The result of that explanation is that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is as Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Anyone who explains to me both clauses of the mishna with regard to a barrel according to the opinion of one tanna I will honor, and carry his garments after him to the bathhouse, and treat him as a servant treats his master.

转专讙诪讛 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖谞讟诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇讙讜讝诇讛

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it, and that is the meaning of the term: For his purposes. Since he intended to rob the owner of the barrel, he must return it to its place. In the first clause of the mishna, where the owner of the barrel did not designate a place for it, anywhere that he places it constitutes a return to its place. In the latter clause of the mishna, where the owner designated a place for the barrel, since the bailee did not return the barrel to that place, it is not considered to have been returned.

转专讙诪讛 专讘讬 谞转谉 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖谞讟诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖诇讜讞 讘讛 讬讚

Rabbi Natan bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it, as one who misappropriates the property of another is responsible for any subsequent damage to it.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讙讜讝诇讛 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇砖诇讜讞 讘讛 讬讚 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov and Rabbi Natan disagree? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to whether misappropriation requires loss: Is one liable for misappropriation only if it results in depreciation of the deposit, or is one liable for misappropriation even if he only intended to damage the deposit but there was no depreciation? The one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it holds that misappropriation requires loss. And the one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it holds that misappropriation does not require loss.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 诪讬讚讬 谞讟诇讛 拽转谞讬 讟诇讟诇讛 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讟诇讟诇讛 诇讛讘讬讗 注诇讬讛 讙讜讝诇讜转 讜拽讗 住讘专 砖讜讗诇 砖诇讗 诪讚注转 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讬 讜讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讜住讬驻讗 砖讛谞讬讞讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜诪讛

Rav Sheshet objects to that explanation: Does the tanna teach that the bailee took it? It is taught in the mishna: The bailee moved it, indicating that he sought neither to misappropriate it nor to rob the owner of it. Rather, Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the bailee moved the barrel to stand upon it and bring fledglings from a nest in a tree. The bailee did not attempt to use its contents. He merely climbed on the barrel. And the tanna of the mishna holds: The legal status of one who borrows without the knowledge of the owners is that of a robber in terms of responsibility. And the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And the latter clause is referring to a case where the bailee is responsible because he placed the barrel in a place that is not its designated place.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞讛 讘诪拽讜诪讛 诪砖诪注

The Gemara asks: And why doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan, who claimed that it is not possible to establish both clauses of the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the same tanna, explain the mishna in that manner? He holds that the term: He placed it, indicates that he replaced it in its designated place. Therefore, the latter clause cannot be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the contradiction remains.

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜诇讜讬 讞讚 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜讞讚 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讜注讛 砖讛讬讛 专讜注讛 注讚专讜 讜讛谞讬讞 注讚专讜 讜讘讗 诇注讬专 讜讘讗 讝讗讘 讜讟专祝 讜讘讗 讗专讬 讜讚专住 驻讟讜专 讛谞讬讞 诪拽诇讜 讜转专诪讬诇讜 注诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute between Rav and Levi. One says: Misappropriation requires loss. And one says: Misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara comments: It may be concluded that it is Rav who says: Misappropriation does not require loss, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a shepherd who was herding his flock, which included the animals of others, and he abandoned his flock and went to the city, and a wolf came and devoured an animal, and a lion came and clawed an animal, the shepherd is exempt, as in any case, the attacks occurred through circumstances beyond his control. If he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal that was later attacked, he is liable to pay for the animal. Since he utilized the animal, it is as if he misappropriated it, and therefore he is liable to pay even in a case involving circumstances beyond his control.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛谞讬讞 诪拽诇讜 讜转专诪讬诇讜 注诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讛讗 砖拽诇讬谞讛讜

And we discussed this baraita: Due to the fact that he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal, is he liable to pay? Didn鈥檛 he already remove them? Even if he improperly used the animal, he already removed his staff and satchel, and it is tantamount to returning it to the owners.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘注讜讚谉 注诇讬讛 讜讻讬 注讜讚谉 注诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讛讗 诇讗 诪砖讻讛

And Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The tanna is referring to a case where the wolf devoured the animal when the staff and satchel were still on the animal. Since the bailee is still using the animal, it is considered his in terms of liability to pay for the damage caused. The Gemara asks: And if the staff and satchel are still on the animal, what of it? But he did not pull the animal and therefore did not acquire it.

