Today's Daf Yomi
December 13, 2016 | י״ג בכסלו תשע״ז
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
Bava Metzia 78
If one tries is selling something and is desperate for the money then the sale isn’t final until he receives all his money. But if he is trying to get rid of bad property, then the sale is final even before he receives all the money. The mishna brings cases where one rents an item for a certain purpose and then uses it for a different purpose. If the animal died because of the change, the renter is obligated. In the first line of the mishna, it seems to imply that the renter is responsible for all cases where a change was made – not necessarily depending on how it died – which is different from the second part of the mishna where it depending on how it died. The gemara gives 4 answers – 3 establish the mishna in cases where the animal died because of the change. The fourth says that the first part is Rabbi Meir’s opinion and the second part if the rabbis opinion. And that Rabbi Meir holds that anyone who goes against the owner’s wishes is called a robber. The gemara then tries to figure out where this statement of Rabbi Meir was said.
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מפני רעתה
due to its poor quality. In other words, he was eager to sell not due to financial pressure, but because he wanted to get rid of this low-value field. His persistent demands for every last dinar are due to his fear that the buyer will change his mind and cancel the transaction.
פשיטא בעי לזבוני במאה ולא אשכח וזבין במאתים וקא עייל ונפיק אזוזי לא קני אלא אי בעי לזבוני במאה ולא אשכח ואי טרח הוה משכח ולא טרח וזבין במאתים וקא עייל ונפיק אזוזי מאי כמוכר שדהו מפני רעתה דמי או לא תיקו
The Gemara discusses a similar case. It is obvious that if one wants to sell his property for one hundred dinars but does not find a buyer, and in actuality he sells property for two hundred, and goes in and goes out for money, the buyer has not acquired the field, as it is clear that the seller performed the transaction due to financial straits. But if he wants to sell his property for one hundred and does not find a willing buyer, and the case was that if he troubled himself he would find one, and instead he did not trouble himself and sells property for two hundred, and then he goes in and goes out for money, what is the halakha? Is he considered like one who sells a field due to its poor quality or not? No answer was found, and therefore the Gemara states that this dilemma shall stand unresolved.
שכר את החמר ואת הקדר וכו׳ שוכר עליהן או מטען עד כמה שוכר עליהן אמר רב נחמן עד כדי שכרן
§ The mishna teaches that if one hired a donkey driver or a potter and they reneged, and the goods would be lost, he may hire other workers at a higher price at the former’s expense, or deceive them to make them agree to return to work. The Gemara asks: Up to what amount may he hire at their expense? Rav Naḥman said: Up to their wages, i.e., if the first workers did part of the work and the employer had not yet paid them, he may add the amount he owes the original workers to the new workers’ wage.
איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן עד ארבעים וחמשים זוז אמר ליה כי תניא ההיא שבאתה חבילה לידו
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman: But it was taught in a baraita that he can hire at their expense for up to forty or fifty dinars. Rav Naḥman said to him: When that baraita is taught it is with regard to a case where the bundle has come into his possession, i.e., the original worker left his tool kit with the employer. In this situation, the employer has more financial leverage, as he can sell the contents of the bundle to cover even higher costs.
מתני׳ השוכר את החמור להוליכו בהר והוליכו בבקעה בבקעה והוליכו בהר אפילו זו עשר מילין וזו עשר מילין ומתה חייב השוכר את החמור להוליכה בהר והוליכה בבקעה אם החליקה פטור ואם הוחמה חייב להוליכה בבקעה והוליכה בהר אם החליקה חייב ואם הוחמה פטור אם מחמת המעלה חייב
MISHNA: With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, or one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, even if this path is ten mil and that one is also ten mil, and the animal dies, he is liable. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, if it slipped and injured itself he is exempt, but if it died of heatstroke he is liable, as it was the walk in the hotter valley that caused its death. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, if it slipped he is liable, because this was caused by the mountainous terrain, but if it died of heatstroke he is exempt. If it suffered from heatstroke due to the ascent, he is liable.
