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Today's Daf Yomi

December 30, 2016 | 讗壮 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

Bava Metzia 95

From where do we derive various halachot about a borrower that are not mentioned in the verses explicitly: That “captivity” is also included in cases where the borrower is obligated? 聽That a borrower is responsible for theft and loss? 聽That the exemption of the owner being “with the borrower” applies also for theft and聽loss? 聽If the shomer聽was negligent聽and the owner was “with the shomer is he exempt? 聽There is a debate about this. 聽Rav Hamnuna has a narrow view of the exemption of 聽“the owner is with the borrower”. He claims it is a case where the owner was working with the animal itself at the time of its break or death and was also with him from the time of borrowing until the time of its death. 聽The gemara knocks down each of these statements and rejects this explanation.


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注讚 砖讬驻专讜讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讬讞讚讜


unless the verse specifies that one is liable only where he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.


讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讞诇拽 讛讻讗 诇讗 爪专讬讱 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 诪讛 诇讬 拽讟诇讛 讻讜诇讛 诪讛 诇讬 拽讟诇讛 驻诇讙讗


The Gemara answers: You can even say that Rabbi Natan鈥檚 derivation from the word 鈥渙r鈥 is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as here, in the verse concerning a borrower鈥檚 liability, there is no need for the word 鈥渙r鈥 to divide the cases. What is the reason? The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability is based on logical reasoning, as follows: What difference does it make to me if it is entirely killed, and what difference does it make to me if it is partially killed, i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.


讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讘砖讜讗诇 诪谞讗 诇谉


搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss?


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 谞讬诇祝 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讛 诇砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇诪讬讟专讞 讜讗转讜讬讬 转讗诪专 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚讗驻砖专 诇诪讬讟专讞 讜讗转讜讬讬


And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was injured or died, because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about a case where the animal was injured or died? It is notable in that it is no longer possible to make an effort and bring the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. Shall you also say this ruling about a case of theft or loss, where it is still possible to make an effort to locate and bring back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜谞砖讘专 讗讜 诪转 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专转 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖驻讟讜专 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 砖讜讗诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讜讝讛 讛讜讗 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 转砖讜讘讛


Rather, a borrower鈥檚 liability for theft and loss is derived like that which is taught in a baraita: From the verse: 鈥淎nd it is injured or dies鈥 (Exodus 22:13), I have derived only that a borrower is liable if the animal is injured or dies. From where do I derive that he is liable in a case of theft or loss? You can say it is an a fortiori inference: If a paid bailee, who is exempt from liability in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, is nevertheless liable in a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, isn鈥檛 it logical that he should also be liable in a case of theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.


诪讗讬 讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 转砖讜讘讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讻谉 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讘讟讜注谉 讟注谞转 诇住讟讬诐 诪讝讜讬讬谉


The Gemara asks: What is added by the conclusion of the baraita that this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation? The Gemara explains that the baraita anticipated the following rebuttal: And if you would say that the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he pays the double payment when he takes a false oath stating the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit. If so, can you derive a halakha from the case of a paid bailee to that of a borrower, who pays only the principal in such a case? It would appear that a borrower does not always bear a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is thereby undermined.


讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 拽专谞讗 讚砖讜讗诇 注讚讬驻讗


Anticipating this refutation, the baraita states that it is invalid because even so, the fact that a borrower is liable to pay the principal when he claims the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, without the ability to exempt himself by taking an oath, is a greater stringency than the fact that a paid bailee is liable for the double payment, but only if he takes a false oath to that effect. Consequently, a borrower has a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is valid.


讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽住讘专 诇住讟讬诐 诪讝讜讬讬谉 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讗


Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita holds that an armed bandit is classified as a robber. The paid bailee is not liable for the double payment if he claims that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, as the double payment is paid only for a false claim of theft, not robbery. Consequently, the basis of the refutation is flawed.


讗砖讻讞谉 诇讞讬讜讘 诇驻讟讜专 诪谞讗 诇谉


The Gemara asks: We have found sources for the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss; from where do we derive a source for the halakha that in a case of theft or loss he is exempt if he had also borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as borrowing the animal? The verse describing his exemption from liability is stated only with regard to a case in which the animal entrusted to him is injured or dies (see Exodus 22:13).


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 谞讬诇祝 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讛 诇砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 砖讻谉 讗讜谞住


And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies, as the type of occurrence should not make any difference, then one can counter: What is notable about a case in which it is injured or dies? It is notable in that it is an unavoidable accident, and so it is reasonable that one鈥檚 liability be limited. Can you say the same in a case of theft or loss, which theoretically he could have prevented?


