Bekhorot 18

סבר לה כרבי יוסי הגלילי דאמר אפשר לצמצם בידי שמים וכל שכן בידי אדם

holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two matters that are in the hands of Heaven to coincide precisely, and all the more so matters that are in human hands. Consequently, one cannot cite Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in order to determine the opinion of the Rabbis.

נימא כתנאי נמצא מכוון בין שתי עיירות לא היו עורפין רבי אליעזר אומר שתיהן מביאות שתי עגלות מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דתנא קמא סבר אי אפשר לצמצם ורבי אליעזר סבר אפשר לצמצם

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: If the corpse of a slain person was found precisely between two towns, they would not break the heifer’s neck at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them. What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to this matter, in that the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely and Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely?

ותיסברא אי קסבר תנא קמא אי אפשר לצמצם אמאי לא היו עורפים יביאו עגלה אחת בשותפות ויתנו

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And how can you understand that to be the dispute? If the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, why does he claim that they would not break the heifer’s neck? Let them bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is actually nearest.

אלא להני תנאי דכולי עלמא אפשר לצמצם והכא בקרובה ולא קרובות קמיפלגי דתנא קמא סבר קרובה ולא קרובות ורבי אליעזר סבר קרובה ואפילו קרובות

Rather, with regard to these tanna’im, everyone agrees that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely. And here they disagree over whether the singular form kerova in the phrase “the town which is nearest [kerova]” indicates that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not the many nearest [kerovot] towns; as the first tanna holds that it is derived from the term “kerova” that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not multiple kerovot; and Rabbi Eliezer holds that although the verse states “kerova,” nevertheless this includes even multiple towns that are kerovot.

מאי הוי עלה אמר רב חייא בר אבין אמר רב עמרם תנא נמצא מכוון בין שתי עיירות רבי אליעזר אומר שתיהן מביאות שתי עגלות וחכמים אומרים יביאו עגלה אחת בשותפות ויתנו

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about the Rabbis’ opinion with regard to whether matters in human hands can coincide precisely? Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rav Amram says: The Sages taught in a baraita: If the slain person was found precisely between two towns, Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them; and the Rabbis say: They bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is nearest.

מאי קסברי רבנן אי קסברי רבנן דאפשר לצמצם וקרובה ואפילו קרובות לייתי תרתי ואי קרובה ולא קרובות אפילו חדא לא לייתי אלא לאו שמע מינה קסברי רבנן אי אפשר לצמצם ואפילו בידי אדם שמע מינה

What do the Rabbis hold in this regard? If the Rabbis hold that is possible for two matters that are in human hands to coincide precisely, and the singular “kerova” includes even multiple towns, kerovot, then they should bring two heifers. And if they hold that “kerova” indicates: But not kerovot, then they should not bring even one heifer. Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Rabbis hold: It is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, and this is true even with regard to matters that are in human hands? Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

רבי טרפון אומר בורר לו את היפה מאי טעמא דרבי טרפון קא סבר ההוא דבריא נפק ברישא

§ The mishna teaches that in the case of a ewe that gave birth for the first time to two male offspring whose heads emerged as one, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon? He holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, and therefore it belongs to the priest.

רבי עקיבא אומר משמנין כו׳ אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן הכהן נוטל כחושה אמר ליה רבי חייא בר אבא לרבי יוחנן והא אנן משמנין ביניהן תנן אמר ליה עד דאכלת כפנייתא בבבל תרגימנא מסיפא

The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to Rabbi Akiva, the priest takes the leaner of the two. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But didn’t we learn that they assess the value of the offspring between them, which indicates that the priest and owner divide their value? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: While you were eating dates in Babylonia, we in Eretz Yisrael explained it based on the latter clause in the mishna.

דקתני סיפא מת אחד מהן רבי טרפון אומר יחלוקו רבי עקיבא אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה ואי סלקא דעתך משמנין ביניהן דכי הדדי פליגי הכי נמי לפלגי גבי הדדי אלא מאי משמנין שומן יהא ביניהן דאמר ליה לכהן אייתי ראיה דבכור הוא ושקיל

As the latter clause teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb, and Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. And if it enters your mind that when Rabbi Akiva said that they assess the value between them he meant that they divide the value between them, then in the latter clause too, let them divide the value of the remaining offspring between them instead of leaving it with the owner. Rather, what does: They assess [meshammenin] the value between them, mean? It means that the additional fat [shumman] of the better twin will be the subject of dispute between them, as the owner says to the priest: Bring a proof that the better one is the firstborn, and take it.