השוכר את החמור והבריקה או שנעשית אנגריא אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או נשברה חייב להעמיד [לו] חמור
With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or was seized for public service [angarya], the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, and he is not required to reimburse the renter or to supply him with another donkey. If the animal died or its leg broke, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
גמ׳ מאי שנא רישא דלא קא מפליג ומאי שנא סיפא דקא מפליג
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the first clause, where the tanna does not distinguish between the various ways in which the animal might have died, as he rules that the renter is always liable, and what is different about the latter clause, where he does distinguish between whether the animal was injured through slipping or heatstroke?
אמרי דבי רבי ינאי רישא שמתה מחמת אויר דאמרינן אוירא דהר קטלה ואמרינן אוירא דבקעה קטלה רבי יוסי בר חנינא אמר כגון שמתה מחמת אובצנא רבה אמר כגון שהכישה נחש
The Gemara answers: A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The first clause is referring to a case where it died on account of the air, as we say that the air of the mountains killed it and we can equally say that the air of the valley killed it. A change in weather such that the animal is exposed to weather conditions he is unaccustomed to can be lethal. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The mishna is referring to a case where it died on account of exhaustion [uvtzena], as it can be assumed that this was caused by the weather. Rabba said: The mishna is speaking of a case where a snake bit it, as this is just as likely to happen in one place as it is in the other.
רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן הא מני רבי מאיר היא דאמר כל המעביר על דעת של בעל הבית
Conversely, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement of the first clause of the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Anyone who diverges from the intention of the employer by acting against their agreement
נקרא גזלן
is called a robber. Since he contravened their agreement and did not receive approval of the other party, it is considered as though he stole the animal from its owner. A robber is liable for any damage that occurs, even due to circumstances beyond his control.
הי רבי מאיר אילימא רבי מאיר דצבע דתנן הנותן צמר לצבע לצבוע לו אדום וצבעו שחור שחור וצבעו אדום רבי מאיר אומר נותן לו דמי צמרו
The Gemara asks: Which of Rabbi Meir’s statements indicates that this is his opinion? If we say that it is Rabbi Meir’s statement with regard to a dyer, this claim can be refuted. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 100b): With regard to one who gives wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool.
רבי יהודה אומר אם השבח יתר על היציאה נותן לו את היציאה ואם היציאה יתירה על השבח נותן לו את השבח
Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement resulting from the dying exceeds the dyer’s expenses, then the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. This apparently indicates that because the dyer diverged from the agreement, Rabbi Meir considers him a robber, which is why the dyer must refund the entire value of the wool.
ממאי דלמא שאני התם דקניא בשינוי מעשה
The Gemara challenges this proof. From where do you know that this mishna is the source of Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to reneging on an agreement made with an employer? Perhaps it is different there, as the dyer acquired the wool by means of the physical change in a substance, and it is for that reason, not due to his divergence from the agreement, that he is comparable to a robber.
אלא הא רבי מאיר דמגבת פורים דתניא מגבת פורים לפורים מגבת העיר לאותה העיר ואין מדקדקין בדבר אבל לוקחין את העגלים ושוחטין ואוכלים אותן והמותר יפול לכיס של צדקה
Rather, the source of the opinion of Rabbi Meir is the case of Purim collection. As it is taught in a baraita: The Purim collection, i.e., money collected for the Purim feast for paupers, may be used only for Purim; the city collection, i.e., money collected for poor people of a certain city, is given only for that city. And one does not scrutinize the matter by limiting the allocation for the poor to the exact costs of the meal and no more, but they acquire the calves and slaughter and eat them, and the remainder of the money, over and above the costs of the Purim feast, goes to the charity fund and is used for other charitable needs.
רבי אליעזר אומר מגבת פורים לפורים ואין העני רשאי ליקח מהן רצועה לסנדלו אלא אם כן התנה במעמד אנשי העיר דברי רבי יעקב שאמר משום רבי מאיר ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל מיקל
Rabbi Eliezer says that this is not the case. Rather, the Purim collection is only for the Purim feast, and it is not permitted for a poor person to purchase even a strap for his sandal from it unless he stipulated in the presence of the people of the city that he may do as he wishes with the money he receives. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient. This shows that according to Rabbi Meir the recipient may not diverge at all from the intention of the one who gave the charity.
