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Today's Daf Yomi

December 27, 2016 | 讻状讝 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bava Metzia 92

How much is a worker allowed to eat? 聽Can he eat more than the value of his wages? 聽Is the food allowance views as an addition to his wages – meaning it belongs to him and can be transferred to others – or is it a “gift” from God which would therefore be for his use only. 聽One can view the latter option as a basic human right – to allow one to eat from the produce he is working with.


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讜诪讛诇讱 讻注讜砖讛 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬

but a worker who was walking is considered like one who was performing his labor. Yet, since one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine, he would not be entitled to eat while walking if not for the ordinance of the Sages.

讜讘讞诪讜专 讻砖讛讬讗 驻讜专拽转 讻砖讛讬讗 驻讜专拽转 诪讛讬讻谉 讗讻诇讛 讗讬诪讗 注讚 砖转讛讗 驻讜专拽转 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讞诪讜专 讜讙诪诇 讗讜讻诇讬诐 诪诪砖讗讜讬 砖注诇 讙讘讬讛谉 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬讟讜诇 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讗讻讬诇诐

搂 The mishna teaches: And with regard to a donkey, it is permitted to eat when it is being unloaded. The Gemara is puzzled by this statement: From where can it eat when it is being unloaded? Since the load is being removed from the animal at the time, how can the donkey eat from it? Rather, you should say: It may eat until it is unloaded. As long as it is bearing its load the donkey may eat from the food on its back. The Gemara comments: We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A donkey and a camel may eat from the load on their backs, provided that the owner of the animal does not take some of the food in his hand and feed them.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讜讻诇 驻讜注诇 拽讬砖讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讻讜转讘转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞住诪讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 驻讜注诇 讬转专 注诇 砖讻专讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗转 讛讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 专注讘转谉 讜讬讛讗 住讜转诐 讗转 讛驻转讞 讘驻谞讬讜

MISHNA: A laborer may eat cucumbers while he works, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. Rabbi Elazar 岣sma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it, according to the strict letter of the law. But one teaches a person not to be a glutton and thereby close the opening to other job offers in his face. When people hear of his greed they will be reluctant to hire him.

讙诪壮 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讬谞讜 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讘诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诇转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讛讜 诪诇诪讚讬谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first tanna. A mishna would not repeat the exact same opinion. The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them concerns the statement: But one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the first tanna, he does not accept the notion that one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the Rabbis, they do accept this principle that one teaches a person not to be a glutton.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘 讗住讬 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 砖讻专讜 讗诇讗 诇讘爪讜专 讗砖讻讜诇 讗讞讚 讗讜讻诇讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讘爪专 讗诇讗 讗砖讻讜诇 讗讞讚 讗讜讻诇讜

If you wish, say instead that the practical difference between them concerns a halakha taught by Rav Asi. As Rav Asi says: Even if he hired him to harvest only one cluster, the laborer may eat. And Rav Asi further said: Even if he harvested only one cluster, he may eat it.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬转讘 诇讻诇讬讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬转讘 诇讻诇讬讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讬转讘 讘专讬砖讗 讜讛讚专 诇讬讻讜诇

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for Rav Asi to state both of these halakhot, despite their apparent similarity. As, had he taught us only this first one, one might have thought that he may eat because there is no other food to place in the homeowner鈥檚 vessels, as he was hired to harvest only a single cluster. The Torah permits him to eat, and if he is not allowed to eat that cluster, what else is there for him to eat? But if there is produce left over to place in the homeowner鈥檚 vessels, as in the second case, one might say that he should first place some in the vessels and then eat.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇讘住讜祝 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇讘住讜祝 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had Rav Asi taught us only this second case, one might have said that the reason he may eat is that ultimately it is possible to fulfill the requirement to place produce in the owner鈥檚 vessels, i.e., he can eat and still perform the task. But in a situation where ultimately it is not possible to fulfill his task, since if he were to eat the only cluster he was hired to harvest there would be nothing left for him to do, one might say that he may not eat. Therefore, both halakhot are necessary.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 诪爪讗转讬 诪讙讬诇转 住转专讬诐 讘讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜讻转讜讘 讘讛 讗讬住讬 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻讬 转讘讗 讘讻专诐 专注讱 讘讘讬讗转 讻诇 讗讚诐 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

The Gemara returns to the dispute of the mishna: If you wish, say that the practical difference between the opinions of the first tanna and the Rabbis concerns a halakha taught by Rav. As Rav says: I found a concealed scroll, a document that lists halakhot in shortened form so that they will not be forgotten. Rav discovered this document in Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 house, and it was written in it: Isi ben Yehuda says that with regard to the verse: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25), the verse is speaking of the entry of any person who passes alongside a vineyard, not only a laborer.

