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Bava Metzia 76

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Summary

Our learning today is in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 76 years of independence. We also continue to pray for the swift and safe return of the hostages, and for the safety and success of our soldiers. 

What are the rules surrounding a worker or employer retracting from an agreement? When the Mishna mentions one party “deceiving” the other, what does this mean? Is it referring to a worker canceling on the employer, the reverse scenario, or does it involve an instance where an employer directs an agent to hire workers, but the agent communicates a wage different from what the employer had stipulated? While seven potential scenarios of the latter circumstance are delineated, only certain ones conform to the legal principles expounded in the Mishna.

 

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Bava Metzia 76

אִם בַּעַל הַבַּיִת חוֹזֵר בּוֹ – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה. כׇּל הַמְשַׁנֶּה – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה, וְכׇל הַחוֹזֵר בּוֹ – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה.

Conversely, if the employer reneges, he is at a disadvantage. These two rulings are in accordance with the principle that whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage.

גְּמָ׳ ״חָזְרוּ זֶה בָּזֶה״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״הִטְעוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה״, דְּאַטְעוֹ פּוֹעֲלִים אַהֲדָדֵי. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת: זִיל, אֲוגַר לִי פּוֹעֲלִים, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וְאַטְעִינְהוּ.

GEMARA: The Gemara starts by analyzing the phrase: And they deceived one another. The Gemara comments: The tanna does not teach: They reneged on the agreement with one another, which would indicate that either the employer or the laborers changed their mind. Rather, it states that they deceived one another, which evidently means that the laborers deceived one another. The Gemara therefore inquires: What are the circumstances? The Gemara explains: This is referring to a case where, for example, the employer said to one of the laborers: Go and hire laborers for me, and that laborer went and deceived those other laborers.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַיל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא – תַּרְעוֹמֶת מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ? סְבוּר וְקַבֵּיל. אִי דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בִּתְלָתָא, וַאֲזַיל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בְּאַרְבְּעָה – הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״שְׂכַרְכֶם עָלַי״ – נִתֵּיב לְהוּ מִדִּידֵיהּ,

The Gemara again asks: What are the circumstances of this deception? If the employer said to him: Hire for me laborers at four dinars, and he went and told them that they are hired for three dinars, what is the relevance of this grievance? After all, they knew and accepted the conditions of their hire. What grounds for complaint do they have? If the employer said to him to hire laborers for three dinars, and the middleman went and told them it was for four, what are the circumstances? If he told them at the time: The monetary value of your services, i.e., your wage, is incumbent upon me, let that middleman give them the difference from his own pocket.

דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֵל לַעֲשׂוֹת בְּשֶׁלּוֹ וְהֶרְאָהוּ בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ מִשָּׁלֵם, וְחוֹזֵר וְנוֹטֵל מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת מַה שֶּׁהֶהֱנָהוּ.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who hires a laborer to perform work in his own field, and the employer inadvertently showed the laborer a field belonging to another in which he should work, the employer must give the laborer his full wages; and in addition, the employer goes back and takes from the owner of the field in which he worked the value of the benefit that owner received from the laborer. The employer is entitled to claim from the owner of the field the profit that owner gained from the work, but not the entire wages of the laborer. This indicates that one who says: Your wage is incumbent upon me, must pay the specified sum.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ שְׂכַרְכֶם עַל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to state this halakha where the middleman said to them: The obligation to pay your wages is incumbent upon the employer, and it subsequently became apparent that the employer was not willing to pay that much. In this case the laborers have a grievance only against the laborer who hired them.

וְלִחְזֵי פּוֹעֲלִים הֵיכִי מִיתַּגְרִי? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא דְּמִתְּגַר בְּאַרְבְּעָה וְאִיכָּא דְּמִתְּגַר בִּתְלָתָא, דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה – טָרְחִינַן וּמִתַּגְרִינַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה.

The Gemara challenges: But let us see how much laborers are hired for in that place, and the employer should pay them in accordance with the accepted custom. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a place where there are those who hire for four dinars and there are others who hire for three. The reason for their grievance is that the laborers can say to the middleman: Had you not told us that you were hiring us for four dinars, we would have made an effort and found another employer, and we would have hired ourselves out for four dinars. Consequently, you caused us a loss.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכָא בְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה, הֲוָה זִילָא בַּן מִילְּתָא לְאִתְּגוֹרֵי.

If you wish, say that the mishna is referring even to a place where there is a fixed wage for laborers. But here we are dealing with a homeowner, i.e., one usually not accustomed to labor, who was hired for his services. In order to supplement their earnings, such people will occasionally work for others as well. The reason for their grievance is that these laborers who own fields say to the middleman: Had you not told us that we are hired for four, it would have been too demeaning for us to be hired, as it is not worthwhile to work in the field of another for so little when we have our own plots of land. This is the cause of their grievance.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּפוֹעֲלִים עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה – טָרְחִינַן וְעָבְדִינַן לָךְ עֲבִידְתָּא שַׁפִּירְתָּא. וְלִחְזֵי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? בְּרִיפְקָא. רִיפְקָא נָמֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ? דִּמְלֵי מַיָּא וְלָא יְדִיעַ.