讗诇讗 讙诪专 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇谉 讙诪专讬 讞讬讜讘讗 讚砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪讞讬讜讘讗 讚砖讜讗诇 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 讻讗谉 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专


Rather, derive the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies from the halakha of a paid bailee, who is exempt for theft and loss if he had borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as the animal. The Gemara asks: But from where do we derive that the exemption from liability also applies to a paid bailee himself? We derive the limitation of liability of a paid bailee from the limitation of liability of a borrower: Just as below, with regard to a borrower, for those cases in which the verse states that he is liable, it states that if he borrowed the animal together with the services of the owner that he is exempt, so too, here, with regard to a paid bailee, for those cases in which he is liable, if he undertook to safeguard the animal together with borrowing the services of the owner, then he is exempt.


讘诪讗讬 讙诪专 讗讬 讘诪讛 诪爪讬谞讜 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 讻讚驻专讻讬谞谉 砖讻谉 讗讜谞住


The Gemara asks: Through what method is this derived? If it is derived through an interpretive principle known as: What do we find, i.e., a comparison between cases with similar details, this can be refuted, just as we refuted the possibility of deriving a limitation on one鈥檚 liability in a case of theft or loss from a case in which the animal was injured or died. Because a case in which it is injured or dies is an unavoidable accident, it is reasonable that one鈥檚 liability be limited specifically to such circumstances.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉


Rather, the halakha that a bailee who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is stolen or lost is derived as follows: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if he borrows鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive 鈥渁nd鈥 indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., it should be seen as a continuation of the previous passage detailing the liability of a paid bailee. And therefore, let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, including the exemption from liability in a case in which the services of the owner were borrowed at the same time as the animal.


讜讗讻转讬 砖讜讗诇 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诇讗 讙诪专 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讻谉 驻讟讜专 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讗诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But still, the halakhot of a borrower cannot be derived from those of a paid bailee though an a fortiori inference, as an attempt to do so can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he is exempt in a case in which the animal is injured or died. Shall you also say the same for a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies? Since a borrower has a more severe level of liability, perhaps the exemption from liability that exists in a case of theft or loss for a paid bailee is not in effect with regard to a borrower.


讗诇讗 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讘砖讜讗诇 诇讞讬讜讘讗 诪谞诇谉 讚讙诪专 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉 诪讛 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚砖讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专


Rather, the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies is derived as follows: From where did we originally derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss? It was derived though an a fortiori inference from the fact that a paid bailee is liable. One of the principles of an a fortiori inference is that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. Accordingly, just as in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a paid bailee who undertook to look after it together with borrowing the services of its owner, the bailee is exempt, so too, in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a borrower who had borrowed it together with the services of its owner, the borrower is exempt.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬讜 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬讜 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专


The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who accepts the principle of: It is sufficient. But according to the one who does not accept the principle of: It is sufficient, what can be said; how does he derive a borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability in a case in which he borrowed an item together with its owner鈥檚 services and the item was lost or stolen?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉 讜转讞转讜谉 诪注诇讬讜谉


Rather, it is derived as follows: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if he borrows鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive 鈥渁nd鈥 indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., the halakhot of a paid bailee. And therefore let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, and halakhot applying to the case below, of a borrower, can be derived from the case above, of a paid bailee.


讗讬转诪专 驻砖讬注讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讞讚 讗诪专 驻讟讜专


搂 An amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to a mishap that occurred due to a borrower鈥檚 negligence in safeguarding the deposit he borrowed together with the services of its owner, Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree. One Sage says he is liable, and one Sage says he is exempt.


诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 拽住讘专 诪拽专讗 谞讚专砖 诇驻谞讬讜 讜诇讗 诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜


The one who says he is liable holds that the verse beginning: 鈥淎nd if he borrows,鈥 which details the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, but not in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee.


讛诇讻讱 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讜驻砖讬注讛 谞诪讬 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讛诇讻讱 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讞讬讜讘 讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专


Accordingly, the verse: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:14), which appears in the passage of a borrower, is not written in reference to an unpaid bailee, and so that exemption from liability does not apply to him. And in addition, the liability for negligence, which appears in the passage of an unpaid bailee, is not written in reference to a paid bailee or a borrower. Accordingly, the liability of a paid bailee and of a borrower in a case of negligence is derived only via an a fortiori inference from the liability of an unpaid bailee, not from an explicit verse.


讗讘诇 讘讘注诇讬诐 诇驻讟讜专 讗祝 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗砖讜讗诇 讜讗砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讗讛谞讱 讞讬讜讘讬 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 讘讛讚讬讗 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讻转讘


But it is not possible to derive that even a paid bailee and a borrower are exempt in cases where they took hold of an item together with borrowing the services of its owner and a mishap occurred due to their negligence. What is the reason for this? When it is written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay,鈥 that is in reference only to a borrower and to a paid bailee. Even then, it is written in reference to only those liabilities that are written explicitly with regard to them. It is not written with regard to their liability for negligence, which is derived only through an a fortiori inference. Consequently, the borrower and the paid bailee are liable for negligence even in a case where they also borrowed the services of its owner.


诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 拽住讘专 诪拽专讗 谞讚专砖 诇驻谞讬讜 讜诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜 讜讻讬 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘


Conversely, the one who says that a borrower is exempt holds that the verse: 鈥淎nd if he borrows,鈥 which details the exemption from liability in a case where one borrows an item together with the services of its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, and also in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee. And accordingly, when it is written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay,鈥 this exemption is written also in reference to an unpaid bailee, limiting his liability even in a case of negligence.


转谞谉 讛砖讜讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讛砖讜讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 讗讜 砖讻专谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 拽转谞讬


The Gemara suggests proofs for each opinion: We learned in the mishna that in the case of one who borrowed a cow and he borrowed the services of its owner together with it; or one who borrowed a cow and he hired its owner with it; or if one borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara explains the proof: The mishna mentions the exemption from liability with regard to a borrower, whereas it does not teach it with regard to an unpaid bailee, who is liable only for a mishap that was the result of his negligence. Presumably, this is because exemption from liability does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee鈥檚 negligence.


讜诇讟注诪讬讱 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪讬 拽转谞讬


The Gemara rejects the proof: But even according to your reasoning, does it teach exemption from liability with regard to a paid bailee? It does not, although it certainly applies to at least cases of theft and loss.


讗诇讗 转谞讗 诪讬诇转讗


Rather, with regard to the tanna of the mishna, the matter


讚讻转讬讘讗 讘讛讚讬讗 拽转谞讬 讚讗转讬讗 诪讚专砖讗 诇讗 拽转谞讬


that is explicitly written in the Torah he teaches, and those matters that are derived through interpretation he does not teach. Consequently, no proof can be brought from the mishna.


转讗 砖诪注 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it; in all of these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it dies, the borrower or renter is exempt.


住讘专讜讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 砖讜讻专 讻砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讚诪讬 讜讛讗 讛讗讬 转谞讗 拽转谞讬 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 诪讚专砖讗 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 拽转谞讬


The Gemara notes: The scholars in the study hall assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one who rents an item is responsible for it like a paid bailee. According to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to both a borrower and a paid bailee. Consequently, the baraita can serve as a proof: Doesn鈥檛 this tanna teach even a matter that is derived through interpretation, i.e., the fact that exemption from liability applies to a paid bailee, while he still does not teach that it applies to an unpaid bailee? It would appear that this is a proof that exemption from liability does not apply to an unpaid bailee, since it does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee鈥檚 negligence.


讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 砖讜讻专 讻砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讚诪讬 讜转谞讗 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专


The Gemara refutes this proof, as one could counter: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the liability of one who rents an item is like that of an unpaid bailee. And, according to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to an unpaid bailee, and it is understood that the same is true for a paid bailee. Understood like this, the baraita explicitly applies the exemption from liability to a case of negligence. Since, ultimately, it is unclear according to whose opinion the baraita is taught, no proof can be drawn from it.


讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讚诪讞诇讬祝 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转谞讬 砖讜讻专 讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻砖讜诪专 砖讻专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻砖讜诪专 讞谞诐


If you wish, say that the baraita can be understood as referring to an unpaid bailee, even if it is assumed to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As Rabba bar Avuh reversed their opinions and taught: How does one who rents an item pay in the case of a mishap? Rabbi Meir says: Like a paid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like an unpaid bailee.


讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖转讛讗 驻专讛 讜讞讜专砖 讘讛 讞诪讜专 讜诪讞诪专 讗讞专讬讛 讜注讚 砖讬讛讜 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 注讚 砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗讻讜诇讛 诪讬诇转讗 诪砖诪注


Rav Hamnuna says that the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with the services of its owner exists only in very specific circumstances: A borrower is always liable, unless the item entrusted to him is a cow and its owner plows with it in the service of the borrower, or it is a donkey and its owner drives it by walking behind it in the service of the borrower, i.e., the owner and his animal are engaged in the same work. And even so, the borrower will not be exempt unless the owner is working for him from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time when it is injured or dies. The Gemara notes: Evidently, Rav Hamnuna holds that the phrase: 鈥淚ts owner is with him鈥 (Exodus 22:14), teaches that the exemption from liability applies only when the owner is working for the borrower for the entire matter.


诪转讬讘 专讘讗 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转


Rava raises an objection from the baraita cited previously: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it; in all these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it died, the borrower or renter is exempt. Rava explains how the baraita poses a challenge: What, is it not referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work than his animal? The baraita proves that the exemption from liability applies even in such a case.


诇讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讚拽讗 诪专驻讬 讜讗讝讬诇 拽诪讛


The Gemara rejects this: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. The Gemara asks: But, if so, what does the baraita mean by saying: He performed the work in another place? The Gemara explains: For example, it is a case where the owner loosens the hard soil with a hoe while walking ahead of the animal. He is engaged in the same work, but not in the same place.