讜讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖讘拽 讗讬住讬 讞讬讬 诇讻诇 讘专讬讛

And Rav said in response: Isi has not left any livelihood for any entity, as many people might pass by and consume all the fruit of one鈥檚 vineyard. The first tanna agrees with Rav, while the Rabbis accept Isi ben Yehuda鈥檚 opinion that by right even one who is not a laborer may eat.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专讬转讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚诇诪讗 讘注讜砖讬谉 讘住注讜讚转诐 讚注讘讚讜 讜讗讻诇讜 讗诪专 诇讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 诇讗讜讙专 讗讙讜专讬 讜谞讬拽讟驻讬讛 诇驻专讚讬住讬讛 讜诇讗 谞讬转讜 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讜讗讻诇讜 诇讬讛

Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Kahana, and I suggested that perhaps Isi ben Yehuda was referring to laborers who perform labor for their meal; that is, they voluntarily enter his vineyard to perform labor and eat. In other words, Isi ben Yehuda did not mean that anyone may help themselves to produce. Rather, if one chooses to perform labor in the vineyard of another, he may eat from his grapes even if he was not hired by the owner. Rav Kahana said to me: Even so, a person prefers to hire laborers to pluck the fruit of his orchard, rather than have everyone come and eat it, as he fears that people he did not hire might not perform the work properly.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 驻讜注诇 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗讜 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a laborer who eats while performing labor, does he eat from his own property, i.e., is the food he eats in addition to his wages and therefore considered his private property, or does he eat from the property of Heaven? In other words, perhaps the Torah granted him the right to eat the food with which he works as a special privilege, but it does not belong to him.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 讚讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诪讗讬

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference raised by this dilemma? The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where he says: I myself will not eat, but I will give the produce to my wife and children in my stead. If you say that he eats from his own property, we give them the food, as it belongs to him, but if you say that he eats from the property of Heaven, the Merciful One entitles the laborer himself to eat, but the Merciful One does not entitle his wife and children to do so. What, then, is the halakha?

转讗 砖诪注 讗讜讻诇 驻讜注诇 拽讬砖讜转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讻讜转讘转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗讜讙讬专 讘讚谞拽讗 讗讻讬诇 讘讝讜讝讗 讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 住讜祝 住讜祝 讗讜讙讬专 讘讚谞拽讗 讗讻讬诇 讘讝讜讝讗 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 专讞诪谞讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: A laborer may eat cucumbers, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. If you say that he eats from his own property, is it possible that he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet he may eat an amount worth a whole dinar? Would the Torah have granted him ownership over such a large sum relative to his wages? The Gemara refutes this argument: Rather, what then will you say? Will you say that he eats from the property of Heaven? Ultimately, in that case too he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet in practice he may eat an amount worth a dinar. Rather, what have you to say? That the Merciful One entitles him to eat more than his wages. Here too, one can likewise say that the Merciful One entitles him to possess more than his wages.

转讗 砖诪注 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞住诪讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 驻讜注诇 讬讜转专 注诇 砖讻专讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪转讬专讬谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇

The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from another statement from the mishna: Rabbi Elazar 岣sma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, Rabbi Elazar 岣sma, holds that he eats from his own property, and therefore he may not eat an amount worth more than he earns, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that he eats from the property of Heaven?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜讛讻讗 讘讻谞驻砖讱 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讻谞驻砖讱 讘讚讘专 砖诪讜住专 谞驻砖讜 注诇讬讜

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible that everyone agrees that he eats from his own property, and here they disagree with regard to the meaning of a term in the verse: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure [kenafshekha]鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that 鈥渁t your own pleasure [kenafshekha],鈥 which literally means: In accordance with your soul, is referring to a matter for which he hands over his soul, i.e., the laborer acquires the fruit by virtue of the risks he accepts upon himself as part of his work.

讜诪专 住讘专 讻谞驻砖讱 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专

And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that the term kenafshekha means: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt, as you yourself do not have to eat, so too, with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt. This indicates that there are cases in which a worker is not entitled to eat.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讝讬专 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 诇讱 诇讱 讗诪专讬谉 谞讝讬专讗 住讞讜专 住讞讜专 诇讻专诪讗 诇讗 转拽专讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a nazirite who is working in a vineyard says: Give the grapes to my wife and my children, as he is prohibited from eating them himself, they do not listen to him. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara answers: There, the reason is different, due to the well-known proverb concerning a nazirite: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go round, go round; do not approach a vineyard. It is prohibited for a nazirite to eat any of the products of the vine. To keep a nazirite away from temptation, the Sages attempt to deter him from accepting work in a vineyard by not allowing him to give the fruit to his family. Consequently, this halakha is due to the concern about a possible transgression and has nothing to do with the rights of a laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 驻讜注诇 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 诪讗讬 驻讜注诇 谞讝讬专 讜讛转谞讬讗 谞讝讬专 讜讛转谞讬讗 驻讜注诇 诪讬讚讬 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 转谞讬讬谉

Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, they do not listen to him. But if you say that he eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara refutes this argument: In this particular context, what is the meaning of a laborer? It means a nazirite laborer. The Gemara questions this response: But isn鈥檛 it taught in one baraita concerning the case of a nazirite, and isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita concerning the case of a laborer? Apparently, these are two different halakhot. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Were these baraitot taught alongside one another, such that one can deduce a halakha from the change in wording? These are two separate baraitot, and therefore no inference can be drawn from the difference in terminology, and both may be referring to a nazirite laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 诪谞讬谉 诇驻讜注诇 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜讗诇 讻诇讬讱 诇讗 转转谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 谞讝讬专 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪砖讜诐 讗诇 讻诇讬讱 诇讗 转转谉 诪砖讜诐 诇讱 诇讱 讗诪专讬谉 谞讝讬专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from another baraita: From where is it derived with regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, that they do not listen to him? As it is stated: 鈥淏ut you shall not put any in your vessel鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). And if you would say that so too, this is referring to a nazirite, if so, the reason is not due to the verse: 鈥淏ut you shall not put any in your vessel鈥; rather, it is due to the principle: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, do not approach a vineyard.