והשני ירעה עד שיסתאב וחייב במתנות ורבי יוסי פוטר מאי טעמא דרבי מאיר אמר רבי יוחנן הואיל וכהן בא עליו משני צדדין דאמר ליה אי בכור הוא כוליה דידי הוא אי לא בכור הוא הב לי מתנות מיניה

§ The mishna teaches: And the second lamb that remains in the possession of the owner must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it, and he is obligated to have the gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it; and Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving those gifts. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, whose opinion is the ruling cited first in the mishna? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The owner is obligated since the priest comes upon him from two sides, i.e., by force of two complementary claims, as the priest says to him: If the second lamb is in fact the firstborn, it is mine in its entirety, and if it is not the firstborn, at least give me the priestly gifts from it.

ורבי יוסי מאי טעמא אמר רבא עשו שאינו זוכה כזוכה ואף על גב דלא מטא לידיה כמאן דמטא לידיה וזבניה לישראל במומיה

And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, who deems the owner exempt from giving the priestly gifts from the second animal? Rava says: In this particular case, the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And therefore, even though the second lamb of the Israelite did not actually enter the priest’s possession, it is considered as though it entered the priest’s possession and he then sold it to the Israelite in its blemished state, in exchange for the lamb he received. The owner can then claim that perhaps it is the firstborn, and he already fulfilled his obligation of giving it to the priest.

אמר רבי אלעזר הכל מודים בספק בכור שאין חליפין ביד כהן שחייב במתנות

§ Rabbi Elazar says: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal with uncertain firstborn status, the replacement for which is not in the possession of the priest, that it is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. In other words, in a case where the priest receives neither offspring, e.g., when a male and female are born together, all agree that the owner must give the gifts to the priest.

הכל מודים מאן רבי יוסי פשיטא עד כאן לא קא פטר רבי יוסי התם אלא דחליפין ביד כהן דעשו שאינו זוכה כזוכה אבל אין חליפין ביד כהן לא

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Elazar said that everyone concedes, to whom was he referring? Was he referring to Rabbi Yosei? That seems obvious. After all, Rabbi Yosei deemed the owner exempt from giving the gifts only there, where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, as the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. But if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, evidently Rabbi Yosei does not rule that one is exempt, as his reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is the statement of Rabbi Elazar necessary?

מהו דתימא טעמא דרבי יוסי דקסבר דאי מחייבת ליה במתנות אתי ליה לידי גיזה ועבודה אף על גב דאין חליפין ביד כהן קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar’s statement is in fact necessary, lest you say that the reason Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts is that he holds that if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he will assume that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. Consequently, even though there is no replacement in the hands of the priest, the Sages ruled that one is exempt from giving the gifts, in order to ensure that he does not violate the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rabbi Elazar therefore teaches us that this is not the halakha, as Rabbi Yosei agrees that one is obligated to give the priestly gifts in such circumstances.

ומי מצית אמרת הכי והתני סיפא שהיה רבי יוסי אומר

The Gemara objects: And how can you say this? But doesn’t the latter clause of the mishna (18b) teach: As Rabbi Yosei says:

כל שחליפיו ביד כהן פטור מן המתנות ורבי מאיר מחייב חליפין ביד כהן אין אין חליפין ביד כהן לא

With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of the priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, yes, Rabbi Yosei rules that the owner is exempt from giving the gifts, but if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, he is not exempt.

מהו דתימא רבי יוסי לדבריו דרבי מאיר קאמר ליה לדידי אפילו אין חליפין ביד כהן דאי מחייבת ליה במתנות אתי ליה לידי גיזה ועבודה לדידך אודי לי מיהא היכא דחליפין ביד כהן דעשו שאינו זוכה כזוכה ואמר ליה רבי מאיר לא

The Gemara explains that even so, Rabbi Elazar’s statement is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion but stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, i.e., he said to him: In my opinion, the Israelite is exempt from giving the priestly gifts even if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, as, if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he might think that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. But even according to your reasoning, at least concede to me in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, that the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And Rabbi Meir said to Rabbi Yosei: No, I do not concede in that case. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar is teaching that Rabbi Yosei does, in fact, maintain that the reason for the Israelite’s exemption is that the replacement is in the possession of the priest.