讜讗诪专 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讗诪专 专讘 砖讛讻讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 讜专爪转讛 诇驻谞讬讜 讜讛讗 诇讗 讞住专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

And Rav Shmuel bar Yitz岣k says that Rav says: The tanna is referring to a case where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff and it ran before him, which is a form of pulling. The Gemara asks: But by causing the animal to run, he did not cause a loss to the animal. Why is he liable to pay? Rather, must one not conclude from it that Rav holds: Misappropriation does not require loss?

讗讬诪讗 砖讛讻讞讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara rejects that proof: Say that he weakened the animal with a staff, and that is the only reason that he is liable to pay. The Gemara comments: Rav鈥檚 language is also precise, as he teaches: Where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff. The reason that he explains that he struck the animal with a staff, as opposed to his hand, is to indicate that the animal was weakened. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss.

讜诪讚专讘 住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诇讜讬 住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讜讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 谞讛讜专讗讬 诪砖讜谞讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘砖讜诪专 讞谞诐

The Gemara comments: And from the fact that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss, it may be inferred that Levi holds that misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Levi? Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Nehorai: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee. There is no need for the Torah to state the halakha of misappropriation twice. If an unpaid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation, all the more so is a paid bailee liable to pay. The reason that the Torah repeated this halakha is to teach that a paid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation even if there is no loss.

讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 诪砖讜谞讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan continues: And I say that misappropriation by a paid bailee is not different.

讜诪讗讬 诪砖讜谞讛 诇讗 转讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜转讬转讬 诪砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜诪讛 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 砖驻讟讜专 讘讙谞讘讛 讜讗讘讚讛 砖诇讞 讘讛 讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻转讘讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

The Gemara elaborates: And what is meant by: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee? As one could claim: Let misappropriation not be stated with regard to a paid bailee, and derive it from misappropriation with regard to an unpaid bailee by means of an a fortiori inference: And if an unpaid bailee, who is exempt in cases where he claims theft and loss, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then a paid bailee, who is liable in cases where he claims theft and loss, all the more so is it not clear that he is liable if he misappropriated the deposit? With regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write misappropriation in the case of a paid bailee? It is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss; intent to misappropriate is enough to render him liable to pay.

讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 诪砖讜谞讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 讛讬讗 诪讗讬 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 砖讻谉 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讘讟讜注谉 讟注谞转 讙谞讘

Rabbi Yo岣nan stated: And I say that it is not different, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: This case and that case are one. The Gemara elaborates: What is the meaning of: This and that are one? It means that it was necessary to teach misappropriation in both cases due to the fact that it can be refuted by an a fortiori inference: What is notable about an unpaid bailee? He is notable in that he pays the double payment when he falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. A paid bailee reimburses the owner only for the cost of the deposit in that case. The legal status of the paid bailee is not consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore no a fortiori inference is possible.

讜诪讗谉 讚诇讗 驻专讬讱 住讘专 拽专谞讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪讻驻讬诇讗 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara comments: And the one who does not refute the a fortiori inference holds: The absolute requirement to pay the principal even without having taken a false oath is more stringent than the requirement to pay the double payment that is effected only with the bailee taking a false oath. In his opinion, the legal status of the paid bailee is consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore an a fortiori inference is possible.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 转讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇讗 讘砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜诇讗 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜转讬转讬 诪砖讜讗诇 讜诪讛 砖讜讗诇 讚诇讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 拽讗 注讘讬讚 砖诇讞 讘讛 讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rava says: The verse should not state misappropriation, neither with regard to an unpaid bailee nor with regard to a paid bailee, and one can derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from misappropriation with regard to a borrower: And if a borrower, who utilizes the deposit with the knowledge of the owner, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then with regard to an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee, who may not utilize the deposit at all, all the more so is it not clear that they are liable to pay if they misappropriate the deposit?

诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讞讚讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜讗讬讚讱 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讬讚讜谉 诪讛 砖讜讗诇 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专

Why, then, is the halakha of misappropriation stated in the cases of the unpaid and paid bailees? One mention is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss. And the other mention is so that you will not say: With regard to this a fortiori inference, there is principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion inferred from an a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference, and thereby conclude: Just as a borrower who is in partnership with the owner is exempt, so too, an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee who are in partnership with the owner are exempt. Consequently, it was necessary for the verse to mention the halakha of misappropriation with regard to both the paid and unpaid bailee.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪讛 诇讬 讞讚讗 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says: Misappropriation requires a loss, why do I need these two mentions of misappropriation? The Gemara explains: One mention is so that you will not say with regard to this a fortiori inference the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

讜讗讬讚讱 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讚讬谉 谞讗诪专讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗祝 讻讗谉 诇砖讘讜注讛