If you wish, say that actually, we are dealing with regular laborers, not a homeowner, and the reason for their grievance is that they say to the middleman: Since you spoke to us of four, we made an effort to do higher-quality work for you. The Gemara challenges: And let us see their work. If it is evident that they performed the task more effectively, they deserve to be paid more money. The Gemara responds: This is referring to tilling the land, where the quality of the work is not immediately apparent. The Gemara asks: With regard to tilling as well, doesn’t the employer know what they have done, as he can examine the earth they tilled? The Gemara answers: The laborers dug a ditch that is now filled with water, and therefore the employer does not know exactly what they have accomplished.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ סְבוּר וְקַבֵּיל, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ לֵית לָךָ ״אַל תִּמְנַע טוֹב מִבְּעָלָיו״?

If you wish, say that actually, we are dealing with an employer who said to the middleman: Hire laborers for four, and he went and told them that they were hired for three. And as for that which you said: Why should they have a grievance against him, as they knew and accepted these terms? Although they agreed to those terms, they still have a grievance, as they can say to the one who came to terms with them: Don’t you have respect for the verse: “Do not withhold good from him to whom it is due, when it is in the power of your hand to do it” (Proverbs 3:27)?

פְּשִׁיטָא אִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בִּתְלָתָא, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – דַּעְתַּיְיהוּ אַעִילּוּיָא.

§ After analyzing the circumstances of the case in the mishna, the Gemara observes: It is obvious that if the employer said to someone that he should hire laborers for three dinars, and that person went and said to them that they were hired for four, and they said to him: We agree to be paid as the employer says, in that case it is clear that their minds are on any additional sum the employer might have offered, and they certainly did not intend to accept less than the one with whom they spoke proposed.

אֶלָּא אִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא, וְאָמְרִי: כְּמָה שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, מַאי? אַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמְכִי, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ מְהֵימְנַתְּ לַן דְּהָכִי אָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, אוֹ דִלְמָא אַדִּיבּוּרָא דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת קָא סָמְכִי?

But if the employer said he would hire them for four dinars, and the middleman went and told them that the offer was for three, and they said to him: We agree to be paid as the employer said, what is the halakha? Is it correct to say that the laborers rely on his statement, as they are effectively saying to him: We trust you that the employer said that which you reported in his name? Or perhaps they rely on the employer’s statement, and therefore they are entitled to the higher wages specified by the employer?

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from a halakha concerning a bill of divorce: A woman said to her agent: Bring my bill of divorce for me. Knowing her husband was writing a bill of divorce, she asked the agent to collect the document and transmit it to her. According to the terms of his agency, the wife is divorced only when the document reaches her possession, as he was not appointed as an agent to receive the bill of divorce on her behalf.

וְאִשְׁתְּךָ אָמְרָה ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הֵילָךְ כְּמָה שֶׁאָמְרָה״. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

But the agent went and told the husband: Your wife said to me: Receive my bill of divorce for me. This statement indicates that the wife had appointed him to receive the bill of divorce in her stead, as an agent of receipt, which would mean that she is divorced as soon as the agent is given the document. And the husband said: Take it in the manner in which my wife said. With regard to this case, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Even when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, she is not divorced.

שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ אַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידַהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ – מִכִּי מָטֵי גִּיטָּא לִידַהּ מִיהָא תִּיגָּרַשׁ. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי:

One can learn from this that the husband relies on the agent’s statement. Since the husband was under the mistaken impression that he was interacting with an agent of receipt, he did not instruct him to deliver the document to his wife, and therefore the bill of divorce was not transmitted in the proper manner, which is why she is not divorced at all. As, if it enters your mind that the husband relies on her statement, she should at least be divorced when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, in accordance with the terms of an agent for delivery. This shows that the statement of an agent is accepted as a faithful representation of the wishes of the one who appointed him. Rav Ashi said:

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי אִיתְּמַר אִיפְּכָא, ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״ וְאִשְׁתְּךָ אָמְרָה, ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הֵילָךְ כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרָה״. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: מִשֶּׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדוֹ – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, אַלְמָא דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידַהּ קָא סְמִיךְ.

How can these cases be compared? Granted, if the opposite was stated, i.e., in a case where the woman said: Receive my bill of divorce for me, and the agent said to the husband: Your wife said: Bring me my bill of divorce, and the husband said: Here you are, as she said; and Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: From when the bill of divorce reaches the agent’s possession, she is divorced, it would be understandable. Apparently, the husband relies upon her statement that the agent is an agent of receipt.