ואמר רב פפא הכל מודים בספק מעשר שפטור מן המתנות הכל מודים מאן רבי מאיר פשיטא עד כאן לא קמחייב רבי מאיר התם אלא בספק בכור הואיל ובא עליו כהן משני צדדין אבל ספק מעשר לא

And Rav Pappa says with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain that its owner is exempt from the mitzva of the priestly gifts. The Gemara asks: When Rav Pappa says that everyone concedes, to whom is he referring? Is he referring to Rabbi Meir? That would seem obvious. After all, Rabbi Meir deemed one obligated to give the gifts only there, in the case of an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, since the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. But with regard to an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain Rabbi Meir does not rule that one is obligated, as that reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is Rav Pappa’s statement necessary?

מהו דתימא טעמא דרבי מאיר דלא תשתכח תורת מתנות אפילו ספק מעשר נמי קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains that the statement of Rav Pappa is necessary lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir deems him obligated in the gifts is so that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten; if so, the same would apply even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us otherwise.

ומי מצית אמרת הכי והקתני סיפא שהיה רבי יוסי אומר כל שחליפיו ביד כהן פטור מן המתנות ורבי מאיר מחייב

The Gemara asks: And how can you say this? But doesn’t the latter clause teach: As Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, the basis for the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei is not whether an obligation is imposed so that the halakhic category of the priestly gifts should not be forgotten, but whether the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal, which means that an animal whose replacement is in the priest’s possession is not subject to the mitzva of the gifts.

מהו דתימא רבי מאיר אפילו ספק מעשר מחייב והא דמיפלגי בחליפין להודיעך כחו דרבי יוסי דפטר אפילו היכא דכהן בא עליו משני צדדין קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains that Rav Pappa’s statement is necessary lest you say: Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to give the gifts even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain, in order that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten. And as for the fact that the mishna presents their disagreement with regard to replacement animals, this serves to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who deems one exempt from the mitzva of the gifts even in a case where the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that in fact Rabbi Meir exempts one from the mitzva of the priestly gifts in the case of an animal whose tithed status is uncertain.

מת אחד מהן רבי טרפון אומר יחלוקו אמאי יחלוקו ניחזי אי שמן מית דכהן הוא והאי דאיכא דבעל הבית ואי כחוש מית דבעל הבית מית והאי דאיכא דכהן הוא אמר [רבי] אמי חזר בו רבי טרפון

§ The mishna teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb. The Gemara asks: Why should they divide it? Let us see: According to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, as explained earlier, if the fatter and better of the two died it should be assumed that it was the one that belonged to the priest, and this one that is left belongs to the owner. And if the leaner of the two died, it should be assumed that the animal of the owner died, and this one that is left belongs to the priest. Rabbi Ami said: In fact, Rabbi Tarfon retracted his previous ruling that the priest takes the better of the two, and instead ruled that the priest and owner divide the value of the offspring in all cases. The mishna was not emended to reflect the updated ruling.

רבי עקיבא אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה אמר רבי חייא משל דרבי טרפון למה הדבר דומה לשנים שהפקידו אצל רועה שמניח רועה ביניהם ומסתלק

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where two animals were born together and one of them died, Rabbi Akiva says: The living offspring remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Rabbi Ḥiyya stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says that the priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, and it is unclear to whom it belonged. In that case, the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between them. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is not in the possession of either the owner or the priest, and therefore it is divided between them.

ומשל דרבי עקיבא למה הדבר דומה לאחד שהפקיד אצל בעל הבית שהמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

And Rabbi Ḥiyya also stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner, who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. In that case, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the remaining sheep is currently in the possession of the homeowner, the one who deposited the animal must prove that the living sheep belongs to him. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is in the possession of the owner, and therefore the burden of proof rests upon the priest.

אלא במאי פליגי רבי עקיבא פליג בשנים שהפקידו אצל רועה שמניח רועה ומסתלק ורבי טרפון פליג באחד שהפקיד אצל בעל הבית אמר רבא ואיתימא רב פפא הכל מודים בשנים שהפקידו אצל רועה שמניח רועה ביניהם ומסתלק ובאחד שהפקיד אצל בעל הבית שהמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva are addressing different circumstances, then with regard to what matter do they disagree? Does Rabbi Akiva disagree with the conclusion in the parable mentioned with regard to Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion, of two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd, that the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws? And similarly, does Rabbi Tarfon disagree with the conclusion in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the homeowner keeps the remaining sheep? Certainly not. Rather, Rava says, and some say it was Rav Pappa who says: Everyone concedes in the case of two who deposited sheep with a shepherd that the shepherd places it between them and withdraws, and everyone concedes in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