讗讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讘诇砖讜谉 驻讜注诇 拽讗 谞住讬讘 诇讛 拽专讗 讚驻讜注诇

The Gemara refutes this proof: Yes, it is indeed so. This baraita is discussing a nazirite, and since it teaches the halakha by utilizing the language of a laborer, without specifying that he is a nazirite, it cites the verse that is stated with regard to a laborer. In fact, the actual source for the halakha is a decree due to naziriteship, while the practice is permitted to any other laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讜讻专 讗转 讛驻讜注诇 诇拽爪讜转 讘转讗谞讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 2:7): With regard to one who hires a laborer to prepare figs for drying,

讛专讬 讝讛 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讜讻诇 讗谞讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讘谞讬 讘砖讻专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 讜讘谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讜讞讬讬讘

this laborer may eat and is exempt from separating tithe. Since the Torah granted him permission to eat, he may do so while he is working without separating tithes, as is the case with regard to gifts due to the poor. But if the laborer stipulated: On the condition that I and my sons may eat, or that my son may eat for my wages, he himself may eat and is exempt from separating tithes, as he is permitted to eat by Torah law, and his son may eat but is obligated to separate tithes.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讘谞讜 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞

And if you say he eats from his own property, why is his son obligated? A son may eat from his father鈥檚 table without rendering the food subject to tithes. Ravina said: The reason is because it looks like a sale. Although the produce belongs to the laborer by Torah law, when he makes a deal involving his son it has the appearance of a transaction. Therefore, he must separate tithes to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of observers.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讜讻专 讗转 讛驻讜注诇 诇注砖讜转 讘谞讟注 专讘注讬 砖诇讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬讗讻诇讜 讜讗诐 诇讗 讛讜讚讬注诐 驻讜讚讛 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉

The Gemara cites yet another relevant source: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year produce, such laborers may not eat the fruit, as all fruit of the fourth year of a tree must be taken and consumed in Jerusalem. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year produce, they are considered to have been hired under false pretenses. Consequently, he must redeem the fruit and feed them.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 驻讜讚讛 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转

And if you say that the laborer eats from the property of Heaven, why must the owner redeem the fruit and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition. Even if by Torah law the laborer is granted a personal right to eat, this applies only to permitted food. The Gemara explains: There, the reason is because it looks like a mistaken transaction, as they accepted employment under the assumption that they would be permitted to eat the fruit. He is therefore obligated to compensate them.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 谞转驻专住讜 注讙讜诇讬讜 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬讗讻诇讜 讜讗诐 诇讗 讛讜讚讬注谉 诪注砖专 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 诪注砖专 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara suggests another proof: But now state the latter clause of that same mishna: If his cakes, in which he had earlier preserved his figs, broke apart and crumbled, so that they must be preserved once again, or if his barrels of wine opened and he hired laborers to reseal them, these laborers may not eat. The reason is that the figs and wine were already subject to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And if the owner did not inform them that it is prohibited for them to consume the food, he must tithe the food and feed them. But if you say he eats from the property of Heaven, why must he tithe the food and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讘砖诇诪讗 谞转驻专住讜 注讙讜诇讬讜 诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讗诇讗 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诪讗讬 诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚注 讬讚注 讚讗讬讟讘讬诇 诇讛讜 诇诪注砖专

And if you would say: Here too, is it because it looks like a mistaken transaction, that explanation is not tenable. Granted, in the case where his cakes broke apart, this does look like a mistaken transaction, as the laborers were unaware that the figs had been preserved once already, and they mistakenly thought that the fruit had not yet reached the stage at which it would become subject to tithes. But with regard to the other case, when his barrels opened, what mistaken transaction is there here? They certainly know that the wine had already been rendered untithed produce with regard to tithes, as wine is subject to tithes as soon as it has been collected into the pit alongside the winepress.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 砖谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诇讘讜专 讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讬谉 诪砖讬专讚 诇讘讜专

Rav Sheshet said: This is referring to a case where his barrels opened in such a manner that the wine once again fell into the pit from which it came. The laborers therefore assumed that the owner was not yet obligated to set aside tithes. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this explanation: But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that wine is immediately subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit?

讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬拽驻讛 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注讬谞谉 讜谞讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬讘注讬 诇讻讜 讗住讜拽讬 讗讚注转讬讬讻讜 讚诇诪讗 诪拽驻讛 讘讗转专讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚谞讙讬讚 讗讬讛讜 诪拽驻讛

The Gemara answers: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that wine is subject to tithes only from when one starts to remove the seeds and the waste floats to the top, which occurs after the wine has already descended into the pit. The reason for this halakha is that the laborers can say to him: We did not know that the wine had already been removed from the pit. The Gemara asks: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already floated. The Gemara responds: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a place where that same man who pulls the wine from the pit is also the one who floats its waste. Consequently, it was reasonable for the laborers to assume that they had been hired to perform both tasks.