讜讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 注诇 讙讘讛 讛讜讬 专讬砖讗 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讗诇讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 砖讻专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 讞讜专砖讬谉 注诇 讙讘讛 讜诪转讛 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was working alongside it, it may be inferred that the first clause, i.e., the passage of the baraita cited above, is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work. As the latter clause teaches: If he borrowed it and afterward borrowed the services of its owner, or rented it and afterward hired its owner with it, in both these cases, although the owner was plowing alongside it and at that time it died, the borrower or renter is liable.


讗诪专讬 专讬砖讗 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讜专讬砖讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 专讬砖讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗讜 注诇 讙讘讛 讗诇讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讜 讘注诇讬诐 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 驻讟讜专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚注诇 讙讘讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讘注诇讬诐 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讞讬讬讘


In resolution of this difficulty, the Sages say: Both the first clause and the latter clause pertain to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. And the difference in formulation of the two clauses is because the first clause teaches us a novelty and the latter clause teaches us a novelty. The first clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was not actually working alongside his animal but was merely engaged with the same work, since the owner was working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is exempt. The latter clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was actually working alongside his animal, since the owner was not working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is liable.


讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讜转讗


The Gemara is puzzled: What is this? Granted, if you say that the first clause is referring to a case where the owner is engaged in different work than his animal, and the latter clause is referring to a case where he is engaged in the same work as his animal, then this is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did: It teaches that it is irrelevant whether the owner did or did not work together with his animal. Rather, the liability of the borrower depends on whether or not the owner was working for the borrower when he entrusted the borrower with his animal.


讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讗讬 专讘讜转讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讜讬


But if you say that the first clause and the latter clause both pertain to a case where the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal, what is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did? Both this clause and that clause concern similar cases, in which the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal. It is therefore apparent that the clauses concern different cases. The first clause teaches that the borrower is exempt even in a case where the owner was engaged in different work than his animal. The first part of Rav Hamnuna鈥檚 ruling, that the owner needs to be engaged in the same work as his animal, is thereby refuted.


讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讗诇讗 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛


And furthermore, even the second part of Rav Hamnuna鈥檚 ruling, that the exemption applies only when the owner was working for the borrower from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time of the mishap, can be refuted, as it is taught in a baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:14), do I not already know what is stated in the next verse, that 鈥渋f its owner is not with him, he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:13)? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚ts owner is not with him鈥? It serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption from liability to apply.


讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗诇讗 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗讛 诪专砖讜转 诪砖讗讬诇 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘讘注诇讬诐 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 转讬讜讘转讗


And it is taught in another baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay,鈥 do I not already know what is stated in the preceding verse, that 鈥渋f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f its owner is with him鈥? It serves to tell you: Once the animal has left the domain of the lender, i.e., its owner, and has been entrusted to the borrower, with its owner working for the borrower at that time, even for only one moment, and then it dies, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Hamnuna provided by these baraitot is indeed a conclusive refutation.


讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉


搂 The Gemara explains how the first of these baraitot arrives at its conclusion: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, that when the Torah mentions two details together in reference to a halakha, it is presumed that the halakha applies only when both details are in effect (see 94b), and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiya. Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, that it is presumed that the halakha applies even when only one of the details is in effect, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.


讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讟注诪讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讗 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 驻讟讜专


The Gemara clarifies: When the Torah refers to an owner working for the borrower, it should be understood as referring to the time of the borrowing and the time of the mishap. According to Rabbi Yoshiya鈥檚 opinion, this indicates that the owner worked for him at both times, whereas according to Rabbi Yonatan鈥檚 opinion, this implies that he worked for him at either time. Based on this, Abaye and Rava explain the verses: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as follows: From the verse: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay,鈥 it appears that the reason the borrower is liable is that the owner was not working for him at either point in time. By inference, if he worked for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is exempt.


讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讗 讗讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 诪讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥? From this verse it appears that the reason the borrower is exempt is that the owner was working for him at both points in time. By inference, if he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is liable. The two verses appear to contradict each another.


诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛


To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase 鈥渋f its owner is with him鈥 serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

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Bava Metzia 95

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 95

注讚 砖讬驻专讜讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讬讞讚讜


unless the verse specifies that one is liable only where he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.


讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讞诇拽 讛讻讗 诇讗 爪专讬讱 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住讘专讗 讛讜讗 诪讛 诇讬 拽讟诇讛 讻讜诇讛 诪讛 诇讬 拽讟诇讛 驻诇讙讗


The Gemara answers: You can even say that Rabbi Natan鈥檚 derivation from the word 鈥渙r鈥 is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as here, in the verse concerning a borrower鈥檚 liability, there is no need for the word 鈥渙r鈥 to divide the cases. What is the reason? The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability is based on logical reasoning, as follows: What difference does it make to me if it is entirely killed, and what difference does it make to me if it is partially killed, i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.


讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讘砖讜讗诇 诪谞讗 诇谉


搂 The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss?


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 谞讬诇祝 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讛 诇砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇诪讬讟专讞 讜讗转讜讬讬 转讗诪专 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚讗驻砖专 诇诪讬讟专讞 讜讗转讜讬讬


And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was injured or died, because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about a case where the animal was injured or died? It is notable in that it is no longer possible to make an effort and bring the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. Shall you also say this ruling about a case of theft or loss, where it is still possible to make an effort to locate and bring back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 讜谞砖讘专 讗讜 诪转 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专转 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖驻讟讜专 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 砖讜讗诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讞讬讬讘 讘讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讜讝讛 讛讜讗 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 转砖讜讘讛


Rather, a borrower鈥檚 liability for theft and loss is derived like that which is taught in a baraita: From the verse: 鈥淎nd it is injured or dies鈥 (Exodus 22:13), I have derived only that a borrower is liable if the animal is injured or dies. From where do I derive that he is liable in a case of theft or loss? You can say it is an a fortiori inference: If a paid bailee, who is exempt from liability in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, is nevertheless liable in a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, isn鈥檛 it logical that he should also be liable in a case of theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.


诪讗讬 讗讬谉 注诇讬讜 转砖讜讘讛 讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讻谉 诪砖诇诐 转砖诇讜诪讬 讻驻诇 讘讟讜注谉 讟注谞转 诇住讟讬诐 诪讝讜讬讬谉


The Gemara asks: What is added by the conclusion of the baraita that this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation? The Gemara explains that the baraita anticipated the following rebuttal: And if you would say that the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he pays the double payment when he takes a false oath stating the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit. If so, can you derive a halakha from the case of a paid bailee to that of a borrower, who pays only the principal in such a case? It would appear that a borrower does not always bear a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is thereby undermined.


讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 拽专谞讗 讚砖讜讗诇 注讚讬驻讗


Anticipating this refutation, the baraita states that it is invalid because even so, the fact that a borrower is liable to pay the principal when he claims the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, without the ability to exempt himself by taking an oath, is a greater stringency than the fact that a paid bailee is liable for the double payment, but only if he takes a false oath to that effect. Consequently, a borrower has a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is valid.


讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 拽住讘专 诇住讟讬诐 诪讝讜讬讬谉 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讗


Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita holds that an armed bandit is classified as a robber. The paid bailee is not liable for the double payment if he claims that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, as the double payment is paid only for a false claim of theft, not robbery. Consequently, the basis of the refutation is flawed.


讗砖讻讞谉 诇讞讬讜讘 诇驻讟讜专 诪谞讗 诇谉


The Gemara asks: We have found sources for the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss; from where do we derive a source for the halakha that in a case of theft or loss he is exempt if he had also borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as borrowing the animal? The verse describing his exemption from liability is stated only with regard to a case in which the animal entrusted to him is injured or dies (see Exodus 22:13).


讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 谞讬诇祝 诪砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讛 诇砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 砖讻谉 讗讜谞住


And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies, as the type of occurrence should not make any difference, then one can counter: What is notable about a case in which it is injured or dies? It is notable in that it is an unavoidable accident, and so it is reasonable that one鈥檚 liability be limited. Can you say the same in a case of theft or loss, which theoretically he could have prevented?


讗诇讗 讙诪专 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讙讜驻讬讛 诪谞诇谉 讙诪专讬 讞讬讜讘讗 讚砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪讞讬讜讘讗 讚砖讜讗诇 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 讻讗谉 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专


Rather, derive the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies from the halakha of a paid bailee, who is exempt for theft and loss if he had borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as the animal. The Gemara asks: But from where do we derive that the exemption from liability also applies to a paid bailee himself? We derive the limitation of liability of a paid bailee from the limitation of liability of a borrower: Just as below, with regard to a borrower, for those cases in which the verse states that he is liable, it states that if he borrowed the animal together with the services of the owner that he is exempt, so too, here, with regard to a paid bailee, for those cases in which he is liable, if he undertook to safeguard the animal together with borrowing the services of the owner, then he is exempt.


讘诪讗讬 讙诪专 讗讬 讘诪讛 诪爪讬谞讜 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 讻讚驻专讻讬谞谉 砖讻谉 讗讜谞住


The Gemara asks: Through what method is this derived? If it is derived through an interpretive principle known as: What do we find, i.e., a comparison between cases with similar details, this can be refuted, just as we refuted the possibility of deriving a limitation on one鈥檚 liability in a case of theft or loss from a case in which the animal was injured or died. Because a case in which it is injured or dies is an unavoidable accident, it is reasonable that one鈥檚 liability be limited specifically to such circumstances.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉


Rather, the halakha that a bailee who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is stolen or lost is derived as follows: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if he borrows鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive 鈥渁nd鈥 indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., it should be seen as a continuation of the previous passage detailing the liability of a paid bailee. And therefore, let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, including the exemption from liability in a case in which the services of the owner were borrowed at the same time as the animal.