לא נחלקו אלא בחצר בעל הבית ורועה כהן רבי טרפון סבר אקנויי קא מקני ליה בחצירו וניחא ליה דליתעביד מצוה והוה ליה כשנים שהפקידו אצל רועה שמניח רועה ביניהן ומסתלק

Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree only where the offspring were born in the courtyard of the homeowner, and the shepherd is a priest to whom the homeowner usually gives his firstborn animals. Rabbi Tarfon holds: The homeowner transfers to the priest a portion of his courtyard so that the priest should acquire the firstborn offspring located there, because it is suitable for him that the mitzva of giving the firstborn to a priest should be performed. Therefore, the priest is considered to hold partial jurisdiction of the courtyard. And consequently, this is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, where the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between themselves.

ורבי עקיבא סבר כיון דאית ליה פסידא לא מקני ליה מידעם והוה ליה כאחד שהפקיד אצל בעל הבית שהמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since there is a loss to the owner in this case of uncertainty, he does not transfer anything to the priest. And as the courtyard belongs exclusively to the Israelite, this case is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. The halakha in that case is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

מתני׳ שתי רחיליו שלא ביכרו וילדו שני זכרים שניהם לכהן זכר ונקבה הזכר לכהן שני זכרים ונקבה אחד לו ואחד לכהן רבי טרפון אומר הכהן בורר לו את היפה רבי עקיבא אומר משמנין ביניהן והשני ירעה עד שיסתאב

MISHNA: If one’s two ewes had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males, both of them are given to the priest, as each is its mother’s firstborn. If one gave birth to a male and the other to a female, the male is given to the priest, as it is its mother’s firstborn. If they gave birth to two males and a female, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them, and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point the owner may slaughter and eat it.

וחייב במתנות רבי יוסי פוטר מת אחד מהן רבי טרפון אומר יחלוקו רבי עקיבא אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה שתי נקבות וזכר או שני זכרים ושתי נקבות אין כאן לכהן כלום

And when the owner slaughters the animal, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as perhaps both ewes gave birth to females first.

אחת ביכרה ואחת לא ביכרה וילדה שני זכרים אחד לו ואחד לכהן רבי טרפון אומר הכהן בורר את היפה רבי עקיבא אומר משמנין ביניהן והשני ירעה עד שיסתאב

If one of his ewes had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it.

וחייב במתנות רבי יוסי פוטר שרבי יוסי אומר כל שחליפיו ביד כהן פטור מן המתנות ורבי מאיר מחייב מת אחד מהן רבי טרפון אומר יחלוקו רבי עקיבא אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה זכר ונקבה אין כאן לכהן כלום

And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt him from giving those gifts, as Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts. And Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. If one of the animals died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the one that had already given birth bore the male, and the one that had not given birth bore the female, in which case neither of the animals would have firstborn status.

גמ׳ צריכא דאי אשמועינן קמייתא בההיא קאמר רבי עקיבא דתרי מחדא

GEMARA: This mishna and the previous mishna (17a–b) listed three cases in which Rabbi Akiva rules that the priest receives the leaner of two potentially firstborn offspring, whereas Rabbi Tarfon maintains that he receives the better of the two. The Gemara notes: It was necessary to teach each of these three cases, as, had the mishna taught only the first case, that of a single ewe that gave birth to two male offspring, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as the two offspring came from one womb, and there is no reason to assume that the better offspring was born first.

אבל רחיליו שלא ביכרו דתרי מחדא וחד מחדא אימא מודי ליה לרבי טרפון דהך דילידא חד שביח טפי

But in the second case, that of his two ewes which had not previously given birth and which collectively gave birth to two males and a female, where two offspring came from one mother and one offspring came from one other mother, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as it can be claimed that the superior animal is this one that came from the mother that gave birth to a single offspring.

ואי אשמועינן הא בהא קאמר רבי עקיבא דתרוייהו לא ביכרו אבל אחת ביכרה ואחת שלא ביכרה וילדו שני זכרים אימא מודי ליה לרבי טרפון

And had the mishna taught only that second case, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as both mothers had not previously given birth. But in a case where one had previously given birth and the other one had not previously given birth, and collectively they gave birth to two male offspring, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon