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Today's Daf Yomi

May 5, 2019 | 诇壮 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Bekhorot 18

The mishna brings various cases of cases where it is doubtful whether there is a firstborn and the tanaim debate what the halacha is in each case. Is it possible to an occurrence to have at the exact same moment (like an animal giving birth at the exact same moment to two animals)? If one holds no, then would he still agree that humans also cannot plan things to occur at the exact same moment/mesaure things to exact specifications? The laws regarding doubt are parallel to cases regarding doubt in other areas of halacha. If the owner keeps the animal that is possibly a firstborn, does he need to give the “gifts” from that animal to the priest? Rabbi Yossi and RAbbi Meir debate this issue but in what exact situation are the arguing?


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住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讚讗诪专 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讘讬讚讬 砖诪讬诐 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讘讬讚讬 讗讚诐

holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two matters that are in the hands of Heaven to coincide precisely, and all the more so matters that are in human hands. Consequently, one cannot cite Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion in order to determine the opinion of the Rabbis.

谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 谞诪爪讗 诪讻讜讜谉 讘讬谉 砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 诇讗 讛讬讜 注讜专驻讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 砖转讬讛谉 诪讘讬讗讜转 砖转讬 注讙诇讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is subject to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: If the corpse of a slain person was found precisely between two towns, they would not break the heifer鈥檚 neck at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them. What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to this matter, in that the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely and Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely?

讜转讬住讘专讗 讗讬 拽住讘专 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讛讬讜 注讜专驻讬诐 讬讘讬讗讜 注讙诇讛 讗讞转 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讜讬转谞讜

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And how can you understand that to be the dispute? If the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, why does he claim that they would not break the heifer鈥檚 neck? Let them bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is actually nearest.

讗诇讗 诇讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜讛讻讗 讘拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 拽专讜讘讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 拽专讜讘讜转

Rather, with regard to these tanna鈥檌m, everyone agrees that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely. And here they disagree over whether the singular form kerova in the phrase 鈥渢he town which is nearest [kerova]鈥 indicates that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not the many nearest [kerovot] towns; as the first tanna holds that it is derived from the term kerova that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not multiple kerovot; and Rabbi Eliezer holds that although the verse states kerova,鈥 nevertheless this includes even multiple towns that are kerovot.

诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 注诪专诐 转谞讗 谞诪爪讗 诪讻讜讜谉 讘讬谉 砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 砖转讬讛谉 诪讘讬讗讜转 砖转讬 注讙诇讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讘讬讗讜 注讙诇讛 讗讞转 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讜讬转谞讜

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about the Rabbis鈥 opinion with regard to whether matters in human hands can coincide precisely? Rav 岣yya bar Avin says that Rav Amram says: The Sages taught in a baraita: If the slain person was found precisely between two towns, Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them; and the Rabbis say: They bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is nearest.

诪讗讬 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讚讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜拽专讜讘讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 拽专讜讘讜转 诇讬讬转讬 转专转讬 讜讗讬 拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讚讗 诇讗 诇讬讬转讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讬讚讬 讗讚诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

What do the Rabbis hold in this regard? If the Rabbis hold that is possible for two matters that are in human hands to coincide precisely, and the singular kerova includes even multiple towns, kerovot, then they should bring two heifers. And if they hold that kerova indicates: But not kerovot, then they should not bring even one heifer. Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Rabbis hold: It is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, and this is true even with regard to matters that are in human hands? Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗转 讛讬驻讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 拽讗 住讘专 讛讛讜讗 讚讘专讬讗 谞驻拽 讘专讬砖讗

搂 The mishna teaches that in the case of a ewe that gave birth for the first time to two male offspring whose heads emerged as one, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon? He holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, and therefore it belongs to the priest.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讛谉 谞讜讟诇 讻讞讜砖讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讗 讗谞谉 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 转谞谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注讚 讚讗讻诇转 讻驻谞讬讬转讗 讘讘讘诇 转专讙讬诪谞讗 诪住讬驻讗

The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: According to Rabbi Akiva, the priest takes the leaner of the two. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said to Rabbi Yo岣nan: But didn鈥檛 we learn that they assess the value of the offspring between them, which indicates that the priest and owner divide their value? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: While you were eating dates in Babylonia, we in Eretz Yisrael explained it based on the latter clause in the mishna.

讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讻讬 讛讚讚讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诇驻诇讙讬 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪砖诪谞讬谉 砖讜诪谉 讬讛讗 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讻讛谉 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讜砖拽讬诇

As the latter clause teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb, and Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. And if it enters your mind that when Rabbi Akiva said that they assess the value between them he meant that they divide the value between them, then in the latter clause too, let them divide the value of the remaining offspring between them instead of leaving it with the owner. Rather, what does: They assess [meshammenin] the value between them, mean? It means that the additional fat [shumman] of the better twin will be the subject of dispute between them, as the owner says to the priest: Bring a proof that the better one is the firstborn, and take it.

讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘 讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讻讛谉 讘讗 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讻讜诇讬讛 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讗讬 诇讗 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讛讘 诇讬 诪转谞讜转 诪讬谞讬讛

搂 The mishna teaches: And the second lamb that remains in the possession of the owner must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it, and he is obligated to have the gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it; and Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving those gifts. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, whose opinion is the ruling cited first in the mishna? Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The owner is obligated since the priest comes upon him from two sides, i.e., by force of two complementary claims, as the priest says to him: If the second lamb is in fact the firstborn, it is mine in its entirety, and if it is not the firstborn, at least give me the priestly gifts from it.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 诪讟讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讻诪讗谉 讚诪讟讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讜讝讘谞讬讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 讘诪讜诪讬讛

And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, who deems the owner exempt from giving the priestly gifts from the second animal? Rava says: In this particular case, the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And therefore, even though the second lamb of the Israelite did not actually enter the priest鈥檚 possession, it is considered as though it entered the priest鈥檚 possession and he then sold it to the Israelite in its blemished state, in exchange for the lamb he received. The owner can then claim that perhaps it is the firstborn, and he already fulfilled his obligation of giving it to the priest.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘住驻拽 讘讻讜专 砖讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 砖讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转

Rabbi Elazar says: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal with uncertain firstborn status, the replacement for which is not in the possession of the priest, that it is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. In other words, in a case where the priest receives neither offspring, e.g., when a male and female are born together, all agree that the owner must give the gifts to the priest.

讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 诪讗谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻砖讬讟讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 驻讟专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 诇讗

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Elazar said that everyone concedes, to whom was he referring? Was he referring to Rabbi Yosei? That seems obvious. After all, Rabbi Yosei deemed the owner exempt from giving the gifts only there, where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, as the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. But if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, evidently Rabbi Yosei does not rule that one is exempt, as his reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is the statement of Rabbi Elazar necessary?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽住讘专 讚讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讜转 讗转讬 诇讬讛 诇讬讚讬 讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement is in fact necessary, lest you say that the reason Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts is that he holds that if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he will assume that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. Consequently, even though there is no replacement in the hands of the priest, the Sages ruled that one is exempt from giving the gifts, in order to ensure that he does not violate the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rabbi Elazar therefore teaches us that this is not the halakha, as Rabbi Yosei agrees that one is obligated to give the priestly gifts in such circumstances.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讛讻讬 讜讛转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专

The Gemara objects: And how can you say this? But doesn鈥檛 the latter clause of the mishna (18b) teach: As Rabbi Yosei says:

讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讗讬谉 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 诇讗

With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of the priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, yes, Rabbi Yosei rules that the owner is exempt from giving the gifts, but if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, he is not exempt.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讚讘专讬讜 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讜转 讗转讬 诇讬讛 诇讬讚讬 讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 诇讚讬讚讱 讗讜讚讬 诇讬 诪讬讛讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讜讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗

The Gemara explains that even so, Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion but stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, i.e., he said to him: In my opinion, the Israelite is exempt from giving the priestly gifts even if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, as, if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he might think that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. But even according to your reasoning, at least concede to me in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, that the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And Rabbi Meir said to Rabbi Yosei: No, I do not concede in that case. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar is teaching that Rabbi Yosei does, in fact, maintain that the reason for the Israelite鈥檚 exemption is that the replacement is in the possession of the priest.

讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘住驻拽 诪注砖专 砖驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 诪讗谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 驻砖讬讟讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽诪讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘住驻拽 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘讗 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讗讘诇 住驻拽 诪注砖专 诇讗

And Rav Pappa says with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain that its owner is exempt from the mitzva of the priestly gifts. The Gemara asks: When Rav Pappa says that everyone concedes, to whom is he referring? Is he referring to Rabbi Meir? That would seem obvious. After all, Rabbi Meir deemed one obligated to give the gifts only there, in the case of an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, since the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. But with regard to an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain Rabbi Meir does not rule that one is obligated, as that reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement necessary?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚诇讗 转砖转讻讞 转讜专转 诪转谞讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 住驻拽 诪注砖专 谞诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains that the statement of Rav Pappa is necessary lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir deems him obligated in the gifts is so that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten; if so, the same would apply even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us otherwise.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讛讻讬 讜讛拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara asks: And how can you say this? But doesn鈥檛 the latter clause teach: As Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, the basis for the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei is not whether an obligation is imposed so that the halakhic category of the priestly gifts should not be forgotten, but whether the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal, which means that an animal whose replacement is in the priest鈥檚 possession is not subject to the mitzva of the gifts.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 住驻拽 诪注砖专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚驻讟专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讛谉 讘讗 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains that Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement is necessary lest you say: Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to give the gifts even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain, in order that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten. And as for the fact that the mishna presents their disagreement with regard to replacement animals, this serves to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who deems one exempt from the mitzva of the gifts even in a case where the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that in fact Rabbi Meir exempts one from the mitzva of the priestly gifts in the case of an animal whose tithed status is uncertain.

诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗诪讗讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 谞讬讞讝讬 讗讬 砖诪谉 诪讬转 讚讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讜讛讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗讬 讻讞讜砖 诪讬转 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪讬转 讜讛讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讗诪专 [专讘讬] 讗诪讬 讞讝专 讘讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb. The Gemara asks: Why should they divide it? Let us see: According to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, as explained earlier, if the fatter and better of the two died it should be assumed that it was the one that belonged to the priest, and this one that is left belongs to the owner. And if the leaner of the two died, it should be assumed that the animal of the owner died, and this one that is left belongs to the priest. Rabbi Ami said: In fact, Rabbi Tarfon retracted his previous ruling that the priest takes the better of the two, and instead ruled that the priest and owner divide the value of the offspring in all cases. The mishna was not emended to reflect the updated ruling.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪砖诇 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case where two animals were born together and one of them died, Rabbi Akiva says: The living offspring remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Rabbi 岣yya stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says that the priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, and it is unclear to whom it belonged. In that case, the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between them. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is not in the possession of either the owner or the priest, and therefore it is divided between them.

讜诪砖诇 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

And Rabbi 岣yya also stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner, who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. In that case, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the remaining sheep is currently in the possession of the homeowner, the one who deposited the animal must prove that the living sheep belongs to him. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is in the possession of the owner, and therefore the burden of proof rests upon the priest.

讗诇讗 讘诪讗讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 驻诇讬讙 讘砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讜诪住转诇拽 讜专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 驻诇讬讙 讘讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽 讜讘讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva are addressing different circumstances, then with regard to what matter do they disagree? Does Rabbi Akiva disagree with the conclusion in the parable mentioned with regard to Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 opinion, of two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd, that the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws? And similarly, does Rabbi Tarfon disagree with the conclusion in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the homeowner keeps the remaining sheep? Certainly not. Rather, Rava says, and some say it was Rav Pappa who says: Everyone concedes in the case of two who deposited sheep with a shepherd that the shepherd places it between them and withdraws, and everyone concedes in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜专讜注讛 讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 住讘专 讗拽谞讜讬讬 拽讗 诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讘讞爪讬专讜 讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬转注讘讬讚 诪爪讜讛 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽

Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree only where the offspring were born in the courtyard of the homeowner, and the shepherd is a priest to whom the homeowner usually gives his firstborn animals. Rabbi Tarfon holds: The homeowner transfers to the priest a portion of his courtyard so that the priest should acquire the firstborn offspring located there, because it is suitable for him that the mitzva of giving the firstborn to a priest should be performed. Therefore, the priest is considered to hold partial jurisdiction of the courtyard. And consequently, this is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, where the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between themselves.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 驻住讬讚讗 诇讗 诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讚注诐 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since there is a loss to the owner in this case of uncertainty, he does not transfer anything to the priest. And as the courtyard belongs exclusively to the Israelite, this case is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. The halakha in that case is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

诪转谞讬壮 砖转讬 专讞讬诇讬讜 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讜讬诇讚讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 砖谞讬讛诐 诇讻讛谉 讝讻专 讜谞拽讘讛 讛讝讻专 诇讻讛谉 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讜谞拽讘讛 讗讞讚 诇讜 讜讗讞讚 诇讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讛讻讛谉 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗转 讛讬驻讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘

MISHNA: If one鈥檚 two ewes had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males, both of them are given to the priest, as each is its mother鈥檚 firstborn. If one gave birth to a male and the other to a female, the male is given to the priest, as it is its mother鈥檚 firstborn. If they gave birth to two males and a female, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them, and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point the owner may slaughter and eat it.

讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 砖转讬 谞拽讘讜转 讜讝讻专 讗讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讜砖转讬 谞拽讘讜转 讗讬谉 讻讗谉 诇讻讛谉 讻诇讜诐

And when the owner slaughters the animal, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as perhaps both ewes gave birth to females first.

讗讞转 讘讬讻专讛 讜讗讞转 诇讗 讘讬讻专讛 讜讬诇讚讛 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讗讞讚 诇讜 讜讗讞讚 诇讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讛讻讛谉 讘讜专专 讗转 讛讬驻讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘

If one of his ewes had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it.

讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 砖专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讝讻专 讜谞拽讘讛 讗讬谉 讻讗谉 诇讻讛谉 讻诇讜诐

And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt him from giving those gifts, as Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts. And Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. If one of the animals died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the one that had already given birth bore the male, and the one that had not given birth bore the female, in which case neither of the animals would have firstborn status.

讙诪壮 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 拽诪讬讬转讗 讘讛讛讬讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转专讬 诪讞讚讗

GEMARA: This mishna and the previous mishna (17a鈥揵) listed three cases in which Rabbi Akiva rules that the priest receives the leaner of two potentially firstborn offspring, whereas Rabbi Tarfon maintains that he receives the better of the two. The Gemara notes: It was necessary to teach each of these three cases, as, had the mishna taught only the first case, that of a single ewe that gave birth to two male offspring, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as the two offspring came from one womb, and there is no reason to assume that the better offspring was born first.

讗讘诇 专讞讬诇讬讜 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讚转专讬 诪讞讚讗 讜讞讚 诪讞讚讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚讛讱 讚讬诇讬讚讗 讞讚 砖讘讬讞 讟驻讬

But in the second case, that of his two ewes which had not previously given birth and which collectively gave birth to two males and a female, where two offspring came from one mother and one offspring came from one other mother, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as it can be claimed that the superior animal is this one that came from the mother that gave birth to a single offspring.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讗讘诇 讗讞转 讘讬讻专讛 讜讗讞转 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讛 讜讬诇讚讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

And had the mishna taught only that second case, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as both mothers had not previously given birth. But in a case where one had previously given birth and the other one had not previously given birth, and collectively they gave birth to two male offspring, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Bekhorot 18

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bekhorot 18

住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讚讗诪专 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讘讬讚讬 砖诪讬诐 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讘讬讚讬 讗讚诐

holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two matters that are in the hands of Heaven to coincide precisely, and all the more so matters that are in human hands. Consequently, one cannot cite Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 opinion in order to determine the opinion of the Rabbis.

谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 谞诪爪讗 诪讻讜讜谉 讘讬谉 砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 诇讗 讛讬讜 注讜专驻讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 砖转讬讛谉 诪讘讬讗讜转 砖转讬 注讙诇讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is subject to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: If the corpse of a slain person was found precisely between two towns, they would not break the heifer鈥檚 neck at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them. What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to this matter, in that the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely and Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely?

