Bava Metzia 90

והדשות בתרומה ומעשר אינו עובר משום בל תחסום אבל מפני מראית העין מביא בול מאותו המין ותולה לה בטרסקלין שבפיה רבי שמעון בן יוחאי אומר מביא כרשינים ותולה לה שהכרשינים יפות לה מן הכל

or that thresh teruma and tithe, which one may not allow his cows to eat, if he muzzles them he does not violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle, but due to the appearance of prohibition, as observers are unaware that he is acting in a permitted manner, he should bring a piece of that species of produce and hang it in the basket [bateraskalin] that is by the animal’s mouth. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: He does not have to use the same food that the animal is threshing, as he may bring vetches and hang them for it, as vetches are better for it than anything.

ורמינהי פרות המרכסות בתבואה אינו עובר משום בל תחסום והדשות בתרומה ומעשר עובר משום בל תחסום ונכרי הדש בפרתו של ישראל אינו עובר משום בל תחסום וישראל הדש בפרתו של נכרי עובר משום בל תחסום קשיא תרומה אתרומה קשיא מעשר אמעשר

And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this from a baraita: In the case of cows that tread on produce, one does not violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle, but with regard to those which thresh teruma and tithes, he does violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle. And in the case of a gentile who threshes with the cow of a Jew, he does not violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle, but a Jew who threshes with the cow of a gentile does violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle, as it depends on the person who performs the action, not the identity of the animal’s owner. This presents a difficulty with regard to the ruling concerning teruma in one baraita and the ruling concerning teruma in the other baraita, and there is similarly a difficulty with regard to the ruling concerning tithe in one baraita and the ruling concerning tithe in the other baraita.

בשלמא תרומה אתרומה לא קשיא כאן בתרומה כאן בגידולי תרומה אלא מעשר אמעשר קשיא

The Gemara comments: Granted, the contradiction between the ruling concerning teruma in one baraita and the ruling concerning teruma in the other baraita is not difficult, as here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to actual teruma, which may not be fed to a cow, and there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to growths of teruma, which have the status of teruma by rabbinic law, and therefore it is permitted to feed them to one’s animal so as not to violate the prohibition against muzzling. But as for the contradiction between the ruling concerning tithe in one baraita and the ruling concerning tithe in the other baraita, this is difficult.

וכי תימא מעשר אמעשר נמי לא קשיא כאן במעשר כאן בגידולי מעשר בשלמא גידולי תרומה תרומה אלא גידולי מעשר חולין נינהו דתנן גידולי טבל וגידולי מעשר שני חולין

And if you would say that the contradiction between the ruling concerning tithe in one baraita and the ruling concerning tithe in the other baraita is also not difficult, as here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to actual tithe, which may not be fed to a cow, and there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to growths of tithe, which have the status of tithe by rabbinic law, and therefore it is permitted to feed them to one’s animal in order not to violate the prohibition against muzzling, this answer cannot be accepted. The reason is that granted, the growths of teruma are considered like teruma by rabbinic law, but the growths of tithe are non-sacred foods. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 9:4): The growths of untithed produce and the growths of second tithe are non-sacred.

אלא לא קשיא הא במעשר ראשון הא במעשר שני ואיבעית אימא הא והא במעשר שני ולא קשיא הא רבי מאיר הא רבי יהודה

The Gemara suggests a different answer: Rather, this is not difficult. The ruling of this baraita is stated with regard to first tithe, which is considered the owner’s property, whereas the ruling of that baraita is stated with regard to second tithe, which is property of the Temple treasury. And if you wish, say that both this ruling and that ruling are stated with regard to second tithe, and it is not difficult, as the ruling of this baraita, according to which it is prohibited to feed it to the animal, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, while the ruling of that baraita, which says that one may feed it to the animal, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

הא רבי מאיר דאמר מעשר ממון גבוה הוא הא רבי יהודה דאמר מעשר שני ממון הדיוט הוא

The Gemara elaborates: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that second tithe is property belonging to the Most High, i.e., the owner has only the right to eat the food, and therefore he may not let his cow consume it, whereas that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that second tithe is non-sacred property.

היכי דמי כגון שהקדימו בשבלין

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a cow that threshes tithes? Tithes are usually separated only after the produce has been threshed and collected into a pile. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the separation of tithes performed by the owner preceded the separation of teruma at the stage when the produce was still on the stalks.