And the other mention is for that which is taught in a baraita. It is written: 鈥淎nd the master of the house shall approach the judges to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:7). This is stated with regard to an oath. Do you say that it is stated with regard to an oath, or is it stated only with regard to judgment? Misappropriation is stated below, in a later verse in the chapter: 鈥淲hether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:10), and misappropriation is stated above, in an earlier verse in the chapter: 鈥淲hether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:7). Just as below it is stated explicitly with regard to an oath: 鈥淭he oath of the Lord shall be between them both to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:10), so too here, it is stated with regard to an oath and not merely for judgment.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Metzia 41

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 41

爪专讬讱 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

One requires the knowledge of the owner for the item to be considered returned.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, why did the tanna in the first clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner did not designate a specific place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee鈥檚 house? Even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, the bailee should be exempt because he replaced the barrel.

诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诇讗讜 诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners designated a place for the barrel, as after the bailee replaced the barrel, that is its place. But even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, and after the bailee replaces the barrel that is not its place, we do not require the knowledge of the owners. In both cases, once he replaces the barrel, he is exempt from payment.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讬讞讚讜 诇讛 讛讘注诇讬诐 诪拽讜诐 讜讟诇讟诇讛 讜谞砖讘专讛 讘讬谉 诪转讜讱 讬讚讜 讘讬谉 诪砖讛谞讬讞讛 诇爪专讻讜 讞讬讬讘 诇爪专讻讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讗谉 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owners designated a specific place for the barrel, and the bailee moved it and it broke, whether it broke while still in his hand or whether it broke after he replaced the barrel, if he moved it for his purposes he is liable to pay, and if he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt. We arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: We require the knowledge of the owners. Since the bailee moved the barrel from its place for his own purposes, he is a robber and is responsible for damages.

讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讬讞讚讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, why did the tanna in the latter clause of the mishna establish the case specifically where the owner designated a particular place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee鈥檚 house? Even in a case where the owner did not designate a place for the barrel, the bailee should be liable to pay, because the barrel is not considered to have been returned.

诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讗 讬讞讚讜 讚诇讗讜 诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讬讞讚讜 谞诪讬 讚诪拽讜诪讛 讛讜讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚注转 讘注诇讬诐

The Gemara answers: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the owners did not designate a place for the barrel, as the place that the bailee placed the barrel is not its place. But even in a case where the owner designated a place for the barrel, where the place that the bailee placed the barrel is its place, we require the knowledge of the owners for it to be considered as if the bailee returned the barrel.

专讬砖讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讬谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪讗谉 讚诪转专讙诐 诇讬 讞讘讬转 讗诇讬讘讗 讚讞讚 转谞讗 诪讜讘诇谞讗 诪讗谞讬讛 讘转专讬讛 诇讘讬 诪住讜转讗

The Gemara asks: The result of that explanation is that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is as Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Anyone who explains to me both clauses of the mishna with regard to a barrel according to the opinion of one tanna I will honor, and carry his garments after him to the bathhouse, and treat him as a servant treats his master.

转专讙诪讛 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖谞讟诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇讙讜讝诇讛

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it, and that is the meaning of the term: For his purposes. Since he intended to rob the owner of the barrel, he must return it to its place. In the first clause of the mishna, where the owner of the barrel did not designate a place for it, anywhere that he places it constitutes a return to its place. In the latter clause of the mishna, where the owner designated a place for the barrel, since the bailee did not return the barrel to that place, it is not considered to have been returned.

转专讙诪讛 专讘讬 谞转谉 讘专 讗讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 砖谞讟诇讛 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖诇讜讞 讘讛 讬讚

Rabbi Natan bar Abba interpreted the mishna before Rav: The mishna is referring to a case where the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it, as one who misappropriates the property of another is responsible for any subsequent damage to it.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讙讜讝诇讛 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇砖诇讜讞 讘讛 讬讚 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov and Rabbi Natan disagree? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to whether misappropriation requires loss: Is one liable for misappropriation only if it results in depreciation of the deposit, or is one liable for misappropriation even if he only intended to damage the deposit but there was no depreciation? The one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to rob the owner of it holds that misappropriation requires loss. And the one who says that the bailee took the barrel in order to misappropriate it holds that misappropriation does not require loss.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖砖转 诪讬讚讬 谞讟诇讛 拽转谞讬 讟诇讟诇讛 拽转谞讬 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讟诇讟诇讛 诇讛讘讬讗 注诇讬讛 讙讜讝诇讜转 讜拽讗 住讘专 砖讜讗诇 砖诇讗 诪讚注转 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讬 讜讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讛讬讗 讜住讬驻讗 砖讛谞讬讞讛 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜诪讛