讜讛砖转讗 讚转谞讬 专讘 讝讘讬讚 讘讚讘讬 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讬讬谉 诪砖讬专讚 诇讘讜专 讜讬拽驻讛 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖讬砖诇讛 讘讞讘讬讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 砖诇讗 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诇讘讜专 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注讬谞谉 讚诪砖诇讬

The Gemara adds: And one can reach a different conclusion now that Rav Zevid has taught the following version of the above dispute, heard from the school of Rabbi Hoshaya: Wine is subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit and its waste floats. And Rabbi Akiva says: It is subject to tithes from when he drains the waste from the barrels. They would pour all of the wine into a barrel, before draining and removing the waste after fermentation. With this in mind, you can even say that the barrels were not opened into the pit, but simply opened up, as the laborers can say to him: We did not know that he had already drained the waste.

讜谞讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬讘注讬 诇讻讜 讗住讜拽讬 讗讚注转讬讬讻讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖诇讬 讘讗转专讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讚砖专讬拽 讛讛讜讗 诪砖诇讬

The Gemara poses a question: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already been drained. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a place where that same man who plugs the barrel with a stopper is also the one who drains its waste, and therefore they assumed they had been hired to perform both tasks.

转讗 砖诪注 拽讜爪抓 讗讚诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜 诪驻谞讬 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讚注转 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讜 拽讜爪抓 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘讛诪转讜 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讚注转

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. But he cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not have the basic level of mental competence.

拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讗讬谞讜 拽讜爪抓 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 拽讟谞讬诐 谞诪讬 谞拽讜抓 诇讛讜

The Gemara analyzes this mishna: It might enter your mind that all these examples involve cases where the father, master, or husband, depending on the case, provides his children, slaves, or wife with food, and they assist him in his work. Granted, if you say that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, it is due to that reason that he may not stipulate this on behalf of minors, as the Torah also entitled minors themselves to eat when they work, and they cannot waive their rights. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, and the food he consumes is a monetary obligation, let him be allowed to stipulate on behalf of minors as well. Since in a case where a father provides sustenance for his children he keeps the profits of their labor, he should be entitled to stipulate this concerning their payment.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讚讜诇讬诐 谞诪讬 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讬讚注讬 讜拽讗 诪讞诇讬

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a situation in which the father does not provide his children with food. Therefore, he does not keep the profits of their labor and has no right to make stipulations concerning the terms of their employment. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, in the case of adult children and slaves too, the father or master should not be able to stipulate in this manner. Since he does not provide them with food, why should he be able to waive their rights? The Gemara responds: Adults are aware of the stipulation and forgive their rights to the food. He can stipulate this only with their agreement.

讜讛讗 转谞讗 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 拽讜爪抓 讗讚诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜 讗讘诇 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘讛诪转讜 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讗讘诇 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜拽讜爪抓 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讻谞注谞讬诐 讘讬谉 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Hoshaya teach in a baraita: A person can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and on his wife鈥檚 behalf, but not on behalf of his animal; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, but not on behalf of his minor son or daughter; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, whether they are adults or minors. This contradicts the ruling of the previous mishna that one cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor slave.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讘专讬讬转讗 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转

What, is it not correct to say that this and that, both sources, are referring to cases where the master provides the slaves with food, and they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, the tanna of the mishna, holds that a laborer eats from his own property, and therefore he can relinquish the rights of his minor slave, and one Sage, of the baraita, holds that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, and therefore he cannot relinquish the rights of his minor slave? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; everyone agrees that a laborer eats from his own property, and it is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food, as stated previously, and the baraita is referring to a case where he provides them with food.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讛讻讬 拽讟谞讬诐 谞诪讬 谞拽讜抓 诇讛讜 爪注专讬讬讛讜 讚讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he provides the slaves with food? If so, let him also be allowed to stipulate on behalf of his minor children that they receive no food, as presumably the baraita is referring to a case where he provides his minor children with food. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One does not entitle him to waive the suffering of his minor son and daughter. His young children will suffer if they are prevented from eating the food they see before them.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转

The Gemara further asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bava Metzia 92

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 92

讜诪讛诇讱 讻注讜砖讛 诪注砖讛 讚诪讬

but a worker who was walking is considered like one who was performing his labor. Yet, since one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine, he would not be entitled to eat while walking if not for the ordinance of the Sages.