讜讗讻转讬 砖讜讗诇 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诇讗 讙诪专 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬驻专讱 诪讛 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专 砖讻谉 驻讟讜专 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 转讗诪专 讘砖讜讗诇 砖讞讬讬讘 讘砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But still, the halakhot of a borrower cannot be derived from those of a paid bailee though an a fortiori inference, as an attempt to do so can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he is exempt in a case in which the animal is injured or died. Shall you also say the same for a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies? Since a borrower has a more severe level of liability, perhaps the exemption from liability that exists in a case of theft or loss for a paid bailee is not in effect with regard to a borrower.


讗诇讗 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讘砖讜讗诇 诇讞讬讜讘讗 诪谞诇谉 讚讙诪专 诪砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讚讬讜 诇讘讗 诪谉 讛讚讬谉 诇讛讬讜转 讻谞讚讜谉 诪讛 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讗祝 讙谞讬讘讛 讜讗讘讬讚讛 讚砖讜讗诇 谞诪讬 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻讟讜专


Rather, the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies is derived as follows: From where did we originally derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss? It was derived though an a fortiori inference from the fact that a paid bailee is liable. One of the principles of an a fortiori inference is that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. Accordingly, just as in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a paid bailee who undertook to look after it together with borrowing the services of its owner, the bailee is exempt, so too, in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a borrower who had borrowed it together with the services of its owner, the borrower is exempt.


讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬讜 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚诇讬转 诇讬讛 讚讬讜 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专


The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who accepts the principle of: It is sufficient. But according to the one who does not accept the principle of: It is sufficient, what can be said; how does he derive a borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability in a case in which he borrowed an item together with its owner鈥檚 services and the item was lost or stolen?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讜讬讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇 注谞讬谉 专讗砖讜谉 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜谉 诪转讞转讜谉 讜转讞转讜谉 诪注诇讬讜谉


Rather, it is derived as follows: The verse states: 鈥淎nd if he borrows鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive 鈥渁nd鈥 indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., the halakhot of a paid bailee. And therefore let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, and halakhot applying to the case below, of a borrower, can be derived from the case above, of a paid bailee.


讗讬转诪专 驻砖讬注讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讜专讘讬谞讗 讞讚 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讜讞讚 讗诪专 驻讟讜专


搂 An amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to a mishap that occurred due to a borrower鈥檚 negligence in safeguarding the deposit he borrowed together with the services of its owner, Rav A岣 and Ravina disagree. One Sage says he is liable, and one Sage says he is exempt.


诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 拽住讘专 诪拽专讗 谞讚专砖 诇驻谞讬讜 讜诇讗 诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜


The one who says he is liable holds that the verse beginning: 鈥淎nd if he borrows,鈥 which details the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, but not in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee.


讛诇讻讱 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讜驻砖讬注讛 谞诪讬 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讗 讻转讬讘 讛诇讻讱 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讞讬讜讘 讗转讬讗 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专


Accordingly, the verse: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:14), which appears in the passage of a borrower, is not written in reference to an unpaid bailee, and so that exemption from liability does not apply to him. And in addition, the liability for negligence, which appears in the passage of an unpaid bailee, is not written in reference to a paid bailee or a borrower. Accordingly, the liability of a paid bailee and of a borrower in a case of negligence is derived only via an a fortiori inference from the liability of an unpaid bailee, not from an explicit verse.


讗讘诇 讘讘注诇讬诐 诇驻讟讜专 讗祝 讘砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讜讘砖讜讗诇 诇讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗砖讜讗诇 讜讗砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讗讛谞讱 讞讬讜讘讬 讚讻转讬讘 讘讛讜 讘讛讚讬讗 讛讜讗 讚诪讬讻转讘


But it is not possible to derive that even a paid bailee and a borrower are exempt in cases where they took hold of an item together with borrowing the services of its owner and a mishap occurred due to their negligence. What is the reason for this? When it is written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay,鈥 that is in reference only to a borrower and to a paid bailee. Even then, it is written in reference to only those liabilities that are written explicitly with regard to them. It is not written with regard to their liability for negligence, which is derived only through an a fortiori inference. Consequently, the borrower and the paid bailee are liable for negligence even in a case where they also borrowed the services of its owner.


诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 拽住讘专 诪拽专讗 谞讚专砖 诇驻谞讬讜 讜诇驻谞讬 驻谞讬讜 讜讻讬 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 谞诪讬 讻转讬讘


Conversely, the one who says that a borrower is exempt holds that the verse: 鈥淎nd if he borrows,鈥 which details the exemption from liability in a case where one borrows an item together with the services of its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, and also in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee. And accordingly, when it is written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay,鈥 this exemption is written also in reference to an unpaid bailee, limiting his liability even in a case of negligence.