Rav Sheshet objects to that explanation: Does the tanna teach that the bailee took it? It is taught in the mishna: The bailee moved it, indicating that he sought neither to misappropriate it nor to rob the owner of it. Rather, Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the bailee moved the barrel to stand upon it and bring fledglings from a nest in a tree. The bailee did not attempt to use its contents. He merely climbed on the barrel. And the tanna of the mishna holds: The legal status of one who borrows without the knowledge of the owners is that of a robber in terms of responsibility. And the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And the latter clause is referring to a case where the bailee is responsible because he placed the barrel in a place that is not its designated place.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛谞讬讞讛 讘诪拽讜诪讛 诪砖诪注

The Gemara asks: And why doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan, who claimed that it is not possible to establish both clauses of the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the same tanna, explain the mishna in that manner? He holds that the term: He placed it, indicates that he replaced it in its designated place. Therefore, the latter clause cannot be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the contradiction remains.

讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜诇讜讬 讞讚 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜讞讚 讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讚转谞讬讗 专讜注讛 砖讛讬讛 专讜注讛 注讚专讜 讜讛谞讬讞 注讚专讜 讜讘讗 诇注讬专 讜讘讗 讝讗讘 讜讟专祝 讜讘讗 讗专讬 讜讚专住 驻讟讜专 讛谞讬讞 诪拽诇讜 讜转专诪讬诇讜 注诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute between Rav and Levi. One says: Misappropriation requires loss. And one says: Misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara comments: It may be concluded that it is Rav who says: Misappropriation does not require loss, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a shepherd who was herding his flock, which included the animals of others, and he abandoned his flock and went to the city, and a wolf came and devoured an animal, and a lion came and clawed an animal, the shepherd is exempt, as in any case, the attacks occurred through circumstances beyond his control. If he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal that was later attacked, he is liable to pay for the animal. Since he utilized the animal, it is as if he misappropriated it, and therefore he is liable to pay even in a case involving circumstances beyond his control.

讜讛讜讬谞谉 讘讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讛谞讬讞 诪拽诇讜 讜转专诪讬诇讜 注诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 讛讗 砖拽诇讬谞讛讜

And we discussed this baraita: Due to the fact that he placed his staff and his satchel on the animal, is he liable to pay? Didn鈥檛 he already remove them? Even if he improperly used the animal, he already removed his staff and satchel, and it is tantamount to returning it to the owners.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讗诪专 专讘 讘注讜讚谉 注诇讬讛 讜讻讬 注讜讚谉 注诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讛讜讬 讛讗 诇讗 诪砖讻讛

And Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The tanna is referring to a case where the wolf devoured the animal when the staff and satchel were still on the animal. Since the bailee is still using the animal, it is considered his in terms of liability to pay for the damage caused. The Gemara asks: And if the staff and satchel are still on the animal, what of it? But he did not pull the animal and therefore did not acquire it.

讜讗诪专 专讘 砖诪讜讗诇 讘专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讗诪专 专讘 砖讛讻讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 讜专爪转讛 诇驻谞讬讜 讜讛讗 诇讗 讞住专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

And Rav Shmuel bar Yitz岣k says that Rav says: The tanna is referring to a case where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff and it ran before him, which is a form of pulling. The Gemara asks: But by causing the animal to run, he did not cause a loss to the animal. Why is he liable to pay? Rather, must one not conclude from it that Rav holds: Misappropriation does not require loss?

讗讬诪讗 砖讛讻讞讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖讛讻讬砖讛 讘诪拽诇 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara rejects that proof: Say that he weakened the animal with a staff, and that is the only reason that he is liable to pay. The Gemara comments: Rav鈥檚 language is also precise, as he teaches: Where the shepherd struck the animal with a staff. The reason that he explains that he struck the animal with a staff, as opposed to his hand, is to indicate that the animal was weakened. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss.

讜诪讚专讘 住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诇讜讬 住讘专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚诇讜讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘谉 谞讛讜专讗讬 诪砖讜谞讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘砖讜诪专 讞谞诐

The Gemara comments: And from the fact that Rav holds that misappropriation requires loss, it may be inferred that Levi holds that misappropriation does not require loss. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Levi? Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Nehorai: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee. There is no need for the Torah to state the halakha of misappropriation twice. If an unpaid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation, all the more so is a paid bailee liable to pay. The reason that the Torah repeated this halakha is to teach that a paid bailee is liable to pay for misappropriation even if there is no loss.

讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 诪砖讜谞讛

Rabbi Yo岣nan continues: And I say that misappropriation by a paid bailee is not different.