דלמא התם נמי דאדעתא דפורים הוא דיהיב ליה אדעתא דמידי אחרינא לא יהיב ליה
The Gemara refutes this proof: Perhaps there too, this is considered an explicit condition, as it was with the intent that the poor person use it for Purim that he gave him money, but he did not give it to him with the intent that it be used for anything else. Consequently, that is why Rabbi Meir rules stringently in a case of this kind, where the recipient diverged from the intention of the giver.
אלא הא רבי מאיר דתניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר משום רבי מאיר הנותן דינר לעני ליקח לו חלוק לא יקח בו טלית טלית לא יקח בו חלוק מפני שמעביר על דעתו של בעל הבית
Rather, the proof that Rabbi Meir maintains that one who diverges from an agreement is considered a robber is from this statement of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: In the case of one who gives a dinar to a poor person to purchase a robe for himself, he may not purchase a cloak with it; if he gives him money to purchase a cloak, he may not purchase a robe with it, because in so doing he diverges from the intent of the homeowner, i.e., the giver.
ודלמא שאני התם דאתו למחשדיה דאמרי אינשי אמר פלניא זבנינא ליה לבושא לפלוני עניא ולא זבן ליה אי נמי זבנינא ליה גלימא ולא זבן ליה
The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Perhaps it is different there, as they will come to suspect the giver of going back on his word, for people will say that so-and-so said: I am purchasing clothing for such and such a poor person, but he did not actually purchase it. Alternatively, people will claim that he said: I am purchasing him a cloak, but he did not actually purchase it for him, as they do not see the poor person wearing the item they heard the giver promise to purchase for him. In other words, in this case the poor person might not diverge from the intent of the giver in order not to discredit the giver in the eyes of the public.
אם כן ליתני מפני החשד מאי מפני שמעביר על דעתו של בעל הבית שמע מינה משום דשני הוא וכל המעביר על דעת של בעל הבית נקרא גזלן
The Gemara responds: If so, if this is the reason, let the mishna teach: Because of suspicion. What is the meaning of the phrase: Because he diverges from the intent of the homeowner? Conclude from it that he is called a robber because he changed and departed from the terms of the agreement, and this shows that anyone who diverges from the intention of the employer is called a robber. Evidently, this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
השוכר את החמור והבריקה מאי והבריקה הכא תרגימו נהוריתא רבא אמר אבזקת
§ The mishna teaches with regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill [vehivrika], that the one who rented it to him bears no responsibility. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term vehivrika? Here, in Babylonia, they interpreted it as light in the eye, a white spot that forms on the pupil of the donkey’s eye that impairs its vision. Rava said that it is referring to worm rot [avzeket], a disease of worms in the donkey’s foot.
ההוא דאמר להו אבזקת במילתא דמלכא אמרו ליה במאי בטלי כסף או בטלי דהב איכא דאמרי בטלי כסף אמר וקטלוה איכא דאמרי בטלי דהב אמר ושבקוה
With regard to the term worm rot, the Gemara relates: There was a certain individual who said to others: I saw worm rot on the king’s clothing. They said to him: On what did you see it? On silver, i.e., linen, items or on gold, i.e., woolen, items? There are those who say that he said he had seen it on silver items, and they killed him. Since worms are not found on linen garments, they realized that he must have been lying. There are those who say that he said he had seen it on gold items, and therefore they let him be.