讜讘讞诪讜专 讻砖讛讬讗 驻讜专拽转 讻砖讛讬讗 驻讜专拽转 诪讛讬讻谉 讗讻诇讛 讗讬诪讗 注讚 砖转讛讗 驻讜专拽转 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讞诪讜专 讜讙诪诇 讗讜讻诇讬诐 诪诪砖讗讜讬 砖注诇 讙讘讬讛谉 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬讟讜诇 讘讬讚讜 讜讬讗讻讬诇诐

搂 The mishna teaches: And with regard to a donkey, it is permitted to eat when it is being unloaded. The Gemara is puzzled by this statement: From where can it eat when it is being unloaded? Since the load is being removed from the animal at the time, how can the donkey eat from it? Rather, you should say: It may eat until it is unloaded. As long as it is bearing its load the donkey may eat from the food on its back. The Gemara comments: We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A donkey and a camel may eat from the load on their backs, provided that the owner of the animal does not take some of the food in his hand and feed them.

诪转谞讬壮 讗讜讻诇 驻讜注诇 拽讬砖讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讻讜转讘转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞住诪讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 驻讜注诇 讬转专 注诇 砖讻专讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪转讬专讬谉 讗讘诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗转 讛讗讚诐 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 专注讘转谉 讜讬讛讗 住讜转诐 讗转 讛驻转讞 讘驻谞讬讜

MISHNA: A laborer may eat cucumbers while he works, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. Rabbi Elazar 岣sma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it, according to the strict letter of the law. But one teaches a person not to be a glutton and thereby close the opening to other job offers in his face. When people hear of his greed they will be reluctant to hire him.

讙诪壮 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讬谞讜 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讘诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诇转谞讗 拽诪讗 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诇专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讛讜 诪诇诪讚讬谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first tanna. A mishna would not repeat the exact same opinion. The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them concerns the statement: But one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the first tanna, he does not accept the notion that one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the Rabbis, they do accept this principle that one teaches a person not to be a glutton.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘 讗住讬 讚讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 砖讻专讜 讗诇讗 诇讘爪讜专 讗砖讻讜诇 讗讞讚 讗讜讻诇讜 讜讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讘爪专 讗诇讗 讗砖讻讜诇 讗讞讚 讗讜讻诇讜

If you wish, say instead that the practical difference between them concerns a halakha taught by Rav Asi. As Rav Asi says: Even if he hired him to harvest only one cluster, the laborer may eat. And Rav Asi further said: Even if he harvested only one cluster, he may eat it.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬转讘 诇讻诇讬讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讘诇 讛讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬转讘 诇讻诇讬讜 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗讬诪讗 诇讬转讘 讘专讬砖讗 讜讛讚专 诇讬讻讜诇

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for Rav Asi to state both of these halakhot, despite their apparent similarity. As, had he taught us only this first one, one might have thought that he may eat because there is no other food to place in the homeowner鈥檚 vessels, as he was hired to harvest only a single cluster. The Torah permits him to eat, and if he is not allowed to eat that cluster, what else is there for him to eat? But if there is produce left over to place in the homeowner鈥檚 vessels, as in the second case, one might say that he should first place some in the vessels and then eat.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇讘住讜祝 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇拽讬讜诪讬 诇讘住讜祝 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had Rav Asi taught us only this second case, one might have said that the reason he may eat is that ultimately it is possible to fulfill the requirement to place produce in the owner鈥檚 vessels, i.e., he can eat and still perform the task. But in a situation where ultimately it is not possible to fulfill his task, since if he were to eat the only cluster he was hired to harvest there would be nothing left for him to do, one might say that he may not eat. Therefore, both halakhot are necessary.

讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 诪爪讗转讬 诪讙讬诇转 住转专讬诐 讘讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜讻转讜讘 讘讛 讗讬住讬 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻讬 转讘讗 讘讻专诐 专注讱 讘讘讬讗转 讻诇 讗讚诐 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专

The Gemara returns to the dispute of the mishna: If you wish, say that the practical difference between the opinions of the first tanna and the Rabbis concerns a halakha taught by Rav. As Rav says: I found a concealed scroll, a document that lists halakhot in shortened form so that they will not be forgotten. Rav discovered this document in Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 house, and it was written in it: Isi ben Yehuda says that with regard to the verse: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25), the verse is speaking of the entry of any person who passes alongside a vineyard, not only a laborer.

讜讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖讘拽 讗讬住讬 讞讬讬 诇讻诇 讘专讬讛

And Rav said in response: Isi has not left any livelihood for any entity, as many people might pass by and consume all the fruit of one鈥檚 vineyard. The first tanna agrees with Rav, while the Rabbis accept Isi ben Yehuda鈥檚 opinion that by right even one who is not a laborer may eat.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专讬转讛 诇砖诪注转讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讚诇诪讗 讘注讜砖讬谉 讘住注讜讚转诐 讚注讘讚讜 讜讗讻诇讜 讗诪专 诇讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇讗讬谞讬砖 诇讗讜讙专 讗讙讜专讬 讜谞讬拽讟驻讬讛 诇驻专讚讬住讬讛 讜诇讗 谞讬转讜 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讜讗讻诇讜 诇讬讛

Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Kahana, and I suggested that perhaps Isi ben Yehuda was referring to laborers who perform labor for their meal; that is, they voluntarily enter his vineyard to perform labor and eat. In other words, Isi ben Yehuda did not mean that anyone may help themselves to produce. Rather, if one chooses to perform labor in the vineyard of another, he may eat from his grapes even if he was not hired by the owner. Rav Kahana said to me: Even so, a person prefers to hire laborers to pluck the fruit of his orchard, rather than have everyone come and eat it, as he fears that people he did not hire might not perform the work properly.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 驻讜注诇 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗讜 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a laborer who eats while performing labor, does he eat from his own property, i.e., is the food he eats in addition to his wages and therefore considered his private property, or does he eat from the property of Heaven? In other words, perhaps the Torah granted him the right to eat the food with which he works as a special privilege, but it does not belong to him.