אִי נָמֵי: מִשֶּׁהִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת – אַלְמָא דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ. אֶלָּא הָתָם – מִשּׁוּם דְּעָקַר שָׁלִיחַ לִשְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ לִגְמָרֵי, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״שָׁלִיחַ לְִקַבָּלָה הָוֵינָא, לְהוֹלָכָה לָא הָוֵינָא״.

Alternatively, had Rav Naḥman ruled: From when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, she is divorced, one could conclude that evidently, the husband relies on the agent’s statement, and based on that statement, the agent is designated as an agent for delivery. But there, in the case cited, where Rav Naḥman rules that she is not divorced, it is not because the husband relies on one statement or the other. Rather, it is due to the fact that by means of his statement the agent negates his agency entirely, as he said to the husband: I am an agent for receipt, meaning: I am not to be an agent for delivery. He is essentially saying that he is not prepared to go to the trouble of delivering the bill of divorce to her. Therefore, even if he does ultimately deliver the bill of divorce to her, he is an agent neither for the woman nor for her husband. No conclusion can be drawn with regard to the question of which statement the husband relies upon.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הַאי תַּנָּא ״חָזְרוּ״ נָמֵי ״הִטְעוּ״ קָרֵי לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הָאוּמָּנִין וְהִטְעוּ אֶת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, אוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הִטְעָה אוֹתָן – אֵין לָהֶם זֶה עַל זֶה אֶלָּא תַּרְעוֹמֶת.

§ The Gemara had assumed that the term deceived used in the mishna must be referring to an inaccuracy stated by the middleman in his discussion with the laborers. The Gemara now offers an alternative explanation. If you wish, say that when the mishna teaches: They deceived one another, it means that one of the parties reneged on the agreement, as this tanna also calls a circumstance described by the term reneged, meaning that either the employer or the laborers reneged on their agreement, by the term deceived. As it is taught in a baraita in a similar manner: With regard to one who hires artisans or laborers, and they deceived the employer, or the employer deceived them, they have nothing but a grievance against one another, and no monetary claim.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁלֹּא הָלְכוּ. אֲבָל הָלְכוּ חַמָּרִים וְלֹא מָצְאוּ תְּבוּאָה, פּוֹעֲלִין וּמָצְאוּ שָׂדֶה כְּשֶׁהִיא לַחָה – נוֹתֵן לָהֶן שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם, אֲבָל אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הַבָּא טָעוּן לַבָּא רֵיקָן, עוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה לְיוֹשֵׁב וּבָטֵל.

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? When they did not go to the workplace, i.e., the employer reneged immediately. But if donkey drivers went and could not find any produce to carry, or laborers went off to work and found that the field was too moist for tilling, the employer must give them their full wages to which they are entitled. But he does not give them the entire stipulated amount, as a donkey driver who comes back loaded cannot be compared to one who comes back empty, nor can a laborer who performs work be compared to one who sits idle. The employer deducts a sum from the laborers’ wages, paying them the amount they are willing to receive given that they do not actually have to perform the work.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁלֹּא הִתְחִילוּ בִּמְלָאכָה, אֲבָל הִתְחִילוּ בִּמְלָאכָה – שָׁמִין לָהֶן מַה שֶּׁעָשׂוּ. כֵּיצַד? קִבְּלוּ קָמָה לִקְצוֹר בִּשְׁנֵי סְלָעִים, קָצְרוּ חֶצְיָהּ וְהִנִּיחוּ חֶצְיָהּ. בֶּגֶד לֶאֱרוֹג בִּשְׁנֵי סְלָעִים, אָרְגוּ חֶצְיוֹ וְהִנִּיחוּ חֶצְיוֹ – שָׁמִין לָהֶן אֶת מַה שֶּׁעָשׂוּ.

In what case is this statement, that if they reneged they have only a grievance, said? When they had not started the work at all. But if they had started the work, the court appraises for them that which they have done, for which they receive some form of compensation. How so? If they received standing grain to reap for a contractual agreement of two sela for the entire field, and they reaped half of it and left half of it, or if they took a garment to weave at two sela, and they weaved half of it and left half of it, in these cases the court appraises for them that which they have done.

הָיָה יָפֶה שִׁשָּׁה דִּינָרִים – נוֹתֵן לָהֶן סֶלַע, אוֹ יִגְמְרוּ מְלַאכְתָּן וְיִטְּלוּ שְׁנֵי סְלָעִים. וְאִם סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם סֶלַע.

The baraita details this appraisal: If the current wage for the part of the task they had done was now worth six dinars, a sela and a half, as the price for this assignment increased, either he gives them a sela, as originally agreed upon, since they do not forfeit their stipulated wages, or they finish their work and take two sela. And if the current wage for the part of the task they had done was worth a sela, he gives them a sela. This statement will be explained by the Gemara.