או שנעשית אנגריא אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך אמר רב לא שנו אלא באנגריא חוזרת אבל אנגריא שאינה חוזרת חייב להעמיד לו חמור
§ The mishna teaches: Or if the donkey was seized for public service, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to temporary public service, i.e., the government confiscates the animal for a certain period of time, after which they return it. But in a case of permanent public service, where they confiscated the animal permanently, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
ושמואל אמר בין אנגריא חוזרת בין אנגריא שאינה חוזרת אם בדרך הליכה ניטלה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך ואם לאו בדרך הליכתה ניטלה חייב להעמיד לו חמור
And Shmuel said: Whether the donkey was seized to perform a permanent public service or a temporary public service, if it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, i.e., the government officials led the animal in the direction it was already going, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. The common practice was that when an animal was confiscated by government officials, the one who had been leading it would follow them until the officials found another animal. At this point, the officials would take the animal they just found and release the one they had previously seized. Therefore, the owner can insist that the renter follow the officials, who in any event are going in the direction he wishes to go, in order to retrieve the animal he had rented. But if it was seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking, but in a different direction, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
מיתיבי השוכר את החמור והבריקה או שנשתטתה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או שנעשית אנגריא חייב להעמיד לו חמור
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or went mad, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. If it died or was seized for public service, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
בשלמא לרב לא קשיא כאן באנגריא חוזרת כאן באנגריא שאינה חוזרת אלא לשמואל קשיא
Granted, according to the opinion of Rav this is not difficult, as he can explain that here, in the mishna, it is referring to permanent public service, and therefore the owner does not have to provide the renter with another donkey, whereas there, in the baraita, it is referring to temporary public service. Consequently, the owner must give the renter another donkey. But according to the opinion of Shmuel it is difficult.
וכי תימא לשמואל נמי לא קשיא כאן שבדרך הליכתה ניטלה כאן שלא בדרך הליכתה ניטלה
And if you would say that according to the opinion of Shmuel too, it is not difficult, as he could resolve the apparent contradiction in a similar manner by explaining that here, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, and there, in the baraita, it is referring to a case where it was seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking but in a different direction, this resolution is not possible.
הא מדקתני סיפא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אם בדרך הליכתה ניטלה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך ואם לאו חייב להעמיד לו חמור מכלל דלתנא קמא לא שאני ליה
This resolution cannot be accepted, because from the fact that the baraita teaches in the latter clause that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, but if not the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey, by inference one can learn that according to the opinion of the first tanna there is no difference whether or not the animal was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking. If so, the baraita is difficult to reconcile with Shmuel’s opinion.
אמר לך שמואל לאו מי איכא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר דקאי כוותי אנא דאמרי כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר איבעית אימא כולה רבי שמעון בן אלעזר היא וחסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני השוכר את החמור והבריקה או נשתטית אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או שנעשית אנגריא חייב להעמיד לו חמור במה דברים אמורים שלא בדרך הליכתה ניטלה אבל ניטלה בדרך הליכתה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך
The Gemara answers that Shmuel could say to you: Isn’t there the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds in accordance with my opinion? I spoke in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. If you wish, say instead that the entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and it is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or went mad, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. If it died or was seized for public service, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey. In what case is this statement said? When it is seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking but in a different direction, but if it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you.
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This month's learning is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.
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Bava Metzia 78
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
מפני רעתה
due to its poor quality. In other words, he was eager to sell not due to financial pressure, but because he wanted to get rid of this low-value field. His persistent demands for every last dinar are due to his fear that the buyer will change his mind and cancel the transaction.
פשיטא בעי לזבוני במאה ולא אשכח וזבין במאתים וקא עייל ונפיק אזוזי לא קני אלא אי בעי לזבוני במאה ולא אשכח ואי טרח הוה משכח ולא טרח וזבין במאתים וקא עייל ונפיק אזוזי מאי כמוכר שדהו מפני רעתה דמי או לא תיקו
The Gemara discusses a similar case. It is obvious that if one wants to sell his property for one hundred dinars but does not find a buyer, and in actuality he sells property for two hundred, and goes in and goes out for money, the buyer has not acquired the field, as it is clear that the seller performed the transaction due to financial straits. But if he wants to sell his property for one hundred and does not find a willing buyer, and the case was that if he troubled himself he would find one, and instead he did not trouble himself and sells property for two hundred, and then he goes in and goes out for money, what is the halakha? Is he considered like one who sells a field due to its poor quality or not? No answer was found, and therefore the Gemara states that this dilemma shall stand unresolved.
שכר את החמר ואת הקדר וכו׳ שוכר עליהן או מטען עד כמה שוכר עליהן אמר רב נחמן עד כדי שכרן
§ The mishna teaches that if one hired a donkey driver or a potter and they reneged, and the goods would be lost, he may hire other workers at a higher price at the former’s expense, or deceive them to make them agree to return to work. The Gemara asks: Up to what amount may he hire at their expense? Rav Naḥman said: Up to their wages, i.e., if the first workers did part of the work and the employer had not yet paid them, he may add the amount he owes the original workers to the new workers’ wage.
איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן עד ארבעים וחמשים זוז אמר ליה כי תניא ההיא שבאתה חבילה לידו
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman: But it was taught in a baraita that he can hire at their expense for up to forty or fifty dinars. Rav Naḥman said to him: When that baraita is taught it is with regard to a case where the bundle has come into his possession, i.e., the original worker left his tool kit with the employer. In this situation, the employer has more financial leverage, as he can sell the contents of the bundle to cover even higher costs.
מתני׳ השוכר את החמור להוליכו בהר והוליכו בבקעה בבקעה והוליכו בהר אפילו זו עשר מילין וזו עשר מילין ומתה חייב השוכר את החמור להוליכה בהר והוליכה בבקעה אם החליקה פטור ואם הוחמה חייב להוליכה בבקעה והוליכה בהר אם החליקה חייב ואם הוחמה פטור אם מחמת המעלה חייב
MISHNA: With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, or one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, even if this path is ten mil and that one is also ten mil, and the animal dies, he is liable. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, if it slipped and injured itself he is exempt, but if it died of heatstroke he is liable, as it was the walk in the hotter valley that caused its death. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, if it slipped he is liable, because this was caused by the mountainous terrain, but if it died of heatstroke he is exempt. If it suffered from heatstroke due to the ascent, he is liable.
השוכר את החמור והבריקה או שנעשית אנגריא אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או נשברה חייב להעמיד [לו] חמור
With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or was seized for public service [angarya], the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, and he is not required to reimburse the renter or to supply him with another donkey. If the animal died or its leg broke, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
גמ׳ מאי שנא רישא דלא קא מפליג ומאי שנא סיפא דקא מפליג
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the first clause, where the tanna does not distinguish between the various ways in which the animal might have died, as he rules that the renter is always liable, and what is different about the latter clause, where he does distinguish between whether the animal was injured through slipping or heatstroke?
אמרי דבי רבי ינאי רישא שמתה מחמת אויר דאמרינן אוירא דהר קטלה ואמרינן אוירא דבקעה קטלה רבי יוסי בר חנינא אמר כגון שמתה מחמת אובצנא רבה אמר כגון שהכישה נחש
The Gemara answers: A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The first clause is referring to a case where it died on account of the air, as we say that the air of the mountains killed it and we can equally say that the air of the valley killed it. A change in weather such that the animal is exposed to weather conditions he is unaccustomed to can be lethal. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The mishna is referring to a case where it died on account of exhaustion [uvtzena], as it can be assumed that this was caused by the weather. Rabba said: The mishna is speaking of a case where a snake bit it, as this is just as likely to happen in one place as it is in the other.
רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן הא מני רבי מאיר היא דאמר כל המעביר על דעת של בעל הבית
Conversely, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement of the first clause of the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Anyone who diverges from the intention of the employer by acting against their agreement
נקרא גזלן
is called a robber. Since he contravened their agreement and did not receive approval of the other party, it is considered as though he stole the animal from its owner. A robber is liable for any damage that occurs, even due to circumstances beyond his control.
הי רבי מאיר אילימא רבי מאיר דצבע דתנן הנותן צמר לצבע לצבוע לו אדום וצבעו שחור שחור וצבעו אדום רבי מאיר אומר נותן לו דמי צמרו
The Gemara asks: Which of Rabbi Meir’s statements indicates that this is his opinion? If we say that it is Rabbi Meir’s statement with regard to a dyer, this claim can be refuted. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 100b): With regard to one who gives wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool.
רבי יהודה אומר אם השבח יתר על היציאה נותן לו את היציאה ואם היציאה יתירה על השבח נותן לו את השבח
Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement resulting from the dying exceeds the dyer’s expenses, then the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. This apparently indicates that because the dyer diverged from the agreement, Rabbi Meir considers him a robber, which is why the dyer must refund the entire value of the wool.
ממאי דלמא שאני התם דקניא בשינוי מעשה
The Gemara challenges this proof. From where do you know that this mishna is the source of Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to reneging on an agreement made with an employer? Perhaps it is different there, as the dyer acquired the wool by means of the physical change in a substance, and it is for that reason, not due to his divergence from the agreement, that he is comparable to a robber.