ולרבי יהודה והא בעי חומה כגון שדש לפנים מחומת בית פאגי

The Gemara further asks: And according to the explanation that the baraita that permits feeding this produce to one’s animal is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, i.e., that this is referring to second tithe, how is the consumption of this tithe permitted before it enters Jerusalem? But one is required to bring second tithe within the city wall. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where he threshed inside the wall of Beit Pagei, the outer wall of Jerusalem, which enclosed a semi-rural suburb.

איבעית אימא לא קשיא כאן במעשר ודאי כאן במעשר דמאי השתא דאתית להכי תרומה אתרומה נמי לא קשיא כאן בתרומת ודאי כאן בתרומת דמאי

If you wish, say a different answer to the original contradiction between the baraitot: This is not difficult; here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to definite tithe, which may not be fed to a cow, whereas there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to doubtfully tithed produce [demai], from which one is required to separate tithes by rabbinic law. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this answer, i.e., that this baraita is referring to demai, the contradiction between the ruling of this baraita concerning teruma and the ruling of that baraita concerning teruma is also not difficult, as one can likewise say that here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to definite teruma, and there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to teruma of demai.

בשלמא מעשר דמאי איכא אלא תרומת דמאי מי איכא והתניא אף הוא ביטל את הוידוי וגזר על הדמאי לפי ששלח בכל גבול ישראל וראה שלא היו מפרישין אלא תרומה גדולה בלבד

The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to demai of tithe, there is such a concept, as the Sages decreed that one must separate tithe from doubtfully tithed produce. But with regard to demai of teruma, is there teruma of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: He, Yoḥanan the High Priest, also annulled the declaration of tithes (Deuteronomy 26:12–19), due to fear that the agricultural halakhot were not being properly observed and the declaration that one has separated his tithe in accordance with Torah law would therefore be false, and he decreed that one must separate demai of tithe from the produce of one who is unreliable with regard to tithes. He issued this decree because he sent messengers throughout all the borders of Eretz Yisrael and saw that they would separate only the great teruma alone, not tithes. It is clear from here that Jews were not suspected of neglecting the mitzva of teruma, and therefore was no need to separate teruma from demai.

אלא לא קשיא כאן בתרומת מעשר ודאי כאן בתרומת מעשר דמאי

Rather, the Gemara offers a slightly different answer: It is not difficult; here, the ruling in this baraita is stated with regard to definite teruma of the tithe, separated by a Levite from his tithe and given to a priest; there, the ruling in that baraita is stated with regard to teruma of the tithe from demai.

בעו מיניה מרב ששת היתה אוכלת ומתרזת מהו משום דמעלי לה הוא והא לא מעלי לה או דלמא דחזיא ומצטערא והא חזיא ומצטערא

§ The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If the animal was eating from the produce it was threshing, and it was excreting diarrhea [matrezet], what is the halakha? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason that one must let the animal eat because the food is good for it, and this produce is evidently not good for it, and therefore the animal should be muzzled to prevent it from harm? Or perhaps the reason for the prohibition against muzzling is that it sees food and suffers when it cannot eat, and this one also sees food and suffers when it cannot eat.

אמר להו רב ששת תניתוה רבי שמעון בן יוחי אומר מביא כרשינים ותולה לה שהכרשינים יפות לה מן הכל שמע מינה משום דמעלי לה הוא שמע מינה

Rav Sheshet said to them: You learned a baraita that provides the answer to your question. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One can bring vetches and hang them for it, as vetches are better for it than anything. One can learn from the baraita that the reason is because the food is good for it. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the baraita that it is so.

איבעיא להו מהו שיאמר אדם לנכרי חסום פרתי ודוש בה מי אמרינן כי אמרינן אמירה לנכרי שבות הני מילי לענין שבת דאיסור סקילה אבל חסימה דאיסור לאו לא או דלמא לא שנא

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a person can say to a gentile: Muzzle my cow and thresh with it? Do we say that when we state the principle that speaking to a gentile and requesting of him to perform for oneself a task forbidden to a Jew is prohibited by a rabbinic decree, this matter applies only to Shabbat, when the performance of labor is a prohibition that entails stoning, but with regard to muzzling, which is merely a regular prohibition, giving an instruction of this kind to a gentile is not prohibited; or perhaps there is no difference between the prohibitions of Shabbat and other prohibitions in this regard?