讜诪讗讬 诪砖讜谞讛 诇讗 转讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜转讬转讬 诪砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜诪讛 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 砖驻讟讜专 讘讙谞讘讛 讜讗讘讚讛 砖诇讞 讘讛 讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻转讘讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉

The Gemara elaborates: And what is meant by: Misappropriation that is stated with regard to a paid bailee is different from misappropriation that is stated with regard to an unpaid bailee? As one could claim: Let misappropriation not be stated with regard to a paid bailee, and derive it from misappropriation with regard to an unpaid bailee by means of an a fortiori inference: And if an unpaid bailee, who is exempt in cases where he claims theft and loss, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then a paid bailee, who is liable in cases where he claims theft and loss, all the more so is it not clear that he is liable if he misappropriated the deposit? With regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write misappropriation in the case of a paid bailee? It is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss; intent to misappropriate is enough to render him liable to pay.

讜讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讛 诪砖讜谞讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 讛讬讗 诪讗讬 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 砖讻谉 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讘讟讜注谉 讟注谞转 讙谞讘

Rabbi Yo岣nan stated: And I say that it is not different, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: This case and that case are one. The Gemara elaborates: What is the meaning of: This and that are one? It means that it was necessary to teach misappropriation in both cases due to the fact that it can be refuted by an a fortiori inference: What is notable about an unpaid bailee? He is notable in that he pays the double payment when he falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. A paid bailee reimburses the owner only for the cost of the deposit in that case. The legal status of the paid bailee is not consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore no a fortiori inference is possible.

讜诪讗谉 讚诇讗 驻专讬讱 住讘专 拽专谞讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪讻驻讬诇讗 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara comments: And the one who does not refute the a fortiori inference holds: The absolute requirement to pay the principal even without having taken a false oath is more stringent than the requirement to pay the double payment that is effected only with the bailee taking a false oath. In his opinion, the legal status of the paid bailee is consistently more stringent than that of an unpaid bailee, and therefore an a fortiori inference is possible.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讗 转讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇讗 讘砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜诇讗 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜转讬转讬 诪砖讜讗诇 讜诪讛 砖讜讗诇 讚诇讚注转 讘注诇讬诐 拽讗 注讘讬讚 砖诇讞 讘讛 讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

Rava says: The verse should not state misappropriation, neither with regard to an unpaid bailee nor with regard to a paid bailee, and one can derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from misappropriation with regard to a borrower: And if a borrower, who utilizes the deposit with the knowledge of the owner, misappropriated the deposit, he is liable to pay, then with regard to an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee, who may not utilize the deposit at all, all the more so is it not clear that they are liable to pay if they misappropriate the deposit?

诇诪讛 谞讗诪专 讞讚讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讜讗讬讚讱 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讬讚讜谉 诪讛 砖讜讗诇 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专

Why, then, is the halakha of misappropriation stated in the cases of the unpaid and paid bailees? One mention is to say to you: Misappropriation does not require loss. And the other mention is so that you will not say: With regard to this a fortiori inference, there is principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion inferred from an a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference, and thereby conclude: Just as a borrower who is in partnership with the owner is exempt, so too, an unpaid bailee and a paid bailee who are in partnership with the owner are exempt. Consequently, it was necessary for the verse to mention the halakha of misappropriation with regard to both the paid and unpaid bailee.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 爪专讬讻讛 讞住专讜谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪讛 诇讬 讞讚讗 砖诇讗 转讗诪专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says: Misappropriation requires a loss, why do I need these two mentions of misappropriation? The Gemara explains: One mention is so that you will not say with regard to this a fortiori inference the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

讜讗讬讚讱 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讜谞拽专讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诇 讛讗诇讛讬诐 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讚讬谉 谞讗诪专讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专讛 砖诇讬讞讜转 讬讚 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诇砖讘讜注讛 讗祝 讻讗谉 诇砖讘讜注讛

And the other mention is for that which is taught in a baraita. It is written: 鈥淎nd the master of the house shall approach the judges to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:7). This is stated with regard to an oath. Do you say that it is stated with regard to an oath, or is it stated only with regard to judgment? Misappropriation is stated below, in a later verse in the chapter: 鈥淲hether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:10), and misappropriation is stated above, in an earlier verse in the chapter: 鈥淲hether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:7). Just as below it is stated explicitly with regard to an oath: 鈥淭he oath of the Lord shall be between them both to determine whether he misappropriated his neighbor鈥檚 goods鈥 (Exodus 22:10), so too here, it is stated with regard to an oath and not merely for judgment.

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