אלא הא רבי מאיר דמגבת פורים דתניא מגבת פורים לפורים מגבת העיר לאותה העיר ואין מדקדקין בדבר אבל לוקחין את העגלים ושוחטין ואוכלים אותן והמותר יפול לכיס של צדקה
Rather, the source of the opinion of Rabbi Meir is the case of Purim collection. As it is taught in a baraita: The Purim collection, i.e., money collected for the Purim feast for paupers, may be used only for Purim; the city collection, i.e., money collected for poor people of a certain city, is given only for that city. And one does not scrutinize the matter by limiting the allocation for the poor to the exact costs of the meal and no more, but they acquire the calves and slaughter and eat them, and the remainder of the money, over and above the costs of the Purim feast, goes to the charity fund and is used for other charitable needs.
רבי אליעזר אומר מגבת פורים לפורים ואין העני רשאי ליקח מהן רצועה לסנדלו אלא אם כן התנה במעמד אנשי העיר דברי רבי יעקב שאמר משום רבי מאיר ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל מיקל
Rabbi Eliezer says that this is not the case. Rather, the Purim collection is only for the Purim feast, and it is not permitted for a poor person to purchase even a strap for his sandal from it unless he stipulated in the presence of the people of the city that he may do as he wishes with the money he receives. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient. This shows that according to Rabbi Meir the recipient may not diverge at all from the intention of the one who gave the charity.
דלמא התם נמי דאדעתא דפורים הוא דיהיב ליה אדעתא דמידי אחרינא לא יהיב ליה
The Gemara refutes this proof: Perhaps there too, this is considered an explicit condition, as it was with the intent that the poor person use it for Purim that he gave him money, but he did not give it to him with the intent that it be used for anything else. Consequently, that is why Rabbi Meir rules stringently in a case of this kind, where the recipient diverged from the intention of the giver.
אלא הא רבי מאיר דתניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר משום רבי מאיר הנותן דינר לעני ליקח לו חלוק לא יקח בו טלית טלית לא יקח בו חלוק מפני שמעביר על דעתו של בעל הבית
Rather, the proof that Rabbi Meir maintains that one who diverges from an agreement is considered a robber is from this statement of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: In the case of one who gives a dinar to a poor person to purchase a robe for himself, he may not purchase a cloak with it; if he gives him money to purchase a cloak, he may not purchase a robe with it, because in so doing he diverges from the intent of the homeowner, i.e., the giver.
ודלמא שאני התם דאתו למחשדיה דאמרי אינשי אמר פלניא זבנינא ליה לבושא לפלוני עניא ולא זבן ליה אי נמי זבנינא ליה גלימא ולא זבן ליה
The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Perhaps it is different there, as they will come to suspect the giver of going back on his word, for people will say that so-and-so said: I am purchasing clothing for such and such a poor person, but he did not actually purchase it. Alternatively, people will claim that he said: I am purchasing him a cloak, but he did not actually purchase it for him, as they do not see the poor person wearing the item they heard the giver promise to purchase for him. In other words, in this case the poor person might not diverge from the intent of the giver in order not to discredit the giver in the eyes of the public.
אם כן ליתני מפני החשד מאי מפני שמעביר על דעתו של בעל הבית שמע מינה משום דשני הוא וכל המעביר על דעת של בעל הבית נקרא גזלן
The Gemara responds: If so, if this is the reason, let the mishna teach: Because of suspicion. What is the meaning of the phrase: Because he diverges from the intent of the homeowner? Conclude from it that he is called a robber because he changed and departed from the terms of the agreement, and this shows that anyone who diverges from the intention of the employer is called a robber. Evidently, this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
השוכר את החמור והבריקה מאי והבריקה הכא תרגימו נהוריתא רבא אמר אבזקת
§ The mishna teaches with regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill [vehivrika], that the one who rented it to him bears no responsibility. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term vehivrika? Here, in Babylonia, they interpreted it as light in the eye, a white spot that forms on the pupil of the donkey’s eye that impairs its vision. Rava said that it is referring to worm rot [avzeket], a disease of worms in the donkey’s foot.