诇诪讗讬 谞驻拽讗 诪讬谞讛 讚讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讚讬讚讬讛 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诪讗讬

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference raised by this dilemma? The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where he says: I myself will not eat, but I will give the produce to my wife and children in my stead. If you say that he eats from his own property, we give them the food, as it belongs to him, but if you say that he eats from the property of Heaven, the Merciful One entitles the laborer himself to eat, but the Merciful One does not entitle his wife and children to do so. What, then, is the halakha?

转讗 砖诪注 讗讜讻诇 驻讜注诇 拽讬砖讜转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讻讜转讘转 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬谞专 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗讜讙讬专 讘讚谞拽讗 讗讻讬诇 讘讝讜讝讗 讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 住讜祝 住讜祝 讗讜讙讬专 讘讚谞拽讗 讗讻讬诇 讘讝讜讝讗 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 专讞诪谞讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: A laborer may eat cucumbers, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. If you say that he eats from his own property, is it possible that he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet he may eat an amount worth a whole dinar? Would the Torah have granted him ownership over such a large sum relative to his wages? The Gemara refutes this argument: Rather, what then will you say? Will you say that he eats from the property of Heaven? Ultimately, in that case too he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet in practice he may eat an amount worth a dinar. Rather, what have you to say? That the Merciful One entitles him to eat more than his wages. Here too, one can likewise say that the Merciful One entitles him to possess more than his wages.

转讗 砖诪注 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讞住诪讗 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 驻讜注诇 讬讜转专 注诇 砖讻专讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 诪转讬专讬谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇

The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from another statement from the mishna: Rabbi Elazar 岣sma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, Rabbi Elazar 岣sma, holds that he eats from his own property, and therefore he may not eat an amount worth more than he earns, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that he eats from the property of Heaven?

诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜讛讻讗 讘讻谞驻砖讱 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讻谞驻砖讱 讘讚讘专 砖诪讜住专 谞驻砖讜 注诇讬讜

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible that everyone agrees that he eats from his own property, and here they disagree with regard to the meaning of a term in the verse: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure [kenafshekha]鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that 鈥渁t your own pleasure [kenafshekha],鈥 which literally means: In accordance with your soul, is referring to a matter for which he hands over his soul, i.e., the laborer acquires the fruit by virtue of the risks he accepts upon himself as part of his work.

讜诪专 住讘专 讻谞驻砖讱 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专

And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that the term kenafshekha means: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt, as you yourself do not have to eat, so too, with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt. This indicates that there are cases in which a worker is not entitled to eat.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讝讬专 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 诇讱 诇讱 讗诪专讬谉 谞讝讬专讗 住讞讜专 住讞讜专 诇讻专诪讗 诇讗 转拽专讘

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a nazirite who is working in a vineyard says: Give the grapes to my wife and my children, as he is prohibited from eating them himself, they do not listen to him. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara answers: There, the reason is different, due to the well-known proverb concerning a nazirite: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go round, go round; do not approach a vineyard. It is prohibited for a nazirite to eat any of the products of the vine. To keep a nazirite away from temptation, the Sages attempt to deter him from accepting work in a vineyard by not allowing him to give the fruit to his family. Consequently, this halakha is due to the concern about a possible transgression and has nothing to do with the rights of a laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 驻讜注诇 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 诪讗讬 驻讜注诇 谞讝讬专 讜讛转谞讬讗 谞讝讬专 讜讛转谞讬讗 驻讜注诇 诪讬讚讬 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 转谞讬讬谉

Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, they do not listen to him. But if you say that he eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara refutes this argument: In this particular context, what is the meaning of a laborer? It means a nazirite laborer. The Gemara questions this response: But isn鈥檛 it taught in one baraita concerning the case of a nazirite, and isn鈥檛 it taught in another baraita concerning the case of a laborer? Apparently, these are two different halakhot. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Were these baraitot taught alongside one another, such that one can deduce a halakha from the change in wording? These are two separate baraitot, and therefore no inference can be drawn from the difference in terminology, and both may be referring to a nazirite laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 诪谞讬谉 诇驻讜注诇 砖讗诪专 转谞讜 诇讗砖转讬 讜讘谞讬 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讜讗诇 讻诇讬讱 诇讗 转转谉 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 谞讝讬专 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪砖讜诐 讗诇 讻诇讬讱 诇讗 转转谉 诪砖讜诐 诇讱 诇讱 讗诪专讬谉 谞讝讬专讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from another baraita: From where is it derived with regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, that they do not listen to him? As it is stated: 鈥淏ut you shall not put any in your vessel鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). And if you would say that so too, this is referring to a nazirite, if so, the reason is not due to the verse: 鈥淏ut you shall not put any in your vessel鈥; rather, it is due to the principle: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, do not approach a vineyard.