רַבִּי דּוֹסָא אוֹמֵר: שָׁמִין לָהֶן מַה שֶּׁעָתִיד לְהֵעָשׂוֹת, הָיָה יָפֶה שִׁשָּׁה דִּינָרִים – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שֶׁקֶל, אוֹ יִגְמְרוּ מְלַאכְתָּן וְיִטְּלוּ שְׁנֵי סְלָעִים. וְאִם סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם סֶלַע.

Rabbi Dosa says: The court appraises for them that which must still be done. If the current wage for the part of the task they had not done was worth six dinars, i.e., he can only find laborers who will complete it for six dinars, which is equivalent to one and a half sela, either he gives the first laborers a shekel, which is equivalent to half a sela, or they finish their work and take two sela. And if the current wage for the part of the task they had not done was worth a sela, he gives them a sela.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין אָבוּד, אֲבָל בְּדָבָר הָאָבוּד – שׂוֹכֵר עֲלֵיהֶן אוֹ מַטְעָן. כֵּיצַד מַטְעָן? אוֹמֵר לָהֶן: סֶלַע קָצַצְתִּי לָכֶם – בֹּאוּ וּטְלוּ שְׁתַּיִם. וְעַד כַּמָּה שׂוֹכֵר עֲלֵיהֶן? עַד אַרְבָּעִים וַחֲמִשִּׁים זוּז.

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said, i.e., in what circumstance are the laborers paid for the amount they performed and the employer has only a grievance against them? It is said with regard to a matter that does not involve financial loss due to the work stoppage, but with regard to a matter that involves financial loss due to the work stoppage, the employer may hire replacement laborers for a high price at the expense of the first laborers or deceive the first laborers. How does he deceive them? For example, he can say to them: I fixed a sela as wages for you; come and take two. And up to what amount may he hire at their expense? Even up to forty or fifty dinars. He can pay other laborers far more than the first laborers’ wages to ensure that the work is completed.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין שָׁם פּוֹעֲלִים לִשְׂכּוֹר. אֲבָל יֵשׁ שָׁם פּוֹעֲלִים לִשְׂכּוֹר, וְאָמַר: ״צֵא וּשְׂכוֹר מֵאֵלּוּ״ – אֵין לוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן אֶלָּא תַּרְעוֹמֶת.

In what case is this statement said, i.e., in what circumstance may the employer deceive them to such an extent in order to ensure that the work is completed? When there are no other laborers there, in that place, to hire. Since the employer will suffer a heavy loss, he may resort to one of these methods. But if there are laborers there to hire, and the laborers who reneged said to the employer: Go and hire from these, the employer has nothing but a grievance against them.

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חֲבִיבִי אָמַר, אִילּוּ אֲנָא הֲוַאי – לָא הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לָהֶן אֶלָּא כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם! וְהָא עֲלַהּ קָתָנֵי: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הַבָּא טָעוּן לְהַבָּא רֵיקָן, עוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה לְיוֹשֵׁב וּבָטֵל! לָא סַיְּימוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ.

A tanna taught that baraita before Rav: The employer must give them their full wages. Rav said to him: My uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya, said: If I were ruling on this case, I would give them only the wages of an idle laborer, but no more, and yet you said that he gives them their full wages? The Gemara asks: But the baraita teaches concerning this very matter: A donkey driver who comes back loaded cannot be compared to one who comes back empty, nor can a laborer who performs work be compared to one who sits idle. Evidently, even the tanna of the baraita agrees that they do not receive their full wages. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaching the baraita before Rav did not conclude it, and he was unaware of this limitation, which is why he commented that they do not deserve their entire wages.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: סַיְּימוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר. חֲבִיבִי אֲמַר: אִי הֲוַאי אֲנָא – לָא הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ כְּלָל, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל! אֶלָּא קַשְׁיָא הָךְ.

There are those who say that the tanna indeed concluded it before him, and this is what Rav is saying: My uncle said: If I were ruling on this case I would not give them anything, and yet you said that he gives them the wages of an idle laborer? The Gemara questions this version: But this is difficult. How can one account for the difference between the ruling of the baraita and that of Rav’s uncle, Rabbi Ḥiyya?

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּסַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מִדְּאוּרְתָּא, הָא דְּלָא סַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מֵאוּרְתָּא.

The Gemara responds: It is not difficult, as this case, where Rabbi Ḥiyya would rule that the laborers are not paid at all, is referring to one who surveyed his land the night before, observed that it was fit to be tilled, and hired laborers on the basis of this examination. It is their misfortune that something occurred in the meantime to prevent them from carrying out the task. Conversely, that case, where the baraita rules that they are given some payment, is referring to a landowner who did not survey his land the night before. Since he failed to check his own field, he must bear the responsibility.

כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מַאן דַּאֲגַר אֲגִירֵי לְרִפְקָא וַאֲתָא מִטְרָא וּמַלְיַיהּ מַיָּא, אִי סַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מֵאוּרְתָּא –

This is like that which Rava said: With regard to one who hires laborers to till, and rain fell and filled his land with water, preventing the laborers from performing the work, if he surveyed his land the night before and did all he could,

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Bava Metzia 76

אִם בַּעַל הַבַּיִת חוֹזֵר בּוֹ – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה. כׇּל הַמְשַׁנֶּה – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה, וְכׇל הַחוֹזֵר בּוֹ – יָדוֹ עַל הַתַּחְתּוֹנָה.