转谞谉 讛砖讜讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讛砖讜讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 讗讜 砖讻专谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讗诇 讛驻专讛 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 拽转谞讬


The Gemara suggests proofs for each opinion: We learned in the mishna that in the case of one who borrowed a cow and he borrowed the services of its owner together with it; or one who borrowed a cow and he hired its owner with it; or if one borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara explains the proof: The mishna mentions the exemption from liability with regard to a borrower, whereas it does not teach it with regard to an unpaid bailee, who is liable only for a mishap that was the result of his negligence. Presumably, this is because exemption from liability does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee鈥檚 negligence.


讜诇讟注诪讬讱 砖讜诪专 砖讻专 诪讬 拽转谞讬


The Gemara rejects the proof: But even according to your reasoning, does it teach exemption from liability with regard to a paid bailee? It does not, although it certainly applies to at least cases of theft and loss.


讗诇讗 转谞讗 诪讬诇转讗


Rather, with regard to the tanna of the mishna, the matter


讚讻转讬讘讗 讘讛讚讬讗 拽转谞讬 讚讗转讬讗 诪讚专砖讗 诇讗 拽转谞讬


that is explicitly written in the Torah he teaches, and those matters that are derived through interpretation he does not teach. Consequently, no proof can be brought from the mishna.


转讗 砖诪注 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专


The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it; in all of these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it dies, the borrower or renter is exempt.


住讘专讜讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 砖讜讻专 讻砖讜诪专 砖讻专 讚诪讬 讜讛讗 讛讗讬 转谞讗 拽转谞讬 诪讬诇转讗 讚讗转讬讗 诪讚专砖讗 讜讗讬诇讜 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 诇讗 拽转谞讬


The Gemara notes: The scholars in the study hall assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one who rents an item is responsible for it like a paid bailee. According to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to both a borrower and a paid bailee. Consequently, the baraita can serve as a proof: Doesn鈥檛 this tanna teach even a matter that is derived through interpretation, i.e., the fact that exemption from liability applies to a paid bailee, while he still does not teach that it applies to an unpaid bailee? It would appear that this is a proof that exemption from liability does not apply to an unpaid bailee, since it does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee鈥檚 negligence.


讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 砖讜讻专 讻砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讚诪讬 讜转谞讗 砖讜诪专 讞谞诐 讜讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 诇砖讜诪专 砖讻专


The Gemara refutes this proof, as one could counter: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the liability of one who rents an item is like that of an unpaid bailee. And, according to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to an unpaid bailee, and it is understood that the same is true for a paid bailee. Understood like this, the baraita explicitly applies the exemption from liability to a case of negligence. Since, ultimately, it is unclear according to whose opinion the baraita is taught, no proof can be drawn from it.


讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讚诪讞诇讬祝 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讜转谞讬 砖讜讻专 讻讬爪讚 诪砖诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻砖讜诪专 砖讻专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻砖讜诪专 讞谞诐


If you wish, say that the baraita can be understood as referring to an unpaid bailee, even if it is assumed to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As Rabba bar Avuh reversed their opinions and taught: How does one who rents an item pay in the case of a mishap? Rabbi Meir says: Like a paid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like an unpaid bailee.


讗诪专 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖转讛讗 驻专讛 讜讞讜专砖 讘讛 讞诪讜专 讜诪讞诪专 讗讞专讬讛 讜注讚 砖讬讛讜 讘注诇讬诐 诪砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 注讚 砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 讗讻讜诇讛 诪讬诇转讗 诪砖诪注


Rav Hamnuna says that the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with the services of its owner exists only in very specific circumstances: A borrower is always liable, unless the item entrusted to him is a cow and its owner plows with it in the service of the borrower, or it is a donkey and its owner drives it by walking behind it in the service of the borrower, i.e., the owner and his animal are engaged in the same work. And even so, the borrower will not be exempt unless the owner is working for him from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time when it is injured or dies. The Gemara notes: Evidently, Rav Hamnuna holds that the phrase: 鈥淚ts owner is with him鈥 (Exodus 22:14), teaches that the exemption from liability applies only when the owner is working for the borrower for the entire matter.


诪转讬讘 专讘讗 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讻专讛 讜砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 砖讗诇讛 讜砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 注讜砖讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转


Rava raises an objection from the baraita cited previously: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it; in all these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it died, the borrower or renter is exempt. Rava explains how the baraita poses a challenge: What, is it not referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work than his animal? The baraita proves that the exemption from liability applies even in such a case.


诇讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪拽讜诐 讗讞专 讚拽讗 诪专驻讬 讜讗讝讬诇 拽诪讛


The Gemara rejects this: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. The Gemara asks: But, if so, what does the baraita mean by saying: He performed the work in another place? The Gemara explains: For example, it is a case where the owner loosens the hard soil with a hoe while walking ahead of the animal. He is engaged in the same work, but not in the same place.