讗讬谉 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讘诇砖讜谉 驻讜注诇 拽讗 谞住讬讘 诇讛 拽专讗 讚驻讜注诇

The Gemara refutes this proof: Yes, it is indeed so. This baraita is discussing a nazirite, and since it teaches the halakha by utilizing the language of a laborer, without specifying that he is a nazirite, it cites the verse that is stated with regard to a laborer. In fact, the actual source for the halakha is a decree due to naziriteship, while the practice is permitted to any other laborer.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讜讻专 讗转 讛驻讜注诇 诇拽爪讜转 讘转讗谞讬诐

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 2:7): With regard to one who hires a laborer to prepare figs for drying,

讛专讬 讝讛 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪注砖专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讜讻诇 讗谞讬 讜讘谞讬 讗讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讘谞讬 讘砖讻专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 讜讘谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讜讞讬讬讘

this laborer may eat and is exempt from separating tithe. Since the Torah granted him permission to eat, he may do so while he is working without separating tithes, as is the case with regard to gifts due to the poor. But if the laborer stipulated: On the condition that I and my sons may eat, or that my son may eat for my wages, he himself may eat and is exempt from separating tithes, as he is permitted to eat by Torah law, and his son may eat but is obligated to separate tithes.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讘谞讜 讗诪讗讬 讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞

And if you say he eats from his own property, why is his son obligated? A son may eat from his father鈥檚 table without rendering the food subject to tithes. Ravina said: The reason is because it looks like a sale. Although the produce belongs to the laborer by Torah law, when he makes a deal involving his son it has the appearance of a transaction. Therefore, he must separate tithes to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of observers.

转讗 砖诪注 讛砖讜讻专 讗转 讛驻讜注诇 诇注砖讜转 讘谞讟注 专讘注讬 砖诇讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬讗讻诇讜 讜讗诐 诇讗 讛讜讚讬注诐 驻讜讚讛 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉

The Gemara cites yet another relevant source: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year produce, such laborers may not eat the fruit, as all fruit of the fourth year of a tree must be taken and consumed in Jerusalem. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year produce, they are considered to have been hired under false pretenses. Consequently, he must redeem the fruit and feed them.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 驻讜讚讛 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转

And if you say that the laborer eats from the property of Heaven, why must the owner redeem the fruit and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition. Even if by Torah law the laborer is granted a personal right to eat, this applies only to permitted food. The Gemara explains: There, the reason is because it looks like a mistaken transaction, as they accepted employment under the assumption that they would be permitted to eat the fruit. He is therefore obligated to compensate them.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 谞转驻专住讜 注讙讜诇讬讜 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 讛专讬 讗诇讜 诇讗 讬讗讻诇讜 讜讗诐 诇讗 讛讜讚讬注谉 诪注砖专 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讗诪讗讬 诪注砖专 讜诪讗讻讬诇谉 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讛讜 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara suggests another proof: But now state the latter clause of that same mishna: If his cakes, in which he had earlier preserved his figs, broke apart and crumbled, so that they must be preserved once again, or if his barrels of wine opened and he hired laborers to reseal them, these laborers may not eat. The reason is that the figs and wine were already subject to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And if the owner did not inform them that it is prohibited for them to consume the food, he must tithe the food and feed them. But if you say he eats from the property of Heaven, why must he tithe the food and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讘砖诇诪讗 谞转驻专住讜 注讙讜诇讬讜 诪讬讞讝讬 讻诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讗诇讗 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诪讗讬 诪拽讞 讟注讜转 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚注 讬讚注 讚讗讬讟讘讬诇 诇讛讜 诇诪注砖专

And if you would say: Here too, is it because it looks like a mistaken transaction, that explanation is not tenable. Granted, in the case where his cakes broke apart, this does look like a mistaken transaction, as the laborers were unaware that the figs had been preserved once already, and they mistakenly thought that the fruit had not yet reached the stage at which it would become subject to tithes. But with regard to the other case, when his barrels opened, what mistaken transaction is there here? They certainly know that the wine had already been rendered untithed produce with regard to tithes, as wine is subject to tithes as soon as it has been collected into the pit alongside the winepress.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 砖谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诇讘讜专 讜讛转谞讬讗 讬讬谉 诪砖讬专讚 诇讘讜专

Rav Sheshet said: This is referring to a case where his barrels opened in such a manner that the wine once again fell into the pit from which it came. The laborers therefore assumed that the owner was not yet obligated to set aside tithes. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this explanation: But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that wine is immediately subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit?

讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬拽驻讛 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注讬谞谉 讜谞讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬讘注讬 诇讻讜 讗住讜拽讬 讗讚注转讬讬讻讜 讚诇诪讗 诪拽驻讛 讘讗转专讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚谞讙讬讚 讗讬讛讜 诪拽驻讛

The Gemara answers: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that wine is subject to tithes only from when one starts to remove the seeds and the waste floats to the top, which occurs after the wine has already descended into the pit. The reason for this halakha is that the laborers can say to him: We did not know that the wine had already been removed from the pit. The Gemara asks: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already floated. The Gemara responds: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a place where that same man who pulls the wine from the pit is also the one who floats its waste. Consequently, it was reasonable for the laborers to assume that they had been hired to perform both tasks.