Conversely, if the employer reneges, he is at a disadvantage. These two rulings are in accordance with the principle that whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage.

גְּמָ׳ ״חָזְרוּ זֶה בָּזֶה״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״הִטְעוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה״, דְּאַטְעוֹ פּוֹעֲלִים אַהֲדָדֵי. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת: זִיל, אֲוגַר לִי פּוֹעֲלִים, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וְאַטְעִינְהוּ.

GEMARA: The Gemara starts by analyzing the phrase: And they deceived one another. The Gemara comments: The tanna does not teach: They reneged on the agreement with one another, which would indicate that either the employer or the laborers changed their mind. Rather, it states that they deceived one another, which evidently means that the laborers deceived one another. The Gemara therefore inquires: What are the circumstances? The Gemara explains: This is referring to a case where, for example, the employer said to one of the laborers: Go and hire laborers for me, and that laborer went and deceived those other laborers.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַיל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא – תַּרְעוֹמֶת מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ? סְבוּר וְקַבֵּיל. אִי דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בִּתְלָתָא, וַאֲזַיל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בְּאַרְבְּעָה – הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: ״שְׂכַרְכֶם עָלַי״ – נִתֵּיב לְהוּ מִדִּידֵיהּ,

The Gemara again asks: What are the circumstances of this deception? If the employer said to him: Hire for me laborers at four dinars, and he went and told them that they are hired for three dinars, what is the relevance of this grievance? After all, they knew and accepted the conditions of their hire. What grounds for complaint do they have? If the employer said to him to hire laborers for three dinars, and the middleman went and told them it was for four, what are the circumstances? If he told them at the time: The monetary value of your services, i.e., your wage, is incumbent upon me, let that middleman give them the difference from his own pocket.

דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֵל לַעֲשׂוֹת בְּשֶׁלּוֹ וְהֶרְאָהוּ בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – נוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ מִשָּׁלֵם, וְחוֹזֵר וְנוֹטֵל מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת מַה שֶּׁהֶהֱנָהוּ.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who hires a laborer to perform work in his own field, and the employer inadvertently showed the laborer a field belonging to another in which he should work, the employer must give the laborer his full wages; and in addition, the employer goes back and takes from the owner of the field in which he worked the value of the benefit that owner received from the laborer. The employer is entitled to claim from the owner of the field the profit that owner gained from the work, but not the entire wages of the laborer. This indicates that one who says: Your wage is incumbent upon me, must pay the specified sum.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ שְׂכַרְכֶם עַל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to state this halakha where the middleman said to them: The obligation to pay your wages is incumbent upon the employer, and it subsequently became apparent that the employer was not willing to pay that much. In this case the laborers have a grievance only against the laborer who hired them.

וְלִחְזֵי פּוֹעֲלִים הֵיכִי מִיתַּגְרִי? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא דְּמִתְּגַר בְּאַרְבְּעָה וְאִיכָּא דְּמִתְּגַר בִּתְלָתָא, דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה – טָרְחִינַן וּמִתַּגְרִינַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה.

The Gemara challenges: But let us see how much laborers are hired for in that place, and the employer should pay them in accordance with the accepted custom. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a place where there are those who hire for four dinars and there are others who hire for three. The reason for their grievance is that the laborers can say to the middleman: Had you not told us that you were hiring us for four dinars, we would have made an effort and found another employer, and we would have hired ourselves out for four dinars. Consequently, you caused us a loss.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכָא בְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה, הֲוָה זִילָא בַּן מִילְּתָא לְאִתְּגוֹרֵי.

If you wish, say that the mishna is referring even to a place where there is a fixed wage for laborers. But here we are dealing with a homeowner, i.e., one usually not accustomed to labor, who was hired for his services. In order to supplement their earnings, such people will occasionally work for others as well. The reason for their grievance is that these laborers who own fields say to the middleman: Had you not told us that we are hired for four, it would have been too demeaning for us to be hired, as it is not worthwhile to work in the field of another for so little when we have our own plots of land. This is the cause of their grievance.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּפוֹעֲלִים עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַרְתְּ לַן בְּאַרְבְּעָה – טָרְחִינַן וְעָבְדִינַן לָךְ עֲבִידְתָּא שַׁפִּירְתָּא. וְלִחְזֵי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? בְּרִיפְקָא. רִיפְקָא נָמֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ? דִּמְלֵי מַיָּא וְלָא יְדִיעַ.