讜转讬住讘专讗 讗讬 拽住讘专 转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 讛讬讜 注讜专驻讬诐 讬讘讬讗讜 注讙诇讛 讗讞转 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讜讬转谞讜

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And how can you understand that to be the dispute? If the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, why does he claim that they would not break the heifer鈥檚 neck? Let them bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is actually nearest.

讗诇讗 诇讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜讛讻讗 讘拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 住讘专 拽专讜讘讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 拽专讜讘讜转

Rather, with regard to these tanna鈥檌m, everyone agrees that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely. And here they disagree over whether the singular form kerova in the phrase 鈥渢he town which is nearest [kerova]鈥 indicates that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not the many nearest [kerovot] towns; as the first tanna holds that it is derived from the term kerova that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not multiple kerovot; and Rabbi Eliezer holds that although the verse states kerova,鈥 nevertheless this includes even multiple towns that are kerovot.

诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 注诪专诐 转谞讗 谞诪爪讗 诪讻讜讜谉 讘讬谉 砖转讬 注讬讬专讜转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 砖转讬讛谉 诪讘讬讗讜转 砖转讬 注讙诇讜转 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬讘讬讗讜 注讙诇讛 讗讞转 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讜讬转谞讜

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about the Rabbis鈥 opinion with regard to whether matters in human hands can coincide precisely? Rav 岣yya bar Avin says that Rav Amram says: The Sages taught in a baraita: If the slain person was found precisely between two towns, Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them; and the Rabbis say: They bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is nearest.

诪讗讬 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讚讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜拽专讜讘讛 讜讗驻讬诇讜 拽专讜讘讜转 诇讬讬转讬 转专转讬 讜讗讬 拽专讜讘讛 讜诇讗 拽专讜讘讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讚讗 诇讗 诇讬讬转讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽住讘专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讬 讗驻砖专 诇爪诪爪诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘讬讚讬 讗讚诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

What do the Rabbis hold in this regard? If the Rabbis hold that is possible for two matters that are in human hands to coincide precisely, and the singular kerova includes even multiple towns, kerovot, then they should bring two heifers. And if they hold that kerova indicates: But not kerovot, then they should not bring even one heifer. Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Rabbis hold: It is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, and this is true even with regard to matters that are in human hands? Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗转 讛讬驻讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 拽讗 住讘专 讛讛讜讗 讚讘专讬讗 谞驻拽 讘专讬砖讗

搂 The mishna teaches that in the case of a ewe that gave birth for the first time to two male offspring whose heads emerged as one, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon? He holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, and therefore it belongs to the priest.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讛谉 谞讜讟诇 讻讞讜砖讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讗 讗谞谉 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 转谞谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 注讚 讚讗讻诇转 讻驻谞讬讬转讗 讘讘讘诇 转专讙讬诪谞讗 诪住讬驻讗

The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: According to Rabbi Akiva, the priest takes the leaner of the two. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said to Rabbi Yo岣nan: But didn鈥檛 we learn that they assess the value of the offspring between them, which indicates that the priest and owner divide their value? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: While you were eating dates in Babylonia, we in Eretz Yisrael explained it based on the latter clause in the mishna.

讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讻讬 讛讚讚讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诇驻诇讙讬 讙讘讬 讛讚讚讬 讗诇讗 诪讗讬 诪砖诪谞讬谉 砖讜诪谉 讬讛讗 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讻讛谉 讗讬讬转讬 专讗讬讛 讚讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讜砖拽讬诇

As the latter clause teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb, and Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. And if it enters your mind that when Rabbi Akiva said that they assess the value between them he meant that they divide the value between them, then in the latter clause too, let them divide the value of the remaining offspring between them instead of leaving it with the owner. Rather, what does: They assess [meshammenin] the value between them, mean? It means that the additional fat [shumman] of the better twin will be the subject of dispute between them, as the owner says to the priest: Bring a proof that the better one is the firstborn, and take it.

讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘 讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讻讛谉 讘讗 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讻讜诇讬讛 讚讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讗讬 诇讗 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗 讛讘 诇讬 诪转谞讜转 诪讬谞讬讛

搂 The mishna teaches: And the second lamb that remains in the possession of the owner must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it, and he is obligated to have the gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it; and Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving those gifts. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, whose opinion is the ruling cited first in the mishna? Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The owner is obligated since the priest comes upon him from two sides, i.e., by force of two complementary claims, as the priest says to him: If the second lamb is in fact the firstborn, it is mine in its entirety, and if it is not the firstborn, at least give me the priestly gifts from it.

讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 诪讟讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讻诪讗谉 讚诪讟讗 诇讬讚讬讛 讜讝讘谞讬讛 诇讬砖专讗诇 讘诪讜诪讬讛

And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, who deems the owner exempt from giving the priestly gifts from the second animal? Rava says: In this particular case, the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And therefore, even though the second lamb of the Israelite did not actually enter the priest鈥檚 possession, it is considered as though it entered the priest鈥檚 possession and he then sold it to the Israelite in its blemished state, in exchange for the lamb he received. The owner can then claim that perhaps it is the firstborn, and he already fulfilled his obligation of giving it to the priest.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘住驻拽 讘讻讜专 砖讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 砖讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转

Rabbi Elazar says: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal with uncertain firstborn status, the replacement for which is not in the possession of the priest, that it is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. In other words, in a case where the priest receives neither offspring, e.g., when a male and female are born together, all agree that the owner must give the gifts to the priest.

讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 诪讗谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻砖讬讟讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 驻讟专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 诇讗

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Elazar said that everyone concedes, to whom was he referring? Was he referring to Rabbi Yosei? That seems obvious. After all, Rabbi Yosei deemed the owner exempt from giving the gifts only there, where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, as the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. But if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, evidently Rabbi Yosei does not rule that one is exempt, as his reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is the statement of Rabbi Elazar necessary?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚拽住讘专 讚讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讜转 讗转讬 诇讬讛 诇讬讚讬 讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement is in fact necessary, lest you say that the reason Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts is that he holds that if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he will assume that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. Consequently, even though there is no replacement in the hands of the priest, the Sages ruled that one is exempt from giving the gifts, in order to ensure that he does not violate the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rabbi Elazar therefore teaches us that this is not the halakha, as Rabbi Yosei agrees that one is obligated to give the priestly gifts in such circumstances.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讛讻讬 讜讛转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专

The Gemara objects: And how can you say this? But doesn鈥檛 the latter clause of the mishna (18b) teach: As Rabbi Yosei says:

讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讗讬谉 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 诇讗

With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of the priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, yes, Rabbi Yosei rules that the owner is exempt from giving the gifts, but if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, he is not exempt.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讚讘专讬讜 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讗讬谉 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讜转 讗转讬 诇讬讛 诇讬讚讬 讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 诇讚讬讚讱 讗讜讚讬 诇讬 诪讬讛讗 讛讬讻讗 讚讞诇讬驻讬谉 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 讚注砖讜 砖讗讬谞讜 讝讜讻讛 讻讝讜讻讛 讜讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗

The Gemara explains that even so, Rabbi Elazar鈥檚 statement is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion but stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, i.e., he said to him: In my opinion, the Israelite is exempt from giving the priestly gifts even if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, as, if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he might think that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. But even according to your reasoning, at least concede to me in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, that the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And Rabbi Meir said to Rabbi Yosei: No, I do not concede in that case. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar is teaching that Rabbi Yosei does, in fact, maintain that the reason for the Israelite鈥檚 exemption is that the replacement is in the possession of the priest.

讜讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘住驻拽 诪注砖专 砖驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 诪讗谉 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 驻砖讬讟讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽诪讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讘住驻拽 讘讻讜专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘讗 注诇讬讜 讻讛谉 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 讗讘诇 住驻拽 诪注砖专 诇讗

And Rav Pappa says with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain that its owner is exempt from the mitzva of the priestly gifts. The Gemara asks: When Rav Pappa says that everyone concedes, to whom is he referring? Is he referring to Rabbi Meir? That would seem obvious. After all, Rabbi Meir deemed one obligated to give the gifts only there, in the case of an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, since the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. But with regard to an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain Rabbi Meir does not rule that one is obligated, as that reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement necessary?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚诇讗 转砖转讻讞 转讜专转 诪转谞讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 住驻拽 诪注砖专 谞诪讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains that the statement of Rav Pappa is necessary lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir deems him obligated in the gifts is so that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten; if so, the same would apply even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us otherwise.

讜诪讬 诪爪讬转 讗诪专转 讛讻讬 讜讛拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘

The Gemara asks: And how can you say this? But doesn鈥檛 the latter clause teach: As Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, the basis for the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei is not whether an obligation is imposed so that the halakhic category of the priestly gifts should not be forgotten, but whether the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal, which means that an animal whose replacement is in the priest鈥檚 possession is not subject to the mitzva of the gifts.

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 住驻拽 诪注砖专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 讚诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 诇讛讜讚讬注讱 讻讞讜 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚驻讟专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讬讻讗 讚讻讛谉 讘讗 注诇讬讜 诪砖谞讬 爪讚讚讬谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

The Gemara explains that Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement is necessary lest you say: Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to give the gifts even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain, in order that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten. And as for the fact that the mishna presents their disagreement with regard to replacement animals, this serves to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who deems one exempt from the mitzva of the gifts even in a case where the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that in fact Rabbi Meir exempts one from the mitzva of the priestly gifts in the case of an animal whose tithed status is uncertain.

诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讗诪讗讬 讬讞诇讜拽讜 谞讬讞讝讬 讗讬 砖诪谉 诪讬转 讚讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讜讛讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜讗讬 讻讞讜砖 诪讬转 讚讘注诇 讛讘讬转 诪讬转 讜讛讗讬 讚讗讬讻讗 讚讻讛谉 讛讜讗 讗诪专 [专讘讬] 讗诪讬 讞讝专 讘讜 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

搂 The mishna teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb. The Gemara asks: Why should they divide it? Let us see: According to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, as explained earlier, if the fatter and better of the two died it should be assumed that it was the one that belonged to the priest, and this one that is left belongs to the owner. And if the leaner of the two died, it should be assumed that the animal of the owner died, and this one that is left belongs to the priest. Rabbi Ami said: In fact, Rabbi Tarfon retracted his previous ruling that the priest takes the better of the two, and instead ruled that the priest and owner divide the value of the offspring in all cases. The mishna was not emended to reflect the updated ruling.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪砖诇 讚专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽

搂 The mishna teaches: In a case where two animals were born together and one of them died, Rabbi Akiva says: The living offspring remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Rabbi 岣yya stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says that the priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, and it is unclear to whom it belonged. In that case, the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between them. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is not in the possession of either the owner or the priest, and therefore it is divided between them.

讜诪砖诇 讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇诪讛 讛讚讘专 讚讜诪讛 诇讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

And Rabbi 岣yya also stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner, who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. In that case, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the remaining sheep is currently in the possession of the homeowner, the one who deposited the animal must prove that the living sheep belongs to him. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is in the possession of the owner, and therefore the burden of proof rests upon the priest.

讗诇讗 讘诪讗讬 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 驻诇讬讙 讘砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讜诪住转诇拽 讜专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 驻诇讬讙 讘讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 专讘讗 讜讗讬转讬诪讗 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛诐 讜诪住转诇拽 讜讘讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva are addressing different circumstances, then with regard to what matter do they disagree? Does Rabbi Akiva disagree with the conclusion in the parable mentioned with regard to Rabbi Tarfon鈥檚 opinion, of two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd, that the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws? And similarly, does Rabbi Tarfon disagree with the conclusion in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the homeowner keeps the remaining sheep? Certainly not. Rather, Rava says, and some say it was Rav Pappa who says: Everyone concedes in the case of two who deposited sheep with a shepherd that the shepherd places it between them and withdraws, and everyone concedes in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘讞爪专 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 讜专讜注讛 讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 住讘专 讗拽谞讜讬讬 拽讗 诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛 讘讞爪讬专讜 讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬转注讘讬讚 诪爪讜讛 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻砖谞讬诐 砖讛驻拽讬讚讜 讗爪诇 专讜注讛 砖诪谞讬讞 专讜注讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪住转诇拽

Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree only where the offspring were born in the courtyard of the homeowner, and the shepherd is a priest to whom the homeowner usually gives his firstborn animals. Rabbi Tarfon holds: The homeowner transfers to the priest a portion of his courtyard so that the priest should acquire the firstborn offspring located there, because it is suitable for him that the mitzva of giving the firstborn to a priest should be performed. Therefore, the priest is considered to hold partial jurisdiction of the courtyard. And consequently, this is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, where the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between themselves.

讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘专 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 驻住讬讚讗 诇讗 诪拽谞讬 诇讬讛 诪讬讚注诐 讜讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗讞讚 砖讛驻拽讬讚 讗爪诇 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 砖讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛

And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since there is a loss to the owner in this case of uncertainty, he does not transfer anything to the priest. And as the courtyard belongs exclusively to the Israelite, this case is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. The halakha in that case is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

诪转谞讬壮 砖转讬 专讞讬诇讬讜 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讜讬诇讚讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 砖谞讬讛诐 诇讻讛谉 讝讻专 讜谞拽讘讛 讛讝讻专 诇讻讛谉 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讜谞拽讘讛 讗讞讚 诇讜 讜讗讞讚 诇讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讛讻讛谉 讘讜专专 诇讜 讗转 讛讬驻讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘

MISHNA: If one鈥檚 two ewes had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males, both of them are given to the priest, as each is its mother鈥檚 firstborn. If one gave birth to a male and the other to a female, the male is given to the priest, as it is its mother鈥檚 firstborn. If they gave birth to two males and a female, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them, and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point the owner may slaughter and eat it.

讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 砖转讬 谞拽讘讜转 讜讝讻专 讗讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讜砖转讬 谞拽讘讜转 讗讬谉 讻讗谉 诇讻讛谉 讻诇讜诐

And when the owner slaughters the animal, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as perhaps both ewes gave birth to females first.

讗讞转 讘讬讻专讛 讜讗讞转 诇讗 讘讬讻专讛 讜讬诇讚讛 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讗讞讚 诇讜 讜讗讞讚 诇讻讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讛讻讛谉 讘讜专专 讗转 讛讬驻讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 诪砖诪谞讬谉 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜讛砖谞讬 讬专注讛 注讚 砖讬住转讗讘

If one of his ewes had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it.

讜讞讬讬讘 讘诪转谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 驻讜讟专 砖专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 砖讞诇讬驻讬讜 讘讬讚 讻讛谉 驻讟讜专 诪谉 讛诪转谞讜转 讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 诪转 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛诪讜爪讬讗 诪讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讛专讗讬讛 讝讻专 讜谞拽讘讛 讗讬谉 讻讗谉 诇讻讛谉 讻诇讜诐

And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt him from giving those gifts, as Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts. And Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. If one of the animals died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the one that had already given birth bore the male, and the one that had not given birth bore the female, in which case neither of the animals would have firstborn status.

讙诪壮 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 拽诪讬讬转讗 讘讛讛讬讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转专讬 诪讞讚讗

GEMARA: This mishna and the previous mishna (17a鈥揵) listed three cases in which Rabbi Akiva rules that the priest receives the leaner of two potentially firstborn offspring, whereas Rabbi Tarfon maintains that he receives the better of the two. The Gemara notes: It was necessary to teach each of these three cases, as, had the mishna taught only the first case, that of a single ewe that gave birth to two male offspring, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as the two offspring came from one womb, and there is no reason to assume that the better offspring was born first.

讗讘诇 专讞讬诇讬讜 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讚转专讬 诪讞讚讗 讜讞讚 诪讞讚讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讚讛讱 讚讬诇讬讚讗 讞讚 砖讘讬讞 讟驻讬

But in the second case, that of his two ewes which had not previously given birth and which collectively gave birth to two males and a female, where two offspring came from one mother and one offspring came from one other mother, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as it can be claimed that the superior animal is this one that came from the mother that gave birth to a single offspring.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪讜注讬谞谉 讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 讘讬讻专讜 讗讘诇 讗讞转 讘讬讻专讛 讜讗讞转 砖诇讗 讘讬讻专讛 讜讬诇讚讜 砖谞讬 讝讻专讬诐 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉

And had the mishna taught only that second case, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as both mothers had not previously given birth. But in a case where one had previously given birth and the other one had not previously given birth, and collectively they gave birth to two male offspring, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon

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