讜讛砖转讗 讚转谞讬 专讘 讝讘讬讚 讘讚讘讬 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讬讬谉 诪砖讬专讚 诇讘讜专 讜讬拽驻讛 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖讬砖诇讛 讘讞讘讬讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 砖诇讗 谞转驻转讞讜 讞讘讬讜转讬讜 诇讘讜专 讚讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 诇讗 讛讜讛 讬讚注讬谞谉 讚诪砖诇讬

The Gemara adds: And one can reach a different conclusion now that Rav Zevid has taught the following version of the above dispute, heard from the school of Rabbi Hoshaya: Wine is subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit and its waste floats. And Rabbi Akiva says: It is subject to tithes from when he drains the waste from the barrels. They would pour all of the wine into a barrel, before draining and removing the waste after fermentation. With this in mind, you can even say that the barrels were not opened into the pit, but simply opened up, as the laborers can say to him: We did not know that he had already drained the waste.

讜谞讬诪讗 诇讛讜 讗讬讘注讬 诇讻讜 讗住讜拽讬 讗讚注转讬讬讻讜 讚诇诪讗 诪砖诇讬 讘讗转专讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讚砖专讬拽 讛讛讜讗 诪砖诇讬

The Gemara poses a question: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already been drained. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a place where that same man who plugs the barrel with a stopper is also the one who drains its waste, and therefore they assumed they had been hired to perform both tasks.

转讗 砖诪注 拽讜爪抓 讗讚诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜 诪驻谞讬 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讚注转 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讜 拽讜爪抓 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘讛诪转讜 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讚注转

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. But he cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not have the basic level of mental competence.

拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讗讬谞讜 拽讜爪抓 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 拽讟谞讬诐 谞诪讬 谞拽讜抓 诇讛讜

The Gemara analyzes this mishna: It might enter your mind that all these examples involve cases where the father, master, or husband, depending on the case, provides his children, slaves, or wife with food, and they assist him in his work. Granted, if you say that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, it is due to that reason that he may not stipulate this on behalf of minors, as the Torah also entitled minors themselves to eat when they work, and they cannot waive their rights. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, and the food he consumes is a monetary obligation, let him be allowed to stipulate on behalf of minors as well. Since in a case where a father provides sustenance for his children he keeps the profits of their labor, he should be entitled to stipulate this concerning their payment.

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讚讜诇讬诐 谞诪讬 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讬讚注讬 讜拽讗 诪讞诇讬

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a situation in which the father does not provide his children with food. Therefore, he does not keep the profits of their labor and has no right to make stipulations concerning the terms of their employment. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, in the case of adult children and slaves too, the father or master should not be able to stipulate in this manner. Since he does not provide them with food, why should he be able to waive their rights? The Gemara responds: Adults are aware of the stipulation and forgive their rights to the food. He can stipulate this only with their agreement.

讜讛讗 转谞讗 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 拽讜爪抓 讗讚诐 注诇 讬讚讬 注爪诪讜 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讗砖转讜 讗讘诇 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘讛诪转讜 讜注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讗讘诇 诇讗 注诇 讬讚讬 讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讜拽讜爪抓 注诇 讬讚讬 注讘讚讜 讜砖驻讞转讜 讛讻谞注谞讬诐 讘讬谉 讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讘讬谉 拽讟谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Hoshaya teach in a baraita: A person can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and on his wife鈥檚 behalf, but not on behalf of his animal; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, but not on behalf of his minor son or daughter; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, whether they are adults or minors. This contradicts the ruling of the previous mishna that one cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor slave.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讘讛讗 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诪专 住讘专 诪砖诇 砖诪讬诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讗 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诪砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讜讘专讬讬转讗 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转

What, is it not correct to say that this and that, both sources, are referring to cases where the master provides the slaves with food, and they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, the tanna of the mishna, holds that a laborer eats from his own property, and therefore he can relinquish the rights of his minor slave, and one Sage, of the baraita, holds that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, and therefore he cannot relinquish the rights of his minor slave? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; everyone agrees that a laborer eats from his own property, and it is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food, as stated previously, and the baraita is referring to a case where he provides them with food.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 讘诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转 讗讬 讛讻讬 拽讟谞讬诐 谞诪讬 谞拽讜抓 诇讛讜 爪注专讬讬讛讜 讚讘谞讜 讜讘转讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 诇讗 讝讻讬 诇讬讛 专讞诪谞讗

The Gemara asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he provides the slaves with food? If so, let him also be allowed to stipulate on behalf of his minor children that they receive no food, as presumably the baraita is referring to a case where he provides his minor children with food. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One does not entitle him to waive the suffering of his minor son and daughter. His young children will suffer if they are prevented from eating the food they see before them.

讘诪讗讬 讗讜拽讬诪转讗 诇诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪注诇讛 诇讛谉 诪讝讜谞讜转

The Gemara further asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food?

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