If you wish, say that actually, we are dealing with regular laborers, not a homeowner, and the reason for their grievance is that they say to the middleman: Since you spoke to us of four, we made an effort to do higher-quality work for you. The Gemara challenges: And let us see their work. If it is evident that they performed the task more effectively, they deserve to be paid more money. The Gemara responds: This is referring to tilling the land, where the quality of the work is not immediately apparent. The Gemara asks: With regard to tilling as well, doesn’t the employer know what they have done, as he can examine the earth they tilled? The Gemara answers: The laborers dug a ditch that is now filled with water, and therefore the employer does not know exactly what they have accomplished.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ סְבוּר וְקַבֵּיל, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ לֵית לָךָ ״אַל תִּמְנַע טוֹב מִבְּעָלָיו״?

If you wish, say that actually, we are dealing with an employer who said to the middleman: Hire laborers for four, and he went and told them that they were hired for three. And as for that which you said: Why should they have a grievance against him, as they knew and accepted these terms? Although they agreed to those terms, they still have a grievance, as they can say to the one who came to terms with them: Don’t you have respect for the verse: “Do not withhold good from him to whom it is due, when it is in the power of your hand to do it” (Proverbs 3:27)?

פְּשִׁיטָא אִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בִּתְלָתָא, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – דַּעְתַּיְיהוּ אַעִילּוּיָא.

§ After analyzing the circumstances of the case in the mishna, the Gemara observes: It is obvious that if the employer said to someone that he should hire laborers for three dinars, and that person went and said to them that they were hired for four, and they said to him: We agree to be paid as the employer says, in that case it is clear that their minds are on any additional sum the employer might have offered, and they certainly did not intend to accept less than the one with whom they spoke proposed.

אֶלָּא אִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בְּאַרְבְּעָה, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ אֲמַר לְהוּ בִּתְלָתָא, וְאָמְרִי: כְּמָה שֶׁאָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, מַאי? אַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמְכִי, דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ מְהֵימְנַתְּ לַן דְּהָכִי אָמַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, אוֹ דִלְמָא אַדִּיבּוּרָא דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת קָא סָמְכִי?

But if the employer said he would hire them for four dinars, and the middleman went and told them that the offer was for three, and they said to him: We agree to be paid as the employer said, what is the halakha? Is it correct to say that the laborers rely on his statement, as they are effectively saying to him: We trust you that the employer said that which you reported in his name? Or perhaps they rely on the employer’s statement, and therefore they are entitled to the higher wages specified by the employer?

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from a halakha concerning a bill of divorce: A woman said to her agent: Bring my bill of divorce for me. Knowing her husband was writing a bill of divorce, she asked the agent to collect the document and transmit it to her. According to the terms of his agency, the wife is divorced only when the document reaches her possession, as he was not appointed as an agent to receive the bill of divorce on her behalf.

וְאִשְׁתְּךָ אָמְרָה ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הֵילָךְ כְּמָה שֶׁאָמְרָה״. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ הִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

But the agent went and told the husband: Your wife said to me: Receive my bill of divorce for me. This statement indicates that the wife had appointed him to receive the bill of divorce in her stead, as an agent of receipt, which would mean that she is divorced as soon as the agent is given the document. And the husband said: Take it in the manner in which my wife said. With regard to this case, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Even when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, she is not divorced.

שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ אַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידַהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ – מִכִּי מָטֵי גִּיטָּא לִידַהּ מִיהָא תִּיגָּרַשׁ. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי:

One can learn from this that the husband relies on the agent’s statement. Since the husband was under the mistaken impression that he was interacting with an agent of receipt, he did not instruct him to deliver the document to his wife, and therefore the bill of divorce was not transmitted in the proper manner, which is why she is not divorced at all. As, if it enters your mind that the husband relies on her statement, she should at least be divorced when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, in accordance with the terms of an agent for delivery. This shows that the statement of an agent is accepted as a faithful representation of the wishes of the one who appointed him. Rav Ashi said:

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי אִיתְּמַר אִיפְּכָא, ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״ וְאִשְׁתְּךָ אָמְרָה, ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הֵילָךְ כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרָה״. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: מִשֶּׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדוֹ – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, אַלְמָא דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידַהּ קָא סְמִיךְ.

How can these cases be compared? Granted, if the opposite was stated, i.e., in a case where the woman said: Receive my bill of divorce for me, and the agent said to the husband: Your wife said: Bring me my bill of divorce, and the husband said: Here you are, as she said; and Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: From when the bill of divorce reaches the agent’s possession, she is divorced, it would be understandable. Apparently, the husband relies upon her statement that the agent is an agent of receipt.

אִי נָמֵי: מִשֶּׁהִגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת – אַלְמָא דְּאַדִּיבּוּרָא דִּידֵיהּ קָא סָמֵיךְ. אֶלָּא הָתָם – מִשּׁוּם דְּעָקַר שָׁלִיחַ לִשְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ לִגְמָרֵי, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״שָׁלִיחַ לְִקַבָּלָה הָוֵינָא, לְהוֹלָכָה לָא הָוֵינָא״.