ההוא דאמר להו אבזקת במילתא דמלכא אמרו ליה במאי בטלי כסף או בטלי דהב איכא דאמרי בטלי כסף אמר וקטלוה איכא דאמרי בטלי דהב אמר ושבקוה
With regard to the term worm rot, the Gemara relates: There was a certain individual who said to others: I saw worm rot on the king’s clothing. They said to him: On what did you see it? On silver, i.e., linen, items or on gold, i.e., woolen, items? There are those who say that he said he had seen it on silver items, and they killed him. Since worms are not found on linen garments, they realized that he must have been lying. There are those who say that he said he had seen it on gold items, and therefore they let him be.
או שנעשית אנגריא אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך אמר רב לא שנו אלא באנגריא חוזרת אבל אנגריא שאינה חוזרת חייב להעמיד לו חמור
§ The mishna teaches: Or if the donkey was seized for public service, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to temporary public service, i.e., the government confiscates the animal for a certain period of time, after which they return it. But in a case of permanent public service, where they confiscated the animal permanently, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
ושמואל אמר בין אנגריא חוזרת בין אנגריא שאינה חוזרת אם בדרך הליכה ניטלה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך ואם לאו בדרך הליכתה ניטלה חייב להעמיד לו חמור
And Shmuel said: Whether the donkey was seized to perform a permanent public service or a temporary public service, if it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, i.e., the government officials led the animal in the direction it was already going, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. The common practice was that when an animal was confiscated by government officials, the one who had been leading it would follow them until the officials found another animal. At this point, the officials would take the animal they just found and release the one they had previously seized. Therefore, the owner can insist that the renter follow the officials, who in any event are going in the direction he wishes to go, in order to retrieve the animal he had rented. But if it was seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking, but in a different direction, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
מיתיבי השוכר את החמור והבריקה או שנשתטתה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או שנעשית אנגריא חייב להעמיד לו חמור
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or went mad, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. If it died or was seized for public service, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey.
בשלמא לרב לא קשיא כאן באנגריא חוזרת כאן באנגריא שאינה חוזרת אלא לשמואל קשיא
Granted, according to the opinion of Rav this is not difficult, as he can explain that here, in the mishna, it is referring to permanent public service, and therefore the owner does not have to provide the renter with another donkey, whereas there, in the baraita, it is referring to temporary public service. Consequently, the owner must give the renter another donkey. But according to the opinion of Shmuel it is difficult.
וכי תימא לשמואל נמי לא קשיא כאן שבדרך הליכתה ניטלה כאן שלא בדרך הליכתה ניטלה
And if you would say that according to the opinion of Shmuel too, it is not difficult, as he could resolve the apparent contradiction in a similar manner by explaining that here, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, and there, in the baraita, it is referring to a case where it was seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking but in a different direction, this resolution is not possible.
הא מדקתני סיפא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אם בדרך הליכתה ניטלה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך ואם לאו חייב להעמיד לו חמור מכלל דלתנא קמא לא שאני ליה
This resolution cannot be accepted, because from the fact that the baraita teaches in the latter clause that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, but if not the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey, by inference one can learn that according to the opinion of the first tanna there is no difference whether or not the animal was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking. If so, the baraita is difficult to reconcile with Shmuel’s opinion.
אמר לך שמואל לאו מי איכא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר דקאי כוותי אנא דאמרי כרבי שמעון בן אלעזר איבעית אימא כולה רבי שמעון בן אלעזר היא וחסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני השוכר את החמור והבריקה או נשתטית אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך מתה או שנעשית אנגריא חייב להעמיד לו חמור במה דברים אמורים שלא בדרך הליכתה ניטלה אבל ניטלה בדרך הליכתה אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך
The Gemara answers that Shmuel could say to you: Isn’t there the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds in accordance with my opinion? I spoke in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. If you wish, say instead that the entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and it is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or went mad, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you. If it died or was seized for public service, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey. In what case is this statement said? When it is seized and then taken not in the direction in which it was walking but in a different direction, but if it was seized and then taken in the direction in which it was walking, the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you.