תא שמע נכרי הדש בפרתו של ישראל אינו עובר משום בל תחסום מעבר הוא דלא עבר הא איסורא איכא בדין הוא דאיסורא נמי ליכא ואיידי דתנא סיפא דישראל הדש בפרתו של נכרי עובר תנא רישא אינו עובר

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the aforementioned baraita. A gentile who threshes with the cow of a Jew does not violate the prohibition of: Do not muzzle. One can infer as follows: It is a transgression by Torah law that he does not transgress, but there is a prohibition here by rabbinic law. The Gemara refutes this argument: This is no proof, as by right the baraita should have stated that there is no prohibition here either, but since the tanna of the baraita taught in the latter clause that a Jew who threshes with the cow of a gentile does violate the prohibition, he taught the first clause in a similar style, with the phrase: He does not violate the prohibition. If so, one cannot reach any conclusions from the wording of the baraita.

תא שמע דשלחו ליה לאבוה דשמואל הלין תורי

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as they sent to Shmuel’s father a halakhic inquiry with regard to these oxen

דגנבין ארמאי ומגנחין יתהון מהו שלח להו הערמה אתעביד בהו אערימו עלייהו ויזדבנון

which gentiles steal and castrate. Since it is prohibited for Jews to castrate animals, they would sometimes arrange for a gentile to pretend to steal the animal and subsequently return it after castrating it, as it is easier to handle a castrated animal. What is the halakha with regard to a case of this kind? Shmuel’s father sent to him: They used artifice; therefore, you should use artifice with them and make them sell it as a punishment. This shows that it is prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform a prohibition on one’s behalf.

אמר רב פפא בני מערבא סברי לה כרבי חידקא דאמר בני נח מצווין על הסירוס וקא עברי משום ולפני עור לא תתן מכשל

Rav Pappa said: This provides no conclusive proof, as the inhabitants of the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, who are the ones who raised this question, hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥideka, who says: The descendants of Noah are commanded with regard to castration. They too are prohibited from performing this practice. And consequently, those Jews who cause them to do it transgress the prohibition of: “Nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14).

סבר רבא למימר ימכרו לשחיטה אמר לו אביי דיין שקנסת עליהם מכירה

Rava thought to say that it is not enough that the owners may not use these animals castrated for them by gentiles, but they must even sell the animals for slaughter, but not for plowing, so that they would derive no benefit at all from the increase in the value of their property that resulted from a transgression. A castrated animal is worth more if it is sold for plowing, but not if it is sold for slaughter. Abaye said to him: It is enough for them that you penalized them by requiring them to sell the animals.

פשיטא בנו גדול כי אחר דמי בנו קטן מאי רב אחי אסר ורב אשי שרי מרימר ומר זוטרא ואמרי לה הנהו תרי חסידי מחלפי אהדדי

With regard to the same issue, the Gemara comments: It is obvious that if one sold the castrated animal to his adult son, the son is considered like another person, i.e., there is no need to sell to a complete stranger. If the buyer was his minor son, what is the halakha? Rav Aḥai prohibited this, and Rav Ashi permitted it. Mareimar and Mar Zutra, and some say it was a certain pair of unknown pious men, would exchange such oxen with each other.

בעי רמי בר חמא הושיב לה קוץ בפיה מהו הושיב לה חסימה מעלייתא היא אלא ישב לה קוץ בפיה מהו

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one placed a thorn in the mouth of a threshing animal, what is the halakha? The Gemara is puzzled by this question: If he placed the thorn in its mouth, this is certainly considered proper muzzling. Rather, the dilemma should be formulated as follows: If a thorn settled in its mouth and one did not remove it, what is the halakha?

הרביץ לה ארי מבחוץ מהו הרביץ לה חסימה מעלייתא היא אלא רבץ לה ארי מבחוץ מהו העמיד בנה מבחוץ מהו היתה צמאה למים מהו פרס לה קטבליא על גבי דישה מהו

The Gemara poses a similar question: If one made a lion crouch over it from outside, to frighten the animal and stop it from eating, what is the halakha? The Gemara responds as it did before: If he made the lion crouch over it, this is considered proper muzzling. Rather, if a lion was crouching over it and he did not get rid of it, what is the halakha? Similarly, if he placed its young on the outside, so that the animal looks toward its young and does not eat, what is the halakha? Or, if it was thirsty for water, what is the halakha? If he spread a leather blanket [katavliya] for it over the produce it was threshing, so that the animal cannot see the food, what is the halakha?