讜讛讗 诪讚住讬驻讗 注诇 讙讘讛 讛讜讬 专讬砖讗 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讗诇讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讗诇 讘注诇讬讛 砖讻专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讻专 讘注诇讬讛 注诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讘注诇讬诐 讞讜专砖讬谉 注诇 讙讘讛 讜诪转讛 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was working alongside it, it may be inferred that the first clause, i.e., the passage of the baraita cited above, is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work. As the latter clause teaches: If he borrowed it and afterward borrowed the services of its owner, or rented it and afterward hired its owner with it, in both these cases, although the owner was plowing alongside it and at that time it died, the borrower or renter is liable.


讗诪专讬 专讬砖讗 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讜专讬砖讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 专讬砖讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗讜 注诇 讙讘讛 讗诇讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讜讜 讘注诇讬诐 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 驻讟讜专 讜住讬驻讗 专讘讜转讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚注诇 讙讘讛 讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 讛讜讜 讘注诇讬诐 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讞讬讬讘


In resolution of this difficulty, the Sages say: Both the first clause and the latter clause pertain to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. And the difference in formulation of the two clauses is because the first clause teaches us a novelty and the latter clause teaches us a novelty. The first clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was not actually working alongside his animal but was merely engaged with the same work, since the owner was working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is exempt. The latter clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was actually working alongside his animal, since the owner was not working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is liable.


讛讗讬 诪讗讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 专讬砖讗 讘诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞专转 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讬讬谞讜 专讘讜转讗


The Gemara is puzzled: What is this? Granted, if you say that the first clause is referring to a case where the owner is engaged in different work than his animal, and the latter clause is referring to a case where he is engaged in the same work as his animal, then this is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did: It teaches that it is irrelevant whether the owner did or did not work together with his animal. Rather, the liability of the borrower depends on whether or not the owner was working for the borrower when he entrusted the borrower with his animal.


讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 专讬砖讗 讜住讬驻讗 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讗讬 专讘讜转讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讗讜转讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讛讜讬


But if you say that the first clause and the latter clause both pertain to a case where the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal, what is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did? Both this clause and that clause concern similar cases, in which the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal. It is therefore apparent that the clauses concern different cases. The first clause teaches that the borrower is exempt even in a case where the owner was engaged in different work than his animal. The first part of Rav Hamnuna鈥檚 ruling, that the owner needs to be engaged in the same work as his animal, is thereby refuted.


讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讗诇讗 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛


And furthermore, even the second part of Rav Hamnuna鈥檚 ruling, that the exemption applies only when the owner was working for the borrower from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time of the mishap, can be refuted, as it is taught in a baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 (Exodus 22:14), do I not already know what is stated in the next verse, that 鈥渋f its owner is not with him, he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:13)? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚ts owner is not with him鈥? It serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption from liability to apply.


讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 诪诪砖诪注 砖谞讗诪专 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讗诇讗 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讜诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗讛 诪专砖讜转 诪砖讗讬诇 砖注讛 讗讞转 讘讘注诇讬诐 讜诪转讛 驻讟讜专 转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 转讬讜讘转讗


And it is taught in another baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay,鈥 do I not already know what is stated in the preceding verse, that 鈥渋f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: 鈥淚f its owner is with him鈥? It serves to tell you: Once the animal has left the domain of the lender, i.e., its owner, and has been entrusted to the borrower, with its owner working for the borrower at that time, even for only one moment, and then it dies, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Hamnuna provided by these baraitot is indeed a conclusive refutation.


讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉


搂 The Gemara explains how the first of these baraitot arrives at its conclusion: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, that when the Torah mentions two details together in reference to a halakha, it is presumed that the halakha applies only when both details are in effect (see 94b), and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiya. Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, that it is presumed that the halakha applies even when only one of the details is in effect, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.


讗讘讬讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讟注诪讗 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讗 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 驻讟讜专


The Gemara clarifies: When the Torah refers to an owner working for the borrower, it should be understood as referring to the time of the borrowing and the time of the mishap. According to Rabbi Yoshiya鈥檚 opinion, this indicates that the owner worked for him at both times, whereas according to Rabbi Yonatan鈥檚 opinion, this implies that he worked for him at either time. Based on this, Abaye and Rava explain the verses: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as follows: From the verse: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay,鈥 it appears that the reason the borrower is liable is that the owner was not working for him at either point in time. By inference, if he worked for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is exempt.


讜讛讗 讻转讬讘 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讛讗 讗讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 诪讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises an objection: But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥? From this verse it appears that the reason the borrower is exempt is that the owner was working for him at both points in time. By inference, if he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is liable. The two verses appear to contradict each another.


诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗讬诇讛


To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase 鈥渋f its owner is with him鈥 serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.

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