Alternatively, had Rav Naḥman ruled: From when the bill of divorce reaches her possession, she is divorced, one could conclude that evidently, the husband relies on the agent’s statement, and based on that statement, the agent is designated as an agent for delivery. But there, in the case cited, where Rav Naḥman rules that she is not divorced, it is not because the husband relies on one statement or the other. Rather, it is due to the fact that by means of his statement the agent negates his agency entirely, as he said to the husband: I am an agent for receipt, meaning: I am not to be an agent for delivery. He is essentially saying that he is not prepared to go to the trouble of delivering the bill of divorce to her. Therefore, even if he does ultimately deliver the bill of divorce to her, he is an agent neither for the woman nor for her husband. No conclusion can be drawn with regard to the question of which statement the husband relies upon.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הַאי תַּנָּא ״חָזְרוּ״ נָמֵי ״הִטְעוּ״ קָרֵי לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הָאוּמָּנִין וְהִטְעוּ אֶת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, אוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הִטְעָה אוֹתָן – אֵין לָהֶם זֶה עַל זֶה אֶלָּא תַּרְעוֹמֶת.

§ The Gemara had assumed that the term deceived used in the mishna must be referring to an inaccuracy stated by the middleman in his discussion with the laborers. The Gemara now offers an alternative explanation. If you wish, say that when the mishna teaches: They deceived one another, it means that one of the parties reneged on the agreement, as this tanna also calls a circumstance described by the term reneged, meaning that either the employer or the laborers reneged on their agreement, by the term deceived. As it is taught in a baraita in a similar manner: With regard to one who hires artisans or laborers, and they deceived the employer, or the employer deceived them, they have nothing but a grievance against one another, and no monetary claim.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁלֹּא הָלְכוּ. אֲבָל הָלְכוּ חַמָּרִים וְלֹא מָצְאוּ תְּבוּאָה, פּוֹעֲלִין וּמָצְאוּ שָׂדֶה כְּשֶׁהִיא לַחָה – נוֹתֵן לָהֶן שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם, אֲבָל אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הַבָּא טָעוּן לַבָּא רֵיקָן, עוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה לְיוֹשֵׁב וּבָטֵל.

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? When they did not go to the workplace, i.e., the employer reneged immediately. But if donkey drivers went and could not find any produce to carry, or laborers went off to work and found that the field was too moist for tilling, the employer must give them their full wages to which they are entitled. But he does not give them the entire stipulated amount, as a donkey driver who comes back loaded cannot be compared to one who comes back empty, nor can a laborer who performs work be compared to one who sits idle. The employer deducts a sum from the laborers’ wages, paying them the amount they are willing to receive given that they do not actually have to perform the work.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁלֹּא הִתְחִילוּ בִּמְלָאכָה, אֲבָל הִתְחִילוּ בִּמְלָאכָה – שָׁמִין לָהֶן מַה שֶּׁעָשׂוּ. כֵּיצַד? קִבְּלוּ קָמָה לִקְצוֹר בִּשְׁנֵי סְלָעִים, קָצְרוּ חֶצְיָהּ וְהִנִּיחוּ חֶצְיָהּ. בֶּגֶד לֶאֱרוֹג בִּשְׁנֵי סְלָעִים, אָרְגוּ חֶצְיוֹ וְהִנִּיחוּ חֶצְיוֹ – שָׁמִין לָהֶן אֶת מַה שֶּׁעָשׂוּ.

In what case is this statement, that if they reneged they have only a grievance, said? When they had not started the work at all. But if they had started the work, the court appraises for them that which they have done, for which they receive some form of compensation. How so? If they received standing grain to reap for a contractual agreement of two sela for the entire field, and they reaped half of it and left half of it, or if they took a garment to weave at two sela, and they weaved half of it and left half of it, in these cases the court appraises for them that which they have done.

הָיָה יָפֶה שִׁשָּׁה דִּינָרִים – נוֹתֵן לָהֶן סֶלַע, אוֹ יִגְמְרוּ מְלַאכְתָּן וְיִטְּלוּ שְׁנֵי סְלָעִים. וְאִם סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם סֶלַע.

The baraita details this appraisal: If the current wage for the part of the task they had done was now worth six dinars, a sela and a half, as the price for this assignment increased, either he gives them a sela, as originally agreed upon, since they do not forfeit their stipulated wages, or they finish their work and take two sela. And if the current wage for the part of the task they had done was worth a sela, he gives them a sela. This statement will be explained by the Gemara.

רַבִּי דּוֹסָא אוֹמֵר: שָׁמִין לָהֶן מַה שֶּׁעָתִיד לְהֵעָשׂוֹת, הָיָה יָפֶה שִׁשָּׁה דִּינָרִים – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שֶׁקֶל, אוֹ יִגְמְרוּ מְלַאכְתָּן וְיִטְּלוּ שְׁנֵי סְלָעִים. וְאִם סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן לָהֶם סֶלַע.

Rabbi Dosa says: The court appraises for them that which must still be done. If the current wage for the part of the task they had not done was worth six dinars, i.e., he can only find laborers who will complete it for six dinars, which is equivalent to one and a half sela, either he gives the first laborers a shekel, which is equivalent to half a sela, or they finish their work and take two sela. And if the current wage for the part of the task they had not done was worth a sela, he gives them a sela.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין אָבוּד, אֲבָל בְּדָבָר הָאָבוּד – שׂוֹכֵר עֲלֵיהֶן אוֹ מַטְעָן. כֵּיצַד מַטְעָן? אוֹמֵר לָהֶן: סֶלַע קָצַצְתִּי לָכֶם – בֹּאוּ וּטְלוּ שְׁתַּיִם. וְעַד כַּמָּה שׂוֹכֵר עֲלֵיהֶן? עַד אַרְבָּעִים וַחֲמִשִּׁים זוּז.

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said, i.e., in what circumstance are the laborers paid for the amount they performed and the employer has only a grievance against them? It is said with regard to a matter that does not involve financial loss due to the work stoppage, but with regard to a matter that involves financial loss due to the work stoppage, the employer may hire replacement laborers for a high price at the expense of the first laborers or deceive the first laborers. How does he deceive them? For example, he can say to them: I fixed a sela as wages for you; come and take two. And up to what amount may he hire at their expense? Even up to forty or fifty dinars. He can pay other laborers far more than the first laborers’ wages to ensure that the work is completed.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין שָׁם פּוֹעֲלִים לִשְׂכּוֹר. אֲבָל יֵשׁ שָׁם פּוֹעֲלִים לִשְׂכּוֹר, וְאָמַר: ״צֵא וּשְׂכוֹר מֵאֵלּוּ״ – אֵין לוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן אֶלָּא תַּרְעוֹמֶת.

In what case is this statement said, i.e., in what circumstance may the employer deceive them to such an extent in order to ensure that the work is completed? When there are no other laborers there, in that place, to hire. Since the employer will suffer a heavy loss, he may resort to one of these methods. But if there are laborers there to hire, and the laborers who reneged said to the employer: Go and hire from these, the employer has nothing but a grievance against them.

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חֲבִיבִי אָמַר, אִילּוּ אֲנָא הֲוַאי – לָא הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לָהֶן אֶלָּא כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ נוֹתֵן לָהֶם שְׂכָרָן מִשָּׁלֵם! וְהָא עֲלַהּ קָתָנֵי: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הַבָּא טָעוּן לְהַבָּא רֵיקָן, עוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה לְיוֹשֵׁב וּבָטֵל! לָא סַיְּימוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ.

A tanna taught that baraita before Rav: The employer must give them their full wages. Rav said to him: My uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya, said: If I were ruling on this case, I would give them only the wages of an idle laborer, but no more, and yet you said that he gives them their full wages? The Gemara asks: But the baraita teaches concerning this very matter: A donkey driver who comes back loaded cannot be compared to one who comes back empty, nor can a laborer who performs work be compared to one who sits idle. Evidently, even the tanna of the baraita agrees that they do not receive their full wages. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaching the baraita before Rav did not conclude it, and he was unaware of this limitation, which is why he commented that they do not deserve their entire wages.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: סַיְּימוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר. חֲבִיבִי אֲמַר: אִי הֲוַאי אֲנָא – לָא הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ כְּלָל, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל! אֶלָּא קַשְׁיָא הָךְ.

There are those who say that the tanna indeed concluded it before him, and this is what Rav is saying: My uncle said: If I were ruling on this case I would not give them anything, and yet you said that he gives them the wages of an idle laborer? The Gemara questions this version: But this is difficult. How can one account for the difference between the ruling of the baraita and that of Rav’s uncle, Rabbi Ḥiyya?

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּסַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מִדְּאוּרְתָּא, הָא דְּלָא סַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מֵאוּרְתָּא.

The Gemara responds: It is not difficult, as this case, where Rabbi Ḥiyya would rule that the laborers are not paid at all, is referring to one who surveyed his land the night before, observed that it was fit to be tilled, and hired laborers on the basis of this examination. It is their misfortune that something occurred in the meantime to prevent them from carrying out the task. Conversely, that case, where the baraita rules that they are given some payment, is referring to a landowner who did not survey his land the night before. Since he failed to check his own field, he must bear the responsibility.

כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מַאן דַּאֲגַר אֲגִירֵי לְרִפְקָא וַאֲתָא מִטְרָא וּמַלְיַיהּ מַיָּא, אִי סַיְּירַהּ לְאַרְעֵיהּ מֵאוּרְתָּא –

This is like that which Rava said: With regard to one who hires laborers to till, and rain fell and filled his land with water, preventing the laborers from performing the work, if he surveyed his land the night before and did all he could,

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