פשוט מיהא חדא דתניא רשאי בעל פרה להרעיב פרתו כדי שתאכל מן הדישה הרבה ורשאי בעל הבית להתיר פקיע עמיר לפני הבהמה כדי שלא תאכל מן הדישה הרבה

The Gemara comments: Resolve at least one of the abovementioned dilemmas, as it is taught in a baraita: The owner of a cow who lent his animal to thresh the field of another is permitted to starve his cow so that it will eat plenty of the crop it is threshing, and a homeowner is permitted to untie a bundle of straw before an animal so that it will not eat plenty of the produce it is threshing. This is similar to spreading a blanket over the produce.

שאני התם דקא אכלה איבעית אימא רשאי בעל הבית להתיר פקיע עמיר לפני בהמה מעיקרא כדי שלא תאכל הרבה מן הדישה

The Gemara refutes this comparison: No proof can be brought from here, because there it is different, as it at least gets to eat the produce. If you wish, say instead that the baraita should be explained as follows: A homeowner is permitted to untie a bundle of straw before an animal at the outset, before the threshing begins, so that it will fill itself with straw beforehand and will not eat plenty of the crop it is threshing.

בעא מיניה רבי יונתן מרבי סימאי חסמה מבחוץ מהו שור בדישו אמר רחמנא והא לאו בדישו הוא או דלמא לא תדוש בחסימה אמר רחמנא

§ Rabbi Yonatan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Simai: If one muzzled the animal from the outside, i.e., before it began to thresh, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: One can argue that the Merciful One states: “An ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), and this animal is not in its threshing, as it was muzzled before it was taken to thresh. Or perhaps the Merciful One states that one may not have the animal thresh while it is muzzled.

אמר לו מבית אביך אתה למד יין ושכר אל תשת אתה ובניך אתך בבאכם בבואכם הוא דאסור הא מישתא ומיעל שרי

Rabbi Simai said to him: You can learn from your father’s house, i.e., you can derive this halakha from the case of priests, being a priest yourself. As the Torah states: “Drink no wine nor strong drink, you nor your sons with you, when you come into the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 10:9). Doesn’t a straightforward reading of this verse lead to the conclusion that it is only when you come into the Sanctuary that it is prohibited, whereas to drink wine and then enter is permitted?

ולהבדיל בין הקדש ובין החל אמר רחמנא אלא מה התם בשעת ביאה לא תהא שכרות הכא נמי בשעת דישה לא תהא חסימה

This interpretation is not tenable, as with regard to the same matter the Merciful One states: “That you may make a difference between the sacred and the non-sacred” (Leviticus 10:10), which indicates that the priest must be capable of making these distinctions when he enters the Temple. Rather, just as there, with regard to the prohibition against drinking wine in the Sanctuary, the Torah means that at the time of entry there must be no drunkenness, whether the wine was drunk inside or outside the Sanctuary, here too it means that at the time of threshing there must be no muzzling.

תנו רבנן החוסם את הפרה והמזווג בכלאים פטור ואינו לוקה אלא דש ומנהיג בלבד

§ The Sages taught: With regard to one who muzzles a cow that someone else is using for threshing, and similarly, one who plows with animals of diverse kinds together, e.g., with an ox and a donkey on the same plow, he is exempt, as only one who threshes a muzzled animal and one who leads diverse kinds of animals together are flogged.

איתמר חסמה בקול והנהיגה בקול רבי יוחנן אמר חייב ריש לקיש אמר פטור רבי יוחנן אמר חייב עקימת פיו הויא מעשה ריש לקיש אמר פטור קלא לא הוי מעשה

§ It was stated that the amora’im disagreed about the following case: If one muzzled an animal with his voice, by berating it whenever it tried to eat, and similarly, if he led diverse kinds of animals together by means of his voice, without performing any action, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable; Reish Lakish says he is exempt. The Gemara explains the reasoning behind their opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable, as he maintains that the twisting of one’s mouth to speak is considered an action, albeit a slight one, whereas Reish Lakish says he is exempt, because a mere voice is not considered